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Abstract 
The study examines the nature and context of the debate on state-society relations, focusing 
on the socio-economic and political reforms that have taken place in the governance of the 
public realm in the past three decades. It analyses the process and impact of the new 
governance reforms undertaken in Uganda since the early 1990s on the performance of state 
institutions. It focuses on the implementation of the programme of state reform through 
decentralisation; putting in perspective the ramifications of the claim that decentralisation 
brings about effective, efficient, participatory and citizen-focused service delivery in the 
management of public organisations, including urban authorities. Drawing from the peculiar 
failures of state institutions in post-colonial Uganda, the study critiques the theoretical and 
empirical premise of devolution by attempting to link the process of institutional recovery to 
experimentation with the “new governance models” as applied to the management of the 
urbanisation process. It interrogates the claim that decentralisation reforms bring about 
demand-driven service delivery, democratic discourse and greater organisational 
performance. Anchored in the premises of good governance theorem, the study questions 
the realities of decentralisation in engendering a new official behaviour, taming rigid 
bureaucratic practices, engineering a new service culture and espousing a dictum of state-
civil society engagement. These goals raise the key argument, that is, whether the quest for 
realisation of organisational change in the implementation of urban governance reforms in 
Uganda has been facilitated by the conscious readiness of the state to realise tangible public 
goods such as popular accountability, improved livelihoods of the ordinary people and the 
increased capacity of the state to build sustainable management systems. 
 
Furthermore, the study discusses and questions the capacity of decentralisation to adequately 
address the myriad of urban governance challenges that include explosion of the urban 
population, high poverty levels, scarcity of employment, poor service delivery, deterioration 
in urban infrastructure, low management capacities and a poor management culture, raising 
complex  political questions surrounding the decision making process that seem to have 
undercut the possibility of a new governance model to effectively take root. 
 
This study concludes that although decentralisation has improved relations between 
government officials and the ordinary people, there are still many challenges in the 
management of Kampala city. The challenges encountered in urban service delivery include 
the failure of state institutions to perfom their functions, lack of pro-poor policies, 
demotivated local government officials and prevalence of corruption.  The interventions of 
civil society in service delivery have helped the ordinary people to survive.  However, civil 
society organisations have their own limits and weaknesses.  The attempts by government to 
reform the public sector generally have yielded some positive attitudes but have also lacked 
commitment and resources to realise tangible benefits to the ordinary urban dweller. Finally, 
while decentralisation created strong hopes of better service delivery, tangible results in the 
case of Kampala city have been minimal. The study suggests that successful decentralisation 
requires a dynamic pro-people urban policy, increased avenues of popular participation; 
cultivation of trust, horizontal power relations and strong accountability mechanisms in the 
public domain. 
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Chapter 1 
 
Background to the study: Decentralisation and urban governance 
 
1.0 Background to the Study 
Decentralisation and urbanisatiion are global phenomena that have increasingly gained 
social, economic and political significance in the last five decades or so.  Much as 
decentralisation has been perceived as a process of reforming state structures, cutting down 
on bureaucratic inertia, opening up avenues for participation of civil society and creating an 
efficient system of service delivery, many critical observers still argue that decentralisation 
is not a panacea.1 Nevertheless, democratic decentralisation is irresistible amongst the local 
communities because it gives them the opportunity to gauge their leadership, decisions to 
take or not to take, resources to  use and bargaining with higher authorities on various issues 
of local concern2.  Moreover, most citizens are interested in how the government spends tax-
payers’ money. Therefore, decentralisation opens up possibilities of people questioning how 
public money is used or misused3 In Uganda local taxes include: property rates, ground 
rents, licencing fees, permit fees and fines, and until recently; personal graduated tax4.    
These opportunities for citizen-state engagement or dialogue could be lost in countries 
where democratic decentralisation is completely absent (Mawhood 1993). 
 
The argument pursued by this study, simply stated, is that whereas bureaucratic management 
dominated the social organisation of society for much of the last century5, it is also accused 
                                            
1 Oyugi Walter.(2000).”Decentralisation for Good Governance and Development:The Unending 
Debate” in Development Dialogue.Vol.21,No.1,Spring.See also Manor,J, (1999)The Political 
Economy of Democratic Decentralisation.The World Bank. 
2 Cameron Robert. (2002). “Central Local Financial Relations in South Africa: in Local Government 
Studies, Vol. 28, No.3.See also,Cameron Robert. (2003). “Politics-Administration Interface: The case 
of the city of Capetown” in International Review of Administrative Sciences, Vol. 69. 
3Davey,K.(1994).Taxing a Peasant Society: Graduated.Tax in East Africa. London: 
Knight.Also,Davey Kenneth, (1996).  “Central – Local Relations” in Davey K. et al, Urban 
Management:  The Challenge of Growth.  Aldershot:  Ashgate Publishers Ltd. 
4 See Local Government Act, Local Government Revenue Regulations.  
5 On ideal-type bureaucracy, see H. Gerth & C.W Mills, From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology  
London: Routledge & Kegan Paul (1948) 
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of “red-tape” where “bureaucrats are over-lords responsible for this inefficiency”6  Although 
it has for long been contended that it could hardly be imagined that large scale complex 
organisations could be managed without application of bureaucratic principles, it is also 
conceded that bureaucracy shelters incompetent and indifferent individuals, ineffective 
coordination of functions and dysfunctional roles, and yet, it represents a “concentration of 
potential power that it threatens existing values or even the existing system.7“  Moreover, 
bureaucracies may be potential strongholds of conservatism, partly because the policy 
makers of such organisations represent vested interests which they are reluctant to change.   
Geist and Fava contend that reform movements in almost every city have invariably been 
opposed by bureaucrats who ironically claim to work in the public interest. In centralized 
bureaucracies, all this is done in the guise of “protecting” the organization and its 
management system.8 
 
Worldwide, the shift in organizational management to the new governance model is laying 
emphasis on three critical areas.The first of these is the issue of globalisation that has 
created the so-called “global village,” where socio-economic activities are said to be inter-
connected.  Second is the issue of neo-liberal reforms championed by international financial 
institutions led by the World Bank, that have fundamentally altered the ways in which 
organizations in fund-recipient countries should operate, with emphasis being placed on 
prudent fiscal management, accompanied by accountability, formal public participation and 
transparency.  These tenets of “good governance” have generally been accepted in most 
countries as opening a space for “dialogue” between public officials and the other members 
of society.  The third aspect is democratic governance.  This has arisen because the end of 
the last century witnessed a wave of democratization in almost every corner of the world 
more specifically in the Third World. The wave of democratization significantly affected the 
ways central governments controlled power.  The locus of democracy has been at the local 
level where the ordinary man or woman resides.  Thus, a combination of these interlocking 
factors as well as the realities of the poor people, the fiscal crises afflicting many third world 
                                            
6 See Noel P. Gist & Sylivia F. Fava, Urban Society, New York: 5th Edition, Thomas Y. Cromwell 
Company (1964), p.340 
7 Ibid, p.340 
8 Geist and Fava (1964:340) 
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countries, the unstoppable population explosions in the third world cities have but made the 
governance of third world cities a critical issue that ne to be addressed.  The problem 
however, is not that Africa is over-urbanised. If anything, Africa is in comparative terms 
with other continents, under-urbanised.  
 
Urbanisation in the Third World has raised concern at international as well as in individual 
countries. The UN World Urban Population Report of 20039 reported that the urban 
population had reached 3 billion and was expected to reach 5 billion by 2030. It revealed 
that over the last 50 years, the world has witnessed a dramatic growth of its urban 
population.  The speed and the scale of this growth, especially concentrated in the less 
developed regions, continue to pose formidable challenges to individual countries as well as 
to the world community. It was further reported that monitoring these developments and 
creating sustainable urban environments remained crucial issues on the international 
development agenda. 
 
According to the report, the world’s rural population is anticipated to decline slightly from 
3.3 billion in 2003 to 3.2 billion in 2030.Forty-eight per cent of the world’s population lived 
in urban areas in 2003.  It was projected that the urban population would exceed the 50 per 
cent mark by 2007.This would mark the first time in history that the world urban residents 
would be more than rural residents. Given that trend, it was projected that the world urban 
population would rise to 61 per cent by 2030. 
 
The world’s urban population was estimated to grow at an average annual rate of 1.8 per 
cent, nearly double the rate expected for the total population of the world (almost 1 per cent 
per year).  At this rate of growth, the world’s urban population would double in just 38 
years. This rate would be the highest ever in human history.10 
 
It was noted with some concern that population growth would be particularly rapid in the 
urban areas of less developed regions, averaging 2.3 per cent per year during 2000-2030.  
                                            
9 Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA), Population Division. 2003.Highlights of the 
Final Report: World Urbanization Prospects, accessed at http://www.unpopulation.org 
10 Ibid 
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Almost all the growth of the world’s total population between 2000 and 2030 is expected to 
be absorbed by the urban areas of the less developed regions.  By 2017, the number of urban 
dwellers will equal the number of rural dwellers in the less developed regions. In contrast, 
the urban population of the more developed regions is expected to increase very slowly, 
from 0.9 billion in 2003 to 1 billion in 2030. The average annual growth rate of this 
population is expected to be 0.5 per cent between 2000 and 2030, compared to 1.5 per cent 
recorded during the previous half-century. 
 
The process of urbanization is already advanced in the more developed regions where 74 per 
cent of the population lived in 2003.  The proportion of the population living in urban areas 
is expected to increase to 82 per cent by 2030. The share of the population that is urban is 
lower in the less developed regions: 42 per cent in urban areas in 2003, and expected to rise 
to 57 per cent by 2030.  
 
The problematique associated with rapid urbanization and the governance of cities in Africa 
is to be understood within the context of the modernization paradigm- that is one that 
advocates for a social  transition from rural to urban livelihood This assumes that most of 
the educated and other young people searching for opportunities in the modern sector of the 
economy would have the impulse to move to towns. In this sense, there is an “urban pull”11 
that influences the social set up of rural people. Urban areas are perceived as potential places 
of “good life,” new ideas, industrial employment, better wages and education.12 
 
As a point of historical reference, the fact is that from the ancient times, cities in the world, 
including Africa, had been centres of civilization and innovation. The contention however, is 
that in Africa; urbanization is problematic due to the social ramifications that come with it-
the lack of industrial establishments, small pockets of formal employment, lack of services 
and poor management. The cities in Africa present distorted images of what really they are-
high rise buildings, highways, elegant official cars, and world connections. Such images 
                                            
11 Dukakis-Smith David. (1997). The Third World City. London: Routledge. City. London: Routledge. 
12 Ibid 
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create in the minds of rural opportunity seekers what has come to be known as “twilight 
effect13.” 
 
Dukakis Smith argues that we should not be asking why there is any population explosion in 
third world cities because the obvious answer is that the people are already worse off in the 
countryside, hence the escape root is the city.14 Similarly, Perlman counsels that it is a waste 
of effort for policy makers and scholars to concentrate on the negative side of urbanization; 
that instead, the focus should be on the creative energies of the people and their survival 
strategies. 
 
The problem is rather that in Africa, very rapid urbanization is taking place under fiscal 
strains, shortage of infrastructure and services, lack of jobs, and prevalence of questionable 
systems of management15. 
 
This study contends that although research on urbanization in Africa and elsewhere has been 
undertaken, little has focused on its linkage with good governance16. The study will examine 
and analyse the interplay between the “professed” objectives of decentralisation and its 
promise for better, effective and efficient service delivery. By examining the nexus between 
the role of the state vis - a - vis the role of non-state actors in governance, the study aims to 
unravel the actual changes in the urban system. 
 
                                            
13 Bradshaw Y.W. and Rita Noonan. (1997). “Urbanisation, Economic Growth, and Women’s Labour-
Force Participation: Theoretical and Emperical Reassenssment” in Gugler Joseph (ed) Cities  in the 
Developing World: Issues, Theory and Policy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
14 Perlman J.E. (1993).  “Mega Cities: Global Urbanisation and Innovation” in Shabbir Cheema (ed), 
Urban Management: Policies and Innovation in Developing Countries.  Honololu: United Nations 
University, p. 37. 
15 See Stren, R. (1994). Towards a Research Agenda for the 1990’s:  An Introduction” in Stren 
Richard (ed).  Urban Research in the Developing Countries, Vol. 2:  Africa.  Toronto:  Centre for 
Urban and Community Studies, Unviersi9ty of Toronto. 
16 The Contribution of Urban Development to Economic Growth and Povery Reduction in Sub-
Saharan Africa”.  By Christine Kessides – World Bank www.citiesalliance.org.  See also Bradshaw Y. 
W. and Noonam Rita (1997)”Urbanisation, Economic Growth and Woemn’s Labour Force 
participation in Joseph Gugler (ed.  Cities in the Developing world:  Issues, theory an dpolicy, Oxford 
University Press”. 
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1.1 A brief Historical Reflection  
At the time of gaining political independence from the British colonial masters in 1962, 
Uganda inherited a fairly decentralised governmental structure.  District as well as urban 
local governments had been granted powers over their local matters since 1952.  The 
promise of democratic governance both at local and national levels was evident in the 
immediate post colonial period. The first independence government of Uganda was elected 
on the basis of multi-party competition.  Similarly, local governments comprised largely 
elected councils.  In socio-economic terms the country had great promise.  The economy 
was fairly sound while social infrastructure was reasonably developed, compared to many 
other colonial states in Sub-Saharan Africa17.  Unfortunately, this promise of prosperity was 
not to be realized.  The post-colonial state in Uganda became not only authoritarian, it 
experienced episodes of anarchy, dictatorship, a collapsed economy and a failed state.  
These failures affected the performance of both the central state functions as well as the 
local governments.  The cumulative effect was the alienation of the citizenry from the 
government. 
 
Local governments in the post-colonial period in Uganda worked fairly well between 1962 
and 1966. The year 1966 was a turning point in Uganda’s political history.  The long-
standing conflict between the Kingdom of Buganda (in the central region) and the central 
government under Prime Minister Milton Obote, culminated into a violent attack on Lubiri, 
the seat of Sir Edward Mutesa, the King of Buganda, who doubled as the ceremonial head of 
State of Uganda. His forceful removal from power marked the beginning of political 
troubles in Uganda.  The new Constitution that was hastily drafted effectively outlawed the 
existence of traditional rulers. In 1967, the introduction of a republican Constitution and a 
new Local Administration Act, led to centralisation of powers hitherto enjoyed by local 
authorities.  All officials of local governments were to be appointed by the government.  
Local governments had to increasingly depend on the government for financing as it took 
control of most of the sources of revenue.  Local governments’ budgets had to be approved 
by the Minister of Local Government, as indeed, was the case with most decisions including 
byelaws made by local councils. Increasingly also, local councils were dominated by 
                                            
17 IBRD, (1962), The Economic Development of Uganda. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press. 
  
7
 
 
 
nominated councillors rather than the elected ones. Since there were no general elections 
between 1962 and 1980, there were also, no local elections.18 
 
The situation was made worse by Idi Amin’s military coup in 1971 in which Milton Obote, 
who had declared himself President since 1967 was overthrown.  Between 1971 and 1979 
when Idi Amin ruled, martial law replaced constitutional law.  Civil and human rights were 
abused with impunity.  Many Ugandans who worked for central as well local governments 
“disappeared” or were killed in the broad daylight on the orders of the military officers.  
Civil society went underground, as telling truth to the government was considered a crime.  
Moreover, civil avenues of engaging with government were limited as the Parliament and 
Local Councils had been abolished under Legal Notice No.1, of 1971. During Idi Amin’s 
time elected local governments were abolished throughout the country.  Military men or 
militia were posted to man local administration posts. From the parish to the district, most of 
the administrators had some military training. They ruled by decree. 
 
Amin’s tyrannical rule was ended by a combined force of Tanzanian Peoples Defence 
Forces (TPDF) and Ugandan exiles (Uganda National Liberation Front (UNLF) who routed 
him out of power in May 1979.  The post-Amin period however, was a short-lived 
celebration.19  The new UNLF government was characterized by instability, political greed, 
and faultering legitimacy that it failed to govern effectively.  In 1980, a multiparty general 
election was held.  This too, was unable to resolve the all-important question of installing a 
legitimate government as the electoral process was contested as fraudulent by the opposition 
parties.  Consequently, the government formed by the Uganda Peoples Congress (UPC), the 
party that claimed victory in the election was to face resistance from rebel forces of the 
National Resistance Army (NRA) (1981 – 85). Thus, while the UPC attempted to return 
some semblance of civil rule in contrast to Amin’s military dictatorship, the rebel 
insurgency in the central region of Buganda, made it impossible for the government to exert 
                                            
18 Nsibambi Apolo, The were no or even local elections between 1962 and December 1980 
19 Avigan & Honey (1981), War in Uganda: The Legacy of Idi Amin. Dar es Salaam: Tanzania 
Publishing House Ltd. 
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effective control over all parts of the country. During the reign of UPC under Obote II, most 
local government councillors were nominated. Most of these councillors happened to be the 
functionaries of the ruling party. In other words democratic local governance could hardly 
be realized through these councils. 
 
In January 1986, the NRA, the rebel army led by Yoweri Museveni captured Kampala, the 
seat of political power in Uganda.  The rebels formed a broad-based government with the 
National Resistance Movement (NRM) as the lead partner amongst the cooperating parties.  
The NRM’s vision for a country, long shattered by conflicts, economic malaise, social 
disorder, and political instability was contained in the Ten-Point Programme of NRM.  Point 
No. 1 in this document was restoration of democracy.  One of the key indicators of the 
NRM’s intentions to rekindle democracy was re-introduce local councils (Resistance 
Councils (RCs) at village, parish, sub-county, county and the district. These councils were 
popularly elected.  In launching the decentralisation process in 1992, the RCs were 
remarkably useful as a starting point in re-building institutions of local governance. 
 
The purpose of this brief background to Uganda’s socio-economic and political crisis is to 
highlight the case of failure of effective governance and its effect on the performance of 
national and local institutions.  Uganda’s decentralisation study could be a test-case of a 
country where on the one hand, crisis diminished prospects for institutional growth, and on 
the other hand, a deliberate policy framework could progressively assist a process of 
building such institutions.  But also, it is a case of cumulative legacy in institutional decline 
whose impact overbears on such efforts – for example, the persistence of patron-client 
politics, inefficient allocation and utilization of public resources, superficial participation, 
extended central control and a weak civil society.  Such factors have all, but combined to 
weaken the case for decentralisation and its promise of the anticipated strong state-civil 
society relations in decision making, and effective and efficient delivery of public services. 
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My decision to test-case the efficacy of decentralisation on Uganda’s urban administrative 
systems was based on several claims, rather prematurely; that it had succeeded in service 
delivery and popular participation in rural areas20. Although I was not motivated in the 
direction of a comparison of the rural and the urban, my primary intention was to establish 
the possibility of successful linkage, if all in the urban social process.  Given the challenging 
social and economic constraints that urban residents face in their daily lives, their social 
networks, and interactions with their local political system, I was interested in establishing 
what decentralisation could have done or not done to impact on the social life of an ordinary 
urban resident.  Knowing that the vast majority of Ugandans (about 80 percent) live in rural 
areas, my choice of a study of the impact of decentralisation on the urban sector was not 
intended to negate the social significance of the greater number of the national population, 
but rather, to focus on a sector that receives less critical analysis, and seems to be taken for 
granted in the public policy process.   Thus, my curiosity was further triggered right from 
the initial stages of thinking about this study that a coherent urban policy does not exist in 
Uganda. Moreover, I noticed that urban governance regulations were outdated.  As a result, 
policy pronouncements are adhoc and haphazard. Policy implementation appears bizarre and 
unsystematic, resources are not only insufficient but also wasted, public participation is 
superficial and democratic governance appears to be a myth.  
 
This study on decentralisation and urban governance, takes an overview of urbanisation in 
Uganda by focusing on Kampala City – the capital of Uganda. As Gombay has noted in the 
case of Kampala and other third world cities, the problem of urbanization is not simply an 
explosion of the urban population, nor is it an issue of lack of adequate finances to run them, 
lack of expertise and good managers;it is a problem of  people’s welfare, finding something 
to do for their livelihood,the environment they live in,the systems of entitlements and rights 
and the kind of services they can expect from the urban authorities21. 
 
 Uganda with a population of 24.7 million people (2002 Population Census), has 13.8% of 
its people living in urban areas.   40% of the urban population lives in Kampala.  The 
                                            
20 Nsibambi, A. (1998),  Decentralization and Civil Society in Uganda. See also, Steffensen (2006), 
21 Gombay Christie. (1994). “Eating Cities: Urban Management and Markets in Kampala”. Cities Vol. 
11 No. 2. 
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population of Kampala is 1.2 million, which indicates it is a large city.  Moreover its 
population triples every twenty years.  This large population makes Kampala not only 
Uganda’s largest urban area but also the largest district (in terms of population size). The 
rapid growth of Kampala city both in physical and demographic terms is explained by high 
fertility, natural increase, decline in mortality, internal and international migrations.Kampala 
is also a primate city and hub of economic,social, commercial,industrial and political 
activities that attract internal and international migrants.Generally,all the urban centres have 
experienced growth over the last thirty years due to increase of commercial activities and 
expansion of administrative units.More than official studies have revealed,the great 
expansion of Kampala may be attributed to informality, that is the large informal sector that 
has  allowed several small  businesss sector operators to erect businesses that enable them to 
survive and live in the city. 
 
In Kampala City as well as other urban areas in Uganda, service delivery systems have over 
the years, fallen far below normal expectations of most of the urban residents. Not only have 
planning functions faltered but financial, human and physical management of such resources 
is perceived as poor, ineffective and inefficient. Worse still, public officials are generally 
perceived as corrupt and incompetent. Thus, in the era of decentralisation, there has been a 
lot of anticipation that this state of affairs could change for the better.  Indeed, the extent to 
which far these have been successful has not been critically analysed. This study takes up 
that challenge. 
 
1.2 Rationale 
Commentators on decentralisation and urban service delivery have suggested that 
demographic growth of cities and their contribution to national economies show that cities 
work.22  It is further suggested that while service failures could be a result of resource 
constraints, there is evidence to the effect that most national governments already commit 
substantial resources to urban services. Dillinger further argues, that while decentralisation 
bring about changes in the structure of urban service delivery, it does not necessarily bring 
                                            
22 (Dillinger, 1994) Decentralization and its implications for service Delivery 
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improvements, and that this could partly be explained by the motivations for 
decentralisation, which “appear only tangentially related to administrative reforms.23“ 
 
On the specific case of Uganda, urban service delivery has deteriorated over the years 
(1970s and 1980s) due to a combination of institutional decay, collapse of management 
systems, fiscal crises and subsequent loss of confidence by the residents in their political and 
bureaucratic leadership. This situation as described by Philip Amis24 in a cautionary note, 
that in the Uganda context, especially the urban one; it would be “misleading to discuss 
institutions in terms of crisis when decay has been going on for at least twenty years.25“  
Amis found that urban service delivery was characterised by three trends: (i) most urban 
councils had inadequate resources to provide sufficient quantities as well as quality services 
(ii) the central government dominated service delivery in urban areas (by provision of key 
services such as water, electricity and trunk roads),26 and (iii) some services were provided 
by the communities themselves.  Since the time of his research, some innovations have been 
initiated in urban service delivery as well as in management systems, which need to be 
analysed. These innovations include: contracting out of certain services, outright sale of 
non-core assets, enhancement of revenue collection through tendering to the private 
collectors and partnerships with non-governmental organizations to provide services to 
communities. These new initiatives have engendered among other things, in most urban 
councils: reduction of non-core staff, computerized systems of accounts, introduction of 
results-oriented management styles, introduction of tender boards as well as a new planning 
culture that requires that local councils and non-governmental groups give inputs into local 
governments’ plans.  The objective is to increase people’s participation in service delivery 
and to improve direct responsibility, accountability  and responsiveness in the whole local 
government system. These initiatives took root after decentralisation was introduced as a 
                                            
23  William Dillinger, (1994) Decentralisation and its Implications for Service Delivery. p.8 
24 See Philip Amis (1998) Urban Management: Service Delivery undersrtress, p. 215 
25 Philip Amis (1998) “Urban Management: Service provision under stress” in Holger Hansen and 
Michael Twaddle (eds).  Changing Uganda, despite the paucity of published works on Uganda’s 
urban management and service delivery, Amis found that in Jinja municipal council, decentralisation 
was improving service delivery. 
26 Water in Uganda is provided in both urban and rural areas by government statutory bodies. Water 
is provided by The National Water and Sewerage Corporation. 
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modus operandi of local government but we have little knowledge of what effect they could 
have had on service delivery and the well being of ordinary urban citizens, hence the need 
for this study. 
 
This study attempts to take stock of the various manifestations of decentralisation and the 
effect they could have had on urban service delivery. There is need to know what changes if 
at all, have taken place and the implications of these changes. The specific aims of the study 
are basically three (i) to assess the effectiveness of service delivery by urban local 
governments, (ii) to assess the contributions of stakeholders (NGOs, community groups and 
private organisations) to the processes of urban service delivery and (iii) to determine 
whether or not, the new initiatives brought about by decentralisation have crafted a novel 
governance “concept” to the urban resident in Kampala. In the final analysis, the study aims 
to make a theoretical and empirical contribution to the better understanding of the link 
between decentralisation, state-society relations and “good governance”. 
 
In retrospect, the years of economic collapse and political strife that Uganda experienced in 
the 1970s and early 1980s negatively affected the management, resource base and service 
delivery capabilities of most urban areas including Kampala.  As a consequence, this 
historical socio-economic and political collapse of the country left most of the urban 
infrastructure in a sorry state: roads were in a state of disrepair, streets were dark, garbage 
littered the streets, law and order were not enforceable and social service sectors were 
neglected. This kind of situation prevailed under conditions of state-inspired-violence 
(especially under Idi Amin’s rule): when political organisations were banned, local 
authorities were not elected and local authorities’ managers (who were centrally appointed), 
were outrightly corrupt and incompetent. A combination of professional ineptitude and 
severe fiscal crises impacted negatively on the lives of most urban residents. Ironically, the 
urban populations continued to increase, exerting more pressure on the already inadequate 
facilities in the city and other urban areas. Due to people’s loss of confidence in the urban 
management systems - largely due to corruption and failure to deliver any meaningful 
services, the urban residents adopted two strategies: either to by-pass the formal channels or 
to provide their own services where the city authorities should have acted. 
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When the National Resistance Movement (NRM) came to power in 1986, the central 
government attempted to re-equip the key departments of urban authorities especially the 
department of Works to atleast reduce the garbage heaps and to clear pavements.  The 
strategy of centrally determined supply was seen to be unsatisfactory partly because the 
local state officials had for many years, got involved in a negative culture of corruption, 
neglect of work, and mismanagement coupled with lack of professional skills and work 
ethic. 
 
In 1992 when the Uganda government decided to implement a decentralisation strategy, it 
devolved most of the management functions to elected local councils, which were granted 
legal powers to determine their own priorities, collect their own revenues, draw strategic 
plans, spend according to the budget and evaluate their own performance.  The philosophy 
underlying decentralisation in Uganda is that the elected representatives will act as 
“watchdogs”, that is, perform oversight functions over the local managers, be trustees of the 
people in the provision of public goods and services, and ensure that timely, efficient and 
quality services are rendered to their constituents; to whom they are accountable. This 
philosophy is laden with contradictions.  Since representatives are elected on their promises 
of improving the conditions of their localities, the urban residents expect them to deliver 
quality services, yet the realities of fiscal constraints faced by the urban authorities may not 
permit adequate fulfillment of such promises. The gap between expectations and actual 
deliverables frustrates the voters. While, the decentralisation philosophy conceives local 
representatives as trustees of public interest, on the contrary, they are negatively perceived 
by the people as corrupt and colluding with local managers to perpetuate corruption and 
diversion of resources meant for service delivery. 
 
The Uganda government has put in place several measures to ensure accountable, effective, 
efficient and quality delivery of public services.  Such measures include: an autonomous 
tender board27 for each district or municipality, an accounts committee for each local 
government, and institutional scrutiny by the central government’s the Inspector General of 
                                            
27 These were recently (2005) replaced with Local Contracts Committees. 
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Government (IGG), the Office of the Auditor General (AG), as well as elaborate procedures 
to be followed in all local governments’ transactions (The Financial and Accounting 
Regulations, 1998). The question that remains is whether or not, these measures have 
engendered good governance practices at the local level. 
 
1.3 The problem of urban governance in Uganda: focus on Kampala 
Until 1980, Uganda was not considered a highly urbanised country. This situation has 
dramatically changed within a spell of two decades. The Population Secretariat28 has 
expressed the problem of urbanisation in Uganda, in terms of high fertility, fast growth of 
urban areas and high a rate of rural-urban migration. Between 1980 and 2000, the urban 
population in Uganda increased three times from 940,000 to 3.5 million or 14% of the 
population. With an estimated rate of population growth 6.4% in urban centres, it is 
estimated that by 2025, about 18.6 million people will be living in Uganda’s urban areas. 
This will be approximately half of Uganda’s population. This will have significant 
implications for service delivery. It will worsen the already serious problem of poor and 
inadequate housing conditions, inadequate water supply, poor waste disposal, very high 
urban unemployment, street children and the homeless. 
 
Kampala, the capital of Uganda and the seat of national leadership is experiencing the 
highest population pressures as well as the greatest failure to cope with the demand for 
social services. In 1980 the population of Kampala was 460,000 people, in 1991, it was 
774,000 and in 2002 it reached 1.2 million. It is estimated that by the year 2025, Kampala 
will have a population of 3.5 million people. With these indicators, the assumption that 
Uganda is not a highly urbanised country is false. Unfortunately, the policy makers seem to 
have continued to live with this false assumption, considering that the development plans of 
Uganda do not strike a balance between rural and urban development; clearly tending to 
favour rural development. 
 
Two critical issues make urbanisation in Uganda problematic. The first is that since 1960 
when the World Bank mission assessed the development needs and priorities of the country 
                                            
28 Population Secretariat (2001) 
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(IBRD, 1962), only 4% of the population lived or worked in urban areas, today this has 
raised to 13.9% of the population. Secondly, due to economic and political malaise that 
befell the country in 1970’s and 1980s, the productive sectors of the urban economy 
collapsed terribly, yet the urban population continued to grow. Concurrently, the collapse of 
state and economic capacities did not spare the infrastructure, service institutions, 
administrative capacities and personnel. Besides, the collapse of socio-economic and 
administrative capacities led to “informalism” in most urban systems.  Since urban planners 
neglected their planning function, unauthorised structures sprung up in all corners of the 
urban centres.  Since the administrators failed to keep law and order, several informal (or 
illegal) groups took over control of the urban areas. Moreover, as services such as water or 
health could no longer be provided, individuals, households and groups organised to 
improvise their own service delivery mechanisms. The officials resisted these “self-help” 
groups. However since official alternatives were limited, the official response was more 
often than not, one where corruption was perpetuated. 
 
The Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development (2000) report based on 
participatory poverty assessment found that Kampala residents associated KCC with poor 
planning, bribery and corruption, poor sanitation and high taxation rates. In that report, the 
aspect of poor sanitation is reported as appalling, for example: only 9% of Kampala’s 
population is served by a central sewer system, 12% by private pit latrines, 72% share pit 
latrines and 2% have no any form of sanitation. This is, but one of the aspects where the 
KCC has not done much to improve the conditions of living of its urban dwellers. The KCC 
itself does not deny its problems. In its own assessment (KCC, 2001, Local Government 
Budget Framework Paper for Financial Year 2001/2002 admits that the sewer network 
mainly caters for the civic centre and its utilisation capacity is estimated at only 50 percent. 
The KCC report is very candid in its assessment of the problems facing the city. In 
particular, the issue of poverty is highlighted as the main problem, (KCC, 2001)29 report 
asserts: 
the urban poor in Kampala are much more disadvantaged (than the rich) 
because they live in very poor and shanty housing conditions and lack 
access to supportive social network. Most of the population (54%) lives in 
                                            
29 KCC, (2001) Local Government Budget Framework Paper for Financial Year 2001/2002 p.2 
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one-roomed houses (muzigos). Poverty is one of the underlying causes of 
low functional accessibility to health services since most people cannot 
afford service costs. 
 
 
Other problems highlighted in the KCC report include an inadequate resource envelope, 
influx of people to the city during the day, inadequate central government support to city 
feeder roads, poor drainage and sanitation, inadequate classrooms, unvalued properties in 
the city, a large workforce resulting in a large wage bill, adverse effects of government 
policy on local revenue; and lack of funding for restructuring programmes. 
 
While KCC is realistic in the assessment of its problems, one important thing to observe is 
that it tends to “externalize” them. The list of problems cited above does not reveal the 
internal management problems of KCC.  KCC in the same report shows proudly, how 
revenue collection has improved over the years. It also shows how government has 
significantly increased grants to KCC.  However, there is a general impression amongst the 
people that KCC is corrupt which contributes to its failure to deliver better services 
(Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development 2000). It must be conceded that 
the KCC as an organisation seems to be alerting itself to its management problems. 
According to its budget framework (KCC, 2001) KCC has progressively realised that it 
cannot continue the way it has been described above. It has embraced privatisation of 
markets and revenue collection, initiated property valuation as well as restructuring of its 
own organisation. Despite these moves, it is not yet clear what strategies are in place to 
improve service or to strengthen civil society and private sector partnership in the 
governance of the city. The Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development 2000 
ibid),   reported that Community Based Organisations (CBOs) , and NGOs were finding it 
convenient to by-pass KCC bureaucracy, and to work with local communities; and that 
wherever KCC worked with CBOs and NGOs it was simply in search of their funds.  
 
1.4 The Structure and Responsibilities of Urban Local Governments in Uganda 
The decentralisation policy in Uganda presents a new phenomenon in the renewal of efforts 
by the government to restructure and reconstruct state and society relations at the local level.  
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It is designed to shift some powers, hitherto controlled by the centre to the lower local 
governments.  It hinges on the premise of correcting the historical distortions that denied the 
ordinary citizen a role in public affairs.  The decentralisation policy is anchored on 
encouraging popular participation in the production and provision of public services, 
effective and efficient delivery of services by government, making public officials more 
responsive and responsible for their official activities; the effect of which is the desire by 
government to promote accountability, good governance and democratic practices both in 
government and society. 
 
The framework in which the above goals are pursued has been provided for in the 
Constitution 1995 and the Local Government Act 199730.  In the preamble to the 
Constitution, the National Objectives and Directive Principles of State Policy, the 
democratic principles are stated as follows; 
The state shall be based on democratic principles, which empower and encourage the active 
participation of all citizens at all levels in their own governance. 
(i) All the people of Uganda shall have access to leadership positions at all levels, 
subject to the Constitution. 
(ii) The state shall be guided by the principle of decentralisation and devolution of 
governmental functions and powers to the people at appropriate levels where they 
can best manage and direct their own affairs. 
(iii) The composition of Government shall be broadly representative of national character 
and social diversity of the country. 
(iv) All political and civic associations aspiring to manage and direct public affairs shall 
conform to democratic principles in their internal organisation and practice. 
(v) Civic organisation shall retain their autonomy and pursuit of their declared 
objectives. 
In addition to the above declared broad objectives of state policy which emphasize 
decentralisation as the modus operandi of managing public affairs, chapter eleven of the 
Constitution on local governments gives further basis of intergovernmental relations.  It 
specifies the functions and powers of local governments as well as the parameters of citizen 
                                            
30  These laws repeal the Urban Authorities Act 1964 and the Local Administrations Act, 1967 
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participation in public affairs.  The Local Governments Act 1997 furnishes the details of 
how these goals are to be attained in practice.31 
 
In terms of legal, political and administrative set up, the implementation of the 
decentralisation policy aims to constitute a reform of the local government system.  
However, it remains to be seen if it has transformed state-society relations in terms of 
addressing people’s concerns, such as effective delivery of services, value-for-money (as 
result of paying taxes), being consulted by public officials (both elected and bureaucratic), 
involvement in determination of the priorities of their locality and encouraging meaningful 
participation of the people in government programmes. 
 
It is necessary to understand whether or not elected representatives have been able to cause 
local government officials to be more responsive, action-oriented, accountable and more 
inclined to initiation of “pro-people” programmes.  For this to happen, local governments 
should have control over sizeable amount of resources to parcel out, well trained and 
experienced personnel, and should have management systems inclined to efficiency, 
accountability and transparency.  On the other hand, if societal organisations (non-state 
actors) are weak, they may not effectively engage local officials to secure meaningful 
responses to their needs and aspirations.  These organisations may also suffer from internal 
weaknesses such as intra-organisational conflicts, inadequacy of programmes, resource 
constraints, problems of managerial competence and insufficiency of information. Owing to 
Uganda’s checkered political history, the system of local government and societal (people’s) 
organization are not only nascent; they are also inexperienced and experimenting with the 
newly granted space of engagement with each other. We are interested in the outcomes this 
engagement. 
 
The Constitution and the Local Government Act provide for both district (rural) and urban 
local governments.32 Section 5 of the Act designates a City Local Government as an 
                                            
31 Section 2 of the Local Government Act 1997 
32 Section 4(2) of the Local Government Act provides for Rural Local governments as the district 
council and the sub-county council.  Section 4 (3) provides for local governments in the city as the 
City Council and the Division Council.  Section 4(4) provides for Local Governments in Municipality 
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equivalent to a District Local Government. Section 6 of the Act designates a Municipality or 
a Town Council as a Lower Local Government of the District in which it is situated.  
Notwithstanding this provision, Section 80 of the Act provides that urban local governments 
have autonomy over their financial and planning matters in relation to the district local 
councils. However it requires that their plans be incorporated in the plans of the district.  In 
other words, the urban local governments have independent legal existence apart from the 
district. They have their own elected councils, which perform legislative, administrative and 
planning functions.  These functions are detailed in the Act33. Urban local governments like 
their district counterparts receive grants from the central government and collect their own 
revenue, which they spend according to their own priorities. They are therefore, expected to 
provide services to their constituents. 
 
1.5 The key objective of the study 
The key objective of this study is to assess the effects of decentralisation (devolution of 
powers and responsibilities) on urban local governments, focusing on Kampala City Council 
in order to ascertain whether the objectives of good governance (better service delivery, 
accountability, more efficient and effective management and consultative and participatory 
decision making) have been achieved in KCC. The ultimate goal of the study is to suggest 
ways in which urban governance can be improved for the betterment of management 
systems and the synergy between stakeholders and the managers of KCC. 
The justification for studying urban local governments in the era of decentralisation was 
prompted by a number of factors:  First, in the original designs of Uganda’s decentralisation 
policy, urban areas were generally subsumed to be part of rural districts34.  Secondly, there 
is a tendency on the part of policy makers in Uganda to perceive urban areas, as “enclaves” 
of privileged elites, yet there is evidence to suggest that the majority of the people in the 
urban areas are affected by poverty and social deprivation as their counterparts in rural 
areas.  Thirdly, as the decentralisation process unfolded in the 1990s, the urban authorities 
were assigned extensive responsibilities without adequate resources to meaningfully execute 
                                                                                                                                      
as the Municipal Councils and Division Councils.  Section 4(5) the Local Government in Town 
Council. 
33 Local Government Act, Schedule 2 parts 3 and 4. 
34 See for example, the Local Government Commission Inquiry Report (1987) where urban 
authorities were assumed as part of District Resistance Councils. 
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them. Fourthly, it may be assumed that the urban population could be more forceful in 
articulating their demands on their local governments.  It may be assumed that the urban 
population has the advantage of easier access to information through newspapers, radio and 
other mass media. In addition, most non-governmental organisations (NGOs), business 
associations, trade unions and other civic groups have their headquarters in urban areas.  It 
may also be assumed that the existence of these media and associations encourages people’s 
engagement with local authorities, which in turn may make the latter more responsive, 
accountable and effective in provision of public services.  Fifthly, I was challenged in the 
initial stages of thinking about the relationship between decentralisation and its effects on 
management of urban authorities, that urban local governments could possibly be less 
effective than even the district ones. Officials of urban authorities were accused by the urban 
dwellers for allegedly being corrupt, inefficient, arrogant, unresponsive and uncooperative. 
Given that decentralisation had introduced competitive elections for representatives at 
various levels of local governments, one would have expected a new mechanism of 
“checks” whereby elected officials act as “watchdogs” on the behaviours of local 
government officials, since they now act as supervisors to the latter.35 It could further be 
assumed that the elected representatives would be very keen on their representative function 
because that would be the basis on which they would seek re-election. Besides, it would be 
assumed that the quality of urban-based councilors would be much better than the rural 
based ones, since they are comparatively better educated, informed and possibly materially 
better-off to pursue the role of representation largely in public spirit.36  Finally, in preparing 
this study, I was prompted by a general awareness of the still quite limited range of studies 
that address recent developments in African local government ion any detail37, A detailed 
study of Kampala’s situation may help to enrich comparative analysis of modern African 
city affairs.  
                                            
35 The Local Government Act 1997, Sections 68 and 69 – all officials working for a local government 
are hired, supervised and fired by the council of that Local government. 
36 Although no research has been done in Uganda on this aspect, elsewhere in East Africa Roger 
Southall and Geoffrey Wood (1996), “Local Government and the return to Multipartyism in Kenya” 
African Affairs Vol. 5, No 381 p. 523 found that local elites tended to pursue their own interests rather 
than the claim to serve the people. 
37 Only recently has intellectual interest in urbanization in Africa began to flourish, for example Stren 
1994, Swilling 1997, Halifani 1997, Robinson and White 1994, Even then, there is dearth of literature 
on this subject on the particular case of Uganda. 
  
21
 
 
 
 
The colonial government controlled the migration of African populations to urban areas, the 
end of colonialism saw rapid migration to urban areas. Over the last thirty years, Uganda 
experienced an explosion of urban population, for example, between 1980 and 2006, the 
urban population increased three-fold. A recent population report38 outlines the main causes 
of urban population. Population dynamics manifested in urban population growth and 
internal migration (especially rural to urban). 
 
The key factors behind this population dynamic are varied but the main ones include: rural 
poverty, political instability, landlessness, and natural population growth. Persistent rural 
poverty has caused people to migrate to urban areas with the hope of improving their 
livelihood. Political insecurity is another factor that has led to the increased urbanization rate 
in the Northern region. Insecurity has displaced a number of people, resulting into a large 
influx of the population relocating to urban areas for protection. This causal factor explains 
why Gulu and Lira Municipalities are among the largest urban areas in Uganda today. 
 
Other factors such as land have contributed significantly to the urbanization process in 
Uganda.  First many rural areas have suffered fragmentation of land, leaving too small 
pieces for commercial farming. Secondly in the most of the central region (Buganda), the 
land tenure system favours landlords at the expense of tenants. As a result many of the 
landless tenants end up in urban areas. This has also complicated the urban land usage 
especially in Kampala where urban planning has been undermined. This comes about 
because the urban authorities do not own the land therefore cannot effectively plan for its 
usage. 
 
In recent years, Uganda has experienced some economic growth and political stability. 
These have contributed to the expansion of existing urban centres, especially Kampala. 
There has also been rapid growth of hundreds of small trading centres in the country side, 
particularly along highways and major road junctions. Economic liberalisation policies 
                                            
38 Uganda Republic of, (2007). State of Uganda Population Report 2007: Planned Urbanization for 
Uganda’s Growing Population. Kampala: UNFPA.  
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which have been pursued by the government of Uganda have generally encouraged 
economic activities around urban areas. While in the 1960s the government pursued 
deliberate policy of regional distribution of industries, the liberalization policies have 
concentrated most of such activities around the main urban centres especially around 
Kampala.  These factors have had the effect of pulling the population to urban areas. The 
population explosion in urban areas has posed a challenge to policy makers and 
implementers. 
 
Decentralisation has been implemented in Uganda since 1992, but no comprehensive study 
has focused on its affects on the performance of urban authorities.  This study intends to 
establish whether or not; decentralisation has made the urban local authorities more 
responsive, effective and accountable in meeting the demands and aspirations of their 
constituents.  Besides, little is known about how the organised realm of public sphere (the 
community-based organisation, NGOs and professional groups) has been engaged with 
urban authorities in articulating the demands of their members either through elected 
representatives or directly with the urban authorities, or even making contributions towards 
better service delivery in the urban areas. 
 
Essentially a synergy between the urban authorities and civil society associations is 
important because it is assumed it translates the claims of decentralisation -”empowerment”, 
“participation” and “ownership” of programmes into reality.  It is assumed it gives non-
formal actors a role in planning, implementation and sustenance of local projects or 
programmes.  This study aims to understand how the organised public realm of society has 
interfaced with urban authorities in service delivery to the urban population. 
 
1.6 Kampala City: A Case Study 
In Uganda, there are thirteen municipalities and over sixty towns.  There is however only 
one city - Kampala. It is the largest urban area in Uganda with a population of 1, 208, 54 
(2002-population census). My choice of Kampala as a case study was motivated by a 
number of factors: First, in comparison with other urban areas, it has had tremendous growth 
in population size, for example, the population was 458,503 (in 1980), 774 024 (1991) and 
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1,208,544 (in 2002) which indicates that in a spell of twenty two years, it has almost trebled.  
This is particularly important because the next biggest urban areas are Gulu Municipality 
(113,144), Lira Municipality (89, 871), and Jinja (86, 520).39 Secondly, Kampala is an 
important case study because it is the biggest commercial and industrial centre in Uganda. It 
is also Uganda’s capital city. Most international and national organisations, including NGOs 
have their headquarters there. The two main public universities: Makerere and Kyambogo 
are located there. Given that Kampala’s population is ever increasing, there is a constant 
strain on the services that the Kampala City Council (KCC) can afford to offer. This is 
compounded among other things, by inadequate grants from the central government, 
insufficient local revenues, inadequate managerial competencies of KCC staff, managerial 
systems (information technologies, accounting and budgeting systems and equipment), poor 
motivation of staff (salaries and compensation packages) and the large range of services to 
be offered.  These factors exist within the context where decentralisation has increased 
people’s expectations for better services, the elected local political leaders are expected to 
account to their constituents by delivering on their election manifestos and the central 
government is demanding that value-for-money be seen in terms of services delivered by 
KCC. Popular expectations arise within a perspective, which perceives the local bureaucratic 
managers and the politicians as serving their own interests instead of public interest. The 
city managers are perceived as corrupt, incompetent, unprofessional, arrogant, unresponsive, 
wasteful and unaccountable.  While the basic premise of decentralisation is to create 
organisational incentives in terms of better service delivery so that the constituents may be 
more willing to pay taxes and to cooperate in planning and implementation of service 
delivery, the KCC still faces difficulties of getting this voluntary will from its constituents, 
for example, tax revenues continue to fall below budgeted targets. 
 
Due to the above factors, the situation in Kampala City still leaves a lot to be desired. 
Historically, the political and economic problems that the country suffered in the 1970s and 
1980s led to the collapse of the city’s infrastructure and other capabilities. Secondly, the 
increased population in the city still utilizes the infrastructure that was laid mostly in the 
                                            
39 Gulu Municipality ranks second in urban population largely because of insurgency which has 
pushed large numbers of people from the villages to the urban area.  
 
  
24
 
 
 
1960s for a smaller population at that time.  The situation in Kampala City epitomises the 
urban crisis in Africa (White and Stren 1989) in the sense of ineffective local 
responsiveness, political participation, service delivery mechanisms, local democracy and 
resource mobilisation and utilisation.  The unusual extent in a wider African setting to which 
Ugandan national authorities had promoted decentralization make Kampala a very useful 
study case for exploring the viability of decentralization as a strategy for reforming 
governance. 
 
I developed interest in studying the link between decentralisation and urban governance 
after observing that the design and the general implementation in Uganda was clearly 
focused on rural areas.  Yet, on a critical observation, the urban areas and their population 
had been equally devastated by institutional decline over the years of political and economic 
malaise that afflicted the country in the 1970s through the 1980s. In particular, the economic 
down-turn had hit the urban population in the formal employment really hard: as salaries 
became worthless, goods and services became scarce even for those with some money, 
resorting to black-market supply locally termed as “Magendo”. Theoretically, therefore, the 
ideas that relate to institutional reforms such as efficient government, market driven prices, 
private – public partnerships, public participation in provision, accountable, effective and 
transparent; collectively termed as governance norms and practices appeared not to be in 
place as the government of Uganda embarked on the road to decentralisation. It appeared 
like the NRM government had introduced the new policy for populist purposes, to establish 
itself and to convince the rural dwellers of its intentions to do something about the sorry 
state of community services.  The populist rural focus of the government appeared to 
relegate the importance of the urban areas in the policy of decentralisation. In the initial 
policy papers on decentralisation, the government had not emphasized problems of urban 
areas. 
 
Little attention given to urban areas in policy terms, had failed to recognize the facts on the 
ground, for instance, a rapid rate of population growth, declining service delivery, a weak 
urban economy and weak local government system.  Though these factors adversely affected 
the poor, the so-called middle class was not spared.  Particularly important, was the issue of 
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weak governance structures.  Not only had institutions of local governance collapsed over 
the years, the notions of good governance as envisaged in the decentralized system was 
critically absent.  Laws governing urban areas were absolete.40  
 
The planning function of the urban areas appeared to have ceased to exist.  The process of 
an individual developer getting building plans approved was not only tedious, costly but also 
corrupt. Every developer seemed to understand that the only way of getting plans approved 
was by releasing some kind of ‘incentive” to the officials in the Planning Department of the 
urban authority.  Officials on their part complained of lack of tools, including lack of maps 
for planning purposes. For several years, Kampala City did not have a Master Plan. A World 
Bank funding under its Uganda First Urban Project made it possible for a Master Plan to be 
made in 1994. However, this plan has not been implemented because of technical problems 
such as the need for compensating the developers, who already have erected structures on 
the land meant for other various purposes. Lack of effective planning has complicated 
matters for most urban areas. Urban residents have taken development into their own hands 
– they construct buildings at any place without approval of the urban authority. Besides, the 
urban dwellers are aware that the building inspectors have abandoned their assignment, and 
whenever they come, they are easily bribed.  
 
The other complication arises from unclear national land policy. There is dominance of 
mailo (free-hold) land tenure or private landholding. The constitution proclaims that land 
“belongs to the people” has made urban planning rather tenuous.  Individuals, who hold 
pieces of land, even in areas that are planned for infrastructural development, resist the 
efforts of the urban authorities to enforce proper land use.  The reason is that such land-
owners have their rights protected by the Constitution. As such, it is required under the law 
that such landlords be adequately compensated, in the event of the urban authorities putting 
such land to other uses. The complication of the land issue especially in Kampala city has 
resulted in mushrooming of unplanned structures (slums), poor infrastructure, blocked 
                                            
40 For example, the urban authorities were governed under the Urban Authorities Act (1964).  The 
Public Health Act (1964), The Rating Decree (1979).  These laws had become irrelevant in many 
aspects of urban governance. The Current Local Government Act (1997) deals with all Local 
Government broadly. 
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drainage, regular occurrence of infectious diseases, lack of services and a host of social 
problems that afflict the lives of urban communities.  On the part of the part of the urban 
authorities, the critical issues revolve around failure to collect revenue (especially property 
tax and ground rents), enforcement of the laws and regulations, to ensure safety of their 
citizens and do deliver public services. 
Kampala city is divided into five (5) Administrative Divisions: Kampala Central, Rubaga, 
Nakawa, Makindye and Kawempe.  Each Division is a fully fledged local government.  A 
Division is headed by an elected chairperson, 41and administered by an elected council.  The 
Division Councils make decisions mainly through technical committees. The Chairperson 
appoints the executive committee (cabinet) amongst elected councilors. 
 
The City Town Clerk is the overall administrative officer of the city.  Each Division is 
administered by a Principal Assistant Town Clerk, who is responsible to the Division 
Council as well as the City Town Clerk. This double loyalty on the part of the Division 
officials is a major source of conflict in urban councils. Division officials sometimes receive 
conflicting directives from both authorities. For example, whereas the Division authority is 
responsible for collection of revenue for on-ward transmission to the City Headquarters, 
there are times when councilors at the Division level, demand use of the money at source. 
This breaks the law. The city headquarters may also fail in their financial obligations to the 
Division Councils.  Such factors undermine the process of participatory and democratic 
decision making and management. 
 
1.7 The Genesis and Process of Decentralisation in Uganda  
Uganda’s decentralisation programme began from the “populist” stance of the NRM in 
198642. This stance tended to assume that the Local Government system and the ideology of 
                                            
41 Division Chairperson does not carry the title of Mayor, which is exclusively reserved for the over-all 
City Mayor. 
42    The system of Bukiiko (people’s councils) formed during the war (1981 - 85). These were meant 
to solicit popular support for the NRM war, see The Ten-Point Programme of the NRM. 
  
27
 
 
 
the ruling political organisation were like two sides of the same coin43.  The Commission of 
Inquiry into the Affairs of Local Government in 1987 confirmed this position:  
To define Resistance Councils and Committees as organs of the state; and 
therefore institutions of Local Authorities is to deny them of their very 
rationale.  For the first function of RCs is that of a “watchdog”: it is to 
resist any tendencies on the part of the state officials towards abuse of 
authority or denial of the rights of the people.  Neither can RCs be defined 
as organs of the movement, for to do so would be to restrict their 
membership to only those who uphold the programme of the NRM44. 
In spite of this observation by the Commission of Inquiry, the RC structures through which 
the Local Government system operated were at the same time structures of the NRM. 
 
In 1992 the World Bank concluded a study, Uganda: District Management Study. This study 
highlighted the need for reforming the Local Government system in Uganda on the 
following premises: first, the country had embraced the Structural Adjustment Programme 
(SAP) as a modus operandi for macro-economic management of the national economy. SAP 
assumed that (i) Uganda’s public sector was overextended, (ii) the government needed to cut 
its public expenditures, (iii) the government needed to create an enabling environment for 
the market, and suggested that Uganda’s decentralisation programme should aim at 
supporting macro-economic reform45.  Furthermore, the World Bank report placed emphasis 
on the key elements of the decentralisation programme to include: (i) increased management 
efficiency, (ii) increasing popular participation at the local level, and (iii) improving 
financial performance through increased revenue generation and rational expenditure 
decisions.46 
 
The World Bank team found that most local authorities were neither strong nor viable.  It 
noted that most local authorities spent “more resources in maintaining their existence as 
                                            
43  The widespread formation of Resistance Councils (RCs) was initially to create a system to solicit 
support for NRM after taking over power in 1986, see Sabiti Makara (1992) The Role of Resistance 
Councils in Promoting Democracy in Uganda 
44  Republic of Uganda (1987) Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Local Government 
System p.22 Resistance councils (RCs) were the first version of local government introduced under 
the NRM. 
45 World Bank (1992), Uganda: District Management Study (report prepared for Uganda 
Government) p.ii 
46 World Bank p.iv! 
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organisations than they (did) on delivering programs and services to their constituents.”47 
The report asserted that the envisioned decentralisation programme would be successful if it 
involved an institutional framework that sought among other things to (i) increase the 
‘ownership’ of the process of decentralisation, (ii) understanding what it means and what it 
can do for the individual citizen, (iii) ensure it was sustainable, (iv) create autonomy, 
influence and control at the local level, and (v) have the capacity to survive its creators.48 In 
other words, local governments under the programme of decentralisation were expected to 
evolve, build and sustain strong and viable organisations capable of delivering services, 
based on democratic processes and effective and efficient management systems.  The 
findings of the above study signify that a combination of the NRM government’s 
convictions and donors’ advice made the foundation for the policy of decentralisation that 
was launched in Uganda in October 1992. 
 
It is important to note that the initial focus of the policy of decentralisation was the rural 
district.  Thus, little attention was placed at the role of the urban authorities.  In Uganda, 
there has been a tendency, historically to ‘marginalise’ urban authorities in public policy.  
During the colonial period, there was insignificant urbanization.49 The immediate post-
colonial governments retained the urban areas as gazetted areas of control by the 
government. In the realm of policy making in Uganda, the urban areas are stereotyped as 
settlements of the privileged elite. For example, the Commission of Inquiry into the Affairs 
of Local Government held that the separate management of urban and rural districts 
constituted “official and unofficial “apartheid.50“  This attitude led the commissioners to 
recommend to government a unified management system for urban and rural districts.51 In 
fact, the Commission’s recommendations for implementation to government were 
haphazard.52 Later the World Bank team on district management study findings contradict 
                                            
47 Ibid, World Bank (1992) p.ix 
48 Ibid, World Bank p.ix 
49 David Apter (1961) The Political Kingdom in Uganda pp. 236 – 247, also, P. Gutkind, The Royal 
Capital of Buganda, hms, The Royal Commision of East Africa (Report 1955). 
50 Republic of Uganda, (1987) Report of the Commission into the system of Local Government p.53 
51 Ibid, Report p.55. A minority report by Commissioner Apolo Nsibambi rejecting this position is 
appended to the report. 
52 Ibid, Report (1987) p.55. The commission admitted that there were bound to be problems in the 
course of implementation of their recommendations 
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those of the Commission and assert that some of the municipalities earn much more revenue 
than the surrounding rural districts. The World Bank report saw the issue of merging urban 
authorities with rural ones as “potentially explosive… since some of the districts fortunate 
enough to contain one of the main (rich) urban centers would be able to divert a significant 
part of their revenue to rural services if the money went directly to the (district) Treasury.53“  
The report recommended that urban and rural districts be separate entities. 
 
The above arguments for and against autonomous existence of urban authority serve to 
demonstrate the precarious position the urban authorities found themselves in before 
decentralisation and the challenges they still face thereafter.  Quite clearly, the policy 
makers in Uganda seem to uncritically buy into Lipton’s (1977) arguments of “urban bias.” 
 
1.8 Locating the Conceptual Underpinnings of this Study 
An understanding of decentralisation policy and its effects on the management of 
urbanisation in Uganda is conceptualised within the framework of the broader policy of state 
reconstruction54 and the reforms of the entire public service in Uganda. The renewed efforts 
by the government to rebuild institutions of the state in Uganda since 1986 is a response to 
the negative centralizing tendencies of the 1960s and the socio-economic and political crises 
of the 1970s and 1980s. The centralisation tendencies culminated into the promulgation of 
the Local Administration Act 196755 and the crises that followed Amin’s coup in 197156. 
Thus, the pre - 1986 period was characterised by a weak state and economic 
mismanagement.57 
 
One of the fundamental policy initiatives in the post-1986 period has been the deliberate 
effort to rebuild institutions of local governance. This has taken the form of decentralisation.  
                                            
53 World Bank (1992) District Management Report, p.56 
54 Omach, Paul.( 2000). The African Crisis Response Initiative: Domestic Politics and Convergence 
of National Interests. African Affairs 99(394):73-95. 
55 The Local Administration Act 1967 centralised most of the powers hitherto enjoyed by the local 
authorities into the hands of the Minister responsible for Local Administration. 
56 Amin’s dictatorial rule was characterised by murder of innocent citizens, collapse of the economy 
and social disorders. 
57 (Mutibwa (1992), Uganda Since Independence: A Story of Unfullfilled Promises,  Karugire (1980), 
A Political History of Uganda, London: Heinemann. 
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Technically, decentralisation is a relative term. According to Rondinelli58 decentralisation is 
defined as the transfer of responsibility for planning, management and resource raising and 
allocation from the central government and its agencies to (a) field units of central 
government, (b) subordinate units of levels of government, (c) semi-autonomous public 
authorities and, (d) area-wide non-governmental private or voluntary organisations.  
Rondinelli argues that due to the complexity and scope of decentralisation, it is necessary to 
distinguish among the major types of decentralisation, these include: deconcentration 
(transferring administrative authority while retaining control at the centre), delegation 
(transferring certain managerial responsibilities for specifically defined functions to 
organisations that are outside the regular bureaucratic structure), devolution (creation or 
strengthening of sub-national units of government with legal, administrative, political and 
financial powers to enable them to act autonomously from the centre) and privatisation (a 
situation where government divests itself from the responsibility for certain functions and 
transfers them to the private sector).  As Rondinelli points out, these forms of 
decentralisation have been attempted in many developing countries, either simultaneously or 
separately at different times. In Uganda, the design of decentralisation has evolved towards 
devolution.  The statute of 199359 and the Local Government Act 1997 put in place a new 
system of local government, which has elements of both types of decentralisation.60 
 
The objective of Uganda’s decentralisation policy combines both political and 
administrative criteria suggested by Mawhood.61 Mawhood argues that since the basic 
principle of decentralisation lies in centre - local relations, if a government decentralises 
political decision-making, including financial and administrative jurisdictions, then that is 
proper decentralisation. 
 
In Uganda, the decentralisation programme was designed; 
                                            
58 Rondinelli et al, (1983: 9) 
59 The Resistance Council Statute 1993 started with a design of decentralisation that was basically 
deconcentration. Later the local Government Act 1997 put in place a devolved model. 
60 Devolved functions under the Local Government Act 1997. 
61 Mawhood, P. (1993), “Decentralisation: The Concept and The Practice” in Mawhood P. (ed), Local 
Government in the Third World: Experience of Decentralisation in Tropical Africa (2nd Ed). The Africa 
Institute of South Africa.  
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... to build a more democratic government that is responsive and 
accountable to the public, to promote capacity building at the local level; 
and to introduce local choice into the delivery of civil services, fostering a 
sense of local ownership.  The administrative changes resulting from 
decentralisation aim to bring decision making closer to the population and 
to permit better communication between local leaders and the population 
to which they are responsible.  This creates a situation conducive to local 
decision making founded on local options and circumstances62. 
 
From this perspective, decentralisation is conceived in terms of better service to the people.  
It is also assumed that once decentralisation is undertaken by government, the local people 
will “own” the government programmes, they will be more willing to participate and 
possibly contribute to the design and implementation of the programmes and even be more 
willing to pay taxes.  However, we are cautioned that this may not always be the case.  It is 
observed that public investment alone though desirable is not a sufficient condition for the 
success of decentralisation.  There are behavioural and sustainability problems that are likely 
to be encountered.63  Moreover, decentralisation comes with new practices in a local 
environment that lacks adequate structures, facilities and human skills.  A recent study on 
decentralisation and participation has found that in two districts [Mukono and Rakai in 
which the study was carried out], there was no effective delivery because of the unfounded 
assumption about what could be achieved through popular participation.64  Other studies on 
Uganda’s decentralisation have claimed that “...because decentralisation has been a top-
down approach, though not authoritarian, participation is largely seen as a government 
obligation rather than a people-driven process.65“  It is thus, pertinent to argue that 
depending on the purpose of participation, decentralisation may undermine rather than 
promote empowerment of the citizenry. 
 
                                            
62 Langseth “Civil Service Reform: A General Overview” in Villadsen S. and F. Lubanga, Democratic 
Decentralisation in Uganda, pp 14-15. 
63Ibid, Langseth p.15 
 
64 Fred Mutebi-Goloba (1999), Decentralisation. Democracy and Development Administration in 
Uganda: Limits to Popular Participation. p.10, PhD thesis, London School of Economics and Political 
Science. 
65 G. B. Tukahebwa, “The Role of District Councils in Decentralisation” in Apolo Nsibambi (ed), 
Decentralisation and Civil Society in Uganda. p.27 
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Decentralisation in Uganda has also been equated to democratic governance. For example, it 
has been argued that since decentralisation “... implies devolution of powers and grassroots 
participation, local democracy is being greatly strengthened.66“  Although decentralisation 
has entailed transfer of financial, some legislative and administrative responsibilities to the 
local authorities, real power is still retained at the centre. The framework within which 
decentralisation was designed and operates in Uganda is tied to the political wishes of the 
NRM regime. While some studies have argued that political participation should not be seen 
in the context of elections, on the contrary, the interests of the NRM regime in embarking on 
decentralisation are revealed in the electoral process especially, at the local level.67 
 
The ultimate goal of decentralisation in Uganda is perceived to be “good governance.” It has 
been argued that “although decentralisation is not the same thing as good governance, the 
quest for good governance necessarily entails democratic decentralisation.”68 A working 
group coordinated by the Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs and composed of 
various representatives from government ministries, non-governmental organisations, 
donors, police and prisons met and discussed, and came up with a definition of what good 
governance entails in the Ugandan situation: 
Good governance is the exercise of politico-administrative and 
managerial/authority and order which is legitimate, accountable, 
transparent, democratic, efficient and equitable in resource allocation and 
utilisation, and responsive to the critical needs of promoting human 
welfare and positive transformation of society...69 
 
This definition of good governance tells us little about public officials who may abuse office 
or prove to be incompetent.  The adoption of the working definition may however, serve as a 
benchmark for understanding the intentions of the government.  Even then, that definition is 
state-centric.  It does not include the role of civil society.  This study is centred on the 
interface between the state and the public realm.  It is conceived within a generic perspective 
                                            
66 Villadsen S. “Decentralisation of Governance” in Villadsen S. and Lubanga F. Democratic 
Decentralisation in Uganda. p.60 
67 Ibid, Goloba-Mutebi (1999), p 1 
68 Nsibambi Apolo, “Introduction” in Nsibambi Apolo (ed) 1998, Decentralisation and Civil Society in 
Uganda p.2. 
69 Definition reproduced from Nsibambi A, “Introduction” ibid p.5. 
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of governance whose locus is in public administration.  Rhodes70 identifies seven arenas of 
governance of which two are directly relevant and applicable to public administration 
(specifically, the role of the state in delivery of public services) - these are: “new public 
management” and “good governance.”71  New Public Management perspective refers to the 
introduction of private sector management methods to the public sector through performance 
measures, managing by results, value-for-money, and closeness to the customer.  New 
Public Management involves marketisation in the public sector - introducing incentive 
structures into public service provision through contracting-out, lease-markets and consumer 
choice. 
 
Good governance has been a public sector management trend championed by the World 
Bank. From the World Bank’s perspective, there are three strands of good governance: 
systemic, political and administrative. The systemic use of governance is broader than 
government, covering the distribution of both internal and external political and economic 
power.  The political use of governance refers to a state enjoying both legitimacy and 
authority derived from a democratic mandate.  The administrative use of governance refers 
to efficiency, openness, accountability and audited public service.72  This study is a 
deliberate attempt to test whether or not these tenets of governance have been utilised by 
state actors in the process of decentralisation in Uganda.  It also proceeds on a critical note 
that the World Bank’s design of governance tends to be technocratic, and concerned with 
stability.73 
 
                                            
70 Rhodes (2000), , R.A.W., “Governance and Public Administration” in Jon Pierre (ed), 2000, 
Debating Governance: Authority, Steering and Democracy.  
71 Ibid, Rhodes, R.A.W., “Governance and Public Administration” in Jon Pierre (ed), 2000, Debating 
Governance: Authority, Steering and Democracy. pp.56-57. Rhodes identifies seven strands of 
governance that are relevant to public administration. These include: corporate governance, new 
public management, good governance, international interdependence, socio-cybernetic systems, 
new political economy, and networks. 
72A combination of “new public management” and “good governance” typologies of governance 
appear to be the dominant strands that are applicable to donor-driven third world countries. For 
example, the “package” of public service reforms in Uganda which include among others, 
decentralisation are designed in this World Bank framework. 
73 World Bank 2000, “Decentralisation: Rethinking Governments”, World Development Report 
1999/200, World Bank / Oxford Press, p.107 
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Hyden suggests that the most important empirical dimensions of governance derive from the 
conditions and the means available for the governed to hold the governors accountable for 
their decisions and actions i.e. citizens’ influence and oversight74.  These include: the degree 
of political participation, the means of preference aggregation and methods of public 
accountability.  If these elements are embedded in the public policy process on one hand, on 
the other, responsive and responsible leadership will entail attitudes of political leaders as 
public trustees. According to Hyden, this covers their orientation towards the sanctity of the 
civic public realm: readiness of the public officials to share information with citizens, 
adherence to the rule of law and openness of public policy making. Hyden also proposes 
social reciprocity which refers to the extent to which citizens or groups of citizens treat each 
other and how far voluntary organisations are capable of tolerating each other and 
transcending boundaries of primary social organisation such as kinship, ethnicity or race. 
The interaction between citizen-influence, oversight, responsive and responsible leadership 
and social reciprocities is what constitutes the civic public realm of governance. 
 
In the Ugandan situation, these variables have been applied to public sector reforms, 
including decentralisation since the early 1990s - largely initiated by the donors. However, 
there are few studies that have tested how such reforms have operated, their success and 
failure. Specifically, there are very few studies that have attempted to test how the “good 
governance” tenets have applied to the urban sector (since the introduction of 
decentralisation policy in 1992) in Uganda. 
 
1.9 Unpacking: “Good Governance” 
Governance is technocratic, state-centric, market-oriented and civil society-driven.  It is the 
delineation of what it does in particular circumstances that defines its character and function 
in society. The term governance is still mainly confined to the technocratic and state 
discourses, and it is arguably, yet to enter the vocabulary of popular politics. For example, 
Hirst argues that the technocratic usage of governance at times, poses a threat to the 
                                            
74 Hyden, G. (1992), “Governance and the Study of Politics” in Goran Hyden, and Bratton M. (eds). 
Governance and Politics in Africa,  p 15 
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conventional forms of government.75 The market and private interests appear to be the main 
concern of the technocratic mode of governance.  It is recognised that the markets need state 
regulation but are reluctant to accept the extension of state power. Both the private/market 
interests and civil society distrust the state. Hirst observes that most of the contending 
interests agree that governance is good “provided the state limits the scope of its actions to 
what it has capacity to do and accomplish.”76 He concludes by arguing that the nation-state 
can not be wished away for the following reasons: (i) it is a legitimate source of authority in 
society, (ii) it has institutionalised means managing conflicts, (iii) it has the legitimate means 
of regulating power struggles and above all, democracy matters because it provides the 
mechanisms for consulting and respecting interests involved in the decision making process. 
 
Local governance in the context of the interface between the state and markets, has been 
reluctantly accepted by the central authorities in this era of decentralisation not least because 
it promotes “agencification” of power centres, that is taking away power from the centre and 
allocating it to sub national power centres as well as non-state actors. These include: formal 
public bodies (e.g health boards, school boards), charitable organizations and registered 
private companies. What these agencies have in common is their involvement in delivery of 
public services, pursuit of public policy goals and spending public money. Critics of this 
“agencification” view the role of these agencies as “unelected state77“. Thus, although these 
agencies are not elected, they act on behalf of both the central and local governments, wield 
a lot influence and spend colossal sums of public monies, yet they are not directly 
accountable to the tax payers and voters. Painter et al (ibid) argue that while the positioning 
of these agencies is claimed to be technical efficiency, this may be at the expense of 
allocative efficiency. They act business-like, yet government does not operate on business 
principles and does not aim to achieve typical business goals. Government acts on the basis 
of common good.  This raises a major point of contention in new governance. 
 
                                            
75 Hirst, P. (2000) “Democracy and Governance”.  In Pierre, J. (ed).  Debating Governance: Authority 
Steering and Democracy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
76 Ibid, Hirst, (2000, p 14) 
77 Painter et al (1997), “Local Authorities and Non Elected Agencies: Strategic  Responses and 
Organisational Networks” Public  Administration. Vol. 75 No. 2. 
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The above approach to public service delivery has involved contracting out and indirect state 
provision-where the state is kept in the background. This is viewed critically as taking away 
the ability of the government to govern.78  This perspective is shared by Hirst who posits 
that governance implies a strong state – a well defined institutional framework for regulating 
society, coordinating partners, defending national sovereignty and providing direct services 
not provided by the non state agencies. Thus, despite the perceived advantages of new 
public management, that is: economy, efficiency and effectiveness, there is concern that this 
type of governance “hollows” the state.79 For example, privatisation limits the scope of 
public intervention. This may lead to citizen frustration. This arises from the lack of 
direction of investment by the state. Moreover, some non-state agencies monopolise 
provision of certain services which leaves the ordinary citizens without alternative services. 
There is also loss of accountability. First, the tax payers pay levies to non-elected agencies, 
which do not take responsibility. Secondly, the citizens face a double jeopardy- they lose the 
legitimate claim to be served by the state both as voters and tax payers.  Hence at the time of 
paying taxes or voting, the citizen loses the firm ground for holding the government 
accountable. 
 
Kirkert suggests that the weakness of new public management may be overcome by 
adopting public governance.80 Unlike public management, public governance is broader and 
encompasses both internal and external relations between the different levels of government 
and other actors. Public governance therefore, involves policy networks, private companies, 
and civil society groups.  The policy oriented goals of such groups are shared and 
coordinated in manner that could lead to improvement in public governance. 
 
Kirket’s public governance propositions are in line with theorisation offered by Jon Pierre81. 
Amongst the key writers on governance, Jon Pierre’s contribution to the understanding of 
governance is coherent, systematic and easy to follow. First, Pierre posits that governance is 
a strategy to define the role of the state in society. Second, it is a process of restructuring and 
                                            
78 Sorensen, in Sorensen and Lubanga, (1997), Democratic Decentralisation in Uganda. 
79 Opcit, Rhodes 1994) 
80 Kickert,W.J.M;Erik Han Klijn and Joop,F.M Koppenjan.(eds).(1997).Managing Complex 
Networks:Strategies for the Public Sector.Sage.  
81 Opcit  Jon Pierre (2000), Debating Governance. 
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transforming the state. Thirdly, it presents a situation where formal authority meets informal 
sources of authority. In all the three aspects, Pierre does not suggest that the state should 
shrink. Instead Pierre proposes a perspective that delineates “old” versus “new” governance. 
Old governance raises questions about the process and outcomes of the policy formulations 
through “political brokerage.” This approach is labeled as “state centric”. The state-centric 
approach assumes that the state has the political and institutional capacity to steer society 
and to deliver services. New governance denotes a situation where instead of steering; the 
state simply becomes one of the policy actors, coordinated in a manner that produces 
particular actions. The state however is generally perceived as a necessary partner in the 
whole scheme. Thus, while old governance is associated with the situation where the state 
takes the leading role in the coordination and steering of other societal actors, new 
governance tends to be associated with what has come to be termed as self governance, a 
situation where multiple actors, independently, jointly, or in agreement over certain courses 
of action, pursue particular goals in society. They may do so in concert with the state or at 
times, without it. Self governance simply means that some roles that were previously 
performed by the state are taken over by other actors. In most decentralised counties, this 
type of governance is now on the rise. In this case, civil society has become a key player. 
 
Conceptually, new governance has come to imply first, that there is some distinction 
between production and delivery of services. In decentralised systems, service delivery 
remains the responsibility of the state at the level of planning; core financing, supervision 
while service production may be done by other actors on their initiative or in partnership 
with the state. In the latter case, the role of the state is limited to supervision, coordination, 
and giving policy direction. However, there have been some problems with this 
arrangement. These include lack of interest on the part of state officials to supervise and 
guide the actors, absence of coherent goals and policies, and in the same cases state officials 
wanting to obstruct the efforts of other actors. Corrupt behaviour is often observed in this 
process. As Hirst82 puts it, civil society and NGOs have come to distrust the state because 
they see it as captured by private commercial interests, corrupt politicians and unaccountable 
bureaucrats. Nonetheless, it is generally admitted that market forces and private interests 
                                            
82 Opcit, Hirst. 
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require regulation and restraint because they too, may pursue goals that may undermine the 
legitimate sources of power in society. Private actors do accept that for them to be effective 
there is a need for a political framework, sufficiently conducive for their activities–a stable 
regime, rule of law, an efficient administration, and systems of accountability as well as 
stable micro-economic policies and an active civil society. 
 
While the practice under the above arrangement is to devolve service production to self-
regulating agencies in order to reduce bureaucratic hierarchies, the reality is that citizens 
look to the state as the “provider” of services. This arises from the long-held traditional role 
of the state of “tax and spend”. Government bureaucrats have been accustomed to this 
arrangement. The citizens on their part are generally accustomed to “confronting” 
government to demand their rightful services. The complexity comes with multiple 
providers under the new governance. It raises the question of where the citizens should point 
their finger for accountability. At the same time, the self regulating groups do not 
necessarily assume they have the obligation account to the tax payers. In many cases, they 
create new vertical hierarchies whereby they tend to account to their sponsors rather than the 
beneficiaries of their services. These associations in some instances, may even prove to be 
less accountable than the government agencies. They sometimes behave as if they were 
“private” governments whose pre occupation is to put “efficiency” before answerability.      
 
New governance, nevertheless, provides opportunities for public choice or what Hirschman 
termed “voice” and “exit” options.83 The traditional statist model creates high levels of 
expectations within society, especially in the third world, that the state has the capacity to 
provide almost everything. This has proved to be untenable due to fiscal crisis, poor service 
delivery, inefficient management and the growing influence of globalisation. The new 
governance mode provides avenues for “voices” – the act of complaining or organising to 
complain or protesting with the intent of achieving a certain desired quality or quantity of 
service. On the other hand, “exit” implies that the client of a particular organization 
generally opts to leave for another organization that provides a better service or benefit.  It is 
                                            
83 Hirschman (1993) 
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argued that the more clients exit, the more an organization becomes conscious of its 
deterioration and wakes up to repair itself. 
 
Hirschman’s “voice – exit” model suffers fundamental flaws.  First, it assumes a high level 
of civic consciousness and organisation within society. Secondly, it assumes that there is 
adequate competition amongst the organizations wishing to retain clients.  In situations of 
inadequate supply at the organizational level, the kind that are experienced in third world 
countries, the voice – exit model experiences problems. In a situation where most people are 
illiterate, unemployed, under-provided, and suffer from debilitating forms of poverty; both 
voice and exit may exist only in theory, the practice is that they are generally pre-occupied 
with eking out a living or ‘survival’, hence, the quality of service is compromised.  This 
partly explains why there is little engagement between the ordinary citizens and local 
government service providers. The service consumers seem to be only theoretically part of 
the “partnership.” In cases where only one service provider is selected for a particular area, 
the citizens have no option, but to accept the service or to lose altogether.  In such a case, the 
option of “exit” is closed. 
 
In terms of urban governance, it is observed that there has been a shift from the spatial and 
structural aspects of governing cities. The shift has involved a move from hierarchies of 
government to political negotiations between various stakeholders, for example, between the 
rulers and the ruled.  This has implied a shift from “government” to ‘governance’ – the latter 
denoting mechanisms, processes, and institutions through which citizens and groups 
articulate their interests.84  While the term local government  is associated with a formal 
description of powers and responsibilities of urban authorities, local governance means 
greater diversity in organisation of services, flexibility, variety of actors, even 
transformation of forms of local democracy. These governance forms may imply new forms 
of citizenship. Local governance is also perceived to mean a “place of local dialogue85“.  
Good Governance carries with it a premise of institutional design that is open and 
                                            
84 Montgomery et al (2003), Cities Transformed: Demographic Change and its Implications in the 
Developing World. 
85 Ibid, Montgomery (2003),  p.358 
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accountable to civil society in general, and effective in terms of financial management and 
policy implementation. 
 
Good governance also involves an effective balance between the raising of revenue and 
proper expenditure of that revenue on services and investments that are based on 
accountable decisions (Montgomery et al, ibid).  Good governance occupies a space 
between governability and governance.86 Governability is defined as the capacity to make 
decisions and implementing rules. Governability tends to be formalistic and rule-bound.  On 
the other hand, governance as already discussed, denotes leadership, cooperative efforts and 
achieving common goals.  As Mc Carney puts it, local governance in the context of third 
world cities, involves the dynamics of local institutional challenges, local political forces 
and day-to-day fiscal constraints.87  Mc Carney argues that although governance may be 
seen as in terms of global hegemony (globalisation), its practical relevance lies with the 
local realities. The focus of governance in this regard is on  the efficient use of resources, 
cutting fiscal deficits, effective development management, and enhancing markets. The local 
and external elements of governance have been at the centre of the debate.  Mc Carney 
counsels that instead of rejecting governance as an “external” notion of reo-liberalism, it 
should be weighted against all its merits such as involvement of citizens in municipal 
budgeting, inclusion of groups in exercise of authority and public discussion of public 
projects. 
 
A working model that resonates with the framework of our study is proposed by Shah and 
Shah in what they term as citizen-centred governance principles that include: responsive 
governance – the idea that governments should do the right thing that is deliver services 
consistent with citizens’ preferences.88 Responsible governance, that is, government should 
it right – in a prudent fiscal process, and accountable governance that is, that local 
                                            
86 Leftwitch, A. (1994), “Governance, the State and the Politics of Development”. Development and 
Change. Vol. 25. See also Guy, B. Peters, (1998), “Governance Without Government? ,Rethinking 
Public Administration” in Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory. Vol. 8 No. 2. 
87 McCarney, P.L.(2000), “Thinking about Governance in Global and Local Perspective: 
Consideration on Resonance Between Two discourses”, in Urban Forum. Vol. 11 No. 1, p.1 
88 Shah and Shah,(2006) The New Vision of Local Governance and the Evolving Roles of Local 
Governments. In Local Governance in Developing Countries. Washington D.C: The World Bank 
Institute. 
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governments should be accountable for their actions to the citizens – with integrity and in 
public interest. 
 
1.10 Connecting Good Governance with Decentralisation 
Classical analyses of governance have directly connected local governance with 
decentralisation or what is generally termed as the decentralisation theorem.  Oates89  in his 
theorem argues that local governments understand the concerns of local residents.90  
Maddick asserts that local councils are of great value because they understand the needs and 
aspirations of local people, the potentialities of local actions and their limitations.91  While 
Maddick notes that councilors may present a scenario of “the blind leading the blind” due to 
their limited experiences, local discussions are quite responsive to local needs. This 
encourages fiscal responsibility, efficiency, interjurisdictional competition and innovation.  
According to these propositions, such an ideal decentralized system ensures a level and 
combination of public services consistent with voters’ preferences while providing 
incentives for efficient provisions of services.92  This however is the ideal.  Evidence exists 
that suggests that decentralisation as a form of local autonomy easily falls  prey to the “elite 
capture” problem of the central and local bureaucracies, that is to say, decentralisation may 
fail to tame corruption, misuse of public office and could undermine local democracy. 
 
1.11 The thesis of this study 
There seems to be unfettered and an almost euphoric belief amongst intellectuals, policy 
makers and the general populations in Uganda and in may other countries, that 
decentralisation will result in better service delivery, increased participation in policy 
processes, accountability, democratic practices; which will lead to good local governance.  
Despite this great promise some studies have pointed out that such benefits may not be that 
obvious and should not be over-generalised.  For instance, Prud’homme has observed: 
“Decentralisation measures are like some potent drugs… when proscribed for the relevant 
illness, at the appropriate moment and in correct dose, they can have the desired salutary 
                                            
89 Oates, W. E. (1972). Fiscal Federalism. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. 
90 Maddick, H. (1963),Decmocracy, Decentralisation and Development. 
91 Ibid, Maddick (1963) p.157. 
92 Opcit, Shah and Shah, ( 2006) 
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effect; but in wrong circumstances they can harm rather than heal.”93 In assessing the effects 
of decentralisation on urban governance, both the promises and the potential weaknesses are 
critically taken into account. Thus, rather than dwelling on the so-called “urban 
problematique”, this thesis contends that decentralisation and its aims, processes, solutions 
and outcomes of reconstructing state-society relations, and of rebuilding institutions of local 
governance has a great potential of engineering local development, democracy, and social 
welfare. The task of this study therefore, is to search for ways of how this has happened in 
the realities of Uganda’s urban setting. 
 
1.12   Methodology 
The study design was both quantitative and qualitative.   Qualitative design allowed 
collection of data through both secondary and primary data techniques. Extensive review of 
literature and analysis of policy documents was undertaken to establish the status of the 
issues, for example the progress of decentralisation in Uganda over the last two decades, the 
changing trends of urbanization and an historical overview.  An historical overview was 
particularly done to inform the study about the social economic and political formations of 
the country in the period before the country gained political independence. I was interested 
in the kind of political heritage that the colonial rulers handed to the post-colonial ones, and 
the effect it could have had on the policies made thereafter.  I proceeded from the firm 
ground that it would only be escapist to study a country’s political policies as if the past 
history was non-existent.  In short, I believed that an historical perspective served a critical 
juncture in connecting the current policy trends with the political history of the country. 
 
An extensive analysis of policy documents was a key undertaking of this study.  Most policy 
documents were searched for in the government departments, especially, the Ministry of 
Local Government, Public Service, the Population Secretariat, the Uganda Bureau of 
Statistics, Decentralisation Unit, the Local Government Finance Commission, and the 
libraries at Makerere University, Centre for Basic Research, KCC Library, and Uganda 
Management Institute.  Another set of documents was collected from various NGOs and 
                                            
93 42 Remy Prud’homme “The Dangers of Decentralisation” The World Bank Research Observer 
Vol.10, No.2, 1995 p.201. 
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CBOs in Kampala. These included: Concern Uganda, DENIVA, KACHEPA, Community 
Development Resource Network (CDRN) and many others.  Most interesting in this 
endeavour were documents obtained from the five KCC Division offices as well as the 
headquarters of Kampala City Council (KCC).  I obtained minutes of these local councils, of 
committees of council, tender boards, budget framework papers, three-year development 
plans, capacity building plans, official correspondences, investment plans, statistical 
abstracts, lists of pre-qualified suppliers, as well as some audited accounts. These 
documentary sources served to highlight what the policy makers at the various levels of 
government had planned to do or were actually doing in relation to the issues the study was 
interested in.  I also used these sources to cross-check some of the information that was later 
collected from the primary sources. 
 
Review of academic literature was done throughout the process of the study.  This was done 
for analytical and comparative purposes, to strengthen the perspectives of the on-going 
debates. 
 
1.12.1 Primary Data Collection  
Primary data collection was largely qualitative – involving interviews with key informants.  
Most of the key informants were people occupying positions of authority in Local 
Governments, Civil society, and private businesses. Besides, ordinary citizens were also 
interviewed through semi-structured questionnaires. People managing community-based 
projects were interviewed at various levels. 
1.12.2 Type of Data Collected 
The following types of data were collected: 
⊗ Management Processes and systems; 
⊗ Participatory decision making processes; 
⊗ Social and economic policies; 
⊗ Service delivery systems; 
⊗ Financial management systems; 
⊗ Public-private partnerships in service delivery; 
⊗ The contribution of civil society to service delivery; 
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⊗ The government practices and policies: accountability process, legal regulatory 
frameworks, project management, and “self provision” delivery of services, political 
decision making and changing urban policies. 
 
1.12.3 Sampling Procedure 
The sample for key informants was largely purposive, that is, it targeted persons in positions 
of authority, who were thought to possess deep knowledge about the policies of their 
organizations.  The purposive sample for Local Government officials included both political 
and administrative leaders: 
 
Table 1:  Showing Political  Leaders   
Position No. Interviewed 
KCC Division Chairpersons 3 
KCC Division Members of Executive Committee 10 
Ordinary Division Councillors 15 
Chairpersons of Committees of Council 3 
Deputy Speakers of Division Councils 2 
Chairpersons of Local Council (LC1) 7 
 
 
 
Table 2 : Showing Administrative/Management Personnel 
Position No. Interviewed 
Town Clerks of KCC Divisions  4 
Deputy Town Clerks of KCC Division 1 
Planning officers of KCC Divisions 5 
Chief Finance Officers of KCC Divisions 5 
Clerk to Council of KCC 5 
Division Head, Gender and Social Welfare 4 
 Division Head, Education, KCC 3 
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Division Engineer, KCC 3 
Trade Development Officer, KCC 2 
Public Health Officers |KCC 3 
Division Medical officers 4 
Law Enforcement officers  3 
Budget officers  2 
Council Agents (Parish Chiefs) – [Group Interview] 10 
[Group Interview] 
 
 
1.12.4 Key Informants Interviewed at KCC Headquarters 
 
Political Leaders: 
It proved difficult to interview the Mayor and Members of the Executive Committee.  
However, I managed to interview the Speaker of the Council, six ordinary councilors, and 
three chairpersons of the committees of council.  However I understood that since most of 
the actual service delivery is a responsibility of Division Council it would be rewarding to 
concentrate my efforts there. I did exactly that. 
 
Administrative Staff interviewed at KCC headquarters also fell far below my target.  Thus 
only the following officers were interviewed:  Deputy Director of Finance, Director of 
Planning, Planning Officer (physical), Clerk to Council, Public Relations Officer, Senior 
Personnel Officer, and Senior Land Officer and Senior Committee Clerk and Senior 
Environmental Officer. 
 
1.12.5 Other Selected Key Informants 
This category of respondents was considered important for their deep and special knowledge 
of decentralisation and urban issues as shown in table 3: 
 
Table 3:  Showing Selected Key Informants 
Hon. Jabeli Bidandi Ssali Former Minister of Local Government 
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Mr. John Sempewo Senior Committee Clerk (retired) 
Mr. Kiwanuka Misisi Former Chairperson, Mukono District and former Resident 
District Commissioner, Kampala 
Mr. Paddy Nahabwe Senior Population Officer 
Mr. Iddi Basajjabalaba Senior Statistician, Local Government Commission. 
Mr. Lawrence Banyoya Secretary, Local Government Finance Commission. 
Mr. P. Mutabwire  Commissioner, Local Government 
Martin Onyach-Olaa      Principal Economist, Ministry of Local Government. 
 
 
1.12.6 Category of Respondents Interviewed within Civil Society 
These key informants fell into three categories:  the NGO sector, the CBOs and the business 
sector.  Target respondents were mainly those directly involved in implementing 
programmes which had some policy or service implications to local governance.  Direct 
interviews were conducted with top officials while group discussions were held with the 
members of their organisations. 
 
1.12.7 Administration of Questionnaires 
Questionnaires were administered on a non-probability sample of 300 respondents.  Only 
203 questionnaires were returned fully filled.  Data obtained through the questionnaires was 
intended to capture the issues affecting ordinary citizens, their local initiatives, complaints, 
compliments and communal efforts in solving some of the problems they meet in their daily 
lives. 
 
The geographical coverage of the questionnaire interviews was pre-determined, that is, 60 
questionnaires per administrative Division of Kampala City.  Hence, 5 (five) Divisions, 300 
questionnaires.  Two approaches were adopted for questionnaire administration. Some were 
left for respondents to fill themselves while some were directly administered by the principal 
researcher or his assistants. The principal researcher had five research assistants.  Most of 
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the directly administered questionnaires were returned.  Poor returns were experienced with 
the self-administered questionnaires.   
 
While the questionnaire administration followed a non-probability sample, care was taken to 
ensure gender balance, age differences, and the geographical locations. Specifically I 
targeted the less privileged areas of the city. 
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Table 4:  Showing areas where Questionnaires were administered in Kampala 
Division Area (LC1) 
Kawempe Kibe Zone 
Kimwanyi Zone, Wandegeya 
Kikwebo Zone 1 
Kikuubo Zone IV 
Makerere III (Sebina) 
Kamalimali Zone 
Kigundu Zone 
Busia Zone 
Makindye Area (LC 1) 
 Katongole Zone, Bukasa 
Kelezia Zone 
Lugaga Church Zone 
Kasubi Zone III 
Kabowa Zone 
Nanfuka Zone 
Senyondo Zone 
Serwadda Zone 
Nakawa Kiswa Zone IV 
Bukoto – Mukalazi Zone 
Luzira Stage 7 Zone 
Mutungo Zone 5 
Bina – Luzira Zone 
Central Kagugube (Industrial) Zone 
Kisenyi III 
Kagugube (Kitamanyagamba Zone) 
Katwe – Luzige Zone 
Kamwokya III (Church Zone) 
 
 
1.12.8 Challenges experienced in Questionnaire Administration 
These challenges included: non-cooperation from prospective respondents, failure to fill the 
questionnaires necessitating several visits to one respondent and complaints that “research 
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has no value.”  Others complained of lack of time to sit down for thirty minutes for an 
interview.  The problem with urban residents is that they rarely have sufficient time for 
unscheduled activities (such as interviews).  Some of the interviewees requested to be paid 
for the time they would be spending, being interviewed.  Although research ethics do not 
allow this, some of the local residents, especially the unemployed women appeared too 
needy not to get some kind of “tip”.  I would part with “something small” out of courtesy 
after the interviews. 
 
Group discussions tended to be more friendly and productive.  This was partly because 
interviews were pre-arranged for days, and at time convenient to the members of the group 
to be interviewed.   In each parish where I administered the questionnaires, I held at least 
one group discussion.  Group discussions served a very important in the whole process of 
this study, that is, they served to bridge the information gap left between interviews and 
other sources such as the documentary sources and participant observation. 
 
1.12.9 Observation 
I observed the conditions of living of the residents in several of the unplanned (slum) areas 
where the study participants were found.  The common sites included:  blocked sewers, 
smelly environments, homes filled with flood water, lack of toilet facilities, flies hovering 
over food stuff, and so on.  Apart from these miserable conditions of living it was also 
observed that there were several initiatives undertaken by people themselves such as routine 
cleaning of their neighbourhoods, such as desilting the drains.  In Kimwanyi area, there was 
a time table for each adult member from each homestead to contribute weekly labour or 
alternatively make financial contribution towards cleaning up the dirty environment. Most of 
the feeder roads leading to neighhourhoods were maintained through communal 
contributions.  Further, I noted that although LC meetings have not been as regular as they 
were reported to have been in the past, there was still a strong spirit of communal efforts to 
deal with local problems and issues. 
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1.12.10 Data Processing and Analysis 
Data collected through qualitative techniques was analysed disaggregated and analysed 
thematically to make sense out of what the respondents suggested. This data was later 
integrated with that obtained by questionnaire, observation and secondary sources. This 
triangulation helped the researcher to derive meanings from activities studied at various 
levels. 
 
1.12.11 Success and limitations of the Study 
The purpose for employing a combination of techniques of data collection was to ensure that 
the analysis was sufficiently deep and sensitive to the themes under investigation. However, 
the study was limited in the sense that only the case of Kampala City was done to represent 
the whole urban mileu of Uganda.  Although a case study was found convenient in terms of 
the research undertaking that this author could conveniently and ably handle within the 
limitations of resources and time, still a knowledge gap remained. There is a dearth of 
knowledge on small towns and other mushrooming urban centres. Unfortunately, this study 
could not stretch that far. That notwithstanding, doing a case study allowed the researcher to 
engage the broad governance issues and to collect sufficient data to deepen the 
understanding of the issues. An extensive literature review was done for this purpose.  This 
helped not only in sharpening the perspectives. 
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Chapter 2 
 
Decentralisation and Urban Governance: A Theoretical Framework 
 
2.0 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide the theoretical and conceptual framework within 
which public sector reforms; particularly decentralisation reforms have taken place world-
wide. It examines the perspective of the African and third world socio-economic and 
political realities that affect the managerial and administrative capacities and outcomes. It 
takes cognisance of the fact that reforms take place in a given context and are driven by 
political and economic ideologies. These have specific bearings on the outcomes of specific 
policies in specific locations. The connection between decentralisation and urban 
governance in Africa and Uganda is put in perspective and its outcomes critically analysed 
in this chapter. 
 
Since the 1990s, decentralisation has become a key constituent of governance94. The World 
Bank (2000) points out that by the end of the last decade, some 95% of democracies have 
had elected sub-national governments and that countries everywhere large, small, rich and 
poor - are devolving political, fiscal and administrative powers to sub-national tiers of 
government. Most Third World countries undertaking reforms of their economies have at the 
same time restructured their government, to give priority to local governments and local 
institutions.  The World Bank (ibid) argues, 
Decentralisation itself is neither good nor bad.  It is a means to an end, 
often imposed by political reality.  The issue is whether it is successful or 
not.  Successful decentralisation improves the efficiency and 
responsiveness of the public sector while accommodating potentially 
explosive political forces.  Unsuccessful decentralisation threatens 
political forces.  Unsuccessful decentralisation threatens economic and 
political stability and disrupts the delivery of public services.95  
 
                                            
94  World Bank 2000, World Development Report 1999/2000: Entering the 21st Century p.107.  
95 World Bank ibid p.107. And on p.108, Uganda and South Africa are cited as some of the most 
successful cases of decentralisation. 
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Other authors familiar with Third World problems also argue that even if decentralisation is 
not a panacea for the multitude of such problems, it is worth attempting96.  Mawhood goes 
on to assert: 
Decentralisation suggests the hope of cracking open the blockage of a 
central bureaucracy, curing managerial constipation, giving more direct 
access for the people to government and the government to the people, 
stimulating the whole nation to participate in national development 
plans.97 
 
For both the World Bank and Mawhood, the issue of decentralisation seems to suggest an 
ideological standpoint that is desirable for its own sake.  While not disagreeing with the 
utility that comes with decentralisation, the primacy of decentralisation lies in its policy 
content, design and outcomes.98 
 
Uganda’s decentralisation programme has earned praises. According to Francis and James 
“one of the most ambitious (institutional reforms in Uganda) has been its decentralisation 
policy, held to be one of the most far-reaching local government reforms in the developing 
world.”99 Villadsen100 on his part, claims that Uganda’s “decentralisation process is thus far 
more comprehensive than in any other African country.”101 These observations give us the 
impression that Uganda’s decentralisation policy has been successful.  However, even if this 
was to be the case, the indicators of such success need to be presented in a comparative 
manner.102  Even if one is not swayed by claims of success, the rational measure of policy 
success is the output of its goals.103 
 
                                            
96 Opcit, Rondinelli (1984). Decentralisation in Developing Countries:  A Review of Recent 
Experiences.  World Bank Staff Working Papaers No. 581.  Washington DC:  World Bank. 
97 Opcit, Mawhood (1993), p. 1. 
98  Conyers, Diana. (1986). “Decentralisation and Development. A Framework for analysis”.  
Community Development Journal. Vol.21 No.2. 
99 Francis and James (2003) “Balancing rural poverty reduction and citizen participation: The 
contradictions of Uganda’s Decentralisation program” World Development Vol. 31 No 2, p. 325. 
100 Villadsen, S (1996). “Decentralisation of Governance” in Sorensen Villadsen and F. Lubanga, 
Democratic Decentralisation in Uganda: A New Approach to Local Governance., p. 60. 
101  Ibid, Paul Francis and Robert James, (2003). Also  Villadsen S1 “Decentralisation of 
Governance” in Sorensen Villadsen and F. Lubanga, Democratic Decentralisation in Uganda: A New 
Approach to Local Governance. 
102 Olowu, ( 2001) “Decentralisation and Practices under structural adjustment and democratisation 
in Africa” Democracy, Governance and Human Rights. Paper No4, UNRISD, Geneva.  
103 Ibid, Dele Olowu (2001)  
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As noted in the previous chapter, Uganda’s decentralisation programme was largely 
designed with a rural bias.104 Service delivery which is the cornerstone of Uganda’s 
decentralisation programme was directed at the population. The initial policy agenda tended 
to relegate urban issues such as urban poverty, services, management and governance. Yet, 
when the urban areas were granted some autonomy as substantive local governments, they 
faced several challenges, in many cases far greater than those encountered by rural district 
authorities.105  The challenges faced by urban authorities in service delivery are 
compounded by financial, technical and managerial and political constraints. There is a need 
to establish with certainty what decentralisation has done to mitigate these problems.  
However, in proceeding to capture the complexity of these issues, we need to understand the 
contexts and perspectives of decentralisation. 
 
2.1 Decentralisation in Perspective 
There has been growing consensus amongst scholars, policy makers and development 
practitioners since 1970s that development, good policymaking and practice are not a 
preserve of the central bureaucratic agencies alone. The dominant thinking over the last two 
decades has evolved around partnerships between government agencies and other 
organisations in society as well as individual citizens.  It has been argued for example, that 
decentralisation opens the state system to competitive societal forces by allowing political 
pluralism to replace single party systems, markets to replace state controlled prices and civil 
society to provide services where the state is weak106.  Mawhood posits that decentralisation 
creates a situation where autonomous bodies will have a constructive dialogue with the 
centre.107  It is however, also, important to observe that for decentralisation to be 
meaningful, one important condition should prevail: the state and other elements in society 
                                            
104 Opcit, World Bank (1992) Uganda: District Study, a report by the World Bank team of experts 
which gave the foundation to Uganda’s policy of decentralisation as well as donor support to the 
policy. 
105 The challenges of urban authorities include: waste disposal, water and sanitation, health, 
education, bush clearance, road-works and addressing development issues of their residents. Some 
of the services the urban authorities have to provide are “self-provided” by individuals and families in 
rural Uganda such as most of the water and waste disposal.. 
106 Olowu, D. (1993). “Local Insitutions and Development: The Nigerian Experience” in Goetz G. 
Edward and Clarke E. Susan, The New Localism: Comprative Urban Politics in a Global Era. 
London: Sage Publications.  Sandbrook, R. (1993), The Politics of African’s Economic Recovery. 
Cambrige: Cambridge University Press. 
107 Opcit, Mawhood (1993). 
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should be democratic.108 This is because most decentralising states simply transfer powers 
and responsibilities from the hierarchies of the centre to those of the sub-national authorities. 
The transfer of responsibilities alone may not constitute a democratic method of managing 
society.  It may not transform state-society relations which should be the crux of the matter. 
 
2.2 The Meaning of Decentralisation 
Decentralisation means different things to different people. To Rondinelli et al,109 
Mawhood110 decentralisation means a system of autonomous local governments, to Wunsch 
and Olowu it means “self-governance” of the local communities - their values and 
innovations.111 For Tostensen et al decentralisation means freedom of civil society and the 
whole realm of associational life to organise their membership to engage in actions that are 
beneficial to them or to question the state.112 Both formal and informal groups are actively 
engaged with the state demanding that public officials be accountable to the citizens. 
Similarly, Sandbrook argues that there is a linkage between decentralisation and the notion 
of empowerment, whereby previously deprived groups such as: women, peasants and 
minorities develop a sense of agency and usefulness by making decisions that enable them 
to expand their autonomy and capabilities.113 This however, points to the endemic 
weaknesses in civil society namely: lack of capacity, confidence and autonomy.  According 
to Sandbrook  it is possible for civil society organisations to overcome these weaknesses, 
first of all, by mobilising their membership to confront government, to push it to  be more 
responsible; and secondly, to overcome passivity within their membership.114 This in turn, 
will help them to remain de-linked from the state and therefore, to act independently. In this 
way, the engagement between the state and civil society could gradually produce conditions 
                                            
108 Crook, R.C and Manor, J (1995), “Democratic Decentralisation and Institutional Performance:  
Four Asian and African Experiences compared”.  Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative 
Politics  33(3). 
109Opcit,  Rondinelli et al (1984) 
110 Opcit, Mawhood (1993) 
111 Wunsch, S. and Olowu, D. (2000). “The Failure of the African Centralised State” in Mukandala R. 
(ed). African Public Admnistration: A Reader. Harare: AAPS Books. 
112 Tostensen, A. et al (2001), Associational Life in African Cities: Popular Responses to the Urban 
Crisis. Stockholm: Nordic African Institute. 
113 Opcit,  Sandbrook (1993) 
114 Ibid, Sandbrook  
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favourable for a developmental and democratic society. This is supposed to be the ultimate 
goal of decentralisation. 
 
2.3  Decentralisation versus Centralisation 
The world is experiencing a tremendous upsurge towards local democratic governance.115  
This trend is underpinned by several factors: first, in most Third World countries, 
authoritarian regimes that dominated the first two decades of the post-colonial Africa are 
crumbling under pressure from both internal as well as external forces.  Secondly, in most of 
the African countries, severe socio-economic crises have undermined the legitimacy of 
undemocratic regimes. Thirdly, most of the African authoritarian regimes seem to have 
realised that by continuing to hold power at the centre, this has generated a source of 
weakness rather than strength.116 
 
The authoritarian practices of the post-colonial state in Africa were inherited from its 
predecessor - the colonial state.  The post-colonial state however, failed its mission, to 
significantly reform the state.  Instead, a semblance of local autonomy that had been created 
by the colonial state was either abolished or undermined in the search for national unity, 
centralised planning and development.117  Centralisation of power had the effect of breeding 
dictatorship, consolidating one-partyism, cronyism and intolerance of the views of 
opposition groups. 
 
The post-colonial African leaders were obsessed with maintaining their grip to power by 
creating cliques of cronies and ensuring unquestionable loyalty. These tendencies 
undermined most forms of autonomous organisation in society. This state of affairs, 
according to Ake created a situation where the state was no longer a res republicae for all, 
but for some.118 These authoritarian tendencies undermined the legitimacy of the state, 
                                            
115 The World Bank, (2000) World Development Report (WDR) 2000/2001: Attacking Poverty. 
116 See Dele Olowu (1993) in Wunsch and Dele Olowu The Failure of the Centralised State in Africa 
117 Kasfir, N.(1993). “Designs and Dilemmas of African Decentralisation” in Mawhood P. (1993). 
Local Government in The Third World. 
118 Ake, C. (2000). “Deeper into the Original Sin: The Context of the Ethical Crisis in Africa’s Public 
Services” in Rwekaza Mukandala. African Public Administration: A Reader. Harare: AAPS Books, p 
495. 
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which according to Kasfir had now to rely on force rather than persuasion.119  Centralisation 
manifested not only in political behaviour and practices of the leaders, it also affected the 
administrative systems.120 
 
The negative effects of centralisation of power were compounded by the severe fiscal crises 
that afflicted most African countries since the 1970s. According to Mutahaba et al,121 the 
poor state of finances in most African countries has been attributed to two factors: initially 
fiscal deficits were a result of escalating expenditures by governments’ commitments to 
development as a response to the pressures for enhanced public services, where the 
government was seen as a provider for most of the services in society.  Another factor has 
been the depressed scale of economic activity122 resulting in the economic crisis that 
plagued most African states in the 1970s and 1980s. 
 
The economic crisis in Africa has had three effects on the conduct and management of 
public affairs.  First, the political leaders had fewer resources at their disposal to dispense 
patronage.  While this was in itself a blessing because it had the effect of weakening their 
hold of power at the centre, it had adverse effects on the people’s well-being.  At the same 
time, due to the deepening weaknesses in the resource base at the centre, civil society 
organisations began to emerge, either to provide for their membership (in areas where the 
state previously had a monopolistic role) or to press the governments for services that should 
be provided by the state.123  Secondly, the poor economic performance in most African 
countries took place at the same time as there was increased urbanisation characterised by 
rapid increase in population which necessitated increased investment in service delivery. 
                                            
119 Opcit, Kasfir, (1993), p: 24. 
120  In some countries like Uganda, centralisation of power in the mid-1960 led the ruling party to 
appoint party stalwarts in all local authorities, See Karugire (1980), Mutibwa (1992), and 
Satyarmurthy (1986). 
121 Mutahaba et al, (1993: 16) 
122 Ranodi C. (1997) attributes the economic crisis in Africa to unfavourable international terms of 
trade. 
123  Mutahaba et al, (1993) Vitalising African Public Administration p.9. argue that despite the 
economic down turn, the demands on the state were over-whelming; increased demands for jobs, 
schools, health facilities when the state capacity to provide was weak. 
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Yet, this happened when, state capacity was too weak to give an adequate response.124 
Thirdly, the weak capacity of the state and the economic decline forced most the Sub-
Saharan African countries to seek for assistance from international financiers especially the 
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. These financial institutions impose 
conditionalities which the aid recipient countries have to comply with.  Such conditions 
include: cutting down public expenditure, reduction in public employment, scaling down 
activities of government and privatisation125.  In effect, these measures have engendered a 
fundamental change in the conduct of public administration in donor-supported countries.  
One of these changes has been the restructuring of the state from centralisation to 
decentralisation.  Such a change has largely entailed allowing sub-national units of 
government to acquire some powers and responsibilities outside the direct control of the 
centrally-based officials.  In the particular case of Uganda, the acceptance by the 
government of the donor-driven economic policies in the late 1980s contributed significantly 
to the local government reform of the early 1990s. In the context of the neo-liberal economic 
regime, decentralisation is perceived as a critical measure in reducing the “commandist” role 
of the central bureaucracy and creating a role for local communities to participate in policy 
agenda of the government. 
 
2.4 The Primacy of Local Government Reforms 
The upsurge towards revitalising local governments in most post-colonial states especially in 
Africa in the 1990s has been necessitated by a number of factors: first, the fresh search for 
legitimacy of the state.  Second, the attempt by governments to meet the increasing internal 
and external pressures for democratic governance and thirdly, the attempt to revitalise the 
mechanisms of service delivery and to meet the challenges of new expectations in public 
management and state-society relations. The legitimacy of the state in Africa and 
particularly in Uganda has always been contested. Its claim for control over societal forces 
has remained weak. The policies of the colonial state in Uganda were resisted by popular 
                                            
124 Stren, R. (1989) “Accountability in Africa”. EDI/World Bank, Strenghtening Local Governments in 
Sub-Saharan African. EDI Policy Seminar Report No. 21. Washington D.C: The World Bank, p. 20. 
125  Mutalaba et al (1993: 11) list the key policy reforms in the World Bank and IMF structural 
adjustment programmes to include interalia: restrictions of demand, devaluation of currencies, 
liberalisation of trade, elimination of subsidies, budget balancing, price incentives, privatisation of 
public enterprises and price de-controls. 
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forces.126  In general, the post-colonial state in Africa has tended not to fare any better than 
its colonial predecessor.127 Hyden argues that the post-colonial state in Africa is similar in 
many respects to the colonial state because both chose to govern by without engaging the 
majority of the people. 
 
It is probably not very useful to disconnect the authoritarian practices of the colonial state 
from those of the post-colonial state.  While it is argued that the first few years of 
independence were relatively prosperous for most African states (Manor 1999), other 
evidence suggests that it was at the same time that the African leaders overextended the 
“boundaries” of the state into the space previously occupied by other organisations in 
society.128  For a while, savings generated by the post-war commodity boom enabled 
African states in the 1960s to expand services, replacing or taking over civil society agencies 
in doing so. These developments reinforced authoritarian state predispositions. In Uganda, 
the immediate post-colonial government abrogated the independence Constitution in a bid to 
consolidate itself in power.129 In other post-colonial African countries, the responses to pre-
independence local government arrangements varied but the temptation towards 
centralisation and weakening local governments was prevalent.130 Weakening local 
governments and other autonomous organisations in society had the effect of undermining 
the legitimacy of the state itself.131 Thus while the post-colonial regimes attempted to govern 
in isolation of the prevailing social forces in society their success was limited because this 
undermined their very source of legitimacy. 
 
The renewed efforts by the state in Africa to reinstate institutions of local governments and 
to allow civil society organisations some space may be seen as an attempt by the states to 
search for new avenues of legitimation as well as readiness to face the challenges imposed 
by realities of internal and external pressures to act more democratically and rationally. 
                                            
126  Mamdani, M. (1976). Popular Resistance Struggles by African Workers 1945 and 1949. 
127 Goran Hyden. No Shortcut to Progress p.44.  
128 Opcit, Wunch and Olowu (1993). 
129  Kanyeihamba, G.W, (1976). Constitutional Law and Government in Uganda; Also see, Karugire, 
S. (1980), opcit. This move led to abolition of semi-autonomous local governments. 
130  See Stren R. (1989), Halifani M. (1997), Oyugi (1993), Mawhood (1993). 
131  Lalaye & Olowu Dele (1989) “Decentralisation in Africa”. EDI/World Bank, strengthening Local 
Governments in Sub Saharan Africa. EDI Policy Seminar Report No. 21. Washington DC: The World Bank 
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There is a sweeping wave towards decentralisation and reforms of local government with the 
aim of allowing sub-national units of government to enjoy some degree of autonomy, to act 
on priorities of their local areas and to elect representatives. Decentralisation is seen to 
promote social learning, decongest the centre, empower local communities, and to introduce 
administrative efficiency, effectiveness and responsiveness.132 It is argued that since 
decentralisation brings authority loser to the people, it promotes appropriate action on their 
needs and aspirations. Crook and Manor in their work on South Asia and West Africa found 
that several groups advocated for decentralisation for several reasons: economists pursued 
decentralisation as a means of stopping rent-seeking behaviours of the leaders, pluralists 
hoped it could give interest groups space to organise, autocratic leaders welcomed 
decentralisation because it could act as a substitute for democracy, democratic leaders saw it 
as a way of making governments more responsive to local needs while community 
mobilisers perceived it as a means to achieve things through cooperation with the local 
communities.133 
 
The ongoing decentralisation reforms in most African and many other countries have been 
precipitated by a number of factors. The most important factors include: the realization by 
central governments that they are unable to effectively deliver services, the high and 
increasing incidence of poverty in both rural and urban areas; the failure of centralised 
organisations to work efficiently or cost-effectively and the failure of their managers to be 
adequately responsive to the needs of the people, and in some cases the collapse of 
managerial systems themselves.  These factors have, over the years, culminated in the 
failure of the centralised organisations to mobilise resources, to motivate their staff and to be 
innovative. Thus, decentralisation is a response to a myriad of problems of organisational 
failures. 
                                            
132 Olowu, D. ( 2001). Decentralisation and Practices under Structural Adjustment and 
Democratisation in Africa”.  
133 Crook R. C. and Manor, J. (1998). Democracy and Decentralisation in South Asia and West 
Africa: Participation, Accountability and Performance, p. 1-2. 
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2.5 Inter-governmental Relations and Service Delivery 
The new reforms have entailed centre-local relations. There is a tendency to transfer powers 
to local governments with some legal mandates. The mandates require local governments to 
collect some revenues and to spend it on local priorities, to have discretionary powers over 
locally employed staff and to plan for the development of their areas. The central 
governments have undertaken to offer a range of grants to local governments, to maintain 
security, to engage in macro-economic planning and to monitor and tender advice to local 
governments. 
 
The decentralisation reform requires local governments to avoid “centralisation” at the 
immediate local government, district or municipality level. Meaningful decentralisation 
involves organised dispersal of power in society both in political as well as economic sense. 
This means sharing power and responsibility between several sub-national authority units 
which have jurisdiction over their areas in terms of providing services to their constituents. 
The other important aspect of the local government reforms is their modus operandi. The 
core issues in a local government reform are basically two: one, is financing local services 
and the other one is political.  According to Rondinelli et al these two factors are 
fundamental to the implementation of decentralisation.134 The alternative modes of 
financing local services (Rondinelli et al 1989) are identified to include: 
(i) Public goods which are consumed jointly and simultaneously by many people from 
which it is difficult to exclude anyone.  These goods may be financed from taxes, 
e.g. public roads, 
(ii) Open access goods, these too, are jointly consumed by people.  Such goods may 
include rivers and most natural resources; 
(iii) Toll goods, these may be provided on the basis of people’s ability to pay, thus, 
exclusion is feasible.  Such goods may include electricity, schools, hospitals and 
others; 
                                            
134 Rondinelli et al, (1989). “Analysing Decentralisation Policies in Developing Countries: A Political 
Economy Framework” Development and Change. Vol. 20 No. 2. 
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(iv) Private goods, these are consumed by individuals on the basis of ability to pay.  
Those who are unable to pay are excluded. 
 
According to Rondinelli et al the above classification of goods can help local governments 
to determine when to apply market mechanisms of provision, co-production or quasi-market 
principles.135 The underlying assumption in this classification is the search for equity and 
efficiency. The issue is that since local governments are public organizations, the public 
expects them to provide services without marginalisation of the vast numbers of citizens. At 
the same time, local governments must be cost-effective in the process of rendering services, 
thus those goods which service a larger private end of individuals should be paid for by 
those who can afford.  In reality however, these models of public service provision depend 
on concrete circumstances of a particular country. Rondinelli et al also concede that any 
tendency to over-rely on the market for provision of public goods may raise the profit 
motive above not only equity but also may lead to over-use of certain resources.136 
 
This model of public service provision could have successfully worked in more developed 
countries but is likely to be inappropriate for poor countries.  It has been observed for 
example, that in developing countries like South Africa this model of public service 
provision may encounter problems. 
Poverty renders service delivery (in local governments) by the private 
sector unaffordable (to the poor).  The absence of a visible, indigenous 
private sector leaves foreign companies as the only significant players.  
Although involvement of these companies brings foreign investment, in 
certain instances it causes serious political problems137. 
 
It may further be argued that although the private provision model has become prevalent, 
there is need for local governments to take an active role by putting in place regulatory 
frameworks, monitoring and structuring the arrangements in which the private sector plays a 
role. Regulatory agencies may themselves be consumers of scarce resources. They may as 
                                            
135 Ibid, Rondinelli et al, (1989), p. 66. 
136Ibid,  Rondinelli et al, (1989), p. 67. 
137  David Minakola and Vincent Murunga, “The Role of Alternative Service Delivery in South Africa” 
in Africa Insight Vol. 3, No 1, 2001, p30. They argue that local communities tend not to trust private 
sector providers.. 
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well as require new types of skills to operate them. It has been noted that the shift from, 
urban “administration” to urban “management” has made them relevant in this era of new 
management.138   
 
Arrangements for service provision similar to the ones described by Rondinelli et al (1989) 
have been experimented in Uganda since 1992. Local governments have adopted the 
following mechanisms of service provision: contracting out, outright sale of non-core assets, 
tendering markets, bus and taxi terminals, engaging private companies to collect revenues 
such as property tax and collection of debts.   Moreover, it is observed, that during the 
period of state collapse in Uganda, several self-help groups and community-based 
organisations emerged to provide for their communities.  It is also important to note that 
local governments’ engagements with each particular group produce different forms of 
interactions and results. These may be in form of co-funding, start off capital (seed money) 
or whole funding, leaving the community to takeover sustainability of the service.  These 
alternative options and their outcomes impact differently on, and are perceived differently 
by communities. These actions, perceptions and their implications for public policy in 
Uganda have not been unraveled. 
 
The political raison d’etre for local government reforms is that the success of 
decentralisation depends on the political commitments of central and local governments.  
However, this depends on the political and other motives of the elites in both central and 
local governments. Observers of decentralisation in Uganda have asserted that President 
Museveni’s NRM government has shown serious commitment to the decentralisation 
policy.139  Despite these claims, it is important to note that Museveni’s regime has held 
power since 1986 to date, facing little challenge. Besides, the local government structures 
were legally required to serve as NRM structures as well.  For example, Section 25 of the 
Movement Act required that all village councils serve as Movement organs. In essence, this 
complicated the task of those citizens who, in their ideological persuasions did not subscribe 
                                            
138 See Stren R. (1993) “Urban Management” in development assistance: an elusive concept” in Cities, May 
1993. 
139 Opcit, Lubanga, F. X. 1996, Nsibambi, A. 1998, Hyden, G. 1998, Regan, A., 1998; Makara, S. 2000. 
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to the thinking of the NRM. In a 2005 through an amendment of the constitution, the “no-
party system” was scrapped, and the multiparty system, reintroduce.140  
 
Thus, although the NRM (until 2005) had claimed to be a movement and not a one-party 
state, it did operate like the latter.  The reality of the politics of decentralisation in Uganda 
tends to vindicate Manor’s argument that the real reason why national politicians accept 
decentralisation is because they wish to “use decentralisation to connect their regime with 
social groups and to sustain or revive their party organisations.”141 As Makara and Mamdani 
argue142, Museveni’s government in Uganda was willing to decentralise because 
decentralisation was seen as an alternative to full democratisation, and as a means of gaining 
legitimacy for the NRM regime, which it lacked after capturing power by the barrel of the 
gun in January 1986. 
 
In most studies of decentralisation the political objectives of the policy are usually 
downplayed. Writers on decentralisation tend to emphasise the technocratic objectives143.  
The critics of this approach argue144 that this has led decentralisation to be linked to 
ambiguity and capacity to “conceal more than it reveals”, causing it to serve as a mere 
political instrument of the state actors.  Eaton has summarised the motives of politicians in 
adopting decentralisation thus: 
...Even where national politicians genuinely supported decentralisation for 
the broad benefits it promises to deliver, they continue to meddle in the 
activities that have been officially devolved.145 
 
As a recent study of decentralisation in Uganda, Francis and James has argued146, little 
attention has been paid to the ways in which the newly established system of 
                                            
140 See  Makara, S., Rakner, L. and Svsand, L “Turnround: The National Resistance Movement and 
reintroduction of a Multiparty system in Uganda” in J. Kiiza, Makara, S. and  Rakner, L. (eds) (2008) 
Electroral Democracy in Uganda Fountain Publishers, Kampala. 
141 Manor, J. (1999). The Political Economy of Democratic Decentralisation, p. 33. 
142 Opcit, Makara, S. (2000) and Mamdani (1995). 
143 Opcit, Rondinelli et al, (1989), also Rondinelli and Cheema, (1983) 
144 Slater, D. (1989). “Territorial Power and the Peripheral State: The Issue of Decentralisation” Development 
and Change. Vol. 20 No. , p. 501. 
145 Eaton, K. (2001). “Political Obstacles to Decentralisation. Evidence from Argentina”. Development and 
Change. Vol. 32 (1) p. 105. 
146 Opcit, Francis and James (2003) 
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decentralisation has functioned at the local level. According to these authors147 the “no-
party” system promoted as a “Movement system in Uganda, has gained political ‘capital’ 
and self-perpetuation through decentralisation. In other words, decentralisation has helped 
the survival of the regime by forestalling the pressure from local elites and the international 
donor community for more democratic reforms. Francis and James summarise their 
observation thus: 
In these circumstances, decentralisation has provided a democratic gloss in 
the eyes of both international donors and local actors. Over time however 
the movement style of politics began to take on some characteristics of 
traditional one-party rule.148 
 
These authors further observe that decentralisation in Uganda was undertaken by the 
government for two principal reasons: one was the “technocratic” and the other was 
“patronage”. The “technocratic mode” priotises national targets especially poverty 
reduction.149 The “patronage mode” draws on the language of participatory planning, which 
in the context of lack of resources and the capture by the local elites”, is reduced to a 
ritualised performance with little meaningful citizens’ involvement.150 
 
In the sense of what James and Francis call the “technocratic” mode of decentralisation, 
there is a tendency for the bureaucrats to stick to their hierarchical methods of work, for 
instance, the lengthy bureaucratic procedures, which is non-participatory and non-
consultative. To assume that the bureaucratic technocrats will become more democratic in 
decision-making may simply overstretch the expectations. In developed countries like 
Britain, it is observed that while the primacy of local authorities is to encourage the 
participation of citizens in decision making, this may just be a classical wish. According to 
Stuart (1996) local authorities in Britain have not prepared themselves for such a role. 
Departments of local governments perform limited functions, for example, while local 
authorities may try to speak on behalf of their communities, they consider this role as 
                                            
147 Ibid, Francis and James (ibid, p.327) 
148 Ibid, p.327) 
149 See also, Nsibambi, A. “Making Democratic Decentralisation an Instrument for Poverty Eradication: 
Uganda’s challenge” Paper presented at the UNDP’s Development Forum, Kampala on 4 April 1997. 
150 Opcit, Francis and James,  p.326. 
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peripheral to their work.151 In less developed countries, technocratic competence itself is a 
problem. Pointing out this problem in Uganda, Brett observes: 
Effective policy implementation is equivalent to the difficulty of the tasks 
they perform. Where these are complex and require continuous 
supervision, neither management nor day to day maintenance can be left to 
amateurs. Staff must be employed with appropriate skills.152 
 
Similar concerns about the calibre of Uganda bureaucrats are expressed by Goetz and 
Jenkins who observe153 that the local governments in Uganda hardly have the technical 
capacity in areas of planning, implementation and monitoring of government policies.  
These authors find no link between decentralisation and poverty eradication, especially for 
the poorest of the poor, who continue to have no influence on both local and national policy 
frameworks.  According to Goetz and Jenkins, 
Local authorities often have at their disposal even more resources – 
symbolic and material – with which to resist effort to address the needs of 
the poor, whether these are initiated locally or by national and 
international agencies.  For most part, especially remote and largely 
obscured from the scrutiny of the media or public advocacy groups, local 
political environments frequently reduce the incentives for elites to re-
orient the priorities.154 
 
From this observation, it is important to ascertain the extent to which these kinds of claims 
“remoteness”, aloofness of elites or what others call “elite capture” (Olowu, 2001) have 
affected service delivery.  In an urban setting like Kampala, has the implementation of 
decentralisation reduced the great numbers of socially disadvantaged people or visa versa?  
With the increased ability to collect local taxes, increased central government’s grants, a 
relatively organized civil society and the watchful media, it is expected that KCC should be 
able to deliver better services to the people.  However, it is contestable whether or not, KCC 
has done much better in creating a more accountable, transparent and responsive 
organization than one that existed before decentalisation.  On the contrary, the local public 
                                            
151 John Stuart, “Democracy and Local Government” in Paul Hirst and Sunil Khilmani (eds). Reinventing 
Democracy Oxford: Blackwell Publishers,1996. 
152 For details, Brett E. A. (1993: 47) Providing for the Rural Poor: Institutional Decay and Transformation in 
Uganda. Chapter 3 
153 Goetz, M.A  and Jenkins, R. (1998). “Creating a Framework for Reduction of Poverty-Uganda Country 
Report, Commisioned by DFID, p. 34. 
154 (Ibid p. 33) 
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media has cited cases of vested interests in tendering processes and in service delivery 
which portray KCC as a corrupt organization.155 
 
Also evidence that civil society has been active in demanding and pressing KCC to live to 
its desired expectations is yet to be seen.  The situation in KCC seems to be a semblance of 
concentration of power which as Harris observes156, could lead to those with wealth and 
status to dominate the process of decision making, culminating in concentration of power in 
the hands of a few elites, leaving the poor more disadvantaged than was the case before 
decentralisation. 
 
Scholars have posited that although organisational theory cannot escape the influence of 
Max Weber157 who emphasized hierarchical management in which higher offices supervise 
lower offices, obedience to command is expected to be prompt (and in many cases 
unquestionable), bureaucratic rules take an upper hand, it is equally important that 
managerial innovation and a shift towards less authoritarian methods are desirable in this 
modern era.  Indeed, the problem of management in most of the African countries, including 
Uganda is two fold: first it is the failure of the bureaucratic systems themselves and secondly 
it is the failure to innovate.  In Uganda, not only did the state and economic collapse over 
the years lead to managerial collapse, technological backwardness, shortage of skilled 
managers, low morale and poor pay, but all put together, led to the failure of public service 
systems to deliver services.158  Thus, the promise of decentralisation to improve service 
delivery is also largely dependent on whether or not managerial system are revamped, 
revitalized and significantly improved, including attitudes of public personnel. 
                                            
155  See for example, New Vision July 15, 2003.  In controversy between Uganda Electricity Transmission 
Company and KCC over demolition of people’s homes by the electricity company, the Mayor of Kampala, 
Sebaana Kizito said “It is the duty of the people that they build in a right place”, while the City Engineer, A. 
Byandala contradicted the mayor, saying KCC is overwhelmed with plans, saying. “What matters are land 
titles that accompany the plans . . . we go ahead and approve.” 
156 Harris, R.L. (1983. “Centralisation and Decentralisation in Latin American” in Cheema & Rondinelli (eds). 
Decentralisation and Development. p. 511. 
157Herbert H. Werlin “Poor Nations, Rich Nations: A Theory of Governance” in Public Administration Review 
Vol 63, NO 3, May/June 2003, pp 329 – 342. Werlin argue that the Japanese model of management 
innovations was successful because it moderated the Weberian bureaucratic type by adopting: self-
management work team, job rotation, flexible job classifications, use of persuasion rather than commands, 
welfare corporatism, innovations from below etc 
158 Langseth, (1996). 
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2.6 Urbanisation 
As early as 1961 in a foreword to a book Urban Research Methods edited by Jack Gibbs, 
Kingsley Davis wrote about the trends of urbanisation in the following words: 
The speed of change in the relative recency of truly mass urbanization 
have left national and local governments without consistent policies of 
dealing with the resulting problem. At the moment whether one looks at 
highly industrial or at the agrarian regions, it appears there is a growing 
awareness of urban problems but a great uncertainly as to the best method 
of dealing with them.  Although governments frequently express antipathy 
to the growth of cities, the whole process of urbanisation is so massive and 
so intimately bound up with the coveted goal of economic development 
that is probably impossible to stop.159 
 
While the growth of cities and urbanization in general is seen as a movement towards 
change and human progress. The  United Nations, concern160 is equally noted that in most of 
Third World countries urbanization has not been accompanied by socio-economic 
development, physical infrastructure and administrative capabilities to handle problems 
attendant increased urban populations.161 
 
Urbanisation itself is defined by United Nations a whole range162 of governmental 
organisation and processes for planning at all levels, for decision making and for performing 
public services related to an urban area.  This definition however does not cover all aspects 
of urbanization. According to Dukakis-Smith163, the United Nations has categorized urban 
areas in terms of their various populations thus: settlements of over 20,000 people as urban, 
of more than 100,000 people as cities and more than 5,000,000 as big cities.  Nevertheless 
Dukakis – Smith maintains that the United Nations’ estimates do not tally with the realities 
on the ground in several cases. Gibbs for example, gives several other characteristics of 
urban areas with their variations.164 For the purposes if this study, the concept of 
urbanisation is taken to mean a socio-economic and political dynamic pertaining to human 
                                            
159 Kingsley Davis, 1961. “Foreword” to Jack P. Jibbs, Urban Research Methods, Princeton N.J, D. Van 
Nostrand Co. p xxi. 
160 UN, (1970). Administrative Aspects of Urbanisation. New York: Department of Economic and Social 
Affairs, United Nations p. 4. 
161 Dukakis – Smith, D. (1997).  The Third World City. 
162 Opcit, UN (1970), p. 7 
163 Opcit, Dukakis-Smith (1997), p.2. 
164 Jack P. Gibbs (1961), Urban Research Methods, in his “Introduction.”. 
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livelihoods in specific urban settlements. It is a dynamic that involves the interplay of social, 
economic and political forces and the people’s needs, desires and aspirations.  This dynamic 
underscores the essential premise that the people who live and work in urban areas need the 
provision of services and goods: they desire to a reasonable quality of life and they aspire to 
secure opportunities such as jobs and material as well as social well being. 
 
In this context, it expected that the government policies will be designed to put in place 
frameworks through which the needs, desires and aspirations of urban people will be met. 
The basic assumption in such policy framework would be that the government knows what 
people’s needs, desires and aspirations are.  It would solicit views on how they could be met 
and consequently, would make attempts towards getting them met.  In reality however, in 
poor countries like Uganda – long afflicted by political conflicts, economic decline and 
mismanagement, institutional decay and social disorders165, the conditions for proper policy 
planning, economic development and political stability have not been sufficiently salubrious 
to allow long term planning and sustenance of certain respectable levels of service delivery. 
While urbanization in terms of large concentrations of human settlements in Uganda is 
relatively a new phenomenon, largely spanned off by the colonial administration, urban 
settlements existed before the advent of colonial rule (Anderson 2000, Southall and Gutkind 
1956).166 
 
The conditions hat pertained during the pre-colonial times were such that the urban areas 
formed around the nucleus of the King’s palace where servants and soldiers lived.  The 
advent of colonial rule had similar effect except that colonialism introduced new social 
dynamics along Western norms and values such as: extended trade, commerce and industry, 
urban planning and infrastructure development. During colonialism, the “modern” urban 
areas were segregated.  For example in Kampala and other urban areas in Uganda, there 
were segregated places for Europeans, Indians and Africans planned on racial 
                                            
165 Twaddle, M. et al. (1988). “The Changing State of Uganda” in Twaddle, M. & Hansen, H. Developing 
Uganda. 
166 IBRD, (1962). The Economic Development of Uganda.. These researchers demonstrate a historical fact that 
there existed large urban settlements especially in Buganda where Kibuga, the capital city of the kings of 
Buganda sprawled over large areas with thousands of people.  Thus, it is known through their research that 
Kampala city already existed before the colonial invasion of Uganda. 
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superiority/inferiority order.  The quality of service provision too, followed that pattern167.  
For example Apter described Kampala thus: 
 … Kampala itself with its street lighting, its sewage disposal, its public 
park, and its gracious and generally clean streets where the homes of 
wealthy Asians and bangalours of European civil servants looked out from 
superb gardens of the Kampala hills.168   
 
Apter describes the social structure of the urban areas where trade was dominated by Asians. 
Africans, by 1952 constituted only 2.5% of trade in Kampala.169  In any case, Africans 
operated on the fringes of the municipality.  Similarly high positions in the civil service 
were reserved for Europeans. So segregated was Kampala to the extent that Southall and 
Gutkind describe170 the development of modern amenities in Kampala urban area during its 
early days as “the rapidly growing foreign town of European and Asian officials and 
merchants soon distinguished (itself) sharply from Uganda’s  capital, whose character 
changed too shortly”. 
 
2.7 Legal and Social Framework for Urban Development  
Apart from the social structure of urbanization during the colonial rule, the political and 
administrative development of Kampala needs to be highlighted. The legal framework for 
orderly urban growth was laid down in the Uganda Townships Ordinance of 1903, which 
among other things gave the Governor the power to define the boundaries of towns, to make 
rules and to levy rates.  In accordance with this law, Kampala was gazetted a township in 
1906.  It was directly administered from the centre by the officials of the Protectorate 
Government and financed directly with funds from the government.171 
 
The full status of the municipality was accorded to Kampala under the Local Government 
(municipalities) Ordinance of 1947. This was supplemented by the Town and Country 
Planning Ordinance of 1948.  The Local Government (municipalities) Ordinance had two 
                                            
167Ibid, Southall.A  and Gutkind.P.(1956). Administrative Problems in Greater Kampala 
168 Apter, D.. (1961). The Political Kingdom in Uganda: A Study in Bureaucratic Nationalism, p. 241. 
169  Opcit,  Apter D (1961). The Political Kingdom in Uganda, Princeton N.J; Princton University Press 1961 
pp 240 – 241.  Apter argues that despite the 1933 Trading Centres Ordinance 
170 Opcit, Southall and Gutkind, p. 4. 
171 Ibid, Southall and Gutkind,  p. 4  
 
  
71
 
 
 
fundamentals outcomes: (i) Kampala was raised to an autonomous municipal government 
with some financial, legislative and executive authority and (ii) its political and 
administrative status was raised by appointment of the Mayor and deputy Mayor. At that 
time, there was no significant urbanization in Uganda outside Kampala.  The towns of Jinja 
and Mbale began to expand only in the 1950s.  Important to note here is that all over the 
country, the colonial administration had established administrative headquarters at the 
district, county and sub-counties. It was around these administrative centres that trading 
places and other activities evolved.  In terms of planning, the European residences were still 
excluded from those of Asian traders and the African quarters. The superiority of the 
European residences went with better services and infrastructure that they were commonly 
referred to as “kizungu” (white only areas) in East African and Ugandan towns. Thus, the 
point emphasised here is that the colonial system of urban planning was based on racial 
segregation.  Ironically, the post-colonial regimes inherited similar urban planning systems – 
with the new African ruling elites and petty bourgeoisie occupying the “kizungu” areas, 
while the rest of the ordinary people were relegated to slums and other unplanned areas, 
often without provision for services such as piped water, road access, electricity, schools and 
health clinics. 
 
The post-colonial urbanization has been a paradox of sorts. To the ordinary Ugandan (or 
African), the fact that the new African ruling elites had occupied the “kizungu” area 
originally inaccessible to Africans had a demonstration effect. The new aspirations of the 
educated and African business elites changed from the contentment with the so-called 
“African housing quarters” to occupation of the exclusive urban areas previously for 
government administrators or European residents. This shift in aspirations of African elites 
complicated the system of service delivery. In the first instance, service systems had been 
planned for few European and Asian housing quarters. The rapid expansion of residences 
and other structures could not be matched with adequate services.  Second, there seems to be 
a negative attitude of the privileged elite towards provision for the poor. 
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Moreover, resources for government to expand the provision of services were also scarce.  
According to White172 urbanization in Africa has been taking place very rapidly under 
difficult circumstances.  The rapid growth of urban population had been taking place under 
stressful economic conditions. Thus, the rate of urban population growth has outstripped 
availability of financial resources, the capacity to plan and to provide meaningful services.  
White argues that despite these constraining factors, this should not serve as an excuse for 
government to neglect the unstoppable urbanisation already in high motion, or  what 
Dukakis-Smith 1997 calls “over-urbanisation.” 
 
In Uganda, a high rate of urbanization has taken place since the 1970s, during which period 
the country suffered a severe economic decline and political strife. Ocheng demonstrates173 
the negative performance of the economy during that time, characterised by poor economic 
policies, industrial decline; especially following Amin’s expalsion of the Asian 
entrepreneurs in 1972 as well as the decline in exports.  The paradox of increased rate of 
urbanisation within a context of declining economic situation had negative effect on the 
economy, the capacity of government to provide services as well as copying mechanisms 
adopted by the urban dwellers. 
 
The survival strategies of the Kampala people have class dimensions, that is: each social 
class has its variety of copying mechanisms. This is due to shortage or failure of the 
government services, which affect each social class differently. For example, civil servants 
(especially, the middle and the lower cadres) have to engage in several other activities such 
as urban farming, poultry keeping, petty business to be able to afford basic needs (shelter, 
food, clothing, children’s school bills and medical care). Due to the low level of 
industrialization, jobs in the formal private sector are also very scarce.  Most people in the 
private sector are engaged in trade and small businesses. Bigsten and Kayizzi-Mugerwa174 
                                            
172    Stren, Richard & White, Rodney. (1989). African Cities in Crisis: Managing Rapid Urban Growth. 
173 Ocheng (1998) 
174 Bigsten, A and Kayizzi-Mugerwa (1992). “Adoption and Distress in Urban Economy, Kampala”. World 
Development 20(10). 
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analyse the adoption and distress in Kampala’s urban economy.175 These authors conclude 
that activities which were formally regarded as “informal” have turned out to be “formal” 
even for senior government officials. In summary, they capture the situation in Kampala 
thus: …  
Diversification (of economic activities) has been the main household 
response to the economic decline.  It has helped urban dwellers to meet 
some of their most pressing needs, food, shelter and housing but fell short 
of satisfying their basic needs. There has been a sharp cut in living 
standards. Only a handful of people in Kampala are satisfied with their 
current lot while some slum dwellers live in unspeakable misery.  The 
main casuality of the uncertainty related to earning a living in Uganda has 
been the modern sector, notably government. It has undergone 
“casualisation” as the quality of services and the income of those engaged 
in the sector declined.   For many in the urban economy the “residue” 
sector has become a source of livelihood.176 
 
What needs to be added on the living condition of people in Kampala and their copying 
mechanisms is two-fold. First, as the economic conditions hardened, households adopted a 
“ruralisation” approach177 where people crowd in one room, do odd jobs, live with relatives 
or friends, bring food from up country to subsist on or give up more nutritious foods, give up 
modern medical treatment for traditional ones, their children go to poorer schools or none at 
all, etc. The second aspect is “fueling the government system”, where “fueling” means use 
of private resources to induce public officials to give preferential treatment (in service 
delivery) to an individual which other citizens are entitled to, but denied. This has been more 
common with the “middle” class. In those cases, corruption is seen to be part of making 
government work. These tendencies have, for a long time become part of the unprofessional 
conduct of public service in Uganda. At times, a service may appear to be scarce simply 
because the officials have “hoarded” it, to create “artificial” shortage so that it could be 
provided only to those members of society who “fuel” the system. Thus, inadequacy of 
public services may either be real and “artificial”. Corruption and other unethical conduct by 
                                            
175 Ibid, Bigsten, A. and Kayizzi Mugerwa, S. (1992), “Adoption and Distress in the Urban Economy:  A Study 
of Kampala households”  World Development. Vol. 20, No. 10, See particularly p.1427 for activities of 
different classes and survival of strategies 
176 Ibid, Bigsten, A. and Kayizzi – Mugerwa, S. (1992),  p. 1438. 
177 Bryan, R. (1978). Cities of Peasants: Explorations in Urban Analysis London: Edward Arnold Publishers. 
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government officials undermine the efforts by governments to provide services and the trust 
that citizens have in government. 
 
The urban governance situation in Uganda has not been studied carefully. Like in many 
other African countries, it may end up constituting crises for which policy makers may not 
have prepared178.   While the Uganda government has devolved some responsibilities and 
powers to both district and urban local governments, it remains to be established as to what 
extent this policy has engendered state society relations in the urban setting.  As Halfani179 
in his study of urbanization in East Africa found out, the governments’ bureaucratic 
machinery controls a minimum sphere of urban development. Halfani asserts that the failure 
of government stems from the gap between what governments are able to do and what 
people’s demands and wishes are.  As Castells, puts it, the main  contradiction is that: 
We are still helpless when we wish to act on cities and regions because we 
ignore the source of their social change and fail to identify with sufficient 
accuracy the political process underlying urban management.   As a result, 
we are left with urban systems separated from personal experiences, with 
structures without actors, actors without structures, with cities without 
citizens and citizens without cities.180 
 
Indeed this observation is apt in relation to this study. Kampala and most urban areas in 
Uganda fit this critique. For example, most urban settlements in Uganda are unplanned, 
which complicates the task of urban officials to collect property tax and ground rents.  This 
also makes service provision difficult since officials may not even be aware of new 
structures coming up in various places within the boundaries of greater Kampala.181 The city 
authorities blame the unplanned structures on the land tenure system, whereby KCC controls 
the least land in the city. Most of the land belongs to Buganda kingdom and individuals 
property owners. As an indicator of service delivery problem, by 1991 only 8% of Kampala 
residents had running water in their houses. (KCC 2000 Report) concedes that the planning 
                                            
178 Stren, R.(1994), “Towards a Research Agenda for the 1990’s: An Introduction” in Stren R. (ed).  Urban 
Research in the Developing Countries, Vol. 2: Africa. Toronto: Centre for Urban and Community Studies, 
University of Toronto. 
179 Halfani, M. (1997). “The Challenge of Urban Governance in Africa: Institutional Change and the 
Knowledge Gap” in Swilling M. (ed). Governing Africa’s Cities 
180 Castells, M. (1983). The City and the Grassroots: A Cross-Cultural Theory of Urban Social Movements. 
London: Edward Arnold 
181 Kampala has expanded from the original “seven hills” to several hills in the last twenty years 
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department of the KCC lacks basic equipment for surveying.  In 1994 with assistance of the 
World Bank a new master plan for Kampala was drawn.  However, much of the city had 
already grown without a plan. 
 
Despite these handicaps to service delivery by KCC, the Kampala Urban Study Training 
Program (1995) suggested to KCC measures for improvement of services with a focus on 
“demand–driven partnership”, recommending that “KCC move towards developing 
“partnership” with groups” in planning and service delivery.   Kampala Urban study182 
suggests: 
The demand-driven approach to service delivery is essentially the 
institutionalization of the formation of partnership between communities 
be they groups of households, local association, small - scale commercial 
institutions and business associations, and lower resistance councils, or 
any combination of these, and public institutions such as the Kampala City 
Council, parastatals, Central Government, or any combination of these183. 
 
Demands are defined as those needs of the community which are backed by willingness to 
contribute towards the service in terms of money and or labour.  The underlying principle in 
the demand – driven approach is that the services should be “owned” and managed by the 
community. Partnership in this regard, refers to the relationship between the community and 
public sector agency such as KCC.  The role of the public agency in such a partnership is to 
make sure that the community understands the cost, management, maintenance and service 
implications of the technology available, guidelines for the partnership, roles of partners as 
well as finances available.  Transparency is a critical element because for the partnership to 
work, information sharing is an essential element. Accountability on all sides is also 
important.  This is particularly so because some level of trust should develop within the 
partnership.   Trust based on well developed accountability mechanisms should make it 
possible for services to be “owned” and sustained over a long period of time184. 
                                            
182 Kampala Urban Study was a study commissioned by the World Bank in 1990 to study the structures and 
institutions of Kampala in order to improve service delivery. 
183 Kampala Urban Study Training Program, p. 12. 
184 KUS Training Program (1994). Demonstrates cases of demand – driven projects undertaken in Kampala by 
non – governmental agencies and multilateral agencies where this approach was experimented with some level 
of success.  Examples include:  (i) Kalerwe Drainage (and Project with support from the International Labour 
Organisation (ILO), done with Kalerwe community to man age floods. (ii) Community Management Project 
(Plan  International) providing basic services like latrines, water standpoints, schools in Mulago II, Bwaise III, 
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With an increasing urban population, inadequate resources and services, this approach seems 
to be feasible.   However the extent to which KCC has been able to utilize it, and if at all, its 
outcomes remain unknown. A critical study of KCC budgets since 1997 to date does not 
reveal much about the adoption of this approach. For example, over this period, what 
appears clearly in KCC budgets is that the component of administration, combining the 
Town Clerk’s Office and City Council administrative expenditures consumes a 
disproportionate share of the budgets. 
 
2.8 Importance of urban governance 
For the purposes of this study, a governance approach has been deliberately adopted. The 
rationale for a governance approach is given. This means a deliberate shift from the 
traditional urban management approach. Various ramification of governance are debated 
and a clear reason for the preference of a governance approach to the study of urbanisation 
is given. 
 
The typical Weberian “ideal” bureaucracy where rules and regulations, routines, hierarchy, 
directives are emphasised has been the modus operandi of managing organisations for the 
most part of the last century.185 The concern of the bureaucratic management of organisation 
is authority, discipline, rationality and efficiency. The problem with bureaucratic 
management however is that it tends to be rigid, less innovative, risk-avoiding and 
organisation centered. Discussing the issue of bureaucracy in Africa Nnoli and Oyugi  
argue186 that African cultural and political practices have not been conducive to attainment 
of the benefit of the Weberian bureaucratic model because the rules tend to be “bent” in a 
primordial fashion. Similarly, Leonard observing the situation of bureaucratic management 
in Africa comments: 
                                                                                                                                      
Kawampe I and II.  World Bank/UNDP also sponsored a similar project on water and sanitation in Katwe, 
p.15. 
185 Beetham, David (1987).Bureaucracy..  
186  Nnoli, D. (2000). “Public Administration” in R. Mukantala (ed.) African Public Administration: A Reader. 
Harare: AAPS,Alan Lawton and Aidan Rose, Organisation and Management in the Public Sector, (pp. 29-41). 
Oyugi, W. (1988). “Bureaucracy and Democracy in Africa” in Oyugi et al (eds). Democratic Theory Practice 
in Africa. 
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Africans are unusual among the World’s elites in the extent of their 
patronage obligation to the poorer people and the strength of the moral 
pressures they fulfill.   For these reasons and for selfish ones that are far 
more universal, state organizations in Africa are extensively used to 
pursue informal, personal goals of their managers rather than collective 
ones that are formally proclaimed.187   
 
Leonard further asserts that unlike Europe or United States, Africa has different managerial 
values, and that the problem in Africa is absence of what he calls “bureaucratic hygiene.”188 
Lack of “bureaucratic hygiene”– includes failures of systems of accounting, auditing, 
procurement, contract compliance and personnel management. According to him, these 
elements introduced in Africa by Westerners, have been on the decline. 
 
Important to note in this regard is the fact that in most African countries both in central 
government and local governments, political patronage interferes with the bureaucratic order 
and functioning. Consequently, the ordinary citizen is not properly served. This is 
compounded, in the case of poor countries like Uganda, by the lack of adequate resources, 
skilled and technically competent personnel and collapse of the managerial systems.  In 
terms of managing urban local governments in Uganda, bureaucratic “hygiene” has been far 
from the norm.   As we noted earlier, only with the advent of decentralisation has some 
semblance of order been restored.  This needs to be contextualised and analysed. 
 
2.9 A Governance Approach to Urbanisation 
In both theory and practice, there is a growing trend towards governance in public 
organizations including urban authorities.  “Governance” does not have a specific or fixed 
meaning. It is used in most places as a generic concept but its common usage underlies the 
roles of three agents in society: the state, the market and “civil society”. 
 
World Bank defines189 governance as the manner in which power is exercised in the 
management of a county’s economic and social resources for development.   World Bank’s 
                                            
187 David K. Leonard, (1987). “The Political Realities of African Management.” World Development Vol. 15, 
No 7 p. 901. 
188 Ibid, Leonard p. 903). See also, Mazrui, Ali A (1970).”Political Hygiene and Cultural Transition in Africa” 
in Journal of Asian and African Studies, Vol. 5, No. 1-2. 
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emphasis is on “good governance” which is taken to be synonymous with four elements: 
sound public sector management (efficiency), accountability, exchange and free flow of 
information (transparency) and legal framework for development (justice, human rights and 
civil liberties). In its earlier report, Sub– Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable 
Growth, World Bank observes: 
Ultimately better governance requires political renewal. This means a 
concerted attack on corruption from the highest to the lowest level. This can 
be done by strengthening accountability, encouraging public debate, 
nurturing free press and empowering the women and the poor by fostering 
grassroots organizations….190 
Beyond the World Bank’s perspective, the debate on what governance is, remains varied and 
at times, controversial: yet it is a useful one.  Almost all commentators and analysts who 
have utilized the concept of governance have adopted it to particular circumstances and 
realities. What is critically prevalent, especially in the developing countries, is the 
dominance of neo-liberal policies.  These, in one way or the other, claim to promote “good 
governance”.  The Ugandan policy reforms ranging from macro economic restructuring, 
civil service reforms, liberalisation, privatisation and decentralisation claim to have elements 
of “good governance”.  More specifically the policy of decentralisation is pursued in order 
to promote good governance.191 
 
It is argued that the ascendance of neo-liberal governments in several countries in the 1970s 
and the 1980s onwards saw the rise of economic and political restructuring of the state: 
deregulation of markets, privatisation, reduction of civil service, introduction of 
“managerialism” and other institutional reforms192.  It is noted further that the restructuring 
deprived the state of its traditional sources of power and therefore governance is seen as part 
of the strategy to re-define the role of the state in society.193  Pierre posits that there are two 
meanings of governance: “old governance” and “new governance”.194 To him … 
“governance refers to sustained coordination and coherence among a wider variety of actors 
                                            
190 Opcit, World Bank (1989, p 6) 
191 Nsibambi, A. (1998), Sorensen and Lubanga 1996, Government of Uganda, 2001) 
192 Opcit, Pierre,  (2000) p.1-2 
193 Ibid, Pierre,  p. 2 
194 Jon Pierre, “Introduction: Understanding Governance” in Jon Pierre (ed) Debating Governance Oxford 
University Press, 2000, p. 3 ‘old governance’ is “state centric” or emphasises the role of the state while “new 
governance” is “society centric”, the role of he non state actors in society in provision of services and self 
governance.  Pierre concedes that neither perspective makes prejudgments about the focus of power. 
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with different purposes and objectives”.195 Such actors may include: political actors and 
institutions, corporate groups and interests, civil society and informal groups and 
transnational organizations. In such a situation, some of the roles that were previously 
performed by government may be taken over by these other actors.  According to this logic, 
that is the reason why the concept of governance is broader than government. Thus, 
governance is the synergy between the state and the non-state actors. 
 
Since governance is a very broad concept, it is important that several of its elements are 
delienated so that those aspects are consistent with a specific study like this one are 
identified and utilized to explain issues in specific situations.  As Hirst puts196 it, governance 
should be seen as means by which an activity or a set of activities is controlled so that it 
produces a set of acceptable outcomes. For this reason, it is the debate about states and 
markets.  He argues197 that for instance, if the market was left to govern society it would 
breed “liberal anarchism”.  Since the state is seen to be overextended, and the market and 
other forces in society are supposed to limit that extension, it is imperative that the limited 
state be democratic and efficient. 
 
Governance is also perceived as a response to the inherent weaknesses in the state and the 
market.  Rhodes has pointed out that the shift from traditional public administration to 
governance was the result of loss of faith by students of public administration in the state 
because “…bureaucrats were conceived as self-serving who sought to maximize the agency 
budgets”.  The public interest had become a myth.198 The marketisation too, was fragmented 
and had lost control or coordination. 
 
Within the various perspectives on governance, Minogue, et al, have summarized the 
argument in the context of neo-liberal reforms whereby:  
from the distortions produced by the government interventions; public 
sector reforms followed the same logic, blurring the distinctions between 
                                            
195 Pierre ibid, p 4 
196 Opcit, Hirst, (2000, p.24) 
197 Ibid, p.24) 
198 Rhodes R.A.W. (2000) “Governance and Public Administrations” in Jon Pierre (ed) Debating Governance 
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“public” and “private”…introducing private sector disciplines into the 
public sector…  To examine the government or the public sector was to 
examine the state in Economic reforms have focused on liberating the 
operations of the markets the context of its broad relations to society and 
economy…199 
In this regard, it is claimed that the shift in the emphasis to public management as a typology 
of governance is occasioned by the failure of the state to steer development and at times 
acting as a barrier to development.  Public bureaucracies are failing to manage efficiently.  
Public service is seen as “too inflexible and rule-bound to respond to the changing needs” of 
society.200  In pursuit of public management, private sector principles have been adopted for 
management of public sector organizations. The private sector principles include: 
“managerial capacity, flexibility and competitive drive essential for the efficient and 
effective provision of activities previously assumed to be the province of the public sector” 
(ibid p. 3).201 The public sector in most countries is being reviewed to take care of these 
fundamental changes for instance; local governments have to tender for more work to 
competitive private sector organisations. 
 
The imperative elements of public sector management are identified by Minogue to include: 
i) managers should be given, the freedom to manage, they must be under corresponding 
obligation of accountability for their performance, 
ii) efficiency mechanisms must be promoted: managers must be cost-conscious, 
efficiency review mechanisms be put in performance agreements for senior managers, 
service targets should be designed and above all, methods of measuring customer 
atisfaction/dissatisfaction should designed202; 
iii) decentralized accountability (financial delegation), and  
                                            
199 For a detailed debate on the shift in analysis from traditional public administration to public management, 
Minogue, Polidano and Hulme (1998) “Introduction: the analysis of public management governance” in Martin 
Minogue et al (eds) Beyond the New Public Management, Cheltonham, Edward Edgar. 
200 Ibid, Minogue Polidano and Hulme 
201 A similar discussion in Owen Hughes ( ) Public Sector Management and Administration 
202 Martin Minogue “Changing the State: concepts and practice in the reform of the public sector” in Minogue, 
Polidano and Hume (ibid 1998: 27). Programmes for customer care could include: citizens charter, customer 
care programmes and quality management initiatives in addition to standards of service delivery, openness, 
consultation with service users, value for money and choice. 
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(iv)    the gap between customer expectations and satisfaction must be narrowed. 
Public sector management principles have been introduced in most local governments 
including Uganda’s urban local governments. However, the success of these mechanisms in 
the developed industrial societies cannot be assumed for poor countries. It is generally 
acknowledged that the concept of a “customer” which has been borrowed from private 
sector management does adequately apply to a public service consumer, who is at the same 
time a citizen and a taxpayer. In poor countries, where poverty and illiteracy are high, the 
assumptions that an ordinary citizen will make choice amongst alternatives presented in the 
provision of public service is greatly compromised by his or her failure to access all the 
information as well as his or her limited options.  Most ordinary citizens believe that after 
paying taxes, the government should provide the public services on the basis of the taxes. 
Advocates of the public sector management approach tend to assume that the new approach 
will open up bureaucratic systems to scrutiny and transparency.  On the contrary, most 
government information including local governments, for instance in Uganda remains 
inaccessible.  The behaviour of the political and bureaucratic elites also remains attached to 
the old ways.  Hence, the quest for “good governance” through new public management 
remains contentious in many respects in Uganda’s public sector. 
 
Some elements of public sector management which are claimed to promote “good 
governance” have been attempted in the implementation of Uganda’s decentralisation 
policy, these include:  
(i) “value for money” accountability where it is emphasized that money’s worth of service 
must be seen instead of “paper” accountability,  
(ii) institutional accountability whereby each organ of the local government is charged 
with a particular responsibility has to account for its activities in its work plan and 
budget; 
(iii) representation whereby the elected representatives of the people constitute a “body 
corporate”, the council of each local government level to which the administrative 
staff account.  This representative element also acts as a “voice” of the people in 
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determining priorities of each local government. The representatives also oversee the 
implementation of programmes of the local government concerned; 
(iv) at managerial level, the recommendations of the civil service reform require the local 
government to practise results –oriented-management;203 
(v) and competitive examinations conducted by the District Service Commissions are held 
for promotions in local governments.   
Despite existence of these limited “benchmarks”, to promote good governance through new 
public management principles, there are grey areas of patrimonialism – the tendencies 
towards favouratism, corruption, nepotism and political cronyism have tended to undermine 
the efficacy of “good governance” through public management principles. Efficiency and 
effectiveness, the pinnacles of new public management suffer at the altar of political 
expediency. Following that logic, the claim that better management will increase the 
citizens’ willingness to pay taxes and contribute towards programmes could be greatly 
reduced. 
 
2.10 State–Society Relations as “Good Governance” 
While attempts have been made to reform the public sector by introducing some public 
management principles in the process of implementing decentralisation in Uganda, the 
missing link has remained on restructuring and reconfiguring state – society relations in that 
the process. It is claimed in Uganda, that decentralisation is a means of “bringing power 
closer to the people”. This may in itself be an empty usage of political rhetoric. Alternatively 
it may imply “decentralized despotism”204.  “Good governance” is a qualified concept by the 
World Bank that is distinguishable from the generic and broader concept of governance205. 
                                            
203 Ministry of Public Service, Public Service Reform 2000-2004, Result Oriented Management (ROM) means 
that each department and every senior administrative staff must be rated on the basis of set goal, and 
achievements or accomplishments within a given specific period. 
204 Mamdani, M. (1995). And Fire Does Not Always Beget Ash: Critical Reflection on the NRM. Kampala: 
The Monitor Publications. 
205 For example, RAW Rhodes (2000) identifies atleast seven usages of the concept governance.  In my view, 
limiting governance to “good governance” helps to limit its scope and application to a few variables that can be 
used in this study. 
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Good governance is limited to three levels of government accountability206.  These are (i) 
political accountability whereby the constitution subjects the political leadership to credible 
electoral processes with limited periods of office, (ii) legal accountability emphasises an 
objective and reliable judicial system, law enforcement and court administration, (iii) and 
bureaucratic accountability, that is, efficient and effective delivery of services. This 
definition has been criticised for being state-centric.  However, while there is no need for a 
limited state, the state in Africa is still a major actor and mediator in social and public 
policy.  In Africa and in poor countries like Uganda, a sound state system is necessary to 
build institutions for economic and political stability. The latter elements are pre-requisites 
for both democratic governance and efficacious state-society relations. State–society 
relations are an interplay between state actions and those of other actors in society.  
Contextualised in the sense of good governance, non-state actors play significant roles in 
promoting democracy, advocating for the rights of their membership, self–provision and 
above all in engaging the state to meet its obligations. By engaging in service delivery, non-
state actors become either independent providers or co-producers with state agents, in both 
cases they lie in the realm of the market. By engaging the state actors in continuous 
dialogue, they become watchdogs against abuse of the public office, enhance accountability, 
and prompt effectiveness of the state actors.  In short, they play a representative function, 
which logically, promotes a democratic engagement.  In addition, by occupying the space 
where the state has failed to perform its mandated functions they enhance values of 
collective citizenship and collective action.  Thus while new public management discussed 
above deals with the quality of government as an aspect of good governance, the notion of 
civil society (non state actors) promotes good governance by virtues of participation, 
representation, responsiveness and self–determination.  The question then is, how do these 
play at the local level, and more precisely for our purposes, at local urban level? 
Uganda’s civil society is weak.207 The key factors militating against the vibrance of civil 
society include among others: political instability, preoccupation with economic survival, 
low levels of literacy, ethnic conflicts, predominance of an agricultural economy and low 
                                            
206 Opcit, McCarney (2000), p.3 
207 Mujaju 1998, Makara, S. (1998). Political and Administrative Issues in Decentralisation” in Nsibambi A. 
(ed). 1998. Decentralisation and Civil Society in Uganda. 
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levels of industrilisation.  In respect of the latter aspects, government policies seem to have 
undermined civil society.  First, the agricultural-based cooperative societies and unions were 
undermined by the government’s macro-economic policies of liberalisation.  Secondly, the 
trade union movement was co-opted into the NRM government by appointment of some of 
its leaders to parliament.  The women’s organizations to a large extent, have also been co-
opted for government support.208 
Despite the weaknesses of civil society organizations in Uganda there is evidence to suggest 
that during the tenure of the NRM in power, an atmosphere conductive to the growth of civil 
society has prevailed. Nonetheless, civil society organizations have had to engage in 
themselves in “censorship” in the ways they deal with the government, taking limited 
options: either to be apolitical or to support state activities.209 
While the growth of the civil society in Uganda could be attributed to relative political 
stability and a liberalized economic policy. The key factor facilitating their expansion seems 
to be donor support.  According to Dicklitch210 most civil society organizations are donor-
dependent.  The donors tend to believe that civil society organizations are less bureaucratic, 
more participatory and reach the more disadvantaged people.  Equally, the new approaches 
adopted by government for provision of services under decentralisation require that 
organized groups have some input in policies of local government including their budget 
framework. Some civil society organizations have played key roles in this arrangement. 
 
In conceptual terms, the term civil society remains confusing due to the competing usages it 
attracts211.  Although Robinson and White212 warn that “any attempt to compress the idea of 
civil society into homogeneous and virtuous stereotype is doomed to failure”. A broader 
conceptualization of civil society should include as many non-state actors as possible.  It is 
                                            
208 Trip Mari Aili. (2001), “Women’s Movements and Challenges to Neopatrimonial Rule: Preliminary 
Observations from Africa”. Development  and Change. Vol. 32(1). 
209 Dicklitch, S. (1998). “The Incomplete Democratic Transition in Uganda” in Remonda Bensabat-Kleinberg 
& Janine Astrid Clark (eds), Economic Liberalisation. Democratization and Civil Socieity in Developing 
World. 
210 Ibid, (1998) 
211 Robinson, M. and White, G. (1998). The Democratic Developmental State: Politics and Institutional 
Design, p. 299. 
212 (ibid, p. 299) 
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well known that not all non-state actors are necessarily “virtuous”.  However, a diagnosis of 
their internal behaviours should reveal their strength and weaknesses.  Prejudging them may 
be methodologically dangerous. Moreover, White and Robinson argue213 that while… “there 
is a strong argument to the effect that both state and civil forms of provision have intrinsic, 
albeit different, strength and weaknesses, the question arises as to the extent to which some 
kind of complimentarity can be organized in the provision of services between state agencies 
on one side and civic organizations of various kinds on the other214.  From this perspective, 
it is plausible then to talk of a synergy between state agencies and non-state actors in 
provision of services.  Thus, unlike situations where the state agencies impose their will and 
bureaucratic formalities a non-bureaucratic synergy is seen as more productive, producing 
people-centred governance outcomes.215 
 
2.11. Linking Good governance and decentralisation in the urban context 
Following decades of institutional decline and economic distress, urbanization in Uganda 
grew without adequate policy frameworks, financial and managerial capabilities. Due to 
low-level industrialization and meagre opportunities for formal employment, the informal 
sector expanded in almost all sectors.  By 1992 when decentralisation was launched to begin 
a new process of institution building countrywide, to “bring the state back in” to use Peter 
Evans phrase, “informalisation” was the order of the day rather than the exception.  KCC 
admits that most of the Kampala’s present residential areas have been developed without 
following the formal procedures.  In many places, there are no access roads, and no drainage 
channels or sanitation facilities. Thus, even with more powers, responsibilities and 
resources, the KCC administration faces a daunting task of restructuring the city already 
taken over by “illegal” developers.  However, it appears pertinent to argue that the failure of 
the state to responsibly execute its role is not the fault of the people. 
                                            
213 Ibid (1998, p.6) 
214 Gordon White and Mark Robinson, (1998) “Towards Synergy in Social Provision: Civic Organizations and 
the State”, in Martin Minogue, Charles Polidano and David Hulme Beyond the New Public Management 
Chaltenham: Edward Edgar. 
215 Swilling, M. (1997). “Introduction” in Swilling (ed). Governing Africa’s Cities. Johnannesburg: University 
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As several commentators on the Third World cities have observed the problem of the third 
word cities is a problem of governance resulting from failure of the city governments to 
develop the institutions and priorities that are related to citizens’ pressing problems216.  
Specifically, African cities have been neglected by both national governments and the donor 
community.217  Tostensen et al note218 that while Africa used to be the least urbanized part 
of the world, today, it is experiencing unprecedented high rates of urbanization.  Rakodi and 
Stren blame219 African governments for rural bias in their policies, yet urban conditions 
continue to deteriorate.  Stren (ibid) observes that the urban situation in Sub-Saharan Africa 
might reach crisis levels since governments’ responses to increased urbanization are 
constrained by internal and external factors such as severe financial crises, the debt burden, 
donor pressures and political instability. 
Uganda’s case of urbanization needs a broad but focused policy, which is presently non-
existent. This is imperative because as the Population Secretariat (2001) has noted that 
urbanization in Uganda might constitute a new crisis. The Population Secretariat has 
expressed the problem of urbanization in terms of high fertility rate, high rates of rural-urban 
migration, uncontrolled growth of urban areas and a high rate of urban population growth of 
6.4%. According to the Population Secretariat, while the total urban population was 940,000 
in 1980, it is presently estimated to be 3.5 million and is projected to reach 18.6 million 
people in 2025.  According to these estimates, half of Uganda’s population will be living in 
urban areas by 2025.  These indicators clearly demonstrate that the “myth” that Uganda is a 
dominantly rural country may be placed and lacking in the long term development planning. 
                                            
216 Hardoy E. Jorge and Satterwaite D. (1997).  “Building the Future City” in Gugler Joseph, Cities in the 
Developing World.  Oxford:  Oxford University Press., Rakodi, C. (1997), ).  “Global forces, urban change and 
Urban management in Africa”  in Rakodi Carole (ed).  The Urban Challenge in Africa:  Growth and 
Management of its Large Cities.  Tokyo:  United Nations University, Aina, T. (1997). The State and Civil 
Society:  Politics, Governments and Social Organisation in African cities” in Rakodi C. (ed).  The Urban 
Challenge in Africa:  Growth and Management of its large cities, ToKyo:  United Nations University., Gugler, 
(1997).Cities in the Developing World: Issues, Theory and Policy. Oxford: Oxford University Press., Perlman, 
J. (1993), “Mega-Cities:  Global urbanization and Innovation”, in G. Shabbir Cheema (ed).  Urban 
Management:  Policies and Innovations in the Devleoping Countries.  Honolulu, East-West Centre.Opcit, 
Stren, (1994) 
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areas and that in the Third World the urban population will grow at a rate of140, 000 per day, p 26. 
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Stockholm:  Nordic African Institute. 
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With the above trends in mind, three issues make urbanization in the Uganda problematic.  
When the World Bank assessed the development needs and priorities of Uganda at the time 
of gaining independence from British colonial rule in 1962, only 4% of the population lived 
and worked in urban areas, today it is 16%, and if projections are something to go-by, a half 
of it will be living in urban areas by 2025. The second issue concerns the low productive 
capacities of the urban economy. As consequences of economic malaise that befell the 
country in 1970s and 1980s the formal economy collapsed such as industries and large 
commercial undertakings yet the urban population continued to grow. Thirdly, the collapse 
of the economy and political instability led to institutional decline of state institutions, 
consequently the urban as well as the rural infrastructure lay in ruins, and service delivery 
stagnated while household incomes declined. 
The challenge of urbanization in Uganda lies in whether or not the government will evolve a 
long-term urbanisation policy.  It is a question of whether in the short and medium term; the 
urban local governments will utilize the opportunities created by the current decentralisation 
policy to promote institutional mechanism for enhancing a new managerial spirit and a 
governance agenda to a multifaceted mileu of urban issues. My present study intends to 
contribute towards urban governance taking decentralisation as a starting point in tackling 
entrenched social, economic and political issues in Uganda’s urban setting challenging the 
seemingly one-sided belief in official circles that the locus of development is to do with 
“rural development”.  
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Chapter 3 
 
Local Governance in Uganda: An Historical Overview 
 
3.0 Introduction 
Historical and contemporary analysis of socio-economic and political developments in 
Uganda reveals what Low terms as a “dislocated polity”.220  The historical development of 
Uganda as a nation has been a chequered one – where chaos as opposed to order has been a 
norm rather than an exception. The main cause of social and economic troubles has been 
political instability. While the British colonial rule (that lasted sixty-eight years) had created 
a mixture of direct oppression and a semblance of political order under their policy of 
“indirect rule”, the post-colonial state in Uganda for the most part, has been characterized by 
chaos, dictatorship, economic misery, social disorder and collapse of the institutions for 
service delivery. 
 
This state of affairs affected not only the development and growth of national institutions 
but also the local ones.  In particular, the local institutions have been victims of the political 
malaise at the national level. In this chapter, a retrospective overview summarises the 
developments of the local government system in Uganda.  Specifically, the focus is on urban 
local governments, their relations thereof with the urban society and their capacity to serve 
or promote the welfare of their constituents. Reflection on these issues is made on the 
colonial and the post-colonial periods. 
 
3. 1 The Colonial Heritage of Uganda’s Local Government System 
African societies in Uganda were at various stages of socio-economic and political 
development by the time of colonization. Several European explorers, missionaries and 
                                            
220 D.A Low 1988 “The dislocated polity” in H. Hansen and M. Twaddle Uganda Now, pp 36-53.  Low argues 
that prospects of building a united and integrated Ugandan nation since colonial times through the post-
colonial period had eluded its leaders.  
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colonizers acknowledged that there was an elaborate indigenous system of administration in 
Uganda especially in the kingdom of Buganda.221  For example, Kenneth Ingham writes: 
The leading part played by the Baganda in the affairs of the Protectorate 
was also due to its indigenous system of centralized, autocratic and 
bureaucratic government.222 
 
It is precisely for the same reason of Buganda’s elaborate traditional bureaucracy that the 
British colonial rulers used the services of Baganda agents to establish their hegemony 
throughout the country.223  The role of Baganda agents however, should not be romanticised.  
While it has been equated with “sub-imperialism”224, that is a thesis that cannot be 
sustained. 
 
The development of modern local government in Uganda owes its genesis to the British 
colonial policy as they deemed it expedient and practical. The development of the modern or 
Western style local government in Uganda began from the premise of enforcing law and 
order and introduction of hut tax (later poll tax). It was designed within the framework of 
Lugard’s so called “indirect rule”225 a convenient administrative method of exploiting local 
talent and values, and resources to minimize the costs of administration in colonial entities. 
The principle of indirect rule was described thus: 
[Indirect rule] is designed to adopt for purposes of local government the tribal 
institutions which the native people have evolved for themselves, so that the 
latter may develop in a constitutional manner from their own past, guided and 
restrained by the traditions and sanctions which they have inherited, moulded 
or modified as they may be on the advice of British officers, and by the 
general control of those officers.226 
 
Burke further notes: 
As the Baganda already had an admirable (administrative) system in the 
operation, it followed that the solution to the impasse of ruling territories 
                                            
221  Uganda was formally declared a British Protectorate on April 1, 1893 when the British flag (The Union 
Jack) was hoisted in Kampala by Gerald Portal. 
222 86 Kenneth Ingham, 1962, A History of East Africa, p 239 
223Ibid.Ingham 
224 Ibid Ingham 
225 Lugard F.(1922). The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa. London. 
226 Quoted in Fred G. Burke (1964) Local Government and Politics in Uganda, p.33.  According to Burke p. 34 
when the system of indirect rule would be attempted in areas that had no traditional centralized systems it run 
into serious trouble. 
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characterized by political anarchy was to superimpose a similar chiefly 
hierarchy over Buganda’s “unorganized” neighbours.  Thus, “indirect rule” in 
its original sense was replaced by an indirect style of indirect rule.227 
 
It is important to note nevertheless, that the British indirect rule when applied to Uganda 
was stark with contradictions. The first observation is that sheer administrative convenience 
rather than genuine concern for the well-being of the subjects was its philosophical 
foundation. Secondly, despite its claim of “preserving” native authority and values, the 
sovereignty of the native authority was surrendered to the British government.  In the case of 
Uganda, several agreements, including the famous Buganda Agreement of 1900 were 
instructive to the effect that the king (Kabaka) of Buganda become a sub-sovereign to the 
king of England.228 Thirdly, the adoption of the Buganda model of administration for local 
administration throughout the country was itself a contradiction, which according to 
Karugire “had been effectively undermined by the European intrusion.”229 Throughout the 
colonial period, the main instrument of colonial administration at the local level was the 
African chief. The Native Authority Ordinance of 1919 formalized the institution of the 
chief.  The main purpose of this Ordinance was to clarify the powers, duties and privileges 
of African chiefs in all areas of the Protectorate except Buganda.  Under this law, the chiefs 
were given powers to prevent crimes, to arrest offenders, to prohibit Africans from carrying 
arms, and to require Africans to provide compulsory and free labour for public projects.  The 
institution of the chief was the main contradiction and negation of indirect rule.  Not only 
was the chief alien to segmented societies especially in the Northern part of Uganda, where 
clans collectively made decisions, it introduced to these societies “one-man rule.”230  
 
The powers of the chief extended to arrest, seizure, and control over allocation and use of 
property were almost unlimited.  Under this law, the chief had power to issue orders to be 
obeyed by Africans residing in his area of jurisdiction and in all his actions “proper” or 
                                            
227 ibid Fred G. Burke, p 34 
228 Full discussion of the implications of the Buganda Agreement 1900 in Samwiri R. Karugire (1980) A 
Political History of Uganda pp. 100-104.  For legal and political interpretation of the Agreement, see also 
Grace Ibingira (1976) The Forging of an African Nation, Viking Press, 1976. 
229 Opcit, Karugire (1980), p 123. 
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“arbitrary” he was only ultimately answerable to the District Commissioner.231  The new 
role of the African chief pushed his powers beyond traditional limits.  In the traditional 
sense, a chief was part of society and not above it. The chief’s powers were defined by 
tradition and not by the dictates of foreign superiors. Worse still, in segmented societies 
such as those in Northern Uganda, the attempt by the British to handpick some obsequious 
people to act as chiefs in place of “decentralisation” traditional clan leaders was met with 
resistance and resentment.232 
 
Even the colonial officers themselves held indirect rule as a system of governance in doubt. 
For example, the Governor of the Uganda Protectorate wrote in 1939 that, “a system of 
“indirect rule” although we had none of us heard about the phrase and no clear intention of 
establishing any particular system… it could not be otherwise when you were extremely 
lucky if you got an assistant for a district with a hundred thousand and there were no such 
things as regular police forces or departmental representation in the districts.  All you could 
infact do was to explain what you wanted to some “Native Authority,” and he – or she was 
generally only too anxious to please, the result was that it was done.”233 
 
Colonial administration relied on expedience rather than the force of customary law.234 The 
substitution of the employees for traditional chiefs was carried further in Uganda than any 
other East African territory. This was similar to the Nigerian colonial situation which also 
happened to be a British Protectorate. The British administrators deposed “stubborn” local 
chiefs. For example, the Oba of Lagos was removed in 1951 and in 1954 the king of Bonny 
was deported. The key mission of the British administrators was to establish effective 
political control and to ensure free trade, especially along the Niger River and the coast.  
Sometimes military and naval forces were used to achieve this end.235 This was to the extent 
                                            
231 Fred G. Burke opcit pp. 34-35.  In accordance with the Native authority Ordinance 1919, the chief could 
arrest one of his subjects, try the offender in his court, pass judgment, and levy a fine or imprisonment.  See 
also David Apter (1961) The Political Kingdom in Uganda pp 224-225 the chiefs in Buganda had a dual 
loyalty to Kabaka and the Protectorate Government.  
232 Opcit, Karugire (1980), p. 125. 
233 Uganda Protectorate (1939) Native Administration: Note by the Governor Entebbe: Government Printer 
(p.4) 
234 Uganda Protectorate (1939). Administrative Instructions, p.5. 
235 See J.F.A Ajayi (1962), Mulestones in Nigerian History, Ibadan University Press, pp 28-36. 
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that the colonial masters exacted obedience of their new employees by ensuring that the 
District Commissioner supervised the “Chiefs” and his supervisory role extended “to the 
conduct of every minor official down to the village clerk or constable” (Uganda 
Protectorate, ibid, p.5).  This type of administration had direct implications for state-society 
relations.  For example, it is noted that in colonial administration, not only were all civil 
servants directly answerable to the Governor, this had other implications for society as a 
whole.  It was noted: 
… There is thus an inevitable neglect of communal feelings and loyalties and 
of imponderable but great forces of local tradition and hereditary which have 
played so large a part in the history of our own [British] and other civilized 
countries…In so far as the African masses are concerned the government is 
not only uncontrollable, it is immovable; and if it administers through a 
centralized bureaucratically controlled civil service right down to the contact 
with the peasants in his village, it becomes in fact obliged to impose a rigidly 
authoritarian system throughout.  There is neither a place nor opportunity for 
dissent and opposition, the only choice is between the acquiescence or 
agitation, subservience or sedition.236 
 
Although Karugire suggests237 that colonial administration and the Uganda Protectorate 
existed merely on the “law books” and  “maps of the Land Office”, his observation is 
partially correct, for the colonial masters not only had great influence, they actually 
dominated the state of affairs in Uganda. 
 
Colonial administration and influence was established through treaties with African kings or 
chiefs, persuasion as well as force-the latter usually applied where resistance was 
encountered. Nonetheless, the colonial administration was neither democratic nor 
community-spirited. As Hannigan observes238, colonial administration “did little…to 
develop a community-spirit” as the District Commissioners remained policy makers and 
chief executives while chiefs acted as tax collectors and law enforcement agents.  In many 
respects therefore, the colonial administration was detached from day to day lives of 
ordinary Africans except in matters of rigorously enforcing law and order.  As Low 
                                            
236  Uganda Protectorate, (1939) Native Administration, ibid pp 5-6 
237 Opcit, Karugire (1980)., p. 142. 
238 Hannigan, D. (1958),  A Royal Technical  College of East Africa. Efficiency Against Self Expression in 
Local Government. East Africa Institute of Social Research Conference. p.4. 
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observes239 in this respect: “Singularly few Africans realized that in dealing with British 
administrators they were dealing with the agents of a huge Leviathan which was quite 
prepared to swallow them up.” 
 
The “huge Leviathan” in this case, one supposes that Low meant the structure of the British 
administration and their policy interventions.  Indeed whether positive or negative, there was 
no alternative left for Africans, for the choice was either concession or subjugation to British 
authority.  For example, the British colonial officer in Toro received orders in 1896 that 
stated: 
It is clear that the good government, security and general progress are 
matters in which we are directly interested and it is equally certain that the 
local chiefs look to her H. M’s representatives for guidance in their local 
affairs and recognise his general authority over them.240 
 
Thus, true to the design and intentions of colonial rule, the claims that “indirect rule” 
retained the authority of traditional and local rulers is far fetched. Lugard himself, one of the 
architects of this policy claims in The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa, p.5 that the 
mission of their policy was “to inculcate in the natives a sense of individual responsibility, 
of liberty and justice and to teach their rulers how to apply these principles”.  In addition, 
Lugard does not seem to have had much faith in his so-called principles, for he writes 
further … “in the interest of good government, the right of confirming or otherwise, the 
choice of the people of the successor to a chiefship and disposing of any ruler for misrule or 
otherwise adequate cause is reserved to the Governor.” 
  
The issue here therefore, is the contention as to whether “indirect” rule promoted “liberty” 
of and “justice” for ordinary natives and taught their rulers how to apply them when the 
choice of the people could be disposed without further reference to them. The administrative 
framework put in place in Uganda under “indirect rule” has been summarized by Morris and 
Read241 as, “at best paternalistic and at worst autocratic”.  Similarly, in terms of social and 
                                            
239 Opcit, Low (1958),  p.7. 
240 Quoted in D.A. Low “ The Anatomy of Administrative Origins: Uganda, 1890-1902” p. 12, Paper Presented 
at the East African Institute of Social Research, Kampala Conference January 1958. 
241 Morris , H. F. and Read, J.S. (1972). Uganda: The Development of its Laws and Constitutions. 
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economic development Ehrlich observes that the “Imperial policy at that time was of self-
sufficiency in contrast to ideals of development and welfare of the native.242 
 
Colonial administration affected the conduct of local affairs in two significant ways.  These 
are issue of land and culture.  Through the Buganda Agreement, land was appropriated to 
the chiefly class, thus the ordinary peasants became a tenant, and a subject of exploitation by 
both the chief and colonial administration.243.  In matters of culture and customary law these 
too were tempered and sometimes confused.  For example, Kenneth Ingham observes: 
Lesser courts frequently tried people for offences which had neither legal 
nor traditional sanction. In some areas a refusal to assist in building a 
church might result in a man finding himself in court.244 
 
Thus, while certain traditional customs were not considered repugnant to morality, the 
colonial administration found it expedient to discourage them.  However local chiefs, having 
become protégés of colonial administration took it upon themselves to give application to 
cases that had neither the force of modern nor customary law, as the case of building 
churches cited above by Ingham.  There were however, cases where colonial administration 
took exception to its imposition of their law and allowed customary procedure to prevail.245  
Largely, it is difficult to ascertain whether or not “indirect rule” in Uganda contributed 
significantly to the development of “modern” African local “self-government.” By self-
government, meaning effective participation of ordinary people in governance of their 
locality, especially, given that the institution of the local chief became more despotic and 
sometimes totalitarian than had been the case before the advent of colonial rule. 
 
                                            
242  Ehrlich C. “The Uganda Economy 1903-1945” in Vincent and Harlow, A History of East Africa II also, 
Cyril Ehrlich, “Cotton and the Uganda Economy” East African Institute of Social Research, Kampala, 
(Conference) January, 1957. 
243 See, Grace Ibingira, The Forging of an African Nation 
244 Kenneth Ingham (1958). The Making of Modern Uganda, p.169. 
245 Ibid, Kenneth Ingham (1958)  The Making of Modern Uganda pp. 168-69 for example, in 1918 the colonial 
administration reminded  Buganda Lukiiko (the Buganda Legislature) that under the 1900 Agreement they had 
also no power to make laws.  However, the Governor later admitted it was a mistake. 
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3.2 Colonial Government Reforms at the Local Level 
The African post-colonial governments inherited a relatively developed system of local 
government from the British colonial administration and as Kasfir argues246 such elements 
of a modern local government system took effect only in the second half of the 20th century.  
Before that time there is little evidence that the British system of “indirect rule” had created 
an efficacious system of local government in Uganda. In the rural areas, the colonial 
administration helped to preserve tribal entities under the watchful eye of the local chief 
while the urban areas were removed from the native administration (especially in those areas 
where Europeans and Indians were more numerous such as Kampala and Entebbe 
township). As Sathyamurthy puts it: 
The district boma during the colonial era might be said to represent not 
merely the symbol of central authority but the central authority itself.”247  
 
The structure of power for most of the colonial period was hierarchical, centralized and 
controlled from above, right from the Governor, Provincial Commissioner, District 
Commissioner down to the chiefs. The implementation of administrative directives was 
equally hierarchical. For example, The Administrative Instructions issued by the 
Protectorate Government in 1940 had this say: 
The Provincial Commissioner is, within the limits of his province, the 
principal executive officer of government and is personally and directly 
responsible to the Governor for the peace and good order of his province 
and for the efficient conduct of all public business therein.248 
 
The same instructions add that the Provincial Commissioner was empowered to issue 
directives to any officer serving in his province “preferably by word of mouth.”249 In 
addition, in cases of emergency, the Provincial Commissioner was empowered to act as “the 
sole judge” and to issue orders, “Which must be carried out by the recipients without 
delay.”250 Similarly, the District Commissioner was in position to do the same in relation to 
the district, as was the Provincial Commissioner to his province, to exercise “similar 
                                            
246 Opcit, Kasfir (1993). 
247 Sathyamurthy T.V (1966), “Central–Local Relationships at the District Headquarters” East African Institute 
of Social Research Conference, January 1966, p.1. The word boma meant a seat of colonial authority. 
248 Uganda Protectorate (1940) Administrative Instructions Entebbe: Government Printer, Published by 
Authority, p 1 
249 ibid p. 1 
250  ibid p. 1 
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authority and control.”251 This serves to demonstrate that central control was greatly 
tightened on local administration, leaving little room for local initiatives. 
 
The policy shift from the highly centralized structure and operations of the colonial 
administration began with the change of policy in the Colonial Office in Britain in 1947.  On 
25 February 1947, the British Secretary of State for Colonies Mr. Creech Jones sent to 
governors of all African colonies a confidential dispatch in which he emphasized that there 
was a need to reform local governments, which needed to be “local”, “efficient” and 
“democratic” by stating thus:  
…”local” because the system of government must be close to the common 
people and their problems, “efficient” because it must be capable of 
managing the local service in a way which will help to raise the standards 
of living, “democratic” because it must not only find the place for the 
growing class of educated men, but at the same time command the respect 
and support of the mass of people.252 
 
This policy shift in the British government’s colonial policy sparked off a series of reforms 
in the structures and operations of the colonial government in Uganda.  The first of such 
developments was the designing of the Development Plan for Uganda253, the very first of its 
kind in the country.  The second initiative was the promulgation of the African Local 
Governments Ordinance and District Councils Proclamations and Regulations, 1949 the 
fundamental aim of this ordinance was: “An ordinance to define the composition of African 
local governments and to make provisions for reconstitution of African councils throughout 
the protectorate254“.  Among other things, the 1949 Local Government Ordinance sought to 
(i) establish district councils and other councils, (ii) to allow for establishment of “standing 
committees” of the councils (iii) allow councils to make byelaws applicable to natives 
subject to the approval of the Governor.  
 
                                            
251 ibid p. 1 
252  Quoted in Fred Burke, (1964) Local Government and Politics in Uganda p. 38 
253 See Apter David, opcit, p. 238 in reference to Uganda’s first Development Plan in which the Protectorate 
Government intended to embark on improvement of agriculture through mechanization.  Apter posits that the 
scheme run into trouble with Basoga and Baganda because there had not been effective consultations and was 
opposed. 
254 Preamble to The African Local Governments Ordinance 1949 
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Despite the promulgation of the 1949 Local Government Ordinance, the limited scope of the 
jurisdictions and the powers of councils therein, little seems to have been achieved in the 
line of “Creech-Jones dispatch” regarding “local”, “efficient” and “democratic” government.  
Not only did the ordinance fail to repeal the Native Law Ordinance of 1938, the powers of 
the chiefs, District Commissioners and the whole bureaucratic structure was further 
entrenched.255  
 
Furthermore, the 1949 ordinance, as was the case with previous laws applied only to African 
natives.  Going through the proclamations appended to the ordinance, it is evident that 
democratic local governance was not to come through the ordinance.  In all councils save for 
Buganda (to which this law did not apply), the majority of councillors were appointed or 
nominated either by traditional rulers or by the District Commissioners.  The ordinance also 
created a new form of privilege for the chiefs. Since councillors were elected mainly from 
amongst chiefs and other notables, the institution of the chiefs was further enhanced.  Not 
only were the administrative powers of the chiefs strengthened they also acquired legislative 
powers. Moreover, at lower courts, the chiefs also acted as judges.  It is doubtable therefore, 
that when Creech-Jones thought of “democratic local governance” in reference to the “mass 
of people” he had in mind the form of local government created under the 1949 ordinance. 
 
Commentators on the local government ordinance of 1949 have asserted that the colonial 
government severely hedged its devolution of authority to the district council.”256  This is 
because although the ordinance allowed the councils to become corporate bodies, for 
example, with powers to raise taxes, to make financial decisions, to borrow money, to invest 
surplus funds and to be in charge of important services like agriculture, veterinary, forestry, 
education and others of primary nature, all decisions of district councils were subject to 
                                            
255 Section 4 (1) of the Ordinance; “The Chief shall be appointed or approved by the Governor by such other 
persons the Governor shall authorise … and (chiefs) shall be responsible to the Governor”… 
Section 4 (2): “Every chief shall administer such Protectorate laws as he is legally competent to administer and 
in particular he shall administer the provision of the Native Authority Ordinance”… 
Section 5: “The District Commissioner in charge of any district, or any other person authorised by the 
Governor in that behalf, may appoint such financial, standing and advisory committees as may be necessary for 
proper administration of the district.  Such consist of persons as the District Commissioner shall think fit to 
appoint and shall be presided committees shall over by The district Commissioner…  
256 Ibid, Fred Burke ibid, p. 40 
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approval of the central government.  Other commentators on the above local government 
reforms vindicate the direction that they took. For example, Sathyamurthy argues: 
In order to facilitate a quick and efficient performance of their duties, the 
district officers, pre-eminent among them the district commissioner and 
provincial commissioner were given adequate powers, and provided with 
sufficient scope for the exercise of initiative.257 
 
While Sathyamurthy does not see anything wrong with centralisation, even under the 
reforms, it was evident that the local councilors were ill prepared for the demanding 
responsibility that came with the reforms. The new responsibilities of councils as political 
bodies, which included, formulation of policies, planning, budgeting, raising funds locally, 
law making and ensuring law and order were extensive in scope. However, for all these, it is 
unlikely that the Africans at the time were adequately trained to shoulder them satisfactorily. 
Sathyamurthy notes:  
District level  legislators [were] for the most part men with very poor 
[academic] qualifications and little understanding of the border issues 
involved in district wide planning, let alone national planning.  Their past 
professional and political experience (most of them were) traders and ex 
teachers [of primary schools] being confined to the narrow limits of a 
village or group of villages, it [was] extremely difficult for them to expand 
their horizon in general interest of the district as a whole.258 
 
Given this calibre of councillors, the district officials retained most of the responsibility for 
planning and administration. Under the general guidance of District Commissioner, the 
district team, composed mainly of district technical officers was, in reality, responsible for 
policy matters. There is little surprise that the councillors were largely of low quality. The 
mode of selection of those men was not competitive.  A few notables including chiefs were 
merely handpicked based on patronage. They were either traditional rulers or prominent 
chiefs. There were no competitive elections. Elections provided for in the 1949 ordinance 
were confined to a few country level notables. Taking the case of Busoga district, for 
example, the district council was to be constituted as follows: 22 ex-officio councilors, up to 
20 nominated councillors, and one elected councillor for every 1500 tax payers within the 
                                            
257 Opcit,  Sathyamurthy, p. 1 
258 Ibid, Sathyamuthy,  p. 5.  
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district.259  In another case of Bunyoro-Kitara, the council was to be constituted as follows: 
33 ex-officio councilors, up to 29 nominated councilors and 10 elected councillors.260  
Moreover, the main weakness of the reform was the tendency to limit the leadership of the 
councils to ex-officio members of the council.261  This was clearly undemocratic. Besides, 
the central government reserved powers in two important areas.  In most local governments 
created under the 1949 ordinance, the agenda for the business of the council had to be sent 
to the District Commissioner for his consideration and approval before council convened for 
the business.262  The District Commissioner had power under the 1949 ordinance to cause 
the chairman of council to call a meeting at any time while the Governor retained power to 
dissolve any council at anytime.263  
 
Notwithstanding the centralisation tendencies of the central government in the local 
government reform process, it is noted that the conduct of local government business was 
relatively effective and efficient. This was because the district officials were purely technical 
(apart from the chiefs).  They were capable of planning for and administration of the district.  
To a large measure, they were not involved in local politics, which tended be characterized 
by internecine conflicts and shrouded in intrigue, and at most times, parochial to the extent 
of undermining positive change. On their part, the local notables who found themselves in 
the councils were not “downwardly” accountable since they had not been popularly elected.  
Infact, they were largely accountable to the central government since the law empowered 
them to work for order and “good government.”264  For example the Busoga District 
Council Regulations 1949, section 17 (1) provided, “The council may from time to time 
make byelaws for the good rule and the government of the district”.  This provision runs 
                                            
259 Busoga District Council Regulations 1949, Section 5. 
260 The Bunyoro – Kitara Rukurato Regulations, section 4.  In addition, section 7, the Omukama (King) was to 
have at least two Babito (members of the royal clan) in the council. 
261 In case of the Kingdom areas of Bunyoro, the King was the chairman of council,  in Ankole, the Enganzi 
(Chief Minister) in Toro, the Katikiro (Prime Minister) and in non – Kingdom areas such as Karamoja, Kigezi, 
Lango, West Nile, Bugisu, Bukedi, Karamoja Teso, a senior ex-officio would be the chairman, in his absence 
another senior ex-officio would preside. 
262 See for example Bugishu District Council Regulations, section 16 
263 See Busoga District Council Regulations section 12 (2), Governors Power see section 3 (2) 
264 See for example The African Local Governments Ordinance 1949 Section 5 “No bye-law made by a District 
Council shall be repugnant to a Protectorate law, regulation or order, or to any Act of Parliament… any such 
bye-law which is so repugnant shall be deemed to be null and void and of no effect”. It is important also to 
note that the Native Law Ordinance was not repealed by the 1949 ordinance.  See section 9, of the 1949 
ordinance. 
  
100
 
 
 
through all the regulations of local councils except Buganda.  “Good government” is this 
sense was the implicit way of making sure that, the councilors did not oppose the central 
government. 
 
It is also important to note that the councillors’ problems were not limited to their lack of 
adequate academic qualifications. They were lacking in other respects, which affected 
service delivery to the community. Some of their other limitations included: failure to 
understand procedures, petty bickerings, as well as their obsession with personal pursuits.  It 
is reported for example, that when the Finance Committee was presented with the estimates 
of expenditure and revenue, the inevitable question from the members of the committee was: 
“What about our subsistence allowance?”  Hannigan (1958:6).  Hannigan found several 
complaints about councillors.  The complaint was “The councillors do not understand what 
is going on … They vote for local or self interest.  The committee system is abused” 
Hannigan (ibid p. 6).  Thus given the need for local government to be efficient and the desire 
for popular control, the two principles were far from balancing specially in regard to service 
delivery to the community. 
 
3.3 Urban Development and Governance Reforms  
By 1902, the Protectorate Government was decidedly determined that Uganda unlike its 
neighbouring territory of Kenya, was to remain a largely African country.265 The policy 
position was that the colonial government would discourage large settlement of Whites and 
other foreigners.  The colonial policies in Uganda tended to favour a peasant-dominated 
agricultural system. Part of the reason for colonial officials’ inclination towards 
discouraging White settlements is to be found in the 1900 Buganda Agreement, which 
appropriated most of the land in Buganda to the chiefly establishment.266  Because the 1900 
Agreement had given most of the land to the landed gentry and early colonial policies had 
encouraged small-holder peasants cultivation of cash crops especially cotton, these two 
                                            
265 Cyril Ehrlich, (1957) “Cotton and the Uganda Economy” ibid p. 1, quotes Sir Harry Johnston (the first 
British Commissioner to Uganda) declaring that at he was not in favour of large foreign settlements in Uganda.  
According to Morris, H. S (1968) The Indian in Uganda London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, p. 24, it became an 
official policy of the Protectorate Government that Uganda was “primarily an African country” 
266 Opcit, Kenneth Ingham (1958) The Making of Modern Uganda pp 106-114 discuses the complexities 
created b the new land  tenure in terms of investments by foreigners 
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factors discouraged large White settlements.  Consequently, most of the Whites who lived in 
Uganda were mainly administrators, living in the first two large urban areas of Kampala and 
Entebbe.267 Kampala grew faster than Entebbe largely for two reasons: first, it comprised for 
the most part, the Kibuga, the large capital of Buganda Kingdom, which one of the pioneer 
colonial officers, Lord Lugard found in place by the time he established his fort at Old 
Kampala in 1890.  The Kibuga is reported to have been a large urban settlement with 
thousands of inhabitants as well as visitors to the Kabaka (King of Buganda) located at 
Mengo hill (now part of Kampala).268  
 
The second important factor that contributed to the growth of Kampala was the large 
number of Asian immigrants whose economic occupation was mainly retail trade.  
Alongside the Kibuga, Kampala itself, branded a “town of foreigners”, despite attaining a 
Township status in 1906 grew very slowly because the native government of Buganda and 
the Buganda landowners resisted the government’s enchroachment on their land and their 
Kibuga.  Gutkind reports269 that lukiko (Buganda’s legislature) made a resolution requesting 
the Provincial Commissioner to act in order to “prevent people (foreigners) from taking land 
from our Kibuga” and to “respect the right of our capital which suffers because of the 
proximity of the British town of Kampala”. 
 
The British administrators were also careful in dealing with the Buganda establishment in 
order to avoid unnecessary conflicts where possible.  This cautious policy slowed the rate of 
urbanisation.  For example in 1915, Governor Frederick Jackson wrote: 
I am fully aware that the Kibuga will present us with considerable 
difficulties in years to come.  Present difficulties will not make it possible 
for us to give this area the kind of attention which is required … It will be 
wiser for us to treat each mater… as it arises as a special case and to 
consult at all times with the Chief Minister (of Buganda).270 
 
                                            
267 Entebbe town was for the most of the colonial period, the seat of colonial administration white Kampala 
was commercial centre.  Entebbe was preferred by the colonial administrators because of its quiet environment 
as well as its strategic position, being located at the shores of Lake Victoria. 
268 Gutkind, P. (1961). TheRoyal Capital of Buganda pp 13-17 
269 Ibid, Gutkind, P. (1961). p 24) 
270  Ibid Quoted in Peter Gutkind, (1961), p. 24 
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The Governor perhaps had good reasons to move a bit cautiously because the Baganda were 
consistently pervasive in their suspicion about the continued growth of Kampala, fearing 
that the “European Township” of Kampala would “eat up” their Kibuga.271  Thus contrary to 
what some commentators claim, that the colonial administrators found the Baganda more 
progressive than other indigenous people of Uganda272, this appears questionable.  What 
seems to emerge from historical accounts, especially in respect to the development of 
Kampala suggests that the neo-traditional forces in Buganda stood in the way of 
development for a long time. Nevertheless, most of the modern cash economy was 
concentrated in Buganda, hence the continued growth of Kampala and other towns273.  As 
Southall and Gutkind (1956: 8) noted, the European and Asian urban settlement especially 
in Kampala presented to the Baganda a new life of economic opportunities on one hand, and 
on the other, an encroachment on their traditional authority.274   
 
More broadly, the social, economic and political development of urbanization in Uganda 
introduced new dimensions of social reality in the hitherto predominantly rural peasant 
African society. In socio-economic terms, the rise and the development of urban areas 
marked a new trend of life for Africans in Uganda. Kampala and other towns grew as 
centres of modern economic activity.  Although Kampala was not an administrative centre 
as were most other urban areas in Uganda, it had the largest population of foreign settlers in 
the country. It was clearly marked off as a township for Whites and Asians while the 
Africans lived in the nearby Kibuga, if not in the villages.  Kampala township had planned 
streets, water systems, electricity and other sanitary services.  The adjacent Kibuga lagged 
behind in terms of modern services largely due to the intransigence of traditional leaders.  
However, it soon became a matter of serious concern to the Protectorate Government 
because of its squalid and unsanitary conditions, which harboured a source of diseases to the 
                                            
271 Ibid, Gutkind, p. 27. 
272 Christopher Bakwesegha, “Patterns, Causes and Consequences of Polarised Development in Uganda” in 
Salah E L – Shakhs and Robert Obudho (1974) Urbanisation, National Development and Regional Planning in 
Africa New York: Praeger Publisher 
273 B. W. Langlands (1968/69) “On the disparity in the distribution of economic activity in Uganda”.  
University of East Africa Social Science Council Conference: Geography Papers, Makerere Institute of Social 
Research (Kampala). 
274 Aidan W. Southall and Peter Gudkind, Townsmen in the Making: Kampala and its Suburbs  (p. 8) report 
that the demand for land by Europeans and Asians are from the Kibuga post to Baganda as a political threat 
and an economic temptation.   
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foreign population of the nearby Kampala. By 1930, the colonial government was already 
concerned about the problem of malaria, which affected the population numbers, which 
made the situation worse.275 While the unsanitary conditions persisted in the 
neighbourhoods of Kampala, the influx of migrant labourers from rural areas in search of 
employment swelled the population numbers, which made the situation worse.276 “Pathetic 
bands of ill-clad country-folk, looking more like refugees than pioneers of a modern 
industrial age, were always seen plodding in single file along the roads, their eyes fixed on 
the way to Kampala, their few positions carried in bundles on their heads”.    However, it 
was not only the intransigence of the traditionalist that could be blamed wholly for the poor 
sanitary situation in Kampala, the colonial policies were the underlying cause of the 
problem. The Protectorate Government in Uganda encouraged a dual system of local 
administration: the urban system fully financed by the government and the rural district 
administration.  For example, Southall and Gutkind observed in the case of Kampala and its 
neighbourhoods:  
The overwhelming superiority of the Municipality in wealth and the 
provision of service over Mengo and Kibuga or any other part of the 
densely settled surrounding areas is becoming a major source of 
friction.277 
 
Indeed the disparities in service provision in the Kampala township on one hand, and the 
neighbouring Kibuga could be seen in the disparate financial expenditures on either side278. 
It was reported for example, that central government spent $4000,000 on Kampala in 
1954/55.  Corresponding figures for Buganda Government on Kibuga were $17,619. 
 
  The reasons for poor service delivery in Kibuga ranged from poverty that afflicted most 
Africans to the reluctance of Buganda Government administration to rigorously enforce 
collection of rates as well as other taxes.  Morever, the Kibuga was not a corporate body as 
Kampala was, hence its funds were pooled together with those of the Buganda Government.  
Thus the Kibuga as an urban area suffered from lack of effective urban services. There were 
also reports of corruption and financial impropriety in Buganda government. 
                                            
275 Opcit, Kenneth Ingham (1958) The Making of Modern Uganda pp. 242-244 
276 Ibid, Kenneth Ingham ibid, reports p. 243.  
277 Opcit, Southall and Gutkind (1956. p. 11. 
278 Ibid, Southall and Gutkind (1956) p.13. 
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One of the key historical key sources on the growth, conditions and development of 
urbanization in East Africa is a report known as the East African Royal Commission 1953 – 
1955.279  On the specific issue of urbanization, in East Africa, the Commission reported 
interlia, that: first towns were generally a new development in East Africa, that the part 
played by Africans in the social organisation and economic activities of towns was marginal.  
The Africans, were however, “regarded socially and financially as liabilities for whose 
housing and welfare the urban authorities (were) responsible.”280 Second, that the theory of 
indirect rule as well as the attitudes of European administrators created a view that towns 
were not “a suitable habitat for a permanent African society.” Towns were generally 
perceived as bases for administrative and commercial activities rather than as centres of 
“civilizing” influence. The Commission further noted, that Africans were confined to their 
“primitive” tribal areas in the outskirts of the towns, and those that aspired to abandon their 
customary ways of life found themselves excluded from the social and cultural life of the 
town.281  In policy, planned dwelling places were reserved mainly for Europeans while the 
Africans lived in un-serviced areas surrounding the towns. Generally, the official colonial 
policy was to encourage Africans to live in the rural areas. 
 
The Commission noted that there was no sound urban policy capable of controlling 
managing and providing services in all parts of urban areas.  It was suggested that such a 
policy would need to include (a) an urban development policy which would take into 
account all factors of the situation, (b) an administrative machinery capable of supervising 
and guiding the such a policy, (c) an administrative system which would give serious 
consideration to the special needs of the Africans, and would cause improvement in the 
deplorable conditions of the urban areas. 
 
In a careful review of local governments generally, and particularly of urban local 
governments, a 1961 Commission established to inquire into the relationship between the 
                                            
279 Her Majesty’s Stationery office, East Africa Royal Commission 1953 – 1955 Report, Presented by the 
Secretary for the Colonics to (British) Parliament London, June 1955. 
280 Ibid, p. 201. 
281 Locit p. 201. 
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central government and other authorities found that by that time (a year before Uganda 
attained independence) that “Uganda [was] a land of peasant cultivators282“ and that towns 
were neither numerous or large.  There were only about ten towns with a population 
exceeding 5000.  
 
Addressing itself to the question of rural-urban nexus, the Munster Commission observed283 
that Africans had been treated by the Protectorate Government as belonging to district 
councils even if they happened to live in towns.  The social history of towns, their racial and 
ethnic as well as economic features had created a distinction between urban and rural district 
local governments.  The urban authorities were considered non-African while district 
authorities were regarded as African local governments.  The Commission observed:  
The confusion brought the existence of two administrations in the same 
area and held up the introduction of democratic government.  Though 
there are councils or boards in all sizeable towns, no town, not even 
Kampala, had an elected council.  Councils are nominated by central 
government.  The non-Africans get no training in the democratic process, 
and the African’s vote must be given for the district council to which he 
belongs and not for the authority in which he lives.284 
 
The Commission was concerned that all towns and trading centres were non-African, 
occupied mainly by Indian traders.  Worse still, the Indians living in small towns and trading 
centers were not paying taxes to the district authorities to which these settlements belonged. 
 
Inconsistencies in the structure and administration of urban authorities led the Munster 
Commission to suggest as follows: first, that the municipalities and towns should be based 
on geographical instead of a racial conception.  Secondly, urban authorities should provide 
services such as housing.  Thirdly, urban authorities should become an integral part of the 
local government system.  Fourthly, non-Africans should be conscious of the need for the 
town as a whole and Africans should be allowed to be part of town.  It was further observed 
that there was need for the urban local governments to create a sense of a community and 
                                            
282 Munster Commission (1961) “Report of the Uganda Relationships Commission” London: Colonial Office. 
p. 120 
283 Munster Commission (1961) p. 120 
284 Munster Commission Report (1961) p. 121. 
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finally, as much as possible municipalities should be able to raise their own revenue and to 
be self-sustaining.285   
 
 The Commission however, noted that their suggestions were likely to be opposed by 
European and Indian residents for two reasons: first, enlargement of municipal authorities to 
include the surrounding areas occupied mainly by Africans were likely to be resisted 
because those areas would bring more problems than income to the urban authorities. 
Secondly, it had always been the practice that those individuals with “a stake in the 
municipality- meaning those who make financial contribution should be allowed a voice in 
control of affairs.”133 The Commission observed further that franchise should be extended to 
as many residents as possible but noted that this was also likely to be resisted. According to 
the Commission: 
Witnesses have represented to us that sudden introduction of the national 
franchise in urban areas would put the government of the towns at the 
mercy of those who have little experience in public or business affairs, and 
that abrupt replacement of those experienced people who at present 
manage the towns might injure the services and destroy the confidence of 
the business community.286 
 
Though the Commission does not specify the witnesses, it may be inferred that such 
witnesses could have been either Indians or Whites, who for more than half a century had 
dominated urban affairs and excluded Africans from access to services largely funded by 
central government from public taxes. It is doubtable that African witnesses could express 
such views at that time. 
 
It is important to note that popularly elected urban local government had not been 
encouraged by the protectorate government. For example, even when Kampala attained a 
municipality status on January 27, 1947 the chairman and the members of its council were 
all nominated by the governor and “were responsible to him not to the citizens of 
                                            
285 Ibid, Munster Commission report, pp.120-123. 
 
286 Ibid, Munster Commission, p.12. 
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Kampala287“.   On the critical point of local democracy (at the time when independence was 
due) in urban areas, the Munster Commission made an ernest observation: 
 … it is inevitable that African interests and sentiments will 
ultimately predominate in the municipalities as in central government. The 
other races who have been largely responsible for building up these areas 
may at first take this hardly. We hope that they will realise that the new 
regime is in the nature of things and will not be discouraged from 
continuing to play their part in the management of municipal affairs.288 
 
In a critical review, the Munster Commission further noted that “urban government in 
Uganda was politically backward289“ and recommended that it should be given priority. Not 
only were services reserved for Whites and Indians, there was no democratic governance. 
There was no popular participation in the affairs affecting residents of Kampala and other 
urban areas. While there had been attempts on the part of the protectorate government to 
gradually increase popular representation in district local government; similar steps had not 
been taken for urban local governments.290 
 
 Similarly,strained socio-economic and racial relations, particularly between Indians and 
Africans creeped into policies (especially, pre-independence nationalist policies). It was well 
established that while the Africans in Uganda unlike their counterparts in the neighboring 
Kenya had been favoured by the British policy that insisted that Uganda was to be primarily 
an African country, which gave them priority in matters of land ownership; relations 
between Asians and Africans were only superficially cordial.291 In the main, Indians 
controlled the bulk of the trade in most of the urban areas. They were wealthier compared to 
Africans. Largely also, they had little interest in public affairs except in matters that 
concerned their sectional communities. Indians controlled retail trade, acted as middlemen in 
the cotton business and owned nearly half of all the cotton ginneries and disposed of more 
than half of the crop. 
                                            
287 Opcit, Kenneth Ingham, (1958) pp 242-243.  The first Mayor of Kampala, Mr. A.N. Maini who was an 
Indian was inaugurated on March 1,1950 
288 Opcit, Munster Commission report, (1961) p.125 
289 Ibid, Munster Commission report, p. 128 
290 For example, steps had been by the government under the District Administration Ordinance of 1955to 
allow district councils some more powers to recruit chiefs which appeared as a radical departure the 1949 
ordinance. See also Fred Burke 1963, p. 40 
291 H.S Morris (1968) The Indians in Uganda pp. 143-145. 
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While the Indians became successful business people both the British administrators and 
Africans viewed Indians with suspicion. “Indians success was seen to be a threat to Africans 
commercial development and laws were enacted in 1926 and 1932 to control marketing and 
distribution.”292 
 
There was a move by the protectorate government to limit the role of Indians as middlemen 
especially in the cotton trade. The Africans were pointing an accusing finger at Indians as 
“cheats”. Besides both Europeans and Africans, especially after the Second World War 
feared that the Indians could “find ways of safeguarding themselves by converting their 
economic strength into political power, thus, permanently excluding Africans from 
commerce and industry”. Moreover, Africans were jealous of Indians success and the former 
tended to blame “their frequent failures…to the entrenched position of Indians.”293  
 
Thus, in political terms, the Indians business community suffered a double jeopardy: both 
colonial administrators anxious to dispel the political anxieties of African nationalist groups 
by implicitly turning their attention to Indians “exploiters”. At the same time, the African 
nationalists targeted their attention at Indians who by 1953 controlled 97.5 percent of the 
trade in Kampala while 80 percent of all African traders were making an annual profit of 
₤50 or less. The success of Indians was attributed to family ties and business skills, which 
Africans did not possess.294   
 
Within the political and administrative framework that prevailed in towns during the 
colonial days, the contacts that existed between Africans and Asians were largely limited to 
buyer-seller relations, otherwise, they lived worlds-apart. Indians were perceived by the 
Africans as “protected” by the colonial political machinery and were privileged through that 
arrangement. Although most Indians considered Uganda as their home country, they were 
less interested in challenging the political status quo than the Africans.  It has been argued 
                                            
292 George Delf, (1963) Asians in East Africa London: Oxford University Press pp. 26-27 argues on his part, 
that the success of Indians could not seriously be taken to have stunted African progress. 
293 Opcit,  H.S Morris, (1968) p. 144. 
294 George Delf (1963) opcit, pp. 57. Delf notes that in 1953 and again in 1959 Africans in Uganda boycotted 
Indian shops. Indians were accused of exploiting ignorance of Africans and cheating them. 
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that while the relations between Africans and European administrators were analogous, the 
Africans unlike the Indians hoped to replace the Europeans after independence while the 
Indians did not have such aspirations.295 In fact, they were apprehensive about the likelihood 
of a precarious business situation if Africans took over political power. 
 
Throughout the period of colonial administration, the dual structure of local government, 
which was on one hand, urban and foreign-dominated and on the hand, rural and African-
based, had had serious implications for the kind of local government that developed in the 
country. As Engholm puts296 it,…”anything concerning native administration fell 
exclusively within the competence of the administration; anything concerning trade and 
commerce was (usually) considered the special concern of immigrants. In more specific 
terms the power and influence of the migrants made them felt… through organised pressure 
groups.”297 Overall, the development of local government in Uganda under the British 
colonial administration tended to emphasize technical efficiency rather than popular 
participation and broad consultative governance. 
 
3.4 Post – Colonial Local Government 
Much of what has been written on local governance in the post-colonial era in Uganda has 
tended to emphasize the ethnic and anthropological issues that have undermined the 
efficiency of local government at the grass-roots level.298 A critical overview of the 
developments in the system of local government in the post colonial era in Uganda seems to 
suggest that while the colonial administration maintained a strong hand in its administrative 
style, the post-colonial governments tightened their grip further by use of administrative 
instruments that were inimical to growth of democracy and participatory decision making.  
Part of the explanation as to why the post-colonial government did little to promote grass 
roots democratic governance could be attributed to the failure of the post-colonial leaders 
either to effectively sustain the colonial structure or to imaginatively innovate governance 
                                            
295 Opcit, H.S. Morris, opcit p. 159   
296 Engholm, G. (1966). The Decline of Immigrant Influence on the Uganda Administration 1945-52. East 
African Institute of Social Research Conference, Kampala, Uganda, p.1) 
297 Ibid, Geoffrey F.Engholm, (1966) “The Decline of Immigrant Influence on the Uganda Administration 
(1945-52”, paper written for the East African Institute of social Research Conference, Kampala, January 1966 
298 Burke, F. (1964). Local Government and Politics in Uganda. Colin Leys (1967). Politicians and Policies in 
Acholi-Uganda. Nairobi: EAPH, 
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modes capable of absorbing the new expectations of the Ugandan people after 
independence.  Thus, whereas the British colonial administrators as representatives of an 
imperial power felt little obligation to govern democratically, the post-colonial leaders had 
made commitments during their anti-colonial campaigns to rule more democratically than 
their colonial predecessors had.  Ironically, for the most part of Uganda’s post-colonial 
period, this promise has been a pipe dream. 
 
3.5 Centralizing Tendencies in the Post-colonial Era 
Whereas in the last years of colonial administration, deliberate step-by-step policy initiatives 
were made by the colonial government to increase participation of Africans in the local 
government administrative process, this was gradually reversed and halted by the post-
colonial governments. This is to be seen in the Urban Authorities Act 1964 and the Local 
Administrations Act, 1967.299 It is useful to begin with a synthesis of the Local 
Administration Act, 1967 because it represents a broader framework of the administrative 
style adopted by the post-colonial government. 
 
The background to the local government system adopted in the first decade of independence 
suggests that the constitutional arrangements under which Uganda attained independence 
from the British were tenacious and perpetuated the duality under which the colonial rulers 
had administered the country.300 At the same time, the new post-colonial leaders were 
anxious to strengthen their hold on the structures of power which to them, appeared fluid, 
hence their desire to centralize power at the center. 
 
Under the Local Administration Act 1967 almost all, the powers were centralized in the 
Minister in charge of local administrations.  The Minister’s powers extended from regulation 
of council activities, financial management, tender boards and contracts, down to minute 
issues in a remote village. A discussion of some of these aspects demonstrates the extent of 
                                            
299 The Local Administrations Act was to provide for administration of District Councils.  It is important to 
note the change from “local government” to “local administration”. 
300 Under the Constitution of 1962, two system of local government were adopted: full federal arrangement 
between Uganda Government and Buganda Kingdom, semi-federal arrangement for other Kingdom areas 
(Ankole, Bunyoro and Toro) and district administration for the rest of the country. 
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centralisation301.  Under the Act, Local Councils lost their autonomy in matters of decision 
making, for example, a meeting of a district council could not be convened without approval 
of the Minister.302  Not only had the Minister to receive a copy of the minutes of every 
council meeting303, he had the veto power almost in every matter deliberated upon by the 
council.  For example, the standing orders of a council would have no effect until approved 
by the Minister.   In such case if the Minister made revocations or variations in the standing 
orders made by a council, these too, had to be approved by the Minister.304  Even in matters 
of constitution of a committee of a council, the Minister had the final word.  For example, 
the members of any committee of a council would not exceed eight members without the 
permission of the Minister305 and in the case of the Finance Committee of the Council a 
Local chairman, had to be appointed by the Minister.306 In the substantive area of day to day 
administration of the district, the Secretary-General (with his Assistant), who was the overall 
administrative authority in each district, the role of council was to nominate five names from 
amongst its members, send them to the Minister who would appoint anyone from the list 
sent to him. The district council had no powers to remove the Secretary-General once 
appointed.307  
 
Apart from the extensive powers of the Minister in the appointment of key persons in the 
administration of the district, which extended the patronage of the Minister and the authority 
of the central government in local affairs, the law required the district council to maintain 
order and “good government”308 within the area of its authority. It was the “duty of the 
administration (district council) to cooperate with government to assist in the prevention of 
                                            
301 The centralizing tendencies under the Local Administrations Act 1967 were probably for greater than that 
attempted by the colonial administration because the colonial administration left some of the matters of cultural 
importance to the local authorities, which the new rulers now tampered with. 
302 Local Administration Act 1967 Section 3 (3) 
303 ibid, section 4 (1) 
304 0 ibid, section 5 (2) 
305 ibid, section 21 (2) 
306 ibid, section 21 (3) 
307 ibid, section 14 (2) on the nomination of names and section 15 (3) only the Minister could dismiss the 
Secretary General.  Section 15 (4) The Secretary General would not vacate office by the virtue of a council 
being dissolved. 
308 Ibid, Section 23 (1) 
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commission of any offence, assist in the arrest of any offenders…309“.  Above all, the 
Minister retained the power to dissolve any council by issuance of a statutory instrument to 
that effect, should he feel satisfied that “it is in public interest to do so.”310 
 
In the key function of a council such as law making, financial management and 
administration as well as the general administration of the district, the powers of council 
were severely undermined by the overall powers of the Minister to sanction every action and 
detail.  In the case of byelaws of the council, whereas the law allowed each council to make 
them as such, the Minister had to approve any byelaw before it could have effect.311 
 
The Minister’s most important source of power was in the area of financial management. 
Whereas the law created local councils as corporate bodies with powers to raise and spend 
revenues of council, the reality was that real power on financial matters of any council lay 
with the Minister.  Several sections of the law demonstrate this power. The budget 
containing the estimates of revenue and expenditure of each council had to be approved by 
the Minister312.  In case the Minister disapproved the whole budget of a council, section 
58(8) provided that:”no expenditure shall be incurred, no revenue collected nor shall any of 
the provision of the estimates be put into operation without prior approval of the Minister.” 
 
The Minister had the power to withhold the grants due to any council if he was not satisfied 
with the performance of any council.313 The Minister controlled not only centrally 
administered finances such as block grants, all financial matters and transactions were 
sanctioned by him, ranging from appointment of tender boards executing of actual contracts 
to fixing of rates and levies. 
                                            
309 Section 24 (1). By implication the councils became an extension of the state rather than a representative 
body of the people. 
310 Ibid, section 9 (3) and under section 25 (3) the Minister was empowered to take over any services of a 
council if he felt the council was not performing them to his satisfaction 
311 Ibid, section 37 
312 Ibid, section 58 (5) specifically states that before any expenditure on any item is incurred by council the 
Minister’s approval had to be obtained first.  Under section 30 (1) the council was allowed to enter contracts of 
less them shs 30,000 only.  Beyond that, the Minister had to approve. 
313 Ibid, section 78.  However under section 78 (3) he would give a hearing to the representatives of a council 
before with-holding the grants or releasing them if they convinced him.  In our view, this was the most 
manifest way of extending patronage. 
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Earlier in this chapter the powers of a chief as an instrument of colonial rule were discussed.  
It is amazing to note how the institution of a chief was entrenched further in the post-
colonial era, the purpose of which was to tighten the grip of government on the ordinary 
people rather than creating an atmosphere for democratic governance and participatory 
decision-making. Under the Local Administration Act the local chief’s responsibilities are 
described to include: serving as an intelligence agent, assuming police duties by preventing 
crimes, apprehending offenders and administering justice.  For example, section 40 (I, d) the 
chief was authorized:  
to detect and bring offenders to justice and to apprehend all persons whom 
he is legally authorized to apprehend …. And for any of the purposes 
mentioned in this subsection, he may without warrant, enter at any hour of 
the day or night any place in which he has reasonable grounds to suspect 
that illegal drinking or gambling is taking place, or to which dissolute or 
disorderly are resorting.314 
 
This section of the Local Administration Act appears repugnant to the spirit of local good 
governance.  First, the chief in this regard, seems to have been given absolute powers to 
violate human rights with impunity. Secondly, if the colonial administration is accused to 
have introduced “one man “ rule in most clan-based traditional societies, the colonial chief 
was directly answerable to the District Commissioner and did not enjoy such autonomy to 
exercise direct ruthless personal rule as the post-colonial  law gave him.  The chief under 
this law became the law unto himself. The law authorized the chief to issue orders from time 
to time “to be obeyed by persons residing within the local limits of his jurisdiction to secure 
the enforcement of any law”.  Going by this law, the chief’s powers went beyond any law 
governing public service.  There is no other law in Uganda, which authorized any other 
public officer to act arbitrarily, on one’s own accord and without restraint of the law as the 
chief could operate.315 
 
                                            
314 Ibid, section 41. 
315 There is no section in the Local Administration Act 1967 restraining the extensive powers of the chief.  See 
also section 43 “Any person who without lawful authority disobeys or fails to comply with any lawful order 
(issued by a chief) shall commit an offence”. 
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It is imperative to note that the difference between the chief under colonial administration 
and the chief under the post-colonial administration is that under the former, the chief was 
an instrument of the state whereas under the latter the chief became an embodiment of the 
state apparatus at the local level.  The chief represented the dictatorial tendencies that 
characterized the post colonial state where local authorities were deprived of effective 
powers which were concentrated at the headquarters in Kampala, the remaining power at the 
local level was left to a chief.  In 1990 the Public Service Review and Reorganization 
Commission observed in respect of the system of local government established under the 
Local Administrations Act 1967316, thus:  
powers were concentrated in the central Government in Kampala and 
Entebbe.  It would not be possible for any local authority or agency to 
perform any task without prior reference to the headquarters…Whatever 
few powers were left to them were subjected to the approval of the 
Minister of Local Government in Kampala…This resulted in the collapse 
off almost all services rendered by the districts because of lack of 
authority and financial resources.317   
 
Indeed, this observation critically captures the difficulties that confronted the local 
authorities in their day-to–day operations.  As it has been shown, the local administration 
law required all local authorities to consult and seek the approval of the Minister almost on 
every minute detail.  One is left to wonder whether the Minister had all the time and ability 
to deal with all those issues.  It seems not far fetched to suspect that inefficiency and 
possibly corruption resulted from these over-detailed “consultations”. At the same time, 
over-centralisation should have had negative effects on the performance efficiency and cost-
effectiveness of the local authorities considering several trips senior district officials needed 
to take in order to secure the much needed Minister’s approval on all items and issues.  
Thus, it is argued in this study that Uganda has not had a tradition of good local governance, 
and that elements of it have began to emerge in a decade or so, this is the point it is 
attempting to emphasize.  Even then, this study further argues that the decentralisation so far 
attempted in Uganda is highly politicised due to the nature of the political system under 
which it has evolved, that it has tended to be a “hostage” of its “creators”. 
                                            
316 The Local Administration Act 1967 remained in force until it was first repealed in 1993 under the 
Resistance Councils Statute 1993 and again by the Local Government Act 1997. 
317 Quoted from World Bank (1992) Uganda: District Management Study opcit, p. 9. 
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3.6 Deficit of Local Democracy 
It takes the patience of a curious student of Uganda’s politics to note that although the 
British engineered reforms of local governments from 1949 onwards, and the country was 
engulfed in national struggles for independence, no direct elections took place until 1958.  
The first only truly competitive general elections took place in March 1961, which were won 
by the Democratic Party (DP) and proceeded to form the first African pre-independence 
government under its leader, Ben Kiwanuka. In preparation for independence, another 
general election was held on 25th April1962.This time though; a coalition of Uganda Peoples 
Congress (UPC) and Kabaka Yekka (KY) left DP with minority seats hence, on the 
opposition. This resulted in the UPC-KY alliance that formed the first independence 
government in October 1962.It will be noted that the elections which preceded independence 
were highly competitive both at the local and national levels.318 
  
What will make an observer of Uganda’s national and local governments more curious is the 
fact that from 1962 through the 1960s and 1970s no national local elections were held. 
While Idi Amin advanced the this as one of the reasons for ousting Obote from power in 
1971,he himself did not organize one. For example, one observer of this phenomenon 
writing in 1977 noted: “Though two elections were held in the country’s pre-independence 
period, no national or local elections have been conducted during Uganda’s existence as an 
independent state.” 319 
 
The pre-independence elections were held following the Wild Commission Report 1959. 
Despite the recommendations of the Wild Commission for direct elections, Buganda, which 
had all along had a chiefly Lukiiko (local legislature), boycotted the 1961 elections and in 
the subsequent elections of 1962, the Lukiiko nominated its members of Parliament under 
                                            
318Samwiri Karugire (1996).Roots of Instability in Uganda. Kampala: Fountain Publishers.pp.40-48.  
319 Norman W. Proviser. “National Electoral Process and State Building: Proposals for National Elections in 
Contemporary Uganda.” Comparative Politics .Vol.19, No.3, 1977, p.308.For further details see Colin Leys 
(1965) Politicians and Policies in Acholi, Uganda .Nairobi: EAPH; pp.13 -31; Cherry Gertzel (1974)Party and 
Locality in Northern Uganda. London: Commonwealth Studies, No.16. Anthlone Press; Fred Burke 
(1964).Local Government and Politics in Uganda. Syracuse University Press.  
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the KY umbrella. The rest of the country, however, directly elected their local and national 
leaders at these elections.320 
 
Nevertheless, the story of democratic elections was to begin and end with the pre-
independence elections. The first post-independence elections were to be held in 1980 –the 
controversial ones that returned Milton Obote to power. Owing to the controversies of these 
elections, proper local elections were not held. Instead, party wards nominated their 
councillors to the district councils and the lower district structures. For the reason of 
prolonged absence of democratically elected structures at the local level, most observers 
argue that  a reasonable degree of democratic local governments existed immediately after 
independence, and have begun to gain momentum under the NRM regime since 1986.321 
 
3.7 Urban Authorities Administration in the Post-Colonial Era 
The centralisation tendencies of the post-colonial governments affected the administration of 
both district and urban authorities.  In the case of urban authorities, the Urban Authorities 
Act 1958 though amended by the Urban Authorities Act 1964 but it was generally not 
repealed.  One of the key issues that affected the administration of urban authorities was the 
issue of ownership of towns.  Section 63A of the Urban Authorities Act classified towns as 
follows: 
 
If found in Buganda, they are Buganda towns. If outside Buganda they are local 
administration towns. Others were classified as government towns such as Entebbe, Njeru 
and Mubende.322 The other municipal authority was Kampala City Council which had been 
incorporated by a Royal Charter dated 28th September 1962323. Under the Urban Authorities 
Act 1958 (as amended by the Urban Authorities Act 1964) all towns under Buganda 
                                            
320 ibid Samwiri Karugire (1996).Roots of Instability in Uganda. Kampala: Fountain Publishers. pp.40-48. 
321 See Kasfir, Nelson.”No-Party Democracy in Uganda.” Journal of Democracy Vol. 9, No. 2, April 1998, pp. 
49-63;Kasfir, Nelson, ‘The Ugandan elections of 1989: power, populism, and democratization’, in Holger B. 
Hansen and Michael Twaddle (eds), Changing Uganda. The dilemmas of structural adjustment and 
revolutionary change, London: James Currey, 1991; Kasfir, Nelson, ‘“Movement” democracy, legitimacy and 
power in Uganda’, in Justus Mugaju and Joe Oloka-Onyango (eds), No-party democracy in Uganda. Myths 
and realities, Kampala: Fountain, 2000, pp.60-78;Kjaer, Mette, ‘Fundamental change or no change? The 
process of constitutionalising Uganda’, Democratization, 6:4 (1999), pp.94-113. 
322 Kampala City and Jinja Municipality were government towns. 
323 Kampala City and Jinja Municipality were government towns. 
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Government were responsible to the Minister responsible for local administration in the 
Buganda government and not the central government.324               
 
In respect of the government towns, the Minister responsible for local government in the 
central government retained as much power over urban authorities as those he had over 
district authorities325. The Minister reserved the power to appoint the Chairman and Deputy 
Chairman of any urban council. Whereas the Minister retained the power under the Act to 
provide for appointment or election of councilors and other senior officers of urban councils, 
the Act exempted the Minister and councils in case of breach of law from wrongdoing; for 
example, section 10 of the Act reads: 
All acts of a council or of any person acting as Chairman, deputy to the 
Chairman, councilor, Town Clerk or other municipal officer, as the case 
may be, shall notwithstanding that it be discovered that there was some 
defect in the election or appointment of any such a person or that he was 
disqualified or unqualified for election or appointment, be as valid and 
effectual as if such person had been duly elected or appointed and 
qualified. 
 
This is particularly important because the power to appoint a Council Chairman and a 
Deputy to the Chairman and some councils was reserved for the Minister to exercise under 
section 7(1). Senior Officers of the urban councillors were though appointed by councillors 
subject to the Minister’s approval.326 To the extent of the importance of the Minister’s 
powers in matters of appointment and their tenure of office as well as their terms and 
conditions of work, the urban council to which the officers in question were presumably 
responsible, had no power to dismiss them without the consent of the Minister. Urban 
councils were left with residual powers in matters of appointment of junior staff such as 
council agents, servants and workers for whom the councils would make staff regulations: 
ranging from appointment, assignment of duties, discipline to terms and conditions of 
service. However, even such staff regulations were subject to the Minister’s approval.327 
 
                                            
324 Section 2A (1) of the Urban Authorities Act 1958. 
325 Section 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 of the Urban Authorities Act, 1958 
326 Section 24 of the Urban Authorities Act 1958. These officers included: The Town Clerk, the Treasurer, 
Medical Officer of Health and the Engineer. 
327 Ibid, Section 27 (2). 
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In addition to the powers of the Minister relating to constitution and control over urban 
councils, had powers to approve standing orders of councils, byelaws and their contractual 
process and obligations.328 The Minister also reserved the power to dissolve urban 
councils.329 
 
Whereas the law required the council to procure goods and services through a tendering 
process, following its standing orders, the same law undermined the due process meant to 
strengthen accountable management by inserting in Section 31(3b) that such a contract shall 
not be invalid only because of failure to observe any standing order made under the Act. 
Whatever the reason for insertion of such a clause, it was likely to promote unfair dealings 
and to abate corrupt tendencies. 
 
In terms of financial management, local authorities (both district and urban) are reported 
nevertheless to have been self-sustaining and accountable. It is noted: 
During the 1960s, the local authorities operated annual budgets that 
realized surplus which accumulated on the reserve accounts.  These 
reserve funds were used as the main source of capital financing.  
Generally the liquidity position at that time was sound and some 
investments were financed from revenue contributions.330   
 
The sound financial position of local authorities in 1960s may be attributed to a number of 
factors: first, the economy of Uganda was healthy and growing.  Secondly, there was a high 
rate of tax compliance amongst citizens partly because the local authorities were delivering 
services effectively. Thirdly, corruption was minimal as most public servants were relatively 
well paid.  Public service ethics were also still very strong deriving from the standards that 
had been set by the British administrators. These were however ruined by subsequent 
governments which run down the machinery of public service.  For example in 1970s under 
the military rule of Idi Amin, the economy was run down, service delivery institutions 
collapsed, the local authorities were run by appointed military officers and there were no 
elected bodies.  As there were insufficient finances in the central government treasury, there 
                                            
328 Ibid, Section 59B, . 
329 Ibid, Section 62 (4), also Section 29 (2) of the Act. 
330 J. L. B. Rucogoza, “The State of Local Government Finances” in Republic of Uganda (1998) “Report of the 
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were also insufficient funds for local authorities.  Consequently, infrastructure and social 
services were gravely affected.  It is observed that the situation was so serious that it nearly 
“reached crisis proportions331“. 
 
During the 1970s, corruption in the local authorities also became rampant.  The chiefs went 
“on rampage, embezzling the little that was collected”.  Market-masters did the same.332  
The years of political and economic decline affected the management of local authorities in 
many various ways: in urban areas property rates could not be collected because the 
Government Valuation rolls were out of date and Licence Fees were below actual values 
because the Ministry of Commerce took too long to revise them. In addition, the result was 
that Graduated Tax (personal tax) became the most dominant source of revenue, even in 
urban areas, where its contribution to urban authorities in the 1960s formed a minor 
fraction.333 
 
3.8 Institutional Decline and Its Implications for Kampala City  
In Kampala City Council, internal management had been in a state of flux: budget controls 
had collapsed due to inadequate revenue thus, cash transactions were the mode of operation.  
Staff salaries were not only inadequate, they took months in arrears.  This was in addition to 
the fact that there had been cases of some departments being over-staffed.334  The poor pay 
given to Kampala City Council workers, as noted did not help this situation: 
The Municipality can not afford to raise salaries and wages… Staff can 
not live on their salaries and therefore, have to find other means of 
supplementing their incomes, some of which are almost certainly corrupt.  
In any event few staff do a full day’s work and or have commitment to 
public service.335 
 
When decentralisation was introduced in 1992, Kampala city council became an 
autonomous, self-accounting and self–regulating organization. However, the implications of 
                                            
331 Ibid, Rucogoza, p. 55 
332 Ibid, Rucogoza, p. 58 
333 DAG/ILGS, University of Birmingham, (1988) “Development of Local Administration in Uganda: 
Kampala City Council – The current Condition” Kampala, (Consultancy Report) pp 10-11 
334 Ibid, (pp 16-19) while the lower levels were over-staffed 40% of the senior positions were by 1988, not 
filled due to failure by Kampala City Council to compete for skilled manpower with other agencies.- 
335 Ibid, p. 16 
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institutional decline over the years had serious implications for its management and faced 
new challenges. In a report submitted by Kampala City Council to the Chairman of 
Parliamentary Session Committee336, the main challenges to Kampala City Council were 
identified as follows: the health department of the council lacked basic equipment, 
rodenticides and other materials to control mosquitoes, vermins and (other sources of 
diseases) including bush clearing and desiltation of drains. At that time, out of the council’s 
budget of Shs. 850 million for these purposes only Shs.100 million could be raised. In the 
Engineering department, the situation was not much better, for example only 30% of the 
garbage could be collected.337 Other problems identified in the Engineering Department 
included; insufficient street lighting, over-flooding due to blocked drainage channels, 
congestion in the city due to poor traffic management and lack of road signs and road 
maintenance. 
 
In the planning department, only 30% of Kampala can be identified as a planned area. The 
rest is planned individually, thus, Kampala lacks a comprehensive plan. Part of the problem 
of planning in Kampala is a result of land tenure system where individual mailo land is 45%, 
Kabaka (king of Bunganda) holds 27%, freehold 3%, Kampala city council has 15% and 
Uganda Land Commission has 10%. Other problems are identified as: lack of equipment 
(especially for cartographic work and surveying), shortage of skilled planners, ineffective 
control over building structures and lack of control over service bodies such as water and 
electricity which are provided by Government corporations. The consequences of inadequate 
planning include: poor building structures, unplanned neighbourhoods, lack of access roads 
and lack of services, growth of slum areas and inadequate open spaces. 
 
The main problem of Kampala city council is inadequate financing. About 70% of locally 
raised revenue is spent on recurrent items leaving only about 30% for capital development. 
The problem of financing is conceived in two important respects: first, government grants 
are specified for certain items (they are conditional grants) on government priorities, 
                                            
336 Kampala City Council (1996: September, 1996) “Kampala City Council’s Position” 
337 Kampala City Council, ibid p. 8, it is noted that council had a prior to 1972, a fleet of 63 refuse trucks for 
population of 300,000 people, but today with a population of 1,200.000 they have only 22 trucks.  This leaves 
most of the garbage in Kampala uncollected. 
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therefore, the city council can not use them on its own priorities.  The second financial 
problem is related to lack of long term financing. The argument is that Kampala city council 
needs to invest in provision of services, and then be able to collect taxes from the population 
which appreciates the delivery of services. 
 
The financial resources, planning, and provision of health services and infrastructure remain 
the key challenges of most urban authorities and in Kampala city the challenge is even 
greater. In Kampala city more than 50% residents are not connected to water supply system, 
70% of the sewerage system serves less than 10% of the Kampala’s population and almost 
all wastewater remains untreated. This situation is made worse by the fact that most of 
Kampala population is poor. There has been decline in employment due to the low industrial 
base. This complicates the task of management of the city. Criminal activities have sprung 
up all over the place. Thus, while the management of Kampala city council may not be up to 
the task, the challenges are also over–whelming, making the governance of the city a 
complex one. 
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Chapter 4 
 
Decentralisation: The Case of Rebuilding Institutions of Local 
Governance in Uganda 
  
4.1 Introduction 
It is a well-established fact that any process of change does not take place in a vacuum, but 
rather in a given socio-economic and political context. While the world wide resurgence of 
decentralisation as a governance model has increased in the tempo and practice in 
developed, underdeveloped and the Eastern Europe (former socialist countries) this trend 
presents two trajectories for understanding the process of decentralisation itself. The first 
perspective is to generalize it as a “new” form of governance that is relatively value-neutral 
and applicable to all societies that desire to establish new norms of self-governance at the 
local level, espousing the principle of “subsidiarity.”338 This is the driving force behind what 
is usually termed as democratic decentralisation.339 While the universal tenets of 
decentralisation such as: self-governance, fiscal autonomy, devolution of powers, market 
decentralisation and state-society relations (or civil society) are generally presented as the 
basic principles of decentralisation in any country, these may  only constitute a good starting 
point in the study of decentralisation. They may not give the explanations as to why 
particular countries adopt decentralisation or why they prefer certain forms of 
decentralisation to others. In other words, decentralisation while retaining specific general 
principles on the other hand, its practical aspects are contingent to specific situations. Thus, 
it is important to delienate the specific conditions under which this take place in particular 
countries. It has been noted that countries emerging from many years of civil conflict, such 
as Mozambique and Uganda, the decentralisation design had to take into account peculiar 
circumstances as much as it has had to take cognizance of the peculiarities of the countries 
of former socialist countries of Eastern Europe, which have only recently emerged from 
highly centralised communist systems.340 In such countries, decentralisation was adopted for 
                                            
338 The principle of “subsidiary” refers to a system of governance whereby decisions are taken by the people or 
are taken in close consultation with the ordinary people. 
339 Opcit, Crook and Manor. 
340 For a detailed discussion of varied rationale for design of decentralisation, see Jannie Latvack and Jessica 
Seddon (eds) Decentralisation: Briefing Notes (pear) World Bank Institute. A Leftwich “Governance, the State 
  
123
 
 
 
purposes of mitigating conflicts, reinstating service delivery system and putting in place 
some elements of people’s participation. To that extent, while high-sounding objectives of 
decentralisation will be proclaimed, these are likely to have a narrowly focused agenda 
rather than broadly constituted goals. 
 
In this chapter, I review the stated strategic objectives of decentralisation in Uganda. I do 
this by taking a retrospective outlook at the post-colonial history of the country and focusing 
on the last three decades. I examine the socio-economic and political situation before and 
after adopting decentralisation. Basing on that situational analysis, I locate Uganda’s 
decentralisation into the comparative perspectives. In this context, I argue that 
decentralisation may be based on sound policy initiatives but the practice tends to be shaped 
by the wishes of the implementers, which may affect the original intentions and outcomes of 
the policy. 
 
Much of the literature on Uganda’s policy of decentralisation has not endeavoured to link its 
implementation process with the institutional decay that bedevilled the country. Thus, in 
analyzing the process of decentralisation and what it hoped to achieve, we are likely to miss 
a point. The objectives of decentralisation emphasise popular citizen participation, demand 
for accountability, active civic engagement and effective representation, but these raise a 
pertinent question: how are the people who have not known peace or a generation that has 
not voted supposed to engage in questioning state power? In a situation where naked brutal 
power has been exercised in the past on any individual questioning or suspected to hold 
views contrary to those of the state, how is he/she likely to overcome fear of the state? 
 
At another level in Uganda where scarcity of goods and services has been the norm rather 
than an exception, analyzing people’s perceptions about service delivery as well as their 
voluntary contributions towards service provision is also fairly problematic because scarcity 
had for a long time taught ordinary people three unique lessons: first, that government 
services are a “privilege.” Secondly, that payment of taxes to government is not only a duty 
                                                                                                                                      
and the Politics of Development” Development and Change Vol 25, 1994 p, 369, on the trump of liberal ideas 
over the undemocratic socialist regimes in Eastern Europe. 
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but also a non-quid proquo payment341, and thirdly, that in most cases, for an ordinary 
citizen to receive a public service he/she needs to bribe the officials. The officials too, have 
perceived it as “normal practice” to be “appreciated” by recipients of services.342 
 
In addition to the above issues, there is the all important question of transforming power 
relations both bureaucratic power as well as political power. In a good amount of literature 
on decentralisation, the issue of the politics surrounding decentralisation is treated as a 
given, yet it is the most important question.343 It is important for two reasons. Those holding 
state power wish to use the process of decentralisation to legitimize their rule or to achieve 
the goals of their party.344 In this context, those of the dominant state ideology marginalize 
those citizens with differing political views. Secondly, although many decentralisation 
policies have been initiated in the name of democracy, some non-democratic regimes have 
embraced decentralisation for reasons of legitimizing their regimes and even perpetuating 
their non-democratic agenda. Such regimes will not nurture decentralisation as a process of 
returning power to the civil society. It is argued in this regard that many countries, especially 
in Africa seem to be interested in decentralisation in order to entrench de facto one party 
rule.345 
 
On the part of multilateral and bilateral financiers of the Third World governments, led by 
the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, the issues of critical importance in the 
design of decentralisation programmes are political stability, open macro-economic policies 
(liberalization), more efficiency, and market mechanisms in service provision, public 
accountability and a working legal system.346 They have little concern for how power is 
                                            
341 Quid proquo payment, means payment without expectation for any returns 
342 Corruption and corrupt practices in Uganda were generally seen as “normal practices”. See for example 
Roger Tangri and Andrew Mwenda (2001). 
343 David Slater “Territorial Power and the reripheral state: The issue of decentralisation” Development and 
Change Vol 20 No 3, 1989. Slater argues that the decentralisation does not necessarily empower local 
constituencies, politically. Power is usually retained at the centre. He quotes (p 514) Nyerere, former president 
of Tanzania to have said in 1970s that decentralisation means “the government was moving its guns to the rural 
areas”. See also D. Slater “Debating decentralisation: A reply to Rondinelli” Development and Change Vol 21, 
No 3, 1990. 
344 Opcit, Dele Olowu, (2001). “Decentralisation and Practices under Structural Adjustment and 
Democratisation in Africa” 
345 Ibid, Dele Olowu (2001)  
346 Opcit, Jannie Latvack and Jessica Seddon, (1999).  Decentralisation Briefing Notes 
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organized at the national level, this undermines the neo-liberal and pluralistic spirit in which 
decentralisation as a mechanism for democratization and development is perceived. 
 
4.2 Uganda: “The Bloody Pearl”347 
Some scholars do acknowledge that the ramifications of government policies undertaken in 
the 1990s in Uganda reflect the downward trend the country had suffered in the 1970s and 
1980s are due to bad political leadership.348  This has a significant implication in terms of 
understanding the policy of decentralisation. First, it has to be understood within the whole 
framework of macro-economic reforms undertaken by the government at the end of the 
1980s, which means it is connected with what has come to be known as the era of 
recovery.349 Secondly, it is understood in terms of advancing the idea of “good governance” 
(Brett 1995, Regan 1995, Nsibambi 1995). This implies it is premised on returning 
government to the people and the people to government. But most importantly, 
decentralisation is seen in terms of rebuilding institutions of local governance.350 These 
promises apart, the literature on post-conflict recovery and rebuilding of points out that by 
1986 both the Ugandan economy and society had collapsed.351 Collier notes that by 1986 
when the current government of NRM came to power, 7% of the population were displaced, 
per capita income had declined by 40% since 1971, the stock of capital investment had 
greatly declined, contract enforcement had broken down, political and bureaucratic 
leadership had become opportunistic, and corruption was easily tolerated in public service 
and above all, the system of trust had totally collapsed.352 
 
As a reflection of loss of confidence in the state, the ordinary people had retreated from the 
public transactions to the private realm (into the informal sectors353). The result was that 
                                            
347 “The Bloody Pearl” is a title of a book written by Michael Lewis Richardson (1980) Published by Majestic 
Books Atlanta. It is about the suffering endured by Uganda as a country and the Ugandan people under Idi 
Amin. The subtitle is chosen here to recast the institutional decay in Uganda. 
348 Opcit, Collier and Pradhan 1998, Southall 1988, Katorobo 1995, Regan 1995, Brett 1995, 1993. 
349Opcit, Collier and Reinikka 1999. 
350 Opcit, Nsibambi 1998, Makara 2000. 
351 Opcit, Collier 1999, p. 2. 
352 Ibid, Collier (1999). 
353 Detailed treatment of “magendo” or black marketeering see Phirimoni R. Banugire, “Class Struggle, Clan 
Politics and the Magendo Economy” Mawazo Vol 2, No 2, 1985. Also, Jossy R. Bibangamba, “Macro-level 
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government coffers were not getting taxes and since the government officials had become 
predatory, the little money government received was misappropriated or stolen. Gross 
domestic product (GDP) had declined by 13% (1971-1986354). Moreover, skilled human 
capital run out of the country or were forced out355. In the midst of the collapsing economy, 
those at the helm of power at the centre were feeling insecure and therefore, over-centralised 
power, destroyed centres of local activity and undermined avenues of local governance. In 
this process, avenues of local participation, accountability, transparency and political 
legitimacy were closed. Grassroots structures of managing the local economy were 
undermined. Thus, there were no viable centres to counterveil state power. In the process, 
governments undercut their avenues of attaining legitimacy hence, they had to resort to the 
only means available of violence. 
 
The collapse of the economy and the society had implications for the ordinary Ugandan. 
Goods and services became extremely scarce that a system of allocations of items dubbed 
“essential”, such as soap, sugar, salt, clothes, beer, soda etc had to be improvised. This had a 
social cost because the predatory public servants extended corruption and extortion in the 
process of allocating scarce commodities356. And because the society had collapsed, 
freedom of speech and association had been denied, there were no viable means of checking 
on corrupt officials, who were becoming extremely rich as the majority of Ugandans were 
sliding into poverty357. 
 
4.3 Understanding State Collapse in Uganda 
The indicators of state collapse and malfunction more often become more apparent to, and 
are more easily felt by the urban residents of any country. This is because in less developed 
                                                                                                                                      
Constraints and the Growth of the Informal Sector in Uganda” in Jonathan Baker and Poul Ove Pederson (eds) 
The Rural-Urban Interface in Africa The Nordic Institute, Uppsala, 1992. 
354 Opcit, Collier (1999) argues that if GDP had instead been growing by that percentage, the economy would 
have doubled between those years. 
355 The case of Idi Amin expelling Asians from Uganda in 1972. 
356 Opcit, Bigsten and Kayizzi-Mugerwa (1992) “Adaption and Stress in the Urban economy: A case of 
Kampala Households” World Development Vol. 20, NOID, p. 1426, note that corruption in public service has 
been rampant which explains why the housing sector is dominated by public servants despite their meagre 
salaries. For this reason many government projects are mismanaged. 
357 The officials and the local middlemen in the process of distribution of scarce commodities came to be 
known as “Mafutamingi” – easy money makers 
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countries, rural areas tend to be remote and less susceptible to price changes in the short-run. 
Moreover, the harsh conditions of living and severance are usually part of the rural 
livelihood. The heat and momentous changes of political power, for example, by violent 
means such as military coups bear directly on the residents living in a capital city. In 
Uganda, as in many other countries in the third world, where violent changes of power have 
taken place, insecurity of human life follows, armed robberies next, and then scarcity of 
goods and services. Residents of Kampala, the capital city of Uganda, who have lived there 
through 1970s to date, will tell stories of losing everything they worked for to renegade 
soldiers, of rape of their wives and children, of robbery at road-blocks staged by government 
soldiers, and of extensive violation of human rights of their neighbours, relatives and other 
people they know. Horror reports of people “disappearing”, kidnapped or brutally murdered 
at the hands of state officials were commonplace during the regimes of Amin and Obote in 
the 1970s and 1980s358. 
 
The human rights violations were accompanied by economic hardships and mismanagement 
that brought the country to its knees. Industries closed down due to lack of spare parts, 
goods became scarce due to lack of foreign exchange to import them, and even those traders 
with the money could not stock their businesses lest they would be killed or their stock 
robbed. This situation is captured by Jamal and Weeks who observe . . .  
perhaps of all sub Saharan African countries – Uganda must take the 
dubious honour of being the country that experienced the widest range of 
misfortunes in the last two decades. During a regime of singular economic 
mismanagement and political repression, Amin reduced a once-prosperous 
and promising country to one of the poorest in the world359. 
 
Indeed during the 1970s and the first half of the 1980s, life was short and brutal. Idi Amin’s 
nine year rule 1971-79 left a mark of terror on Uganda’s history. His was a state of blood360. 
 
                                            
358 See George Kanyeihamba. (1988) “Power that rode naked through Uganda under the muzzle of a gun” in 
Hansen & Twaddle, Uganda Now. London: James Currey. Dan Mudoola (1988), “Political Transition since Idi 
Amin: A Study in Political Pathology”, in Hansen & Twaddle, Uganda Now. London: James Currey. Christine 
Obbo, (1988) What went Wrong in Uganda?”, in Hansen & Twaddle, Uganda Now. London: James Currey. 
Richardson (1980), After Amin: The Bloody Pearl 
359 Vali Jamal and John Weeks (1993) Africa Misunderstood 
360 Henry Kyemba, The State of Blood: The Inside Story of Idi Amin. 
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The return of Milton Obote to power through the disputed elections of 1980 was a short-
lived victory. From 1981 to 1985, Obote’s government had to fight rebels of the National 
Resistance Army (NRA) and other insurgents. In the process, Obote’s soldiers lost a sense 
of discipline. Like Amin’s, Obote’s soldiers ravaged villages, raped women, killed, and 
robbed, with impunity361. But unlike Amin, Obote’s government attempted to rebuild the 
economy. With the assistance of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) as well as bilateral donors, there was slight improvement in the economy as a whole. 
It is important to note that by the time Obote returned to power, the economy had virtually 
collapsed to the extent that all exports were non-existent other than coffee which accounted 
for 98% of foreign earnings. Even then, due to smuggling and abandonment of coffee 
shambas by farmers, the coffee available for export was less than half the level it was before 
1972362. This state of affairs complicated the task of Obote’s government to deal with 
institutional and social decay that had prevailed in the country for a decade, it is therefore 
difficult to account for Obote’s achievements or failures during his second time in office. 
But very little seems to have been achieved. 
 
The institutional distortions of the “lost” decades had serious implications on the Ugandan 
society as a whole. The physical infrastructure such as roads, telephones, schools, hospitals, 
water supply had either deteriorated or experienced systemic failures. Morale in the public 
service was very low. Public policy implementation was unreliable and unpredictable as 
departments lacked basic tools like telephone, fax, paper and even pens. Above all, the 
salaries were too miserable to motivate public servants to work efficiently and effectively 
for government. It is reported in a study by Bigsten and Kayizzi-Mugerwa that during the 
hard times, civil servants were hit worst amongst all categories of the Ugandan society 
because they lived on salaries from government which had miserably declined to the extent 
that for a senior staff, a monthly wage could only buy food for a week for a family of four to 
                                            
361 See F.W. Bwengye, The Agony of Uganda. From Amin to Obote. London: Regency  Press. 
362 Keith Edmonds, (1988). “Crisis Management: Lessons for Africa from Obotes’ second term, in Hansen & 
Twaddle, Uganda Now. London: James Currey 
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six people363. The reactions of public servants to their poor conditions of work in 
government were varied.  
 
According to Bigsten and Kayizzi-Magerwa, civil servants’ survival strategies included: 
obtaining a second job in addition to the one he/she has in government364, venturing into the 
informal private sector, changing family diet for inferior foods, growing their own food on 
some pieces of public land or in the backyard of their homes, rearing poultry and animals, 
while others left the public service altogether. 
 
Besides the low morale of public servants and professionals, the state of public service 
institutions was lamentable. Scholastic materials for schools and drugs for hospital and 
dispensaries were lacking. Water supply in both rural and urban areas became unpredictable. 
Most of the people resorted to other sources of lighting and energy supply as electricity 
supply became eratic. Urban residents were particularly hit by the collapse of public services 
as they could not be privately provided. Most hospitals and schools in Uganda are 
government owned. Electricity and water supply are controlled by public bodies. Therefore 
the collapse of the state sector had direct bearing on the provision of these services. There is 
need to conceptualise and to come to grips with the issues of state collapse. What is state 
collapse? According to Gilbert Khadiagala, state collapse is understood to mean a 
fundamental institutional problem, manifesting itself in the inability of state arrangements to 
provide meaningful social action365. Since the state in its institutional mode needs to extend 
its authority and derive legitimacy as an indispensable force in the organization of society, 
there is a problem when it collapses because its purposive role in steering society disappears. 
                                            
363 Opcit, Bigsten Arne and Kayizzi-Mugerwa ibid, 1992, p. 1430 Also, Mahmood Mamdani, “Uganda: 
Contradictions of IMF Programme and Perspective” Development and Change Vol 21, No. 3, 1990, indicates 
that wages earned by civil servants declined in real terms by 26.4 percent annually between 1980 – 1984. Also, 
David Himbara and Dawood Sultan, “Restructuring the Ugandan State and economy: the Challenge of 
international Bantustan” 
Review of African Political Economy No. 63, 1995 
364 Many teachers up today serve in government schools as well as serving in other schools to make ends meet. 
Medical doctors and other professionals still serve elsewhere in addition to their official jobs. In a survey of 
Kampala households, Bigsten and Kayizzi-Mugerwa (1992) ibid, p427 found hat 75% of public servants had 
other “profit making activities” in addition to their official jobs. 
365 Khadiagala, Gilbert M. “State collapse and Reconstruction in Uganda” in I. William Zartman, (1995). 
Collapsed States: Disintegration and Reconstruction of Legitimate Authority Boulder Colorado: Lynne Reinner 
publishers p.33 
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Khadiagala argues that state collapse is more than mere institutional weakness366. 
Institutional weakness may imply organizational dysfunction, but state collapse implies the 
failure of the state to “penetrate and coordinate activities in society and society itself”367. 
 
The problems arising from the collapse of the state are three-fold: it is unable to deliver 
political goods, it is unable to mobilize society for productive activities and relies for its 
existence on the use of brutal force of coercion. As a result, civil society and community 
organizations withdrew from the public arena and retreat from “apolitical” activities to the 
private realm of life. Without a sufficiently legitimate state, the private realm is also 
‘disorganised’ and uncoordinated. This increases incidences of banditry, disorder and 
informalism. As the state collapsed “society carried on”368. As Zartman puts it “the state 
pulled into itself and imploded, became a black hole of power”369. This was the case of the 
state in Uganda. Power withered away from the rulers while holding onto state machinery 
(especially the coercive one).  Indeed as Sandbrook puts it “Political decay feeds on itself.  
As consent declines, politicians   rely more heavily on pay offs and [use of] force370.”    
 
The results are instability, corruption, crime and rebellions. Also, economic problems 
deepen as state coffers dry up. Systemic institutional decay occurs. In comparative terms, 
Uganda’s systemic institutional decay had its counterparts in Chad, Zaire (now Democratic 
Republic of Congo) and Central African Republic.  In these countries, the state collapsed. 
 
4.4 Decentralisation as a Response to Institutional Collapse 
Decentralisation in Uganda as a mode of governance has developed through three phases: 
the first one between 1986 – 1992 was known as Resistance Councils and Committees 
(RCs).   The second phase 1993 – 1997 may be termed as a reform of local government 
through RCs which were re-named Local Councils (LCs).  The third phase is the present 
one, since 1997 is known as Local Government.  Each of these phases is characterized by its 
                                            
366 ibid, Khadiagala  p.34 
367 Ibid, p.35 
368 Zartman, William I. “Introduction: Posing the Problem of State Collapse” in I. Williams                             
Zartman Collapsed States, p.1 
369 Ibid Zartman, p.7 
370 Sandbrook, R. (1985). The Politics of Africa’s Economic Stagnation. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, p. 114. 
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own policy objectives and has served a specific purpose in institutional “re-engineering”.  In 
this section I analyse the contribution of each of the above phases to the process of 
rebuilding institutions of governance in Uganda. 
 
4.4.1 Decentralisation Phase I: Resistance Councils (RCs)  
 The genesis of RCs is to be traced in the ideological persuasions of the National Resistance 
Movement (NRM) and its guerilla army known as the National Resistance Army (NRA) 
which organized and fought Obote’s Uganda People’s Congress (UPC) government 1981 – 
1985 and the short-lived Tito Okello’s military junta in 1985.  RCs were organisational 
instruments for mobilizing rural peasants in NRA’s pursuit for power in the bushes of 
Luwero Triangle371.  The RCs were perceived by the NRA as “people’s power” or “popular 
democracy” and also, as “an integral part of the National Resistance Movement372“. 
 
When the National Resistance Movement (NRM) came to power in January 1986 after a 
successful guerilla war, its leaders defined democracy in three ways: parliamentary (or 
representative) democracy, people’s committees and a decent level of living for every 
Ugandan. On assuming state power, the NRM embarked on establishing RCs at grassroots 
level in every village and urban areas. The main tasks of the RCs were to deal with 
lawbreakers in cooperation with chiefs and police, discussing local development projects, 
and to act as forums for dealing with corruption and misuse of office by government 
officials. Above all, the RCs were responsible for screening recruits into police, army and 
prisons “in order to avoid anti-social elements warming their way into these institutions as 
has been the case in the past.”373 The NRM government constructed a pyramidal structure of 
RCs – RC I at the village, RC II at parish, RC III at sub-country, RC IV at country level and 
RC V at district level. At the national level, the NRM established the National Resistance 
Council (NRC). The structure was indeed an NRM structure. It is important to note that the 
establishment of RCs introduced a new spirit of people’s participation in local governance 
because every female and male adult was a member, especially at RC I (village council). It 
                                            
371 Resistance Councils and Committees were known as Obukiiko in the area captured by NRA from the 
government soldiers.   see The Ten Point Programme of the NRM Kampala: NRM secretary, p.8 
372 Ibid, The Ten-Point Programme of NRM, p 8 
373 Ibid, The Ten-Point Programme of NRM, p 8 
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was the first time in the contemporary history of Uganda that village councils were 
established by government. Representatives directly elected at each of the lower levels 
formed a council at the next higher level except the NRC, which was initially composed of 
“historical” members374. A parallel structure for urban councils was also put in place on the 
same pyramidal design.  In the case of urban RCs, the structure was RC I (cell), RC II 
(parish), RC III (Division), RC IV (Town). All towns and municipalities had their RCs set 
up to RC IV except Kampala City, which doubles as a district hence RC V. The functions 
prescribed for all levels were the same in rural as well as urban areas. 
 
The people enthusiastically embraced the new governance structures as they appeared to 
involve them in some form of decision-making.  At the same time, the government was 
interested in them because they helped the NRM, which had no national structures as it 
came to power to reach the grassroots.  Moreover, the NRM had come to power through the 
power of the gun and needed the support of the people to establish and buttress its regime. 
The RC structures offered the NRM the opportunity to convince its opponents and the 
international community that although it had taken power by the gun, it had devised a 
system, which embraced all Ugandans.  The NRM introduced a system of governance it 
branded a “no – party” system.  The NRM claimed that the “no–party” system was superior 
to multiparty and single party systems because the “no–party” system was “broad–based” 
and “all–inclusive” and its main pillar was the RC system.  According to Kasfir’s analysis: 
 The village-level RCs are a textbook example of participatory  
democracy, with all adult residents gathering to decide village issues, 
electing a council to govern and judge local cases and recalling any 
elected officials who have lost their onfidence375. 
 
This romantic perspective of RCs existed briefly when RCs were first established in 1986 
and a few years that followed.  The underlying motivation of the NRM government was to 
create a new structure that could achieve twin objectives: first to secure legitimacy for its 
                                            
374 At all local levels, elections were conducted not by secret ballot but by residents openly lining behind 
candidates of their choice. The candidate with the biggest number of votes was elected.   However, it turned 
out later that people would tend to elect relatives, friends, etc, and competence was lost as a criterion for 
holding a public office. Between 1986 and 1989, the NRC was not elected. 
375 Nelson Kasfir, “No-party Democracy” in Uganda. Journal of Democracy, Vol 9 No 2, 1998 p. 54 
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new government, secondly, to undo or uproot and undo the support for the political parties; 
and thirdly to justify its new ideology of “no-party” system governance.  The claim of the 
NRM was that every citizen was free to participate in the governance of his village and 
elsewhere if elected at any higher level. As Kasfir notes again, RCs served the NRM’s “no-
party” ideology very well “so long as they remained the institutional expression of popular 
participation, they supplied no party democracy with its most persuasive justification376“.  
Kasfir is quick to point out correctly however, that popular participation in RCs was difficult 
to defend because popular participation ended at village level377. 
 
The RCs had their own institutional problems.  These ranged from conflicts with chiefs, 
police, magistrates and failure to understand their jurisdiction378. At their inception, RCs 
tended to believe they had replaced chiefs.  In some areas RCs argued that during the civil 
war they had done without the chiefs, therefore they could still run their own affairs without 
them. More confusion was found in some areas where the chiefs themselves stood and were 
elected as RC chairmen379. 
 
The important question that was constantly raised was whether RCs were organs of the 
people, of the state or organs of the NRM.  The assumption that they were organs of the 
people was based on their organisational nature as well as the tasks they were to undertake.  
As noted earlier, they operated at grassroots as people’s assemblies and participation in them 
was voluntary on part of all the adult residents of a particular area. 
 
On the other hand, this view of RCs being organs of people’s power was contestable given 
that they were imposed from above, they were a creature of the state and not the people 
themselves.  They could for instance not be compared with cooperative societies, which are 
normally created by people for a specific purpose.   
 
                                            
376 ibid, N Kasfir, 1998, p 54 
377 ibid, N Kasfir 1998, p 54 
378 Sabiti  Makara, “ The Role of Resistance Councils in Promoting Democracy in Uganda” 
 (unpublished research report) Makerere University, 1992 
379 Expedit Ddungu, “Popular Forms and the Questions of Democracy: The Case of Resistance Councils” p. 15 
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At the same time, they were at inception, not defined as organs of the state because the key 
organs of the state such as the chiefs, police, prisons, etc, remained intact.   Moreover, in 
their formative years, RCs had no legal existence as the law prescribing and regulating their 
activities was not enacted until 1987.380  It was possibly more accurate to see RCs as organs 
of the NRM because their creation was facilitated by the cadres of NRM and their overall 
direction originated from the Special District Administrators (SDAs) at the district level and 
the NRM Secretariat. 
 
The enactment of the enabling laws created two perspectives in which RCs could be 
understood.381 On the one hand, they remained organs of the NRM, which on the other hand, 
they became organs of the state.  In the latter capacity, they operated as organs of local 
government.  Implicitly, however, this new legal status of RCs had one important 
implication, the pretension that they were organs of “people’s power” ended. This could not 
have been least expected because RCs had been branded “organs of people’s power” by 
NRM cadres and some intellectuals alike without much careful analyses of what they stood 
for382. RCs had not arisen out people’s consciousness, their roles were defined by the state 
and their ideological dispensation defined for them by the cadres of NRM. They were not 
civil society organizations but state organizations. It is surprising that soon or later, the 
members of the executive committees began to solicit bribes from the residents as well as 
questioning what benefit was there for them to spend all their time on community matters. 
 
The broader problem with RCs was the context in which they were supposed to operate.  
First, the NRM required them to operate as non-sectarian organizations (religious, political 
affiliation, ethnic or racial).  This, at the surface appeared well reasoned in view of the fact 
that the sectarian tendencies had undermined the Ugandan society for a long time.  
However, the real logic behind NRM’s reasoning was different.  It was to require the RCs to 
toe one single ideology of the NRM, that of “no-party”.  In the process, NRM had hoped to 
build and conscript members of RCs as ideologues of the “no-party” system. 
                                            
380 Resistance Councils and Committees Statute No 9, 1987. 
381 ibid, Statute 1987. 
382 Opcit, Expedit Ddungu, “Popular Forms and the Questions of Democracy: The Case of Resistance Councils 
in Uganda” CBR Publications No 4, 1989  M. Mandani, “NRA/NRM: Two Years in Power” 
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Secondly, during the elections of RCs, campaigns for particular positions on the committees 
were not allowed.  The logic seems to have been for NRM to have its ideologues obtain 
positions in these committees.  Thirdly, on paper, the RCs were free to move a vote of no 
confidence in any member of the committee if they were dissatisfied with his or her 
performance or conduct.  At the beginning, this seemed plausible and in several instances, it 
happened.  However, there were two problems with the system of moving and effecting 
votes of no confidence.  One was that if a member of RC in question happened to be a 
relative of socially powerful people, the mover of the motion would be witch-hunted.  The 
second problem was associated with how the affected person related with NRM cadres and 
other officials.  The mover of such a motion of no confidence in such a politically connected 
person would be branded all kinds of names such as kipinga- “retrogressive”, “partisan”, 
sectarian and so on.  The result was that within RCs, there were “untouchables”.  The latter 
point coincides with Mamdani’s observation that the NRM has been reluctant to extend 
democracy beyond individual rights, thus, the “NRM has championed the cause of rights 
only so long as it does not threaten its hold on power383“.  This is a pertinent observation. 
The NRM has used RCs over the years to extend its ideological orientation of “no-party” 
system, undermining all other political tendencies in society.  Thus, in reality, RCs have not 
been autonomous vehicles for championing democratization of society in Uganda. 
 
4.4.2 Decentralisation Phase II:  From Resistance Councils to Local Councils 
In the above section, I have shown and analysed the nature and characteristics of RCs in 
their formative phase.  I have pointed out that the definitional roles of RCs were in many 
cases unclear and at times, confusing.  In this section, I show how RCs turned into structures 
of local government with definite roles and responsibilities.  In effect, therefore, the study of 
Uganda’s decentralisation in functional terms begins from 1992, when the President of 
Uganda launched decentralisation. Although the term Resistance Council (RCs) was 
retained, it now, implied a structure of local government. 
 
                                            
383 Opcit, Mahmood Mamdani, And Fire Does Not Always Beget Ash: Critical Reflections on the NRM, 
Kampala: The Monitor Publications, 1995 p.103                                                                                                                                 
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The President of Uganda in his inaugural speech for decentralisation acknowledged that the 
system of RCs existing prior to decentralisation was weak.  He said in reference to RCs, “we 
feel that the system has a number of weaknesses, which might, if unattended to, cripple all 
our effort.384 In his speech, he pointed out the weaknesses of the existing local governance 
system to include: 
(i) The existing personnel system was neither answerable to Local Authorities nor to 
Central Government.  This was making it difficult to control and discipline the civil 
servants at local level. 
(ii) There were no clear lines of authority with respect to services provided by Central 
Government line ministries. 
(iii) There were no clear relationships between the Central Government and Local 
Government in financial matters. 
(iv) The existing structure of Government tended to preserve the sectoral approach to 
development and to promote duplication of efforts.  It was inefficient and wasted 
resources. 
(v) The existing local government structures tended to require the Local Authorities to 
give rubber stamp approval to decisions taken at the headquarters of Ministries. 
(vi) The elected officials of Local Authorities, such as the District Chairperson had no 
power commensurate with his/her status.  They operated under the shadow of centrally 
appointed District Administrators. 
 
The President Museveni noted that the existing system of Local Government allowed civil 
servants undue freedom to do whatever they wanted “while the Local Councils and their 
chief executives looked on hopelessly385“. He noted further, “it is therefore not fair for 
District Councils to be so dependent on a work force over which they have no control386.” 
These observations are pertinent because the system of local government then worked 
within the framework of the Local Administrations Act, 1967 which had centralised power – 
personnel, financial, legislative and decision-making.  In short, the local governments were 
dependent on the headquarters of the Ministries for approval even in simple administrative 
matters. 
 
                                            
384 President Yoweri Museveni’s address at the launching of the Local Government Decentralisation 
Programme on October 2, 1992, p.6 reproduced in Decentralisation in Uganda: The Policy and its Philosophy, 
Decentrlisation Secretariat, 1993 
385 ibid, President Museveni’s address, p. 5 
386 ibid, President Museveni’s address, p. 5 
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The launching of decentralisation promised to reverse these centralizing tendencies.  The 
main changes announced by the President in this respect included: 
(i) The elected local leaders such as the District Chairperson were to have political 
powers together with the Council to make decisions. 
(ii) The civil servants were to become employees of the district council - appointed, 
controlled and disciplined by the District Service Commission. 
(iii) In addition to grants from the central government, local governments would collect 
local taxes, use them at their discretion and allocate them according to their local 
needs and priorities. 
(iv) It was no longer necessary for local governments to refer budgets to the Minister 
for approval. The role of the Ministry of Local Government was to supervise the 
implementation of government programmes and to issue guidelines. 
 
Broadly, the changes ushered in by decentralisation in 1992 entailed a number of changes in 
the system of government. The new principle became one where governmental decisions 
would be taken as close as possible where the effected people are. For instance most service 
sectors, such as primary education, health services (both curative and public), child welfare, 
control of communicable diseases, water services, paving roads, Local Government police 
and prisons, agriculture, and others of local nature were decentralized to local authorities. 
Besides, District Resistance Councils were allowed to make byelaws without reference to 
the Minister. The power of the Minister to revoke byelaws was removed. The local councils 
only needed to send their byelaws to the Attorney General for publication in the government 
gazette to be effected as local laws.  
 
The most fundamental innovations arising from the new policy of decentralisation under the 
Local Government Statute, 1993 were basically three: a separate personnel system, 
intergovernmental fiscal relations and a new power structure. Under the separate personnel 
decentralisation, the District Service Commissions were introduced to recruit, discipline and 
dismiss local government civil servants as opposed to the unified personnel system, which 
existed before decentralisation. Under the unified personnel system, all employees of the 
local governments were central government employees controlled centrally by the Public 
Service Commission. The locally based personnel suffered from double loyalty, they 
reported both to their ministry’s headquarters as well as to the local councils with which 
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they worked. This had significant implications for the accountability process. The civil 
servants at the local level felt that they were more accountable to their superiors at the 
ministry because their promotion or career advancement depended more on the latter than 
their immediate political bosses at the local level. Similarly, the locally based civil servants 
controlled financial and other resources that came directly from their sector ministries down 
to their departments at district. Largely therefore, the civil servants were their own masters 
at the local level. 
 
The introduction of the separate personnel system entailed fundamental changes in the 
personnel system at the local level. First, District Service Commissions took over the 
personnel function at the local level from the main Public Service Commission, which only 
retained the function of recruiting, promoting, disciplining and dismissing the central 
government employees. The advantages of a separate personnel system were envisaged to 
include accountability and efficient management, responsiveness, quality personnel, 
recruitment of relevant competences and human resources in matters that were seen in terms 
of expertise relevant to the needs of the constituents and the locality. The underlying 
objective was that if civil servants were recruited to serve a particular local council, they 
would be loyal and committed to it. They would take directives from the local councils and 
its leadership and would be answerable to them for their actions. At the same time, the idea 
of separate personnel for local government was based on the belief that the civil servants 
would be more effective and efficient since they would work with people with interest in 
local projects and development programmes at that level. In essence, too, supervision of 
civil servants by the political leaders would be closer and realistic. This would harmonise 
the development programmes of the local councils. 
 
In tune with the above expectations was also the idea of responsiveness on the part of civil 
servants. The new perspective was to see the civil servants not as detached bureaucrats from 
the local circumstances but as part of the social processes at the local level. In this respect, 
the civil servants would be expected to respond to local needs and circumstances, thereby 
deliver socially relevant solutions to local problems. In turn, the local people were expected 
to be more willing to contribute either in kind or financially to local projects because they 
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would be seeing the real benefits of their money or labour. As a result, local constituents 
would be willing to pay taxes, which would facilitate the work of local government at their 
level. 
 
Envisaged too, was a very high calibre of personnel at the local level. It was a well-
established fact that the poor performance of local governments was not only due to 
excessive centralisation and lack of sufficient discretion in most matters but largely due to 
the poor calibre of personnel at the local level.387 To reverse this trend, the new District 
Service Commissions were given powers to hire all categories of personnel for both district 
and urban councils in each district from the lowest cadre such as cleaners to the most senior 
person such as the Chief Administrative Officer (CAO) for the district or Town Clerk for the 
municipality or town. 
 
The separate personnel system though appropriate and relevant for full scale decentralisation 
met skepticism and doubt in some quarters. This was not surprising because both central 
government officials, politicians as well as locally based civil servants had for long, been 
based on a system of patronage and bureaucratic red-tape through which they made personal 
gains by way of what used to be known as “oiling the system”. This meant that local 
officials bribed their senior officers for them to be promoted or gain other favours. With the 
introduction of this new system, the local officials were required to report and account to the 
local politicians as well as constituents for their performance. Some of the doubts rose from 
the senior central government officials who doubted the capacity of the newly created 
District Service Commission to handle complex personnel matters. More importantly, 
officials in the ministries saw the new personnel as a process of taking away their powers 
and resources. Until personnel decentralisation set in all matters of personnel were handled 
at the headquarters of the ministry of Public Service. With decentralisation in place, most 
ministries retained functions relating to the policy, guidance, capacity building, inspection 
and issuance of direction. The ministries were no longer the “bee-hives” for the officials. 
Decentralisation in the form of devolution entailed “separate governments”, that is, central 
                                            
387 F.X. Lubanga, “Human Resources Management and Development in the Context of Decentralisation” in 
Apolo Nsibambi, Decentralisation and Civil Society in Uganda, Kampala: Fountain Publishers, 1995 
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on the one hand, and local on the other. The implication of this to the central government 
officials was that they would no longer issue directives to the local governments especially 
in matters of personnel management. 
 
The locally-based officials, hitherto, employed by the central government were apprehensive 
about the new personnel system. They complained that they had been “sold out and 
abandoned” by the central government.388 The apprehension, perhaps, had grounds. The 
civil servants feared that the local politicians would victimize them based on ethnicity, 
religion, and other parochial grounds. In 1960s, these parochial sentiments characterized 
employment in the decentralized local governments of that time. There was a common 
sectarian saying in some areas especially Buganda which went like “guse oli mwana wami?  
- “whose child are you?” This tendency occurred also in other parts of Uganda389. The civil 
servants reckoned those sentiments and felt that the return of the separate personnel system 
would herald the return of those inward sentiments and compromise meritocracy and 
seniority as the benchmarks for career development in government service. The fears of the 
civil servants were also based on grounds that corruption, nepotism and clientalism, which 
have pervaded the Ugandan society and the public realm would work against the more 
upright and professional civil servants. The more profound fear that pre-occupied civil 
servants was the fact that they were now to be “localized”, that is they were to become 
employees of a single local authority. They would no longer be automatically promoted to 
higher ranks in the central government, as was the case under the unified personnel system. 
If a civil servant reached the highest level in a local authority, that meant the apex of his or 
her career, there would be no further openings for him or her. If one was to join the central 
government for a higher position, that meant applying afresh and sitting for interviews on a 
competitive basis with other people desiring to gain that position. 
 
The concerns of the “local” civil servants have some merits. Under the present system, there 
is already a wide spread practice for the local authorities to recruit “home boys and girls”, 
meaning those graduates who hail from a particular home area. On the broader picture, this 
                                            
388 According to F. X. Lubanga, ibid, some of the members of the District Service Commissions were former 
middle or low cadre civil servants without university degrees 
389  Martin Doornbos(1976), on “Kumanyana movement” in Ankole in his book, Not all the King’s Men 
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may encourage recruitment on non- merit basis, increase corruption and nepotism and 
compromise public service efficiency in the long run. Besides, the national image of the 
public service is likely to fade with time when civil servants have attachments to their “local 
issues” and politics. Moreover, with the rampant scarcity of jobs in the country, there is also 
some temptation for the “better-connected” and the well to do to influence the local 
politicians and the District Service Commission to secure jobs for their sons and daughters 
or relatives. The result will be a growing non-professional public service–dominated by 
particular sections of the people, a tendency that will make the local public service 
impenetrable and non-transparent. The likely consequences will defeat the original 
objectives of decentralisation, that is, accountability and efficiency will be at stake with that 
kind of public servants. 
 
In bid to forestall the likelihood of lower standards of public service at the local level the 
central government with the assistance of the donors instituted the capacity-building project, 
which has helped in the training of local councillors, civil servants and heads of statutory 
bodies in the management of decentralized service delivery, including management of 
personnel matters. The ministry of Local Government has also issued guidelines on the 
management of personnel functions at the local level390. The guidelines have helped to stem 
the wave of political victimization that confronted the civil servants in the early years of 
decentralisation. The local politicians have gradually come to the understanding that in 
disciplining civil servants as well as terminating their contracts, the principle of natural 
justice has to be followed; otherwise, the cost implications involved to compensate the 
aggrieved employee can be astronomical.391 
 
Despite the existence of the separate personnel system, working conditions have not been 
better for civil servants in the local government. First, there is a problem of low pay, which 
is a general problem also in the whole government structure. However, it is perceived at the 
local level that central government employees have some advantages over the local 
                                            
390 Uganda,Republic of.(2003).Human Resource Management in Local Governments:Participant’s 
Handbook.Kampala:.MOLG. 
391 In the case of wrongful termination of the Chief Administrative Officer for Kabale district the district 
council was ordered to pay shs.200 million. In the case of the Town Clerk of Mbarara, his interdiction was 
reversed by the court of law. 
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government ones, namely: that the central government employees have more access to 
allowances such as travel, off-station, facilitation, imprest and others. The second problem is 
that local governments have a tendency to delay the salaries of their employees. Some 
councils have gone up to eight months without paying salaries to their workers while some 
have diverted the money meant for salaries to other activities.392 
 
Another problem for decentralized personnel management seems to stem from functions of 
the District Service Commissions. Although these statutory bodies are enshrined in the 
Constitution (1995) and the Local Government Act 1997, they lack sufficient funding, they 
have small secretariats and the calibre of persons on these commissions is generally low and 
highly politicized. Besides, these commissions have a narrow mandate. Their functions are 
limited to recruitment and disciplinary actions of the employees. They have nothing to do 
with the routine matters of employment of local government workers, a function that is 
vested with the Chief Administrative Officer. Therefore, the welfare of workers does not 
feature in the functions of the District Service Commissions. 
 
In Uganda, the local government workers are not unionized. This means they have no 
common voice through which to speak out on their grievances and dissatisfaction with work 
conditions. The local authorities associations – the Uganda Local Authorities Association 
(ULAA) and the Uganda Urban Authorities Association (UUAA) tend to focus on what they 
consider to be “big” issues affecting the relations between their member authorities and the 
central government. The plight of local governments’ workers has not featured prominently 
on their agenda. Thus, much as the separate personnel system was conceived to increase 
efficiency, responsiveness and accountability on the part of the local government employees, 
the issues of motivation, career path development, training, working conditions and 
retirement benefits have not been adequately addressed. Two daunting issues still stand out 
unresolved. There is the issue of retirement benefits. The local governments have up to now, 
                                            
392 The Minister of Local Government complained in his address at “Decentralisation Implementation Review 
Workshop”, held at Colline Hotel on 23 February 1995 that Iganga District Council had not paid salaries for 8 
months, and Kampala City Council had not paid salaries for 3 months. That this was embarrassing to 
government and undermining decentralisation. Mbarara District Council diverted teachers’ salaries to other 
activities. 
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no independent pension scheme for those who retire from their service. They have to make 
claims from the ministry of public service. The other key issue concerns payroll. This too, is 
still centralized. Low paid workers at the local level such as nurses, teachers and agricultural 
assistants have to use their meagre resources to go to the capital city, Kampala to check with 
the ministry of public service whether their names appear on the payroll when their salaries 
do not come to the district three or so months after employment. This is the reason why 
many local government employees detest transfers from one station to another because that 
involves missing their salary for some months, as adjustments are being made on the payroll 
in Kampala. 
 
Finally, there is the issue of “elite capture”. This concept means the tendency of the 
bureaucratic and powerful political players to use decentralized and locally mobilized 
resources for their own benefit rather than allowing such resources to trickle down to 
programmes intended for the local communities. Under the separate personnel system in 
Uganda, the bureaucratic officials have at times allied with the local politicians to divert or 
misuse resources intended for development programmes.393 This is partly because the 
professional life of the appointed officials depends not on the organizational principles but 
on the “popular” approval of the local politicians who approve of them as good “boys “or 
“girls”. In other words, they are ready and willing to cooperate in the political and economic 
manoeuvres of the local politicians and their powerful allies in society. This tendency has 
undermined the efficacy of both the decentralisation policy and the separate personnel 
system. Thus, while the locally based bureaucrats under the former unified personnel 
systems were branded “semi-gods”, the new system seems to have made them puppets of the 
local politicians, a tendency that has greatly perpetuated corruption in the local 
governments, to the extent that there is now a common adage that the decentralisation policy 
was another way of “decentralising corruption”. Much of this goes on undetected by the 
watchdog institutions of the central government such as the Inspector General of 
Government (IGG) and the Auditor General because it is systemic, involving the appointed 
                                            
393 Several cases of awarding tenders to unqualified companies are common occurrence. Diversion of funds 
from one vote to another is also rampant. Because some powerful elites in the society assisted local politicians 
during their elections, they do whatever is possible to reward them with either jobs in the local authorities or 
securing tenders for them to supply goods or services. Any attempt by the appointed officials to block such 
deals will “spoil” their jobs, so they comply or “cooperate”. 
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officials, the local politicians and the powerful persons in the society. The situation that has 
prevailed in the Uganda under decentralisation is typical of what Conyers warned us of, that 
there is a danger that decentralisation will tend to strengthen the positions of the local elites 
and in the process perpetuate inequalities.394 
 
4.4.3 Centre – Local Relations under Decentralisation 
The spirit under which the decentralisation policy gained ground in Uganda may be 
discerned in the words of President Museveni’s support for it. In support for the new policy 
of decentralisation Museveni writes; 
The message has been clear: Central Government can only be pretentious 
if it claims to have the capacity to provide and oversee development at 
grassroots. Central Government should just be a facilitator, because 
sustainable development can only be locally driven and supported. The 
role of the Centre will be to “set the stage” but not to “act out” the play395. 
 
The message indeed is very clear. The idea behind decentralisation, at least the type of 
devolution that was envisaged in Uganda was intended to roll back the over-extended and 
inefficient central government. The key objectives were in tune with the new neo-liberal 
agenda which required a smaller but more effective central government leaving the rest of 
the activities to the “local state” and the people. Most federal states have used the same 
principles that advocate for a strong central government that is capable of governing 
effectively, a “local state” that regulates activities at the local level and creates conditions 
that guarantee people’s rights and freedom396. To cement the idea of devolution in Uganda, 
Museveni argued, 
We are prepared to allow our people who are short on experience, systems 
and practices of local governance but long on their commitment to 
democratic order to experiment with the new structures, systems and 
procedures so long as we maintain a capacity to recognize and correct 
errors397 
 
                                            
394 Diana Conyers, “Decentralisation and Development: A Framework for analysis” in Community 
Development Journal vol 21, no 2, 1986. 
395 President Museveni’s keynote address at the opening of the “Regional Conference o Local Self-
Governance, Peoples Participation and Development” Kampala 30th August 1993. 
396 See for example, the basis of United States federalism in Clint Bolick, Grassroots Tyranny: The Limits of 
Federalism, Cato Institute, Washington, DC, 1993. 
397 ibid, Museveni’s Key note address 30th August 1993. 
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Museveni’s support for devolution was borne out of number of factors. First the experiment 
with RCs had helped his NRM government secure broad support within the masses 
especially in the rural areas. Secondly, the reforms that were taking place in other section of 
the public sector in Uganda necessitated a devolved form of governance. The key reforms 
that were taking place in the first half of the 1990s include: the privatisation programme398, 
the macro-economic reform or Structural Adjustment programme399, and the public sector 
reforms400. These neo-liberal reforms could only operate with a measure of success if the 
whole governmental structure was revisited and overhauled. Thus it is no exaggeration to 
observe that decentralisation was conceived as part and parcel of the “package” of reforms. 
This observation is important in view of the fact that although RCs as local institutions were 
claimed as a “home grown initiative”401, they operated under the Local Government Act 
1967 until 1993. RCs on their part secured the political objectives of the NRM. The new 
ideas of efficiency, effective governance, a small central state – are concepts that are 
blended with the neo-liberal reforms ushered in by the donors, and taken up by the NRM 
government. 
 
Thirdly, there is the issue federalism. In some parts of the country, especially in the central 
region of Buganda, there was (still is) a strong demand that the form of local government 
under the new constitutional dispensation that was on-going in the early 1990s take the form 
of federalism. Decentralisation was introduced by the government towards the time when 
the Constitutional Commission was due to complete its report402. To some people, especially 
among the Baganda elites, decentralisation was timed to undermine their demand for a 
federal arrangement of local government. In the wake of drafting and debating the Local 
Government Bill, the pro-federalists argued, that the policy of decentralisation as presented 
                                            
398 Geoffrey B. Tukahebwa, “Privatisation as a development policy” in Holger B. Hansen and M. Twaddle, 
Developing Uganda, London: James Currey, 1998. 
399 Paul Collier and Sanjay Pradhan, “Economic Aspects of the Transition from Civil War” in Hansen and 
Twaddle (eds), 1998. 
400 P Langseth, “Civil Service Performance in Uganda” in P. Langseth, J. Katorobo, E. Brett and J. Mionene 
(eds) Uganda: Landmarks in Rebuilding a Nation, Kampal: Fountain Publishers, 1995 
401 Phares Mutibwa, Uganda Since Independence: A Story of Unfulfilled Hopes London: Hurst and Co. 1992 
402 Decentralisation was launched in October 1992, while the Constitutional Review Commission handed in its 
report on 31 December 1992. See World Bank, “Voices and Choices at Macro-leviel, increasing the Value of 
Participation in country-owned poverty-reduction strategies, Uganda Process case study” at 
www.worldbank.org/participation/webfiles/Uganda. This report found that decentralisation in Uganda was 
hastly implemented without adequate capacity at the local level to manage it well.  
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in the bill was a constitutional matter since it sought to entrench a unitary form of, as 
opposed to a federal, government . . . They submitted that exacting the bill would amount to 
pre-empting and prejudicing the Constitution making exercise”403. 
 
Although the bill was passed in December 1993, some sections of the population remained 
uneasy about decentralisation. It could possibly be true that the government timed the 
introduction of the policy to undercut the demand for federalism. This also may explain the 
motivation of the government to allow extensive powers at the time, to be devolved to the 
local level. This could be so because there is possibly little that a federal system could offer, 
apart from perhaps each “local state” having is own constitution that decentralisation did not 
entail in Uganda.404 The important point to note is that decentralisation can only stand to 
achieve significant measure of success if the central government leadership is committed to 
the principle of sharing power. 
 
In Uganda while some sections of society either doubted the commitment of central 
government to devolve power or were skeptical about the intentions of the government, the 
policy was implemented on well-laid principles of sharing power between the centre and the 
periphery. Why were some elites skeptical? Apart from the political culture of centralisation 
that the bureaucratic officials had known for most of their lives in public service, which 
taught them that power flows from the centre, there were other reasons. First 
decentralisation meant loss of power and patronage for the officials in the central 
government ministries. Secondly it also meant loss of control and field visits (which meant 
loss of allowances for officials). The latter has been termed as “administrative tourism” by 
some critical observers405. Secondly, the other source of bureaucratic resistance was the 
institutional framework which gave local authorities autonomy to do whatever they felt was 
                                            
403 Francis Lubanga, “The Process of Decentralisation” in Soren Villadsen and Francis Lubanga, Democratic 
Decentralisation in Uganda Kampala, Fountain Publishers, 1996: p. 55 
404 In the case of Ethiopia, under the 1994 Constitution, powers that are more extensive were granted to regions 
including the right to secede, which is not the case in Uganda. Asmelash Bayene, “Decentralisation as a Tool 
for Resolving the Nationality Problem: The Ethiopian Experience” in Regional Development Dialogue Vol. 
21, No 2, 2000. 
405 Apolo Nsibambi’s assertion in Proceedings of the Constituent Assembly March 28, 1995 
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appropriate for their localities and hence, ceased to be subservient to the wishes and whims 
of the senior government officials in the central government ministries. This resulted in a 
tendency on the part of the latter to attempt to derail and even frustrate the process of 
decentralisation. These officials contended that there was no capacity at the local level to 
manage government business and resource efficiently and effectively406.  
The third and the most fundamental source of problems with the new centre – local relations 
was political. While on one hand, the NRM leadership had gone all out to implement 
decentralisation, on the other hand, its political intentions were suspect by some other 
circles. The pro-federalists argued that decentralisation, was not an effective way of 
empowering local areas. This issue was hotly debated in the Constituent Assembly (CA) 
1994 – 1995. The arguments of pro-federalists took the following tone: 
The fundamental struggles which have gone on in this country and which 
are still persisting revolve around the sharing of the “national cake” 
equitably between the different parts of Uganda . . . We want to suggest 
that we use a federal constitutional formula407. 
This line of argument contended that decentralisation gives only “borrowed power” from 
central government to local authorities which the centre could withdraw anytime if it wished 
to do so. The same view contended that if a federal model is used it would have two effects, 
one; it would distribute national resources as well as allow local entities to harness their own 
local resources, leading to equitable distribution of national resources and local development 
throughout the country. According to this view, it would also create real power at the local 
level, which power would countervail the power of the centre, thus minimise the dictatorial 
tendencies of the centre. 
 
The pro-federalists had another argument that the units (districts) to which decentralisation 
had devolved power were too small to be efficient and self-supporting. On this line of 
thought, they argued that federal units would be larger based on regional units, and thus 
                                            
406 This was partly correct because decentralisation was a new form of administration; both local government 
officials and local politicians had no previous knowledge in handling the new responsibilities independent of 
the centre. Expectations of the population were also too high, hoping for a quick transformation of their areas. 
407 Apolo Nsibambi (Presidential Nominee to the CA) submitting his views on the debates on the form of local 
government 28 March, 1995 
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would have economies of scale in terms of providing services such as roads, major hospitals 
and other large undertakings. Other arguments were based on the uniqueness of each region 
of Uganda. It was argued that each region of the country was uniquely endowed, therefore, 
such endowments - cultural, social and economic would facilitate regional development. 
This argument pointed out that the centre was milking and exploiting some regions without 
returns to such areas- in terms of services408. This argument dismissed decentralisation as to 
mean “go and develop yourself” without consideration of what your area was contributing to 
the national income409. 
 
Arguments for decentralisation as opposed to federation were varied. They run from the 
historical experiences of 1960s when Uganda was run on a semi-federal arrangement to the 
definition of concepts of decentralisation versus federalism, and to the practical outcomes of 
adopting either system. The first argument was that in the 1960s, the federal arrangements 
under the 1962 Constitution created a special status for some regions; the rest of the country 
was ruled on the basis of decentralisation. The pro-federalists were challenged if they could 
articulate a federal arrangement that covered the whole country. Amanya Mushega posed 
questions: 
What criteria are we using for creating either district or region? Are we 
going    to use tribe, are we going to use culture, are we going to use 
geographical features? This has to be clear. And I want to say here that, if 
the federalists would articulate their programme covering the whole of 
Uganda, then their case would be easily followed410. 
 
In this connection, it was argued that the principle had been agreed that power be given to 
the people and the unit to be used was the district. And that the principle for giving power to 
the people was decentralisation. Amanya Mushega argued that the regional tier had no basis. 
He used an analogy to demonstrate his support for decentralisation, thus: 
                                            
408 Dick Nyai (Ayivu country) argued that a few people at the centre were deciding what is good for Uganda, 
which translated into what was good for themselves. He argued further that there was no electricity in Arua yet 
the region’s tobacco growers were contributing 38 billion to the income of Uganda. 
409 ibid, Dick Nyayi contributing to the debate in CA on 28 March 1995. See proceedings of the Constituent 
Assembly 29 March 1995. 
410 Amanya Mushega (Delegate for Igara East in the CA) contribution on the debate on the motion on local 
government. See proceedings of the Constituent Assembly 29 March 1995 
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To say that my child, I am giving you, but let it go further to your aunt, 
then to your mother and your brother, by the time it reaches you, then it 
will be contaminated. Why not give it directly?411. 
 
The argument shared by the supporters of decentralisation in this regard was that as much 
power could be devolved to the district so that it gets sufficient power as a federal state 
would have, without creating a regional tier. 
 
The issue of administrative costs also was considered and debated in the Constituent 
Assembly. Some delegates argued that the regional tier would increase the costs of 
administration leaving less resource for development.  It was contended…”the national 
cake” we are talking about, we are not serious. These institutions will eat up the whole 
“national cake”, I do not think we can afford it”412. 
 
There was also lack of understanding of the differences in concepts of decentralisation and 
federalism. Some delegates in the CA viewed decentralisation as “just a mere process which 
can be adopted through unitary system and federal system”413. Other arguments in the CA 
initiated proposals that instead of using concepts like “decentralisation” and “federalism”, a 
“neutral” word “devolution” should be used instead414. 
 
4.4.4 Implications for the Debate on the Nature of Local Government 
In the final analysis, two positions emerged from the constitutional debate about the nature 
and character of the local government that was adopted for the new Constitution. The 
principle of decentralisation was adopted as the basis of local government system in 
Uganda. At the same time, it was agreed that districts which wished to cooperate for 
purposes of cooperation in development and culture could do so by coming up with a charter 
for that purpose. Federalism was defeated not because it was not desirable but it was deemed 
to take power further away from the people. There were also political undertones that 
                                            
411 Amanya Mushega, CA Proceedings 28, March 1995. 
412 Wandera Ogalo (Delegate for Bukhooli South to the CA) contributing to the local government motion in the 
CA, 28 March 1995. (CA Proceedings March 29, 1995). 
413 Damiano Lubega (Delegate to CA, Rubaga Division South) contribution on local government debate in CA, 
28 March 1995. 
414 Besweri Mulondo, contributing to the debate on the motion on local government in the CA (CA 
Proceedings 29 March 1995) 
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undermined federalism415. It is also understood that by the NRM government introducing 
decentralisation in the period preceding the Constituent Assembly, it had thrown “bait” 
because most local leaders at the district level had begun to enjoy autonomy and power, 
which they would guard jealously. This seems to have significantly reduced the popularity 
of the federal option. 
 
4.4.5 Democratic decentralisation in the context of an authoritarian centre 
 
The irony of pursuing the goals of democratic decentralisation in Uganda is that the debate 
in the CA and other policy initiatives ignored the centre, which has since 1986 functioned 
based on one dominant political player; the NRM (Movement) and its leader Yoweri 
Museveni. The NRM has kept itself in power under a defacto one-party system which; its 
proponents call “no party” or “movement”, which critical observers have aptly noted; simply 
means no other political party has a role in the governance of the country416. Ignoring the 
authoritarian tendencies of the centre has implications as to whether the local structures can 
be truly democratic or not. Thus, it appears paradoxical that one can talk of a democratic 
local governance when the centre is undemocratic. The point here is that while most donors 
and some local observers tend to generously appraise the participatory nature of local 
governance system in Uganda, they have intentionally ignored the limitations imposed by 
centre on local avenues of participation. 
 
This is partly because the country has had a notorious legacy of murderous authoritarianism 
in the past (i.e. before 1986), the measurement and appraisals of policy and political 
performance under the NRM regime are gauged on the basis of past regimes, which does not 
help the current regime to do better. If anything, the local council system has forged a place 
for the regime to gain credentials on the “democratisation” plane undeservedly. However, 
only recently have some critical insights began to emerge. Tripp, for example has observed: 
                                            
415 It was viewed within the circles of the NRM that some delegates who subscribed to multiparty form of 
governance as opposed to “no party” of the NRM had supported some Baganda delegates on federalism for 
political convenience and not convictions.  
416 Nelson Kasfir (1998). The World Bank (www.worldbank.org/participation/webfiles/Uganda) ibid. also 
observes that NRM was a one-party system which was not threatened by prospect of losing elections. 
 
  
151
 
 
 
As many African countries moved towards electoral democratisation in 
the 1990s, Uganda remained essentially authoritarian, but incorporated 
democratic innovations in varying degrees. To portray a semi-
authoritarian state like Uganda as a country without oppression is to gloss 
over numerous continuing violations of rights of association and free 
speech417. 
 
Tripp argues that although the leaders of the current regime in Uganda may not be compared 
with the notorious dictators like Idi Amin, Bokasa Macious Nguema and Mobutu, the extent 
to which they have monopolised power, extended patrimonial  rule is “reminiscent of 
African authoritarian regimes”418.  
 
According to Tripp, in “semi-authoritarian states like Uganda; there is a new game in 
town”419.Basically,distinguishing semi-authoritarian and authoritarianism is a matter of 
degree. Uganda is under an authoritarian regime in which the ballot box can not change the 
top leadership, where the word of the “big man” is law,420 Visible or covert military power 
lies behind most of the decisions, human rights are violated with impunity, political 
opposition is decreed, power is personalised in the chief executive and so on. Given this 
plethora of characteristics, Uganda under the NRM has been more or less an authoritarian 
state since 1986. This complicates the task of labelling the policy reforms for example, 
decentralisation, as democratic. 
 
Secondly, a point that is linked to the above is the fact that organising autonomously outside 
the framework of the state is either suspect or circumscribed. In the framework of centre 
local relations, power was conferred to local government. This means, at least theoretically 
that local governments are free to do whatever they like at local level. On the contrary, this 
does not include rights to challenge the state. On paper, the underlying assumption under 
these relations was that the centre and local authorities would be in constant engagements 
and consultations. What has emerged over time is that the local authorities are growing 
                                            
417 Aili Mari Tripp, “The Changing Face of Authoritarianism in Africa; The Case of Uganda” Africa Today 
Vol.50, no 3. (Spring 2004:p4). 
418 ibid, Tripp, p. 5 
419 Ibid, Tripp, p.6. 
420 (J. Oloka-Onyango (2004) “‘New Breed’ Leadership, Conflict and Reconstruction in the Great Lakes 
Region of Africa:A sociopolitical Biography of Uganda’s Yoweri Kaguta Museveni” inAfrica Today.Vol.30.  
Makara, Sabiti, et al .(2003)Voting for Democracy in Uganda.Kampala:LDC Publishers. 
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accustomed to receiving directives from above which they have to implement; otherwise 
they might be branded “anti-government”. This tendency has its own implications. 
 
It means that the local authorities are increasingly more conscious of being accountable to 
the higher authorities, which undermined accountability to the people below the very basis 
of decentralisation421. Equally, so these tendencies have either undercut or compromised the 
independence and autonomy of the organised groups in civil society. They too are aware that 
not only do have they to declare their budgets and programmes to the authorities, they have 
also to tread lightly on matters considered “political”, otherwise, their registration is revoked 
or they are banned altogether. 
 
Thirdly, the legacy of intolerance runs through the whole structure of government. In the 
early years of RCs, the whole governance system was open to every citizen. At that time, the 
NRM stance was anti-sectarian. The idea was that since political contestation was on the 
basis of individual merit, no one would be excluded on the basis of race, tribe, religion, 
gender and so on, from achieving a political position in the whole structure of government. 
This has changed greatly. During the elections of local councils 1997 and 2001, the NRM 
secretariat bankrolled some candidates contesting for chairmanship at LC5 and LC3. This 
was meant to ensure that the local leaders at those levels would remain loyal to the 
movement. The question is, if the movement is “broad based, inclusive, non-partisan” 
espousing the principles of “participatory democracy, “accountability”, “transparency” and 
ensuring every Ugandan has access “to all positions of leadership” and such access is based 
on “individual merit” in elections422; why then should the NRM have sponsored specific 
candidates? This indeed is the extent of the contradiction that the NRM has ushered and 
finds itself in. The important point is that it has created ambiguity and in some cases, a sense 
                                            
421 See the report by Marios Obwona et al (2000) Fiscal Decentralisation and Local Government Finance in 
Relation to Infrastructure and Service Provision, NALAD and EPRC in conjunction with DANIDA and the 
World Bank. They argue that accountability has been undermined at the local level by two factors (i) reduction 
in local revenue and (ii) over – dependence by local governments on central government grants. 
422 Article 70 of the Constitution of the Republic of Uganda, 1995. 
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of oppression amongst those who wished to associate freely and to organise politically, 
independently of the state party, which is not allowed by the Constitution and other laws423.  
 
Fourthly, the principles of decentralisation and the basis on which centre - local relations 
were constructed in the case of Uganda’s policy of decentralisation presuppose the idea of 
citizens’ voice and exit options.  People’s voice assumes that the population is empowered 
through decentralisation and less government involvement in many activities at the local 
level, which means that the people are the masters of their own destiny. They organise, plan 
and execute those projects beneficial to their own lives. The Constitution of Uganda article 1 
states “All power belongs to the people who shall exercise their sovereignty in accordance 
with this Constitution”. This idea of people’s sovereignty is operationalised by article 176 
(b) of the Constitution which says: “decentralisation shall be a principle applying to all 
levels of local government and in particular, from higher to lower local government units to 
ensure peoples participation and democratic control in decision making” (emphasis added).  
 
This provision is the constitutional basis of people’s voice in local government matters. The 
question however is to what extent are the people involved in decision making? As our 
research findings show, people’s enthusiasm about attending village council meetings has 
waned. At the same time, the evidence from the research shows that people’s organisations 
or community based organisations (CBOs) such as reciprocal saving and lending trusts have 
no linkage with the system of local government. Some suggestions that decentralisation 
would renew the spirit of communal work locally known as “bulungi bwansi”- (for the good 
of the nation) are over-optimistic424. Instead, what has happened is that decentralisation has 
created the impression amongst the ordinary citizens that their taxes which are paid to local 
                                            
423 Sabiti Makara (ed) Voting for Democracy in Uganda: Issues in Recent Elections Kampala: LDC Publishers 
2003. See also, J. Oloka – Onyango, “New Breed” leadership, conflict and reconstruction in the Great Lakes 
Region of Africa: A Sociological Biography of Uganda’s Yoweri Kaguta Museveni” Africa Today Vol 50 No 
3, (Spring 2004). He argues that the main characteristic of Museveni’s regime is their perpetual fear of 
opposition politics.  Nelson Kasfir, “The Uganda elections of 1989: power, populism and democratization” in 
Holger Hansen and Michael Twaddle (eds) Changing Uganda London: James Currey 1991, p 247. Kasfir 
argues that democratization is achieved only when the people are assured that they can organize freely, they 
can vote freely and elections can put the government of the day at risk. This last bit has not happened in 
Uganda for the last eighteen years 
424 Mohammed Kisubi “The process of decentralisation” in Petter Langseth and Justus Mugaju (eds) Post 
Conflict Uganda: Towards an Effective Civil Service Kampala, Fountain Publishers, 1996 
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government if not misused by local government officials should be sufficient to pave roads, 
provide safe water and build schools. A new terminology which weakens the spirit of 
decentralisation has evolved. It is “nfunilawa?” which means “where do I gain?”  
 
The culture of “nfunilawa?” resulted from many years of economic austerity in society 
where everyone had to fend for himself by doing all sorts of things to survive or gain. 
According to Brett, this created a “society in which everyone was involved in enterprise 
culture - whether legal or illegal, formal or informal”425. This tendency has had both positive 
as well as negative effects on the social behaviours of citizens. They hold a strong belief that 
whatever one does, he or she has to gain, which is individualistic in nature and opportunistic 
in orientation. On the negative side, the citizens view local government officials as 
motivated by self interest and gain in whatever programme they happen to design for the 
community. There is a sense of mistrusting public officials and their motives. The public 
officials are perceived as having ulterior motives. This belief is reinforced by rampant 
corruption and lack of accountability in the public arena, nominally termed as “eating”426. 
 
The implication of such perceptions is far reaching. It negates voice options, undermines 
people’s zeal to demand accountability from public officials and sometimes leads to lack of 
interest in public affairs (apathy) as well as participation in and maintenance of public 
projects. As the findings of this study demonstrate, there is very low citizen participation in 
local government projects. As it has been noted earlier, the exit options for ordinary citizens 
at the local level are also limited. The limitations arise from a number of factors; first, the 
state structure at all levels is intertwined with the “party” structure of the NRM. This implies 
that alternative political agenda cannot be pursued by citizens who may wish to do so. 
Secondly, the idea that decentralisation allows citizens at the local to choose from available 
options in services is tenuous because of high levels of poverty in the country - 38% of 
Ugandans live on less than one United States’ dollar per day. Thus, even when the state has 
created opportunities for private sector competition and reduced its over-arching role, this 
                                            
425 E. A. Brett, “Creating the basis for democratic transition in Uganda: the problem of governance” in P. 
Langseth. This culture, according to Brett partly contributed to the of NRM’s acceptance of liberal economic 
reforms, which it had resisted initially when they came to power 
426 “Eating” means gaining from underhand activities of the officials. The opposite of “eating” is “starving” 
meaning that the public office one occupies does not offer loopholes for “eating”.   
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has not necessarily translated into better access to goods and services for the ordinary 
citizen. The purchasing power is simply too low for the majority of citizens. Moreover, high 
illiteracy rates and insufficient access to information make matters worse427. 
 
The above concerns are known to policy makers in the government428. However they remain 
optimistic, hoping that decentralisation will bring decisions closer to the population and 
permit better communication between the service providers and the population. The 
government also believes that with time, the people will be more willing to co-fund 
production of services because they will be able to appreciate the value of the service to 
them as individuals and communities. The government hopes that attitudinal change will 
occur over time429. However, more than ten years ever since decentralisation was launched, 
awareness about decentralisation has increased but attitudes and perceptions about what 
government does or should do have changed slowly. This has not been helped by the weak 
civil society (or local organisational bases). Apart from proliferations of largely foreign or 
foreign-funded non-governmental organisations, civil society in Uganda suffers from 
economic deprivation, ethnic alliances and internal weaknesses within these organisations. 
Due to these inherent weaknesses, the state became pervasive and remains the only source of 
power in society430. Alternative organisations were (and are still) suspect by the state, which 
created a sense of fear and at times resistance within the population. 
 
4.5 Fiscal Decentralisation 
The linchpin of decentralisation lies in the fiscal arrangements made for central and local 
government. This becomes particularly important if such arrangements providing for 
revenue sharing, collection and spending powers are constitutionalised thus, they are backed 
by statutory instruments in terms of regulations, rights and discretions. One important thing 
                                            
427 Although FM radios have increased few Ugandans can afford a radio set. The two leading newspapers, The 
Monitor, (independent) and The New Vision (government) circulate largely in urban areas and still less than 
one-percent of the population afford and read them. Television remains a luxury.         
428 Decentralisation Secretariat (MOLG), Decentralisation in Uganda: The Policy and Its Implications, 1994: 
pp24-26. 
429 A. Regan, “Decentralisation Policy: reshaping state and society” 1998, in Holger, B. Hansen and M. 
Twaddle, Developing Uganda. James Currey. London 1998. 
430 See Susan Dicklitch and Doreen Lwanga “The Politics of being non – political: the human rights 
organizations and the creation of a positive rights culture in Uganda” Human Rights Quarterly Vol 25 No 2, 
2003   
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to note about Uganda’s centre local relations – particularly in respect to fiscal and financial 
arrangements is that they are embedded in the Constitution. First, article 180 of the 
Constitution provides, 
A local government shall be based on a council which shall be the highest 
political authority within its area of jurisdiction and which shall have 
legislative and executive powers to be exercised in accordance with this 
Constitution.”(emphasis added). 
 
This is imperative because it declares a local government council as a fully-fledged 
government. For this purpose, each local government has a legislative body (council) with 
its own speaker as its leader. A local government also has its executive (cabinet) with the 
chairperson as its executive head. The voters directly elect all councils in the constituency of 
a particular local government. The chairperson amongst the elected councillors nominates 
the executive. Nominated persons for cabinet are subject to approval by the council. In short, 
there is a sense of democratic practice in this process.  
 
A local government may be rural or urban. For rural district, there are urban councils 
(towards municipalities) as well as lower rural local government known as sub-counties431. 
It is important to note that although municipalities and towns (urban councils) are lower 
local governments i.e. below the district, the district council does not control them directly. 
They are local councils in their own rights, with their executive (cabinet) and 
responsibilities. In other words, although urban councils are lower local government in 
relation to the district, unlike the rural sub-counties, they are not functionally subordinate to 
the district councils. In fiscal terms, urban councils receive their grants directly from the 
government, collect revenue and expend it according to their own priorities. 
 
The second aspect to note is that a local government council is designated under the 
Constitution and the Local Government Act 1997 (section 7) as “a body corporate with 
                                            
431 In Uganda, there are 80 districts (including Kampala city which has a district Status, (and the only one of its 
kind in the country). There are 13 municipalities and 66 Towns. There are 903 sub-counties. All these are local 
governments. There are other councils, which have no local government status. These include country, parish 
and village. These are designated as administrative Councils. 
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perpetual succession and a common seal, and may sue or be sued in its corporate name”. In 
other words a local government has a legal personality432. 
 
The motivation of the central government to decentralize powers to local government in 
Uganda was based on three inter-related factors: It was envisaged that local councils were 
the most appropriate institutions to take more relevant decisions for the people and 
understand their problems better than the distant central government. Secondly local 
councils would be more responsive, accountable and effective in the provision of public 
services. They would listen and respond to people’s demands and queries more timely. This 
would increase people’s willingness to co-produce services with government agencies. 
Besides accountabilities would be shared. And more important, the willingness by the 
people to pay taxes would increase since the value for the money would be seen in terms of 
services provided by the local government. Thirdly, elected local councillors would have a 
strong sense of responding to the problems of their constituents since that is the only way 
they would reclaim their votes at the next elections. 
 
The above premises have always been laid down in most decentralizing countries433. At 
issue in Uganda’s fiscal decentralisation programme are factors that does not rhyme well 
with he principles laid down in the Constitution and the statutes which need to be critically 
examined.  
 
The Constitution and the Local Government Act specify three types of grants to be given by 
the central government to local governments: unconditional grants, conditional and 
equalization grant. Unconditional grant is given as a minimum grant to the local 
government to run decentralized services434. Conditional grants are given for services agreed 
                                            
432 The legal personalities distinguishes a local government from the administrative entities which does not 
have such legal rights, privileges and liabilities. An administrative entity derives its existence from the local 
government. 
433 See Jannie Litrack, Junaid Ahmad and R. Bird, Rethinking Decentralisation in Developing Countries 
Washington DC, The World Bank, 1998. For an excellent treatment of fiscal decentralisation, Roy Bahl, “How 
to design a fiscal decentralisation program”, and Paul Smoke “Strategic Fiscal Decentralisation in developing 
countries” both in Shahid Usuf et al (editors) Local Dynamics in an era of Globalisation Washington DC, the 
World Bank 2000.   
434 Constitution of the Republic of Uganda article 193, unconditional grants are given basing on the formula 
provided in the Constitution schedule 7. 
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between the central government and local governments so that they are provided by the local 
governments. The conditional grant may not be used for any other purpose apart from the 
one for which it is provided. Equalisation grants are given to those local government lagging 
behind the national average standards in service delivery. They are special grants provided 
to cater for that kind of shortfall.   
 
Apart from grants provided by the central government, the Constitution (article 191) and the 
Local Government Act (section 81) empower local governments to levy taxes and rates 
which include: graduated tax, stamp duty, registration fees, property tax, cess and any other 
tax approved by the local councils in its area of jurisdiction. 
 
Despite the detailed sources of finance for local governments, most of them have 
experienced cash flow problems stemming from inadequate government funding. Although 
in comparative terms, the funding of the local governments by the government have 
increased, the collection of local revenue has been declining. The central government 
funding has increased from Uganda Shillings (Ushs).241 billion in 1997 to Shs.688 billion 
in 2003, representing an increase of 185 percent435. During the same time, most local 
government’s own revenue has declined, especially graduated tax, from Shs.67,3 billion in 
1997 to 36,96 billion in 2002, at short fall of 45 percen436. The decline in the local 
governments’ revenue is attributed to a number of issues. Local government have tended to 
over-rely on one key source of tax, that is graduated personal tax, paid by each adult male of 
the age of eighteen years and above and a woman of similar age, in gainful employment. 
This tax contributes the bulk of tax revenue for all district local government and urban 
councils, including Kampala City Council until recently when it created other sources. The 
graduated tax is very sensitive to political “temperatures” to the extent the whenever there is 
an election, the incidence of taxpayers avoiding it is very high437. It is also generally 
understood that graduated tax is a regressive tax. It is collected harshly by local chiefs and 
                                            
435 Martin Onyach-Olaa “Local Government Planning and Budgeting in Uganda: A survey of issues” in Basic 
Principles of Decentralisation,. Uganda Management Institute (Training Manual) 2004. 
436Ibid , Martin Onyach-Olaa, p 29. 
437 Since 1996 there have been several national and local elections, which have played a great part in the 
incidence of tax avoidance. 
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resented by local people. It is also costly to collect in addition to being unproductive438. One 
important observation that is pertinent to make is that local governments have not been 
innovative in terms of creating avenues for getting their own revenues. This has created a 
dependence syndrome on the central governments funding for most of the local governments 
activities. The local governments on their part argue that the centre retained most of the 
lucrative sources of funds such as sales tax, customs duty, motor vehicle registration, value 
added tax and many others, leaving local governments with trivial sources of income. The 
local governments further argue that the central government wants this status quo so that it 
may control local governments indirectly. The latter argument may hold some truth because 
whereas central government funding to local governments has been increasing as indicated 
above, the bulk of it has been in terms of conditional grants – which are tied to the 
government’s own priorities and leave no flexible discretion for local governments’ use. It 
has been noted that in 1997 there were only ten conditional grants which have since 
increased to thirty two by 2004439. There is no doubt therefore, that increased central 
government’s funding to local governments has increased finances available to the latter, 
albeit reduced their discretionary powers and autonomy. A local government in a 
decentralized system of governance can only assert itself vis-à-vis the central government on 
the important issues only if it is self-sufficient financially. Conversely if the local 
governments are on the arm-string of the centre, they will have little option, but to be 
subservient and weak. This will have the net effect of defeating the principle of purpose and 
spirit of devolution. 
 
It would also be unfair to some extent, to apportion blame for the failure of the local 
governments to raise sufficient local revenues without critically examining the role of the 
NRM government in this aspect. Whereas the law allows local governments to collect 
                                            
438 Ian Livingston and Roger Charlton, “Financing Decentralised Development in a Low Income Country: 
Raising revenue for Local Government in Uganda” Development and change vol 32, No 1, 2001. These 
authors argue (pp 87 – 90) that the regressiveness of graduated tax increases tax avoidance and in some cases it 
causes riots, eg the Iganga riots of 1994. One member of parliament in 2003 has drafted a private members bill 
(Ekullo Epak, MP) (which is not yet debated) seeking abolition of graduated tax. See also, Mette Kg Mette 
Kjaer “The Dynamics of Taxation, reciprocity and Service delivery: illustrations from the Ugandan districts” 
Paper prepared for presentation at Makerere Institute of Social Research November, 2003. 
439 Opcit.,Martin Onyach-Olaa, p 31 
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revenue from various sources at the local level, the attitudes and interests of the ruling NRM 
leaders and cadres have discouraged some individuals and groups from paying certain taxes. 
A clear example is the tax levied on motor bike transporters locally known as boda boda. 
These are popular and numerous in most urban areas helping the poor youth to gain some 
living by transporting passengers to various short-destinations. Most urban councils 
including Kampala City Council levied a fee on them, payable per year. In the case of KCC 
it has been Shs 10,000 per month for the license for each motor bike. Because these lumpen 
proletariats have always tended to vote with the opposition to the NRM in urban areas, the 
NRM leaders including President Museveni directed that boda boda transporters should stop 
paying taxes to urban authorities claiming that they were “exploited” and “harshly treated” 
by the tax collectors. As Ademolekum observes, the problem in some African States, 
especially in one party states, most of the leaders in government (both central and local) owe 
their positions to the ruling party.  Uganda under the NRM  has been a quasi-one-party state 
and thus, the national leaders have tended to ensure that  the most influencial leaders in local 
governments share their idealogy so that there is little opposition to the ruling party. 
According Ladipo Ademolekum such tendecies have made the difference between 
devolution and deconcentration less meaningful. On several ocassions, President Museveni 
has directed the Mayor of Kampala to stop collecting any taxes from boda boda operators. 
Opposition groups claim that Museveni in issuing such orders is seeking cheap popularity 
from such groups.  Nevertheless, Museveni has never been popular in Kampala. Instead, his 
party has been consistently losing elections in the city440. The presidential directive was not 
negotiable. It did not leave room for local councils to reconsider their methods of tax 
collection or even to reduce the tax. It only slapped a ban on that tax. This may have the 
effect of discouraging other taxpayers from attending to their tax obligations. 
 
The insufficient funds available to local councils have affected intergovernmental relations 
amongst local government themselves. The principles enshrined in the laws provide for 
sharing revenues and responsibilities among the various layers of local governments. For 
each district local government the locally raised funds are supposed to be shared as follows: 
                                            
440 Lidipo Ademolekum, “Promoting African Decentralisation” in Public Administration and Development Vol 
11, 1990, p 286.  
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the lower local government-sub-county retains 65% of all revenue it collects in a financial 
year. It remits to the district 35% of the revenue collected. Then, the remaining 65%at the 
sub-county level becomes 100%. Of this amount, 25% it remitted to all village councils, 5% 
is given to parish council and another 5% is given to the county council. In the urban areas 
the formula is different. A division441 in the urban area retains 50% of the revenue collected 
and remits 50% to the municipal or the city council. After receiving these funds from the 
divisions, the municipality or city has statutory obligation to give a grant of 30% to 
divisions, from the funds it has received442. In the same spirit, the law provides that each 
division gives the village councils 25% of its total collections as well as the grant received 
from the municipal or city council, and 10 percent parish councils. The principle of revenue 
sharing is based on the idea that since each local government and administrative unit has 
specific functions to perform, it should have resources to manage its own affairs. In fiscal 
terms, the cornerstone of the principle is to encourage the citizens to pay taxes and benefit 
from them through projects initiated at the local level. With the decentralized funds shared 
by multi layer units of local government and administrative units, this also has the element 
of encouraging multiple centres of accountability. 
 
Nevertheless, there have been problems with the distributive principle embedded in the 
decentralisation system in Uganda. Most district and municipal local governments have 
increasingly become dependent on central governments grants for financing their budgets 
and programmes. As noted earlier, local revenue sources have been declining in actual 
terms. This has meant that district or municipal governments have not been, in many cases, 
able to meet their distributive responsibilities, as the law requires443. In Kampala city, this 
researcher found that the last time the village councils received the 25 percent grant from 
their divisions was 1998. Most of the division finance officers at the division level blamed it 
also on the failure of the KCC to remit to divisions the statutory 30 percent. Therefore, the 
problem seems cyclic, embedded in the web of accusations and counter-accusations.  
                                            
441 A division in the urban area is equivalent of a rural sub-country. 
442 The Fifth Schedule of the Local Government Act 1997, provides a formula to be followed by the city or 
municipality in providing the grant to divisions, regulations 14, 15 and 16 of the schedule 
443 Fifth Schedule of the Local Government Act, regulation 14 (2) 
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There has also been a persistent complaint at the local level, especially at village level, that 
even when the 25 percent is remitted, it ends up in the “pockets” of the local council 
executives who claim it is used for office expenses and “official” duties such as travel and 
meals for the executives. The executive members claim that the amounts remitted are 
usually too small to initiate meaningful projects at village level. In some villages, even the 
whole executive may not know that the 25 percent remittance was made, as some 
chairpersons have ended up putting it to persona use444. The result has been, fewer people 
are willing to pay taxes, which has greatly weakened the financial resource base of local 
governments. It was reported to this researcher that even local council officials, not only 
avoided taxes, they encourage their relatives and other prominent people in their villages not 
to pay. Thus, the materially better off people in the villages are the leading tax avoiders. In 
quiet response, the peasants and the poor attempt to avoid taxes too, until harassed by 
ruthless chiefs and local militia (local defence forces). 
 
Urban areas have a relative advantage over rural areas in terms of revenue sources. These 
include licenses, graduated tax, property tax, service charges and many others. Despite the 
existence of sources for local revenue most urban local government have not been able to 
exploit them fully. For several years urban authorities had become accustomed to relying on 
personal graduated tax like the rural district authorities. By 1996 even KCC relied heavily 
on personal graduated tax as its main source of revenue. Although it is known world wide, 
that property tax has always constituted the main source of revenue for urban authorities, as 
indeed it used to be the case in Uganda before 1972, this source of revenue had declined 
significantly over the years due to hyper inflation, absence of up-to-date valuations, failure 
to enforce tax collection by the authorities, obsoleteness of the Rating Decree of 1979, and 
unclear ownership of properties within most of the urban areas.445 
                                            
444 This researcher did not follow up the issue of local level transfers of funds with administrative units. In the 
rural areas most sub-countries have not had a problem with district authorities in sharing revenue as the sub-
country is the collecting centre. 
445 The problem with property ownership in most urban areas in Uganda was that most of the properties 
belonged to the Asians and other foreigners who were forced out of the country by Idi Amin in 1972. The 
Care-Taker body the Departed Asians Properties Custodian Board (DAPCB) defaulted on property tax 
payment to local authorities almost on all its properties. The properties have been returned to their rightful 
owners under the current government has streamlined ownership and eased matters for tax collectors in urban 
authorities. 
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The urban authorities have awakened up to various sources of local revenues. Parking fees, 
licensing, revaluation of properties for tax purposes, and market fees have reduce their 
dependence on personal graduated tax with time. Also, most urban authorities have 
introduced private tax collectors, who act as agents of the local authorities for commission 
on amounts collected for the latter. On the other hand rural district local government have 
continued to rely more heavily on the major source of local revenue – personal graduated 
tax. They have a problem with the idea of imposing a tax on rural land and houses because 
such a move would not only be unpopular, it would also be politically explosive. Besides, 90 
percent of the poor people live in the rural areas. Imposing a tax on their small properties 
could aggravate poverty and be counterproductive to government efforts to fight it. At the 
same time, the rural rich people pay less tax compared to the urban poor in Uganda. The 
rural rich people pay at best a minimum of Shs.100,000 as personal graduated tax. A 
suggestion by the Local Government Finance Commission (LGFC) that possibilities should 
be explored to the effect that the rural rich people with large pieces of land, large herds of 
livestock and businesses pay more tax has not been explored446. Further more sales tax – a 
tax imposed on consumers as they purchase and consume goods and services, which would 
be an effective source of revenue for local governments does not exists in Uganda. 
Moreover when local governments introduced service charges in dispensaries and other 
service providing institutions, they were ordered by the government to suspend it 
indefinitely during the presidential elections of 2001447. Due to limited sources of revenue, 
most local governments, as noted earlier, rely more on central government grants than their 
own resources. This has limited their flexibility in determining their priorities, thus, they 
tend to act as if they were mere conduits of government funds and programmes. For 
example the former chairperson of Mukono district complained at the National Forum for 
Implementation of Decentralisation (Kampala, June 18 – 19, 1998) that “More conditional 
grants will simply erode people’s power to make decisions which affect them directly. 
 
                                            
446 Local Government Finance Commission “Fiscal Decentralisation in Uganda today” Commission report No 
2. March 1998. The commission had suggested that a tax called “rural enterprise tax” be introduced for the rich 
people. 
447 President Museveni who was a presidential candidate in 2001 ordered all authorities especially in health 
sector to halt the service charge in all government health facilities.     
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The spirit under which fiscal decentralisation was conceived and implemented in Uganda 
was driven by the principle that decentralisation would promote equity, efficiency, and 
poverty reduction in society. One of the key considerations was that some areas had lagged 
behind others in development and service delivery. From this point of view, the central 
government considered the idea of equalization grants. These grants constitute monies paid 
by the central government to local government as subsidies or as special provision for least 
developed areas, based on the degree to which the local government of that area is lagging 
behind the national average standard for a particular service or services. The Local 
Government Act 1997 stipulates that the local government councils should make requests 
for and indicate how their councils would use equalization grants. For some years, 
equalization grants were not given owing to the condition that average service standards had 
not been established. The government commissioned a consultancy study, which has 
established service standards. A few local governments have gained access to this grant in 
recent years.448 The Local Government Finance Commission has been working on a review 
of formulae for different grants.449 The aim of the LGFC’s involvement in grant allocation 
principles and formulae is to limit the influence of strong politicians and local government 
lobbies in the whole process of allocation, which could lead them to gain unfair advantage 
over others.450 
 
4.6 The Link between decentralisation and Accountability  
The success or failure of the design and implementation of any fiscal decentralisation 
programme depends on whether or not it produces a feeling within the community that they 
will gain from the changes brought by the process, they are participating in decision making, 
they receive sufficient feed back on what the government does, and trust their elected and 
appointed officials. The benefit of this process would include greater empowerment, 
effective representation, participation by all groups (inclusion) tangible benefits to the 
                                            
448 Equalisation grants were paid out in 1999/2000 following a study by the LGFC. It is now providing 
subsidies to 34 districts and 40 urban councils. During the FY 2001/2002, Shs 4.33 billion was transferred as 
equalization grants.  
449 Local Government Finance Commission “Fiscal Decentralisation Strategy” 2002. 
450 Lawrence Banyoya “Financing of Decentralisation in Uganda” in Basic Principles of Decentralisation UMI, 
2004 
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community and signs of poverty reduction451. More so, an accountable system of local 
government should be responsive, sensitive and answerable to the needs of the population it 
is created to serve452. In addition, accountability assumes vertical and horizontal linkages in 
the whole structure of the government453. Vertical linkages are based on the upward 
accountability, that is lower local governments to higher ones and onward to the central 
government. But this also involves the central government attending to its obligation, so it is 
a two-way process. Horizontal linkages on the other hand, involve intergovernmental 
relations at the local level as well as their relations with the local communities and groups. 
The bending thread in the whole process of governmental relations with communities and 
groups is the idea of trust454. Citizens will trust the government only if they believe it will 
act in their interest, feeling that if they engage in the activities of public good, the 
government will reciprocate by providing support to the community, groups and individuals. 
In a cyclic momentum, there is a kind of “give and take and take and give “process in the 
conduct of public affairs on both sides. The linchpin of this process is the bureaucratic elite 
who should be accountable for performing decentralized functions efficiently, providing the 
necessary services to the communities, and working towards satisfying the needs of the 
various social groups. 
 
At the same time, the existence of the elected bodies of representatives serves to strengthen 
the bond between the local governments and the people. This is particularly so if the 
electoral system caters for various groups to participate in the choosing of their 
representatives. Socially marginalized groups are able to gain a voice in public decision-
making455. The idea behind representation is that the representation with hold bureaucratic 
officials accountable. Representatives will also have interest in bargaining with fellow 
councillors to get programmes and projects done in their constituencies, and these are likely 
                                            
451 Harry Blair, “Participation and Accountability at the periphery: Democratic Local Governance     in Six 
Countries” in World Development Vol. 28, No 1, p 23, 2000. 
452 Keshai C. Sharma “The Capacity, Autonomy and Accountability of Local Government in Local-Level 
Governance: The case of Botswana” in Regional Development Dialogue Vol 18, No 2, 1997. 
453 M. Shamsul Haque, “Local Governance in Developing Nations: Re-Examining the Question of 
Accountability” in Regional  Development Dialogue Vol 18, No 2, 1997. 
454 V. Braithwaite and M Levi (eds) Trust and Governance New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1998 
455 For example, in Uganda, the Constitution requires that at least a third of each local council must be women. 
Each local council must also have representatives of the persons with disabilities. 
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to be more effective and successful since the local communities stand to gain from their 
proper implementation. 
 
In Uganda’s case, the foundations were laid for local accountability by the decision of the 
government to decentralise the personnel function, financial management, creating elected 
councils and devolving service delivery responsibilities to the local government. The 
argument of the government is that decentralisation creates opportunities for people to see 
the “value for money”, that is their taxes. Thus, behind the logic of the government’s 
thinking is that there is a likelihood of a greater correlation between service delivery and 
people’s willingness to pay taxes, obey laws and cooperate with government in development 
activities. 
 
The constitution of Uganda, the Local Government Act and The Local Government 
Financial and Accounting Regulations require that public officials be transparent, 
accountable and responsive. For example, local governments accounts are supposed to be 
public and accessible, the public accounts committee of each local government is supposed 
to scrutinise the expenditures and ensure that funds were properly expended. The 
administration of the local government has no powers to spend any money unless sanctioned 
by the council. 
 
These regulations and procedures notwithstanding, the original intention of the government 
to create accountable administration at the local level seems to be at variance with the extent 
of graft existing in the local government today.456 The Local Government Finance 
Commission (LGFC), a body charged with the responsibility for intergovernmental finance 
matters. The LCGF noted that while the government created an adequate institutional 
framework at local level for promotion of trust, confidence and accountability, that would 
lead citizens to know how their resources are used, decisions are taken and which projects 
are planned and implemented, “unfortunately very few local governments practice such 
                                            
456 New Vision . . . For example, it was reported that KCC was failing to account for Shs. 1,5 billion. The 
Town Clerk of KCC failed to give satisfactory accountability for it to the Public Accounts Committee of 
parliament on three times he appeared before it. 
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public accountability”457. The LGFC report concludes, “Without trust therefore, there is no 
basis for social cooperation and voluntary compliance with laws and regulations that would 
ideally benefit everyone”458. Thus, there is a link between the levels of accountability on the 
part of local government on the one hand, and on the other the willingness to pay taxes, 
cooperate in public projects and to obey laws on the part of the citizens. The Local 
Government Finance Commission strongly associates the declining local revenues of local 
government to failure by the latter to be adequately accountable and to deliver services to 
the population. As pointed out earlier, local revenues of local governments have declined to 
nearly a half of what they were nine years ago. The Local Government Finance Commission 
shows that in 1998/99 financial year, all local governments collected Shs.109 billion but by 
2001/2002 financial year it had declined to Shs.78 billion459. As a result, the composition of 
local government funding stands as follows: central government transfers 80%, 
contributions by non-governmental organisations 12% while own local revenue is only 
8%460. 
 
Although the local governments have become increasingly dependent on central government 
grants, it is not prudent to assume that the local governments are well founded and capable 
of providing services, as one of their key accountability to the people. The Local 
Government Finance Commission study found that local governments’ financial problems 
are compounded by the deficit financing on the part of the central government. For example, 
the findings revealed that there was a funding gap of Shs.153 billion for all local 
governments if they are to deliver services efficiently and effectively. This gap exists even if 
all local governments were able to collect all their local revenues they need to be funded by 
government461. The problem of under-funding stems from two sources. First unconditional 
grants were initially given to local governments without sufficient knowledge of what the 
services would cost local governments. Secondly as the government has continued 
expansion of services to be delivered at the local level, it has increased the number of 
                                            
457 LGFC, Mobility and Generating Local Revenues, a report of a workshop, February 2003, p. 12 
458 Ibid, LGFC report (2003) p. 11 
115 LGFC Revenue Sharing Study, report no 6, June 2002, p. 55 
459 Ibid.LGFC Revenue Sharing Study, report no 6, June 2002, p. 55 
460 LGFC report 2002, ibid, p. 54 
461 Ibid.LGFC report 2002, p. v 
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conditional grants. This has burdened local governments since these grants are not within 
the mandate of the local governments to vary them or to adjust them for their local priorities. 
This has had the effect of undermining the essence of decentralisation, which is basically 
designed to serve local priorities. Besides, it has been reported462 that conditional grants 
demand that local governments account for each of the various grants, which is time 
consuming and laborious, apart from creating a culture of top-down accountability amongst 
the bureaucrats, as it used to be the case before decentralisation. In this process, downward 
accountability is given less emphasis by the local government officials. This tendency has 
undermined the principle of subsidiarity, that is, the concept of getting decisions and 
accountability closest to the lowest level of local government. What the central government 
has tended to do in this respect is that it has created a system of “force – accounts” whereby 
it retains discretionary authority to initiate projects and programmes which it supervises and 
implements, letting local governments act as its principal agents. 
According to Silverman, 
Within the context of the top-down principal agency model, local 
governments exercise responsibility on behalf of central governments, or 
sometimes, parastatals. When acting as Principal Agents under such 
circumstances, local governments do so under the direction and 
supervision of central government agencies . . . The characteristics of 
principal agency . . . do not depend on the extent to which local 
governments are, or are not, autonomous with respect to any functions 
they might undertake463. 
 
Likewise, it is understood that for decentralisation to achieve its fiscal objectives of 
economic efficiency, improved accountability and resources mobilisation, citizen preference 
should be reflected in budget outcomes at the subnational level464. Thus, in the case of 
Uganda, the aim of the central government appears to be the increasing use of local 
governments as principal agents for implementation of its own programmes. The problem 
however, is that when such programmes are not successfully implemented partly because 
                                            
462Ibid. LGFC report 2002, p. 57. It is noted in this report that thirty poverty action funds (PAF) transferred as 
conditional grants require local government officials at the district to make thirty separate quarterly reports to 
the ministry 
463 Jerry M. Silverman Public Sector Decentralisation: Economic Policy and Sector Investment Programs 
World Bank Technical Paper No. 188 The World Bank, Washington DC, 1992, P. 2 
464 Richard M. Bird and Francois Vaillancourt, “Fiscal decentralisation in developing countries: an overview” 
in Richard Bird and F. Vaillancourt (eds) Fiscal Decentralisation in Developing Countries, Cambridge 
University Press 1998 
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they were not conceived at the local level by the beneficiaries, the central government 
blames local government officials for the failures and not itself or its own officials. As the 
Local Government Finance Commission study has aptly noted, there has been a tremendous 
increase in sector specific funding rather than integrated funding, as it puts it: 
There is no discretion available to Local Governments within and between 
sectors in line with local priorities, which undermines the local ownership 
of programs. Sector guidelines and policies are often very rigid and largely 
by– pass local government structures. This results in lower Local 
Governments having little involvement in planning and little information 
about the services that should be delivered in their areas. The system 
therefore becomes unresponsive to community needs465. 
 
The report concludes “Local Governments heads of departments are increasingly operating 
as local officers of the line ministries, as opposed to officials working for the Local 
Government”466. It has therefore been suggested that the whole system of grants be reviewed 
if a sense of community ownership of programmes is to be achieved and local governments 
are to gain sufficient and reasonable autonomy467. 
 
4.7 Participatory Planning and Society-Oriented Accountability 
Local governments in Uganda were revived with a view that they can make a significant 
contribution to economic development, to revitalisation of the market and the empowerment 
of social groups and communities (including the marginalised ones). Thus, they are 
perceived as appropriate institutions for creating an atmosphere conducive to socio-
economic development as well as democratic governance in society. This is what has been 
termed “bringing power to the people”. As it has been noted earlier in this chapter, the 
centre-local relations in the process of decentralisation aimed at leaving the centre with the 
responsibility for policy while much of the responsibility for service provision was devolved 
to local governments. At the same time, the idea also embedded in the process of 
decentralisation is that the higher local governments should not ‘centralise’ power, that is, 
they should let the lower local governments, community groups and private entrepreneurs 
                                            
465Opcit. LGFC, (2002) report of Revenue Sharing Study p. 57. 
466 Ibid.LGFC, (2002) ibid p. 58 
467Ibid. LGFC (2002,) suggest that conditional grants and Local Government Development Project Funds be 
merged into a Development Transfer System (DTS) to increase local governments’ access to discretionary 
funds which will cater for local priorities.   
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play their part in production and provision of services. These ideas are derived from a neo-
liberal adage that “a good government is one that governs least”. 
 
The underlying principles of Uganda’s decentralisation are that (i) the community will be 
empowered to set its own priorities and demand for services they need rather than being 
determined and supplied by the government officials, (ii) the government officials will 
design services according to the priorities of the community (iii) by the community 
determining what it wants, it will be more willing to participate in the co-production of 
services and (iv) in this way the civil servants will be more responsive and accountable to 
the community they serve. The result is envisaged to be empowerment of the communities 
since they will be able to own and protect the service and see the value for their money. The 
real value for money is seen in terms of services provided by the government, which will 
encourage the members of the community to pay taxes and cooperate with the government. 
Besides, they will gain throughout the process of learning, to demand accountability from 
public officials468. 
 
The other aspect of society-oriented accountability is the application of market mechanisms 
in the production and provision of services. This is the unstated objective of decentralisation 
in Uganda, but one, which has evolved, with the increasing application of the ideas of new 
public management in Uganda’s public sector. Although Oyugi argues that privatisation is 
not part of decentralisation469, the trends in Uganda’s mode of service provision at the 
national and local levels have geared towards the market provision of public services. The 
market provision mode has gained momentum based on the argument that government is a 
poor performer when it comes to doing things that lie within the realm of the market such as 
trading, manufacturing etc. The market is seen as likely to be more responsive to the needs 
of society and because of market competition, assuming the citizens get enough information, 
are likely to get better choices and at lower costs. 
 
                                            
468 James Katorobo, “Action Planning in Decentralisation” in Sorensen Villadsen and Francis Lubanga, 
Democratic Decentralisation in Uganda   
469 Walter Oyugi, “Decentralisation for Good Governance and Development: The Unending debate “ in 
Regional Development Dialogue Vol. 21 No 1, 2000 
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A further argument is that a private entrepreneur is motivated by profit making, therefore he 
or she will have to cut costs of production and be more efficient470. The process of private 
provision in Uganda at the local level has taken the following forms: contracting out, 
contract management and leasing out. The most common form is contracting out of service 
provision to private providers. This has been common with large infrastructural projects 
such as roads, school buildings, hospitals etc. The other form that is common is contract 
management. This is different from contracting out in a sense that this means that a structure 
or facility exists but is poorly managed by the government officials. The new arrangement is 
that a qualified and experienced manager is hired who runs services on behalf of the local 
authority so that it continues to provide services to the public while the manager gets a 
commission fee from government for his or her management services. The third form is 
leasing out. This has involved leasing out facilities to private operators. It has been more 
common with markets, public toilets, taxi and bus parks. Unlike the case of contracting 
management, leasing-out means that the leases pays a specific competitive fee to the local 
authority so that he or she operates the facility and gains profit. In this case, the local 
authority retains the power to inspect and supervise the facility, to see if the lease is 
maintaining standards and charging reasonably. 
 
Studies have established that private provision, especially leasing out serves a dual purpose, 
first the facilities get better managed and attract more clients, and secondly, the financial 
returns to the local authorities increase. A study by the Crown Agents for the Uganda 
government471 established that when Kampala city council contracted out the management 
of public markets in 1994, in the following year the income to the council increased by 23 
percent from Shs.50.8 million to Shs.88 million per month, while it reduced operational 
costs by half from Shs.173.8 million to Shs.88 million per year. The market administrators 
                                            
470 Most of the services and goods whose value exceeds Shs500.000 and below Shs1,000,000 have to be 
procured through selective biding. Goods and services whose value exceeds Shs 1,000,000 have to be tendered 
through competitive biding by private suppliers. Robert J. Bennet, Local Government and Market 
decentralisation: Experiences in industrialised, developing and former Eastern bloc Countries United Nations 
University, Tokyo, 1994. also Tukalebwa G. B. “Privatisation as a Development Policy” in Hansen and 
Twaddle (eds) Developing Uganda James Currey, 1998      
471 Crown Agents, Uganda: Enhancing District Revenue Generation and Administration Final Consultancy 
Report for Uganda Government (1996) contract No. 95 – 4387A 
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were reduced from 215 to 35 employees. At the same time, the report indicates that vendors 
were attracted to take up more stalls in the market after contracting out. In Kampala City 
Council, this mode of service provision has generally shifted to private contracts. These 
range from tax collection, licensing, resurfacing of roads, supply of equipment and 
consumables, managing parks and facilities to cleaning and collection of refuse. This model 
has been replicated in most other local governments. 
 
The process follows from the constitutional provisions, the Local Government Act and the 
Financial and Accounting regulations. The constitution provides for a tender board for each 
district responsible for receiving and evaluating tenders on their own merit. In most local 
governments any service or good whose cost is beyond Shs.1 million cannot be purchased 
in-house, it has to be identified and given to the tenderer to supply a good or service. 
 
While market mechanisms of accountability may have improved the financial position of the 
local authorities, reduced bureaucratic bottlenecks and increased the participation of private 
sector in public sector provision, several flaws still exist in the system of service delivery at 
the local level. This author found that in Kampala the system of private provision is prone to 
abuse. First, the transparency of the tender board is questionable. Several respondents 
indicated that the membership of the tender board comprises the “friends” or political 
supporters of the mayor and not necessarily technically competent people to handle supplies 
and purchasing472. It was argued that they do what the mayor or other influential members of 
the council wish them to. Thus, its independence and autonomy were in doubt473. Secondly, 
the Local Government Act stipulates that any political or administrative leader in the district 
tenders, such a pecuniary interest should be disclosed to the council. Throughout the 
country, local politicians and civil servants have been using proxy companies to bid for 
tenders or to front for their relatives and political or business friends. It is common 
knowledge that the tendering process is neither fair nor accountable. Some studies have 
                                            
472 Vested interests of powerful councillors in securing tenders were reported. The case in point are the tenders 
given to Basajjabalaba to manage the two most profitable markets of Owino and Nakasero in Kampala Central 
division. This act is clearly against the anti-monopoly laws. 
473 We report full controversies of this deal in the subsequent parts of this work. 
See the Local Government Finance Commission, Revenue Sharing Study (report No 6) 2002 p 54. 
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revealed that this process “is seriously abused by (mainly local) politicians and civil 
servants”474.  
 
Thirdly, management of tenders has proved problematic. The bureaucratic officials at the 
division in municipalities and sub-county in the rural district complain that they are not 
directly in charge of implementation of the projects undertaken by the contractors because 
the latter owe their allegiance to the district officials who gave them the contract in the first 
place. There is also a wrong assumption found in several government reports and speeches 
made by government officials that the local communities “own” the tendered projects in 
their areas. To the contrary, the local communities are neither involved in the project designs 
nor in their supervision. An innovation in this respect was made during the implementation 
of the Local Government Development Programme (LGDP) funded by the World Bank and 
other donors to require every local government investment to originate from the parish 
investment committee which is required to identify local needs, prioritise them and come up 
with a locally-relevant project475. 
 
Under the LGDP guidelines a parish investment committee is required to carry out extensive 
consultations with the local communities in order to come up with an investment plan. It is 
also required to raise 10 percent of own revenue to co-fund the project in question, to match 
the funds released by the government. In addition the parish investment Committee has to 
demonstrate that it possesses the capacity to oversee the project and has funds to cover the 
operational costs as well as sustaining the project in the long term. While the LGDP has put 
local infrastructure in place such as access roads, stand water pipes and drainage channels as 
this author observed in all divisions of Kampala, (and elsewhere in the country) the so-called 
participatory approach was glaringly missing. In the first place, the parish as a planning 
body does not exist in the local government laws. In the second place, the parish investment 
committees were not popularly elected. A few notables were hand-picked by local 
councillors to constitute the committees so that their parish does not “miss government 
money”. Of more importance, at parish level, there are no funds since a parish is not a local 
                                            
474 Local Government Finance Commission, Revenue Sharing Study (Report No 6) 2002, p 54 
475 Ministry of Local Government, Second Local Government development Programme (LGDP11): 
Operational Manual for LGs, Kampala, September 2003  
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government but an administrative entity. It was revealed to me that in reality, the 10 percent 
co-funding for local projects is raised by the division authorities in order to get as many 
projects as possible in their area476. 
 
Besides, other problems of accountability have surfaced at the parish level. The parish 
investment committees have no funds to enable them oversee local projects, let alone, 
sparing a lot of their valuable time to supervise them. The reality is that as the division 
officials are planning projects for various areas in their jurisdiction, they approach the 
members of the parish investment committees to write minutes and sign them, which the 
division officials pick up as a “request” from the local community. The actual project 
designs and implementation schedules are done by the division officials. In any case, the so-
called parish investment committees have neither the expertise nor the experience to design 
projects. Most local notables joined the parish investment committees with anticipation that 
in the course of projects getting to their areas they would personally benefit by getting some 
allowances, which has not the case with LGDP funds477. The principles behind these funds 
is that funding for projects should be demand-driven, that is, the community concerned 
should request for funds for a specific community need. Because of this principle, an 
operational and monitoring component is included in the funding for local government 
officials to oversee the implementation of the projects in their area. However, the parish 
investment committees do not share in these allowances although they are also supposed to 
monitor the projects yet it is part of work for which they are paid salaries. There evidence on 
the ground is that most of the local investments have lacked effective community 
participation and accountability to the “beneficiaries” is ubiquitously absent. 
 
The contractors for local projects have been accused of doing “shoddy” work. Public outcry 
is all over the country that local contractors are cheating the public by putting schools 
without adequate cement and other materials, building roads which are washed away by 
                                            
476 One Key informant told me that the 10% of the funds the divisions raise for their LGDP projects is the 
reason why for most of the time, the 25% remittances to village councils have not been made, that, after all, 
they are “tapping” more money for their projects by payment of 10% co-funding for LGDP funds. 
477 At the inception of LGDP, many members of the lower local councils had wanted to constitute themselves 
into investment committee only to find that the guidelines did not allow it. They had also anticipated to 
personally benefit from “allowances”. See MOLG, Investment Planning Guide for Sub-counties and Lower 
Councils Kampala, 1998. 
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rains a few weeks later, building drainage systems with slabs and culverts of poor concrete 
mixtures which collapse as vehicles pass, to mention but a few examples, yet these works 
are more often than not certified by the local governments’ engineers and the contractors are 
paid478. For example universal primary education (UPE) schools built in Soroti district under 
school facility grant (SFG) lacked adequate cement and were on the verge of collapsing over 
the pupils which prompted the minister in charge of primary education to order for their 
demolition. Another example observed by this author in 2003 was the Kazo road in 
Kawempe division –one of the five municipalities of Kampala where the culverts were 
breaking down and drainage getting blocked even before the work was completed. The 
contractor was however paid. 
 
Several reasons have been given for lack of accountability in the local projects. The 
contractors complain that they receive a small fraction of the actual payment479 They give a 
fraction in advance to local government officials so that they get assisted with the 
information regarding the tender, for example, the reverve price. This helps them to bid 
successfully because they have prior information. They also complain that to get the actual 
tender, a payment must be made to some of the influential members of the tender board. 
They say “there is no free tender”. As a result, they provide less quality and quantity in 
actual work so that they can also make some profit. In other words, they fit the work within 
the money that is remaining after bribing their way through to get contracts. 
 
On the part of the lower local government officials, the complaint is that they have little say 
over tenders because it is the district tender board which awards the contracts. They deny 
any involvement in the tendering process or receiving “kick-backs”. Their argument is that 
they have no power to influence the tender board. They argue that they can not take bribes 
from prospective tenders because in case their bid is unsuccessful, it would back-fire on 
them. Notwithstanding their denial of corrupt practices, the local government officials do 
secretly share information with the prospective tenders that is why some of them resist 
                                            
478 The then minister for Local Government Tarsis Kabwegyere has suggested that the whole issue of tendering 
should be revisited but no concrete proposals have been made to that effect. 
479 A number of business people interviewed for this study complained of “kickbacks” to Local Government 
officials 
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transfers from one station to another. Transfer of a local government civil servant to another 
station means loss of “contacts”, which means “business” deals established with 
businessmen or women who supply goods or services to that station. 
 
One middle level officer who had been transferred from Central Division to Makindye 
Division in Kampala confirmed to this author that when he was in the Central Division, he 
would build a house every year out of such business. He complained that Makindye division 
was “dry” and has no “business”. Such behaviours and “business deals” contravene section 
79(4) of the Local Governments Financial and Accounting Regulation, which stipulates 
thus:  
Councillors and members of the (tender) Board and employees of the 
council are prohibited from being suppliers or contractors of the council 
either directly or indirectly.  
 
Moreover, even for suppliers and contractors, the regulation require them to be people of 
proven integrity (section 74(c) of the Financial and Accounting Regulations). This only 
happens to be the written word. The reality is that connivance between suppliers and local 
government officials is rampant and much of it systemic and it is hard to detect. In this 
process, those parties involved thwart accountability.  
 
4.8 Accountability and Public Participation 
Decentralisation has always been advocated as “people power” and for inclusion of 
previously marginalised groups to articulate their views and contribute to decision-making 
processes. Thus, devolution such the one that has been introduced in Uganda over the last 
one decade is seen as an appropriate institutional framework for individuals and 
communities to express not only their preference in choosing how their needs can be met but 
also supporting or protesting the activities and behaviours of government and its agents. 
This process leads to an atmosphere conducive for the people to participate in government. 
It is also claimed that it empowers communities in decision-making processes. The 
programme of decentralisation in Uganda was conceived and implemented with the above 
notions in mind. The question however, is: to what extent have communities held local 
officials accountable? First, the government of Uganda has noted thus, 
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Accountability requires community level institutions where the quality of 
service delivered is discussed; and a link between these institutions and 
management of service. Service users must be able to insist on a good 
service.480  
 
The central government views the local governments in the perspective of involving local 
communities in the delivery of public services. This perception is held in the belief that 
“strong local democratic institutions” will help in attacking poverty in the following ways: 
first, representative local institutions will take pro-poor decisions and secondly, they should 
bear in mind that “lack of power is itself a dimension of poverty481“. Thus, in its poverty 
action programme, the government intends to deliver services, which target the poor, and to 
improve the public perceptions and ownership of the local political and administrative 
processes482. However, the government too, realises that there is “widespread dissatisfaction 
with public services483“, at the local level. A good example to demonstrate this 
dissatisfaction by the public with the services of local governments is the failure of the latter 
to plough back into market facilities in Kampala, which has encouraged the vendors to 
create their own market structures outside the established ones484. Although such actions are 
considered illegal, it is one way used by the people disaffected with the work of local 
governents to get an exit.  
 
Secondly, other government studies have revealed that “participatory planning and 
budgeting were apparently non-existent”485 at the village level. Whenever some meetings 
were organised by local government officials with the local residents, the latter perceived 
them as some form of teaching and not consultation486. Although local residents are given 
room to ask questions at such meetings, these could not be a sign of consultation because the 
agenda of the meetings were not circulated well in advance. The other problem is that the 
village residents do not debate issues in depth because the local officials do not supply 
sufficient information to them. Lack of information remains a serious handicap to effective 
                                            
480 Uganda Government, The Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP: Summary Version 2002) p 15.   
481 ibid, p, 14 
482 ibid, p, 14 
483 A study by Crown Agents, ibid, 1996 found that in Kampala area there were 46 illegal markets. 
484 Uganda government Participatory Planning for Poverty Reduction (report) Kampala, 2000 p.4   
485 ibid. report 
486 ibid, report 2000 
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participation by ordinary people in local government affairs in Uganda. Thus, although the 
government established structures to implement poverty reduction-strategies487, the reality is 
that participation of the ordinary people in these programmes is minimal and remains a 
preserve of central and local government officials. The point of convergence in all these 
studies is that there is a rigorous demand for accountability at intergovernmental and intra-
governmental levels. 
 
The third aspect of local participation and accountability is the role of the non-governmental 
organisations in local governance. The popular perception among local citizens is that of 
“organising” so that the NGOs, especially foreign ones can “give us something”. The idea is 
not necessarily to create associations for empowerment but to “gain”. As some critical 
observers have put it the NGOs have a tendency to create parallel arrangements in the 
community . . . “which can undermine the role of elected councillors in the linkage between 
the community and local governments responsible for service delivery.”488 Service delivery 
itself is seen as partnership between the communities, local governments and non – 
governmental organisations. 
 
In the course of this study, it was difficult to establish the contribution of the communities to 
service provision. What was observed is that some communities on adhoc basis did “self-
help” activities. Even then, it is usually after the chairperson or member of the village 
executive committee puts in efforts to mobilise the residents to work on a water spring, 
access road, bridge and other small works which affect the lives of a section of the 
community489. International NGOs’ have made a significant contribution to community 
level service provisions targeting the poor communities and taking care of the shortfalls of 
the local governments. Examples of NGOs’ operating in Kampala include inter alia Plan 
International which has built primary schools and provided piped water in Kawempe 
                                            
487 The World Bank, Uganda Strategy, 1997, see David Craig and Doug Porter “Poverty Reduction Strategy 
Papers: A New Convergence”, World Development, Vol, 31, No 1, 2002. Martin Onyach–Olaa and Dong 
Porter, “Local Government Performance and pecentralisation in Uganda: implications for central Government 
and Donors” 2000. 
488 ibid, Participatory Planning for Poverty Reduction (report) 2000, p.9 
489 For example, people in Kyebando in Kawempe division contributed money, KCC gave them a grader. The 
money they collected was used to open up a new road. 
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division. It is also taking care of the welfare of children orphaned by AIDS. Another NGO 
called AMREF is operating in Kawempe division providing Aids awareness programmes. 
The problem however, is that most NGOs’ expect the community to contribute towards the 
service they intend to provide. Community contribution in most projects has been minimal; 
hence, the NGOs’ go ahead and provide the service with their own resources. This gesture in 
philanthropy is certainly good and welcome especially for the very poor but it creates a 
dependence syndrome. As people get used to handouts, they lose the momentum to struggle 
for a better hard earned living, and initiative is lost. This is not to suggest that some NGO’s 
have not genuinely contributed to positive attitudes of their beneficiaries. Many advocacy 
organisations such as Action for Development (ACFODE), DENIVA, HURIPEC, 
HURINET, Uganda Debt Network (UDN) to mention but a few, have actively worked with 
local communities on issues of poverty reduction, women’s issues, human rights, 
development and a range of governance issues which have sensitised the communities for 
their better living.  
 
The issue of accountability at the local level remains problematic with or without the 
activities of NGOs. As NGOs supply services that the local governments should have 
supplied the local communities get reprieved in their numerous problems; they become less 
conscious of the need to demand for their share of accountability from the local officials. 
This tendency is accentuated in Uganda by the government’s directives to the NGOs to do 
“development” work and not “politics”. Their beneficiaries are made aware of this silence 
requirement, which prompts their quiescence on controversial issues. This however, is a 
negation to the idea of development of a dynamic and vibrant civil society. It cripples the 
idea of a democratic society with the capacity to take on challenging roles and to question 
those who are supposed to do their responsibilities in public offices and society.  
 
Finally, it is imperative to note the policy makers see that decentralisation as an instrument 
not only for promoting good governance but also as an instrument for fighting poverty. The 
government’s strategy in this regard has been to identify key areas of funding at the local 
level termed as priority areas. These areas constitute the bulk of central government’s grants 
to local governments. Despite increased funding by the government of local governments, a 
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number of factors persist which weaken the implementation of poverty-reduction strategies 
through decentralisation. These include lack of effective participation in decision making at 
the lower levels of local government, lack of adequate finances, lack of qualified personnel 
at the sub-county level and inadequate local governments at the local level490.  
 
A combination of these factors together with low levels of accountability, transparency, 
inefficient and ineffective service delivery make it tenuous to link the success or failure of 
the poverty reduction strategies with decentralisation. Moreover, at the micro-level, what 
matters most for the poor to overcome poverty is the availability of credit and access to 
productive assets such as land which remain largely in the hands of the better–to–do 
people491. Thus whereas PEAP was conceived by the government with four principal aims 
of creating an enabling environment for sustainable growth, good governance, enabling the 
poor to raise their incomes and improving the quality of life of the poor, the question that 
these policy objectives raise is: how have they translated into material well-being of the 
poor? The second question is, if any material well-being has been registered in the lives of 
the poor, to what extent is it a consequence of decentralisation?  
 
Evidence suggests that there are scores of improvement in social service delivery in the 
country. Education has registered significant enrolment of primary school-going children 
from 2.6 million in 1996 to 7.3 million in 2003. This is attributed to the introduction of 
universal primary education (UPE) for all primary school going children in 1997492. The 
government has also put aside significant amounts of financial resources to cater for 
construction of school buildings under the school facility grant (SFG). This has alleviated 
the poor conditions under which children were studying before the introduction of UPE in 
some areas. In some areas especially in the North and Northeast, some classes used to be 
conducted under the tree shades or in grass thatched, temporary structures. The SFG is 
helping to remedy the situation. Nevertheless, most critics of the UPE programme contend 
                                            
490 Uganda Government, National Programme for Good Governance in the Context of the Poverty Eradication 
Action Plan. 2000, p.19 
491 Charles Lwanga-Ntale, “Uganda’s Decentralisation Policy and its Implementation Framework” in UMI, 
Basic Principles of Decentralisation 2004. 
492 Under the UPE programme, children between the age of seven to twelve who are enrolled in government 
aided schools are exempted from paying tuition and other bills except that parents have to provide for their 
lunches, stationery and uniform. 
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that the programme is giving poor quality education. On the other hand, the government 
argues that while it is attending to the issues of quality improvement, the programme is 
helping children who would possibly have never had any opportunity to go to school. Going 
by the increased numbers of enrolment, the UPE programme is successful partly because it 
has greatly reduced the levels of illiteracy that was rampant in the country. Primary school 
enrolment stood at 62.3% in 1992, in 2003 it was 86%. This is attributed to the 
implementation of UPE. The other area where service delivery has improved is water and 
sanitation. Access to safe water in rural areas has increased from 18 percent in 1991 to 55 
percent in 2002. Access to safe water in urban areas has increased from 54 percent to 63 
percent in the same period. 
 
Under the Health Sector Strategic Plan, the government has outlined a minimum health 
package. The key issues are primary health care and prophylactic practices. Thus, emphasis 
is on immunisation of children against preventable diseases, clean environment, maternity 
care, health education, as well as providing basic medical care within the reach of the 
ordinary people- especially in the rural areas. Under the latter programme, the government is 
constructing or upgrading 214 health centres throughout the country. These are constructed 
to include a theatre, maternity ward, and general outpatients ward. A minimum of one 
qualified doctor and nurses are posted there. This programme is in addition to the existing 
larger district hospitals. This has helped to bring services nearer to the people. The problem 
still is that several complaints are raised that there are insufficient drugs. Each of these 
health centres has a management committee comprising local residents. Again, these 
complain that they have very little influence on what the doctors and nurses do in their daily 
routines. The original idea of having local management committees for health centres was to 
increase local ownership of the facilities and to generally oversee the centres. But the 
practice is that members meet only when called upon. Therefore, their influence in the day-
to-day running of the health centres is minimal. Studies have revealed that in the health 
sector, there have traditionally been low levels of demand for accountability by users493. 
Unlike schools where parents–teachers associations (PTA’s) have for long time had 
                                            
493 Emmanuel Ablo and Ritva Reinikka, “Tracking Study for Health and Education” in District Integrity 
Workshop in Uganda” (report) IGG and Work Bank Institute 1999. 
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influence largely because the parents made contribution towards the running of schools, 
such a practice did not exist in health centres494. For this reason, medical personnel have not 
been subject to any significant demand for accountability at the local level. 
 
While emphasis in studies has always been placed on accountability to the local 
communities, intra-organisational factors affecting the levels and conditions requisite for 
proper effectiveness and performance tend to be ignored. For example, in Uganda, 
conditions of work for public service workers are poor, which may induce the workers to 
engage in unethical conduct such as soliciting bribes. A trained medical doctor working in a 
government clinic receives on average Shs.500,000= (equivalent to about US dollars 300) 
per month. A trained primary school teacher receives Shs. 120,000 (equivalent to about US 
dollars 80) per month. This kind of remuneration not only demotivates, it also tempts the 
public service workers to engage in corrupt practices, which in Uganda has come to be 
known as “making the ends meet”. Thus, even if the institutions of government are vigilant 
on checking corruption, with poor pay for public workers, their efforts will be frustrated. In 
any case, higher level corruption amongst the senior civil servants and politicians, 
themselves well paid, exacerbates the problem. The District integrity Workshop report 
(1999) points out: 
 It is generally believed by the stakeholders that while President Museveni 
is capable of curbing the high level or “Grand Corruption” that is evident 
in Uganda, he has become increasingly less willing to do so. Also he is 
apparently beginning to underestimate negative effects and adopt a new 
level of tolerance to corrupt practices by insiders495. 
 
The report quotes President Museveni as saying, “Corruption is not hurting development as 
long as the money does not leave Uganda496“. This high level of tolerance of corruption 
percolates in the whole society. It affects the perceptions of local leaders in charge of 
delivering services and affects the quality of service delivered. “Grand Corruption” breeds 
and nurtures petty corruption. For example, the District Integrity Survey carried out in 1998 
found among service users in one of the districts-Mbale, that 73 percent of those interviewed 
                                            
494 For many years, the running of schools countrywide has suffered low capitation by government which 
necessitated parents to step in with extra contributions to run schools and top up teachers’ salaries 
495 District integrity Workshop, 1999, p.47 
496 ibid, p.47 
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believed that a bribe was usually demanded in order for one to get a service from the local 
service providers. The same study found that 77 percent of the service users were aware that 
paying a bribe is bad and there was consensus that corruption makes services inefficient, it is 
morally repugnant and deters development.  
 
The more important point to note is that while local governments have been tasked with the 
responsibility of managing public funds and services, the risk of “grand corruption” at the 
national level, becoming “grand” at the district and lower levels is gradually eating into 
resources meant for service delivery. Cases have been reported where councillors have 
accused the members of executive and technical staff for engaging in tendering for services 
contrary to the law497. Besides, the trend of corruption becomes entrenched when some of 
the services are still controlled from the centre, such as school grants. A chain of predators 
along the way take portions to the extent that by the time actual delivery is done, only a 
small fraction of the intended service goes to the beneficiaries498. In a tracking study of 
service delivery, it was found that a bulk of central government grants to districts intended 
for services were captured by the local elites at the district. In some cases, as little as only 13 
percent reaches the intended beneficiaries499. This systematic local capture has manifested 
itself in various ways: first, the central government does not have the capacity to supervise 
the use of the grants up to the beneficiary level. Second, the local governments do not have 
enough auditors to follow up the actual use of the funds released to lower local 
governments. Third, the local communities do not get sufficient information that funds have 
been released and the purpose for which they are intended. In most cases, poor communities 
lack the means and organisational capabilities to tackle the more influential local elites. 
Fourth, the local elites are connected through family, marriage, clan and other social 
relations that protect them from the rest of the community in their “dubious” dealings in 
appropriating public resources. Fifth, the power structure in Uganda, both at the centre and 
                                            
497 Geoffrey Tukahebwa, “The Role of District Councils in Decentralisation” in Nsibambi, A Decentralisation 
and civil society in Uganda 
498 154  Ablo and Reinikka (1999) ibid. 
499 Ritva Reinikka and Jacob Svensson, “Local Capture: Evidence from a central Government Transfer 
program in Uganda” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, May 2004 
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the local level is built on patronage to the extent that such acts of mis-appropriation by elites 
of public resources are conceived as political rewards for supporting the “system.”500 
 
Such was the case with a government micro-finance (Entandikwa Scheme) which was 
intended to give concessional loans to the poor to start up small income generating projects. 
The funds ended up with the more influential local elites who defaulted on payment, 
claiming, it was a political reward for their support to the movement system and President 
Museveni’s bid for presidency in 1996 and 2001501. Political patronage more than anything 
else, seems to have been the most debilitating factor in local accountability. The councillors 
are elected on the so-called individual merit, where the most powerful local elites in the area 
use money and other influences including political connections to gain votes. This system of 
power borders on zero-sum politics, right from the top to bottom. It lacks the checks and 
balances, even after decentralisation. As Hyden has observed: 
 
. . . traces of the past are also to be found in the actions of the 
NRM. The notion of politics as a zero-sum game in which the  
winner takes all, is evident in the approach which the NRM 
takes towards government. Patronage continues to be part of 
the way of governing502. 
 
What makes political corruption more glaring at the local level in Uganda is that the local 
leaders perceive it as an “investment” The candidates standing on “individual merit” sponsor 
their own campaigns and if they win, they hope to recoup their “investment gains”. As 
Thomas and Barkan have observed, the candidates for elections in Uganda spend too much 
                                            
500 Anne Matte Kjaer, “Old brooms can sweep too!” An overview of rulers and public sector reforms in 
Uganda, Tanzania and Kenya” Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol 24, September 2004. Also critical, 
Roger Tangri and Andrew Mwenda “Corruption and cronyism in Uganda’s privatisation in the 1990s” African 
Affairs Vol 100, 2001. 
501 William Muhumuza. (2007) Credit and the Reduction of Poverty in Uganda: Structural Reforms in 
Context.Kampala: Fountain Publishers. 
502 Goran Hyden “The Challenges of Constitutionalising politics in Uganda” in Hansen and Twaddle (eds) 
Changing Uganda. James Currey, London, 1991.p, 113 
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money on their campaigns and the public expects to be “facilitated.”503 This “expensive” 
politics has distorted both representation and accountability, for personal gains of 
councillors override the public interest and not vice versa. Thus, it is not the pro-people 
candidates who win the votes; it is the more wealthy who do. This leaves the marginalised 
groups voiceless, as it is only those with the necessary connections with the influential 
groups and personalities, who enter the ring of the beneficiaries, such as gaining tenders to 
supply or to get jobs for their friends and relatives.                                                                                            
 
                                            
503 Thomas M. and J. Barkan, (1998), “Corruption and Political Finance in Africa”. (Mimeo) Prem Unit, World 
Bank, Washington. Also quoted in Floribert Ngaruuo, A Political Economy of reform for service delivery: the 
case for administrative decentralisation in Africa” Nordic Journal of African Studies Vol.12, No2, 2003. 
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Chapter 5 
 
Urban Governance and Service Delivery in the Context of 
Decentralisation in Uganda 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The 1990s witnessed fundamental changes in the way the local governments, the private 
sector and society were interacting and working together in the production of goods and 
services. The new modus operandi revolved around the newly found “wisdom” of public 
sector reforms, involving decentralisation, privatisation, “lean” governments and result – 
oriented service delivery. Urban governance, within the context of these reforms is seen as a 
successor to the traditional systems of local government. Local government has always been 
associated with formal description of powers, responsibilities and politics504. With a change 
towards local governance, urban authorities have to deal with rapid changes, multiple and 
complex stakeholders. Within this context, “urban governance” has implied greater diversity 
in the organisation of services, greater flexibility, a variety of actors, even a transformation 
of forms that local democracy might assume505. 
 
While most of the public sector reforms have taken place largely at macro level (national) by 
way of re–shaping and remodelling the methods and attitudes that were applied in the past, 
the more effective impact could only be felt at the local level, where individuals and 
communities interact more frequently with the local governments. Urban governance in the 
context of developing countries is striving to come to terms with the “new governance” 
framework of doing things, that is, to shed off the traditional bureaucratic management 
practices506. 
 
                                            
504 Mark R. Montgomery et al, Cities Transformed: Demographic and its Implications in the Developing World 
Earthscan/National Academy of Sciences, London, 2003 
2 ibid, p.358. 
505 ibid, p.358. 
506 3 Patria L. Mc Carney “Considerations on Governance from a Local Perspective: Towards a Framework for 
Addressing Critical Disjunctures in Urban Policy” in Paul Collins (ed), Applying Public Administration in 
Development, John Wiseley & Sons, Chichester, 1999. 
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On the part of local authorities, the key issue at hand is that the local governments are under 
increased pressure from all sides to render services more efficiently and effectively. The 
local communities on their part are becoming more conscious, demanding and assertive507 
while at the same time the main issue remains that local governments should be vehicles for 
democracy, not just service delivery508. 
 
In the practical world of local government managers as well as the national leaders, the call 
upon them, particularly coming from international donors and NGOs is to practise “good 
governance”, the elastic connection between politics and administration, creating an area 
where both have to be concerned with how power and authority are structured in various 
contexts, with a view of interfacing with the civil society; unlimited by bureaucratic 
formalism509. In this connection, then, the market forces could play a significant role in the 
arena that was previously designed and designated as an exclusive empire of officialdom. As 
Smith puts it, the separation between “the polity” and the “economy” had to cease in their 
jurisdictional significance510. These perspectives have been attempted in Uganda’s “age” of 
reforms511. For this study, a number of questions arise regarding the application and benefits 
of the new approaches to management of local governments. Specifically, have the political 
and administrative elites been able to change their “traditional” behaviours? Have the 
institutional mechanisms changed to be flexible and adaptive to the requirements of new 
organisational modes of operation? Is there better, effective and efficient service delivery? 
Are the various stake–holders involved in decision making? This chapter seeks to explore 
and analyse  Uganda’s urban service delivery in the context decentralisation, with a view of 
coming to terms with the realities posed by these questions. 
 
                                            
507 Paul Collins “The Last Fifty Years and the Next Fifty Years: A Century of Public Administration” in Paul 
Collins (ed) ibid. 
508 Paul Collins, State, Market and Civil Society: Towards a partnership? “Paul Collins (ed) ibid. See also the 
discussion by Adrian Leftwitch, “Governance, the State and the Politics of Development” Development and 
Change Vol 25, 1994.  
509 Martin Dornbos, “Good Governance”: The Rise and decline of a Policy metaphor. Journal of Development 
Studies Vol 37, No 6, August 2001. 
510 Michael Peter Smith, City, State and Market, Basil Blackwell Inc. Oxford, 1988. 
511 Justus Mugaju, Uganda’s Age of Reforms: A Critical Overview Fountain Publishers, Kampala, 1996 
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5.2 Characteristics of the Urban Setting in Uganda 
Uganda is predominantly a rural country with the majority of the people living in rural areas. 
According to Uganda’s population census (2002) the country’s total population was 24, 748, 
977 people. The distribution of the population by region was as follows: Central region 6, 
683, 877, Eastern 6, 301, 677, Northern 5, 345, 964 and Western 5, 417, 449. Of the total 
population, the majority of the people (86, 1%) live in rural areas, and 13, 9% live in urban 
areas. The rural – urban population by region is shown below. 
 
Table 5:  Showing Distribution of Rural – urban Population 
Region Rural Population Urban Population Percentage of Urban 
Population 
 
Central 5, 000, 019 1, 683, 868 33.67% 
Eastern 5, 872, 468 429, 207 7.3% 
Northern 4, 868, 843 477, 121 9.8% 
Western 5,978, 836 438, 613 7.33% 
Total 21, 720, 166 3, 028, 809 13.94% 
Source of data: Uganda Bureau of Statistics 2002 
 
As the table above shows, the rate of urbanisation in most regions is less than 10 percent of 
the population. Central region is relatively more urbanised because Kampala City with a 
population of 1, 208, 544 is located there. If Kampala was excluded from the central region, 
its urban population would be 475, 324 which would not be any much different from the rest 
of the other regions.  
 
The urban structure in Uganda is defined by the Local Government Act (1997). It includes 
City, Municipality and Town. Each City, Municipality and Town comprises Divisions which 
are also local governments. Local governments have corporate existence. Therefore, they are 
self – accounting units. Below the Division, there are administrative units, namely: parish 
and village (cell). Under the Local Governments Act (section 6) a “Municipal or a Town 
Council shall be a lower Local Government of the district in which it is located”. This 
provision however, does not apply to Kampala, which is both a city and a district512. 
                                            
512 Kampala City is the only city in Uganda. It also doubles as a district. There are 13 municipalities and 66 
towns in the whole country. 
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Most urban areas grow naturally because of trading, manufacturing and administrative 
locations. In Uganda, since the colonial times, the establishment of a district post has always 
tended to create a new town. For example, the recent increase in districts from 39 in 1993 to 
56 today has led to the creation of new towns. Under such conditions, new towns are 
gazetted regardless of whether or not they meet the population criteria. The Local 
Government Act, Third Schedule (regulation 32) stipulates the criteria for establishing and 
gazetting an urban area as a town or municipality. According to this regulation, a town 
should have above twenty five thousand inhabitants. A municipality should have above one 
hundred thousand inhabitants and a city, above five hundred thousand inhabitants. Other 
conditions that need to be satisfied for gazetting an urban area as a town include having 
capacity to meet its costs of service delivery, having its own offices, having a Master Plan 
for land use and presence of water resources. The regulation, however, is explicit on the 
issue of establishment of district towns, whether the above conditions are satisfactory or not. 
Section 32 (2) of the Local Government Act states that “Where a district headquarters is 
established, the area shall be declared a town”. This explains why many towns have smaller 
populations than that required by the regulations.  The tables below demonstrate this. 
 
Table 6:  Showing Urban Population in Central Region by District 
Region District Urban Population 
Central Kalangala 
Kampala 
Kayunga 
Kiboga 
Luwero 
Masaka 
Mpigi 
Mubende 
Mukono 
Nakasongola 
Rakai 
Sembabule 
Wakiso 
3063 
1, 208, 544 
19, 984 
11, 882 
55, 278 
75, 680 
10, 217 
51, 092 
141, 990 
6, 590 
21, 303 
4, 025 
462, 277 
Central region total urban Population  1, 683, 868 
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Source: Uganda Bureau of Statistics (2002 census) 
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Table 7: Showing Urban Population in Eastern region by district 
Region District Urban Population 
Eastern 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Eastern region total Urban population               
Bugiri 
Busia 
Iganga 
Jinja 
Kaberamaido 
Kamuli 
Kepchorwa 
Katakwi 
Kumi 
Mayuge 
Mbale 
Pallisa 
Sironko 
Soroti 
Tororo 
18, 664 
37, 947 
38, 009 
100, 337 
- 
11, 221 
8, 902 
7, 294 
8, 367 
8, 933 
70, 437 
23, 919 
11, 235 
41, 470 
42, 473 
429, 209 
Source: Uganda Bureau of Statistics (2002 census) 
 
Table 8: Showing Urban Population in Northern Uganda by district 
Region District Urban Population 
Northern Region 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Northern region total urban population 
Ajumani 
Apach 
Arua 
Gulu 
Kitgum 
Kotido 
Lira 
Moroto 
Moyo 
Nakapiripit 
Nebbi 
Pader 
Yumbe 
20, 022 
10, 292 
75, 326 
113, 144 
42, 929 
13, 509 
89, 781 
7, 504 
12, 427 
1, 658 
65, 255 
9, 949 
15, 325 
477, 121 
Source: Uganda Bureau of Statistics (2002 census) 
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Table 9: Showing Urban Population in Western Region by district 
Region District Urban Population 
Western 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Western region total urban population 
Bundibugyo 
Bushenyi 
Hoima 
Kabale 
Kabarole 
Kamwenge 
Kanungu 
Kasese 
Kibaale 
Kisoro 
Kyenjejo 
Masindi 
Mbarara 
Ntungamo 
Rukungiri 
14, 161 
37, 887 
38, 656 
45, 757 
40, 605 
13, 838 
11, 949 
59, 136 
4, 822 
10, 627 
15, 377 
25, 515 
92, 115 
13, 342 
16, 826 
438, 613 
Source: Uganda Bureau of Statistics (2002 census) 
 
According to figures (in the tables) above, central region represents 55.6% of all the urban 
population in the country. The other three regions, Eastern has 14.2%, Western 14.5% and 
Northern 15.8%. It is important to note that the figures above represent one or more urban 
areas in a district. For example, Mukono district has a number of towns: Mukono, Lugazi 
and Njeru. Masaka district has Masaka Municipality, and Lukaya town. However most of 
the districts have one major urban area, for example, Kabale, Nakapiripit, Ajumani, Kitgum, 
Apach, Kabarole, Moroto, Kibaale, Hoima, Kisoro, Ntungamo, Kyenjojo, Kumi, 
Kapchorwa, Rukungiri, Moyo, Sembabule, Katakwi, Sironko. In that case, the figures 
represent the population of the main urban area in the district. Also, as it was pointed out 
earlier, most of the towns’ population fall far below the stipulated number required them to 
be gazetted as urban councils. So, most of the urban authorities have been created 
administratively by statutory instruments issued by the Minister of Local Governments 
under the Local Governments Act (section 8 (3) which stipulates;  
Subject to the Town and Country Planning Act, the Minister may, in 
consultation with the District with approval of Cabinet after satisfying 
himself or herself that the requirements under paragraph 32 of the Third 
Schedule are met, declare an area to be a town.   
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Owing to the fact that most of the towns have been created for political and administrative 
convenience most of them do not have the basic, essential facilities that one would 
ordinarily expect in a town. For example, most rural – based towns like Kanungu, Ajumani, 
Nakapiripit and others do not have electricity supply. Just because they happen to be 
headquarters for the districts, they were gazetted as towns. The buildings in most of these 
towns hardly have approved plans. For some of these towns, the populations happen to be 
too small to be able to raise local revenue that could provide and sustain delivery of services 
such as water, roads, garbage collection, public health and education. They are, in reality 
part of the rural setting. The motivation for the local leaders to demand that some areas be 
gazetted as urban areas is sometimes due to their desire that once gazetted; the central 
government will have to finance them so that they can deliver a minimum level of services. 
The rural elites feel that the creation of such a town in their area brings a market for their 
rural products. Logically also, the upgrading of rural built centres into towns leads to 
appreciation in value of buildings, forces the government to provide money for basic 
services such as safe drinking water, providing public health workers for the area, electricity 
and other amenities. 
 
Uganda’s urbanisation process is rather haphazard. First the country has no clear urban 
policy. Secondly, the Town and Country Planning Board is largely dormant. Thirdly, the 
country suffers a critical shortage of qualified physical planners513. Ironically, the few 
physical planners available in the country are largely unemployed partly because most of the 
towns are financially constrained to employ them. 
 
Similarly, surveyors and valuers who are available in the country are either in private 
practice or unemployed for the same reason, above. The net effect of the failure by the 
government and the urban authorities to employ and utilise qualified technical personnel in 
urban affairs has led to urban areas being administered like rural village areas in Uganda, 
where if a person wishes to erect a structure on his piece of land, one simply picks building 
materials and erects one. This type of urban “development” needs to be brought into the 
                                            
513 Until about seven years ago when Makerere University introduced courses in urban planning, there was no 
single institution in the country offering such courses. Up to now most urban areas have no physical planners. 
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focus of the government because as the population of these centres grows without proper 
planning, the lives of the people will continue to be at risk. Waterborne diseases, diseases 
spread by vermin, unhygienic dwellings and filthy environment will continue to affect the 
health of the people. As the urban population grows, there is need for government to come 
up with policies to deal with the situation. This is particularly important for the ever 
emerging so – called “trailer” towns514. These develop spontaneously along the highways 
without any form of planning. There are no proper streets, some buildings are built on places 
where the bigger structures would have had their pit latrines. In some cases, buildings are 
facing in different directions. As such, most buildings are established without any form of 
sanitary disposal515. For example, in Rukungiri town, it was reported that out of the existing 
3014 structures only 1422 have any form of sanitation. The remaining 1592 have no 
sanitation facility, which means that the users of these buildings either use the verandas, 
plastic bags or use any available bushes for sanitary disposal516. Thus, in Uganda the 
definition of a slum as an overcrowded, unplanned and poorer section of an urban area needs 
to be extended to mean almost every part of most of the towns. This is the reality, for most 
towns that sprung up mostly in the 1970s, none of them has any central sewer system. 
 
The above sanitary conditions, combined with the absence of proper infrastructure such as 
properly marked streets, access roads, medical clinics, schools and proper waste disposal 
leave the lives of the inhabitants of these towns not only at the risk of infectious diseases but 
also, to bear the inconvenience of blocked drains, flooded compounds and houses, nasty 
smells from rotting solid waste and the irritating sight of flies and other insects (from 
garbage heaps) hovering over their meals and drinks. Cases of cholera, dysentery, other 
abdominal diseases and malaria are too frequent in Uganda. While it is assumed that the 
urban areas should be cleaner than the rural areas, to the contrary, cholera is more recurrent 
in urban areas including Kampala city, than in the rural areas517. This is a clear indication of 
the gravity of the risky health environment in urban areas. Malaria which is easily spread by 
                                            
514 The term “trailer” town is associated with towns that spring up as a result of trailers or heavy carriage 
vehicles parking in a place overnight on their long distance journeys. 
515 Augustus Nuwagaba, Urbanisation and Sustainable Human Settlement: The case of Uganda “at 
www.gruppo-cerfe.org\pdf\nuwagaba 
516 This was revealed by the Town Clerk of Rukungiri town on 29th October, 2004 to the Orumuri newspaper 
reporter. See Orumuri 9 November 2004 
517 KCC has a permanent quarantine compound for cholera cases at Old Mulago hospital. 
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mosquitoes from unattended bushes and blocked drains is the biggest killer disease in 
Uganda. Available data shows that most of the piped water connections by 2000 were 
largely in Kampala, Jinja and Entebbe. The rest of other towns suffer from lack of safe 
drinking water .The table below demonstrate the gravity of this problem.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 10: Showing Current Size and Structure of Urban Water Market in the Year 
2000 
 KEJ 1 Large Towns 2 Small Towns 3 Urban Sector 
Grouping Towns 7 26 45 78 
Population 1, 610, 000 
55% 
980, 000 
33% 
340, 000 
12% 
2, 930,000 
100% 
Water Connections 29,200 
63% 
15,800 
34% 
1400 
3% 
46, 400 
100% 
Sewer Connections 100, 00 
72% 
3800 
28% 
0 
0% 
13,800 
100% 
Water sales in cubic 
mill metres 
19 mill m 3 4 mill m 3 0, 3 mill m 3 23, 3 mill m3 
Revenue in mill US 13 
81% 
2, 8 
18% 
0, 1 
1% 
16 
100% 
Source: Uganda Urban Water Sector Reform Study June 2000 
Notes:  
1. KEJ = Kampala, Entebbe, Jinja, Njeru, Kajansi, Mukono and Seeta 
2. Large towns = towns with population exceeding 15, 000 excluding KEJ 
3. Small towns = all towns with population of 5000 – 15, 000 and including smaller gazetted 
towns. 
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The figures above indicate that the coverage of safe piped water is small (46,400) 
connections throughout all urban areas, whose population was estimated by 2000 to be 2, 
930,000518. Worse still, the sanitation problem is alarming in Uganda’s urban areas. The 
table above indicates zero connection to the sewer system for all small towns, which means 
that sanitation facilities are a matter of improvisation by the residents in those towns. 
 
Nevertheless the National Water Sewerage Corporation (NWSC) which is the main provider 
of water and sewerage facilities has extended its services in the recent times from its original 
nine major towns of Kampala, Jinja, Entebbe, Mbale, Tororo, Masaka, Mbarara, Lira and 
Gulu to include more towns since 1996519. Much of this expansion has been donor funded. 
For example, the expansion of water works under Gaba III Project to produce more 80, 000 
cubic meters of water was funded by donors at a cost of US dollars 16, 5 million, extension 
of water services in Entebbe town cost Euros 16, 25 million and similar works were funded 
for Jinja and Njeru towns. According to NWSC report, most of Kampala’s peri – urban areas 
now receive piped water. These include; Bunamwaya, Kireka, Seeta, Seguku, Lubowa, 
Nansana, Gayaza, Nnabingo and Buddo. NWSC asserts that if all the major capital works at 
Gaba III are completed, there will be enough water to meet Kampala’s needs520. 
 
Apart from NWSC, the management of water and sanitation in small towns in Uganda falls 
under three organisational settings: 
(i) The Ministry of Water, Lands and Environment is responsible for provision of water 
through its Department of Water Development (DWD). The DWD plans, develops, 
regulates and provides the water services. 
(ii) The Ministry of Local Government through local councils is responsible for water 
and sanitation in urban areas not served by NWSC. 
                                            
518 As indicated earlier, the urban population in Uganda was 3, 028, 809 according to the Population Census 
2002.The above figure was an estimated of the urban population by 2000. The above figures an estimate of the 
urban population by 2000 
519 NWSC is a corporation owned wholly by the central government. Its report indicates it has extended 
services to other urban areas of Kasese, Fort Portal, Kabale, Bushenyi, Soroti and Arua. It now serves 15 
towns. 
520 Uganda – Small Towns Water and Sanitation Project – Implementation Completion Report (World Bank 
Report No 27529) – Credit to the Republic of Uganda of 42, 3 million. Report date 19, December 2003. 
Accessed at http://www.w&s.worldbank.org/serv 
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(iii)   The Ministry of Health is responsible for policy guidance on environmental sanitation 
in both rural and urban sectors of the country521.  
 
Thus, although towns as local governments fall under the direct responsibility of the 
Ministry of Local Government, the latter does not have direct control over the supply and 
regulation of water resources. This could possibly explain the low level of participation in 
the World Bank supported project which was executed by the DWD. Under the World Bank 
supported Small Towns Water and Sanitation Project, the DWD supplied water and some 
sanitary services to eleven towns522. The water project was intended to address the problem 
of unsafe water sources from which the residents drew water such as boreholes, springs, 
rivers and open streams. The objectives of the project more broadly were: to reduce poverty, 
improve the health of the people and to encourage the demand – driven approach through 
people’s participation. But as the project review revealed, the last objective was not 
achieved due to the lack of capacity of the communities to participate. The report attributed 
this to lack of clarity in the role the community was supposed to play, the ambiguous nature 
of their responsibilities and potential conflicts due to the overlapping functions523. In other 
words, there is apparent lack of coordination amongst the service departments of the 
government when it comes to urban service provision. This does not affect the water sector 
alone. The other utilities such as electricity, telephones and highways lie outside the control 
of the urban local authorities in Uganda.                           
 
 
5.3 Trends in Uganda’s Urbanisation 
When the first reliable population census was done in Uganda in 1959, Uganda’s urban 
population vis – a vis the rural population was negligible. Of the total population was 6, 202, 
                                            
521 ibid, Uganda Urban Water Sector Reform Study, 2000 
522 The tons include: Busia, Kalisizo, Kyotera, Lugazi, Luwero, Lyantonde, Malaba, Ntungamo, Rakai, 
Rukungiri and Wobulenzi. 
523 Uganda – Small Towns Water and Sanitation Project – Implementation Completion Report (World Bank 
Report No 27529) – Credit to the Republic of Uganda of 42, 3 million. Report date 19, December 2003. 
Accessed at http://www.w&s.worldbank.org/serv 
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154 persons (96.2%) of this population lived in the rural areas, while the urban population 
was 247, 404 (3, 8).524 
                                            
524 Two issues need to be noted: (i) the figures exclude other races eg Indians and Europeans and (ii) the 
figures for African urban population are increased by inclusion into the definition of “urban” area of large 
chanks of peri – urban Kampala and Jinja towns. These peri – urban areas were still, largely rural areas of East 
Mengo in the case of Kampala (cf 76, 559 in the table above). We need to note further that although the 1959 
population census is the basis of modern statistics in Uganda, it was not the first census in the country. Other 
census had taken place in 1911, 1921, 1931 and 1948, but are said not to have been as systematic as that of 
1959 (cf. Uganda Census 1959, p 1).  
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Table 11: Showing the distribution of African Population of Towns and Trading Centres525 
1. Towns:(a) With 500 Africans or more -  
Kampala       . .  
Jinja            . .          . .  
Kabale         . .           . .  
Entebbe        . .          . .  
Mbale           . .          . .  
Lugazi          . .          . .  
Fort Portal    . .          . .  
Tororo          . .          . .  
Soroti            . .          . .  
Gulu             . .           . .  
Arua             . .          . .  
Kitgum         . .          . .  
Mbarara       . .          . .  
Masaka        . .           . .  
Lira              . .           . .  
Iganga          . .          . .  
Moyo            . .          . .  
Moroto         . .           . .  
Njeru                         . .        
Mubende                   . .  
Bundibugyo               . .   
Kasese         . .           . .  
Butiaba         . .          . .  
Masindi        .  .         . .   
Serere          . .           . .  
Kamuli         . .           . .  
Busembatia                . .  
Kumi            . .          . .  
Hoima          . .           . .  
Amuria        . .           . .   
Katakwi       . .          . .  
Kalisizo       . .          . .  
Kaliro          . .          . . 
Masindi Port 
(b)      Others 
Number 
 
 
 
 
 
24, 056 
19, 828 
10, 186 
  9, 087 
  8, 433 
  7, 744 
  7, 647 
  4, 818 
  4, 618 
  4, 043 
  3, 991 
  3, 242 
  2, 724 
  2, 457 
  2, 152 
  2, 048 
  1, 965 
  1, 931 
  1, 922 
  1, 741 
  1, 596 
  1, 510 
  1, 149 
  1, 135 
      967 
      963 
      951 
      783 
      706 
      656 
      577 
      571 
      547 
      520 
  7, 650 
2. Peri – Urban Areas: 
Kampala           . . 
Jinja . .              . .  
3.Trading Centres: 
(a)With 00 Africans or more - 
Rhino Camp       . .  
Katwe   . .          . .  
Pakwach            . .  
Pabbo   . .           . .  
Warr     . .          . .  
Bugaya . .          . .  
Kabasanda        . .  
Yumbe   . .         . . 
Kasawo  . .        . .  
Parombo            . .  
Kapeka  . .        . .  
Magora  . .        . .  
Kayunga           . . 
 
 
 
(b) Others …     
Number 
 
 
 
67, 781 
8, 778 
 
 
 
 
3, 457 
2, 048 
1, 426 
1, 223 
1, 060 
    988 
    868 
    850 
    802 
    664 
    593 
    540 
    507 
 
 
 
9, 841 
Source: Uganda Protectorate, Uganda Census 1959 African Population, 1961 p 91 
                                            
525 The population census 1959 (p 17) report notes that towns were a recent phenomenon in Uganda. They 
grew largely due to government activities and the growth of non – African economic activities and industry. 
This explains why the population was higher around Kampala, Jinja, Entebbe, Lugazi and Mbale. Apart from 
Entebbe which was the seat of government, these were emerging large commercial centres and Jinja was 
already established as an industrial town. 
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The emphasis placed on the 1959 census is because the subsequent censuses use it as the 
basis of demographic trends in Uganda 
 
Table 12: Showing Trends in the Growth of Urbanisation in Uganda 1969 to 1991 
No of Urban Centres with (1000) 1969 1980 1991 
Above 500 
100 – 499 
  50 – 100 
  10 – 20 
    5 – 10 
    2 – 5 
0 
1 
0 
6 
8 
10 
0 
1 
0 
4 
10 
26 
1 
0 
2 
14 
26 
36 
Total No of Urban Centres with population of 2000+ 28 48 92 
Source: Uganda National Report and Plan of Action (Habitat II) August 1995 
 
The growth in the number of urban centres seems to explain the growth in the urban 
population during the same period (see the table below). 
 
Table 13: Showing Trends of Urban Growth in the biggest Towns (1969 – 1991) 
Rank Urban 
Area 
Status 1969 1980 1991 1969 - 
1980 
1980 – 
1991 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
Kampala 
Jinja 
Mbale 
Masaka 
Entebbe 
Mbarara 
Soroti 
Gulu 
FortPorta  
Kabale 
Lira 
Tororo 
Arua 
Kasese 
Busia 
Mityana 
Iganga 
Lugazi 
Njeru 
Municipality 
Municipality 
Municipality 
Municipality 
Municipality 
Municipality 
Municipality 
Municipality 
Municipality 
Municipality 
Municipality 
Municipality 
Municipality 
Municipality 
Town 
Town 
Town 
Town 
Town 
330700 
47, 872 
23544 
12987 
21096 
16928 
12398 
18170 
7147 
8236 
7340 
15977 
10837 
7431 
1146 
2263 
5958 
N/A 
4637 
448503 
45060 
28039 
21123 
21289 
23253 
15048 
14958 
26806 
21469 
9122 
16707 
9663 
9917 
8663 
2547 
9899 
10439 
3880 
774241 
60979 
53987 
49585 
42763 
40970 
40070 
38291 
32789 
29246 
27568 
26783 
22217 
18750 
27467 
22215 
19740 
18828 
36731 
3, 14 
-0, 58 
1, 68 
7, 7 
0, 09 
3, 55 
1, 86 
-1, 86 
11, 69 
9, 21 
2, 09 
0, 43 
-1, 1 
3, 06 
19, 45 
1, 14 
4, 88 
- 
-71 
4, 7 
3, 35 
5, 96 
8, 89 
6. 36 
5, 16 
9, 11 
8, 55 
1, 83 
2, 81 
10, 05 
4, 29 
7, 57 
5, 79 
10, 65 
19, 84 
6, 27 
5, 53 
20, 43 
Source: National Housing and Population Census (MFPED) 1995 P 47 
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As the demographic trends show from the table above, the urban centres grew very slowly 
during the period 1969 – 91. This is largely explained by Amin’s expulsion of Indians in 
1972 (who owned most of the commercial enterprises), the insecurity that engulfed the 
country and the collapse of the industrial sector. It is not surprising, for example, that the 
industrial town of Jinja registered negative (-0, 58%) growth. In the northern part of the 
country, towns of Gulu and Arua could have registered negative growth during the same 
period due to the insecurity factor526. On the other hand, the border (or near border) towns of 
Busia, Kabale, Fort Portal, Masaka and Iganga experienced momentous growth during that 
period. This growth could be attributed to the “magendo economy” (illicit, or black - market 
trade) that became synonymous with the Amin’s regime and the border towns. Otherwise, 
most other towns experienced slow growth during that period. 
 
The period 1980 – 1991 shows steady urban growth. This is largely because the economy had 
begun to pick in the first half of the 1980s and at the beginning of the 1990s (when the census 
was done)527. It is noteworthy that I have not included a discussion of the urban demographic 
trends in 1991 – 2002 because data available is not clearly disaggregated for clear analysis. 
However it is important to note that the trends show that between 1980 and 2002 the urban 
population more than tripled, that is from about 940, 000 persons in 1980 to 3, 028, 809 in 
2002. This trends confirms the estimates contained in the report of the Uganda Population 
Secretariat528, which projects that by the year 2025 about 18, 6 million will be living in urban 
areas, warning that an increase of that proportion would worsen the already poor living 
conditions in Uganda’s urban areas. This will require careful planning since Uganda’s 
population of below 15 years constitutes 52% of the population. 
 
                                            
526 During Idi Amin’s regime ,there was systemic witch-hunting of soldiers who hailed from Acholi and Lango 
.Then ,during the liberation war of 1979 and thereafter ,West Nile region was a target for Uganda National 
Liberation Army ( UNLA) which caused many people to flee to Sudan .For detail , see Paul Omach, opcit .2004.   
527 See, World Bank,  Uganda: Country Economic Compendusm World Bank Washington DC, 1982, p 75 
indicates that by 1980 almost 40% of industries had ceased operations. The operating ones were at 20% of their 
capacities. The industrial sector had been beset by shortage of foreign exchange, lack of competent managers 
and sheer neglect. See USAID, Country Program Strategic Plan: Uganda 1992 – 1996 Vols. 1 & 2 p 13 (vol. 1) 
indicating that there was a  promise towards industrial recovery as more foreign exchange became available and 
the commitment of government towards more private ownership of industries rather than the predominantly 
public ownership  of the 1970s and 1980s. 
528 See, Republic of Uganda (Population Secretariat), Uganda: Population, Reproductive Health and 
Development Kampala, 2001. 
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5.4 Living conditions in Uganda’s Urban Areas 
Living conditions in most of Uganda’s household can be described as poor, whether rural or 
urban. Although several studies describe the rural areas to be worse off than the urban areas, 
the conditions in the latter are not enviable at all. The conditions of living in most urban areas 
are the central concern of this study. A broad description of the countrywide conditions of 
living is done here before dealing with the specific situation of the urban sector (See the table 
below). 
Table 14: Showing Distribution of Households by Housing Characteristics 2000 – 2001 
   Residence 
Housing characteristics                                Urban       Rural    Total 
Electricity    
Yes 43.9 2.4 8.6 
No 56.0 97.3 91.2 
Missing 0.1 0.3 0.3 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source of Drinking Water       
Piped into dwelling  5.1 0.1 0.9 
Piped into yard/plot 7.0 0.1 1.1 
Public tap 51.2 1.5 8.9 
Open well in yard/plot 0.1 0.0 0.0 
Open Public well 6.8 28.3 25.1 
Protected well in yard/plot 0.2 0.1 0.1 
Protected Public well 10.9 17.0 16.1 
Borehole in yard/plot 0.2 0.2 0.2 
Public borehole 13.6 26.4 24.5 
Spring 1.3 9.4 8.2 
River, stream 0.3 8.8 7.5 
Pond, Lake 0.6 5.3 4.6 
Dam 0.2 1.6 1.4 
Rain water 0.4 0.4 0.4 
Tanker truck 0.1 0.0 0.0 
Bottled water 0.7 0.0 0.1 
Gravity flow scheme 0.0 0.6 0.5 
Other 1.4 0.2 0.4 
Missing 0.1 0.2 0.2 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Time to Water Source       
Percentage <15 minutes 62.7 15.4 22.5 
Midian to water source 9.2 29.9 29.6 
Sanitation Facility       
Flash toilet 9.1 0.5 1.7 
Traditional Pit toilet 79.9 78.3 78.5 
Ventilated Improved Pit Latrine  7.9 1.1 2.1 
No facility, bush, field 2.7 19.1 16.7 
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   Residence 
Housing characteristics                                Urban       Rural    Total 
Other 0.2 0.8 0.7 
Missing 0.1 0.2 0.2 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Flooring Material       
Earth, Sand 19.3 59.9 53.8 
Dung 7.1 3.0 26.6 
Parquet or polished wood 0.6 0.1 0.2 
Vinyl, asphalt strips 24.7 3.5 6.6 
Ceramic tiles 0.4 0.0 0.1 
Cement 47.8 6.4 12.5 
Other 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Total 100.0 100,0 100.0 
Number 1,174 6,711 7,885 
Source: Uganda Bureau of Statistics, Uganda: Demographic and Heath Survey Entebbe, 
2001. 
 
From the table above, only a negligible number of Ugandans living in rural areas have access 
to piped water (1.7%). The main source of water for rural households is open wells, protected 
springs and boreholes. In the urban areas, although access to piped water has reached 63%529, 
only 5% of urban households have running water in their homes. This has serious 
implications for the kind of sanitation that the majority of Ugandans have. By about 58% in 
urban areas drawing water from a standpipe, this has definite advantage of securing safer 
drinking water. Still, a good 37% of urban dwellers draw water from unsafe and probably 
contaminated sources. This, however, is a significant improvement when compared to the 
situation in the 1970s and 1980s when piped water in the most urban areas was either 
unavailable or rationed eg in the case of Kampala. In Kampala for example, most of the peri 
– urban residents such as Kawempe, Bunanwaya, Namungona, Kireka, Namugongo, 
Kiwatule, Kisasi, Busega etc had no connections to the piped water system until 1999 - 
2000530. 
 
Since most of the homes in Uganda do not have access to piped water, sanitation remains a 
big problem both in the rural and urban areas. This ugly situation is captured by The 
Demographic and Health Survey Report (2001) which notes: 
                                            
529 See National Water & Sewerage Corporation report (2004) 
530 These are Peri – urban areas within a radius of 5 miles and below from the city centre. 
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Households without proper toilet facilities are more exposed to the risk of 
diseases like dysentery, diarrhoea, and typhoid fever. Most households (79 
percent) in Uganda use traditional pit latrines, this is true in both rural and 
urban areas. Flush toilets, as well as ventilated improved pit (VIP) latrines 
are less common in rural areas than in urban areas. Overall, one in six 
households in Uganda has no toilet facilities of any kind531.  
 
Indeed, although the problem of toilet facilities is more acute in rural areas it is equally a 
serious problem in the urban areas, for example, only 9.1% of all urban households have 
flush toilets, 79.9 have pit latrines while about 3% have no any kind of toilet facility at all. In 
Kampala, the households without any form of toilet are as high as 6, 4%. The residents use 
polythene bags (commonly known as buveera) and drainage channels for disposal of their 
waste532. 
 
The housing sector in Uganda also remains poor. In the rural areas, the vast majority (93%) 
of houses are temporary with floors made of earth, with only 7% having cemented floors. In 
Uganda’s urban areas the situation is better but still unenviable. While 66% of urban homes 
have cemented floors, 33% of them are made of earth. The poor state of housing in the 
country contributes significantly to the poor health conditions of the people. Overcrowding 
especially in urban slum areas is a key source of health hazards. The Ministry of Works, 
Housing and Communications (MWHC) in its recent ministerial statement pointed to this 
problem thus: 
. . . poor housing, especially, crowded and not properly constructed 
housing contributes to the incidence of diseases, especially respiratory 
infections which were rated as number two cause of morbidity in 
Uganda533. (emphasis added) 
 
The Ministry of Works further notes that such housing tends to be located in places with poor 
drainage and which are bushy. Poor drainage systems and bushy neighbourhoods are 
                                            
531 UBOS, Uganda: Demographic and Health Survey Report, Entebbe, 2001, (p. 16). 
532 See The Monitor, March 18, 2005, which quotes the Kampala Health Inspector Dr. Mohamed Kirumira who 
reported that there had been a reduction in households without any form toilet facilities from 10% to 6, 4% over 
the last five years. However, about 100, 000 families in the slums of Kampala still had no any form of toilet 
facility. 
533 Ministry of Works, Housing and Communications, Budget Framework Paper Financial Year 2004/05 – 
2006/7 p. 36. 
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breeding grounds for mosquitoes, which are responsible for spreading malaria that is the 
number one killer disease in Uganda534. 
 
Although the MWHC is responsible for the housing policy, it is not responsible for direct 
provision of housing in the country. Much of the housing is privately provided either by 
private companies, owner – built, community or by the government owned parastatal 
company – the National Housing and Construction Corporation. The latter builds houses and 
sells them to private home buyers535. Under the policy of decentralisation, the local 
governments are responsible for planning and implementation of housing programmes and 
activities within their areas of jurisdiction. However, due to the historical as well as 
contemporary constraints at the district or municipal levels, which include inadequate 
financial resources, human resources, planning capacity and other administrative capacities, 
there has been no effective guidance and control of housing development. As a result, slums 
have mushroomed in every urban settlement. These are largely unplanned housing units, built 
with poor materials, without approved plans, and without proper sanitation facilities. This 
situation should not be blamed solely on private developers. The urban authorities have failed 
in their responsibility to plan, zone and service land within the areas of jurisdiction to direct 
the course of investment and development. At the same time, private developers tend to place 
houses at any available land without following proper planning procedures that may have 
been laid down by the urban authorities. The consequence of this kind of haphazard 
development is the sprawling slums all over most of the urban areas in Uganda. 
 
In its National Plan of Action for Human Settlements Development, the MWHC has 
identified the following programmes for improvement of urban settlements: -replication of 
low cost housing schemes, slum upgrading in all urban areas, development of appropriate 
housing finance initiatives for all income groups and development of sites and service 
schemes in all urban areas536. Such programmes, the Plan reveals, will be tenable through the 
government’s effort to eradicate poverty, create jobs, increase access to serviced land and 
integration of environmental infrastructure and services. Moreover, the MWHC states that the 
                                            
534 Ministry of Works, ibid. p. 38 
535 Houses constructed by National Housing and Construction Corporation tend to target middle class or higher 
class, and not the poor. Their houses are generally more expensive, except that they are usually set in a planned 
environment. 
536 MWHC, ibid p 39. 
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“policy objective of government is to directly support the improvement of the living 
conditions of the people living in slums and informal settlements.”537 
 
The government’s programme of action on settlements appears promising but tangible results 
are yet to be seen. The table below shows the housing characteristics in Uganda. 
 
Table 15: Showing Distribution of Dwelling Type by Locality, 1995/1996 
Type of House Urban Rural 
Independent House 
Tenement (muzigo) 
Huts 
Others 
37 
51 
3 
9 
71 
5 
22 
1 
 100 100 
Figures may not add up to 100 due to rounding off errors. 
Source: Uganda National Household Survey 1995/96 Report,(Ministry of Finance, Planning 
& Economic Development) Entebbe, 1998. 
 
The percentage of rural house ownership is higher (71%) because most of the rural houses are 
built with simple and cheap materials. The low level of urban house ownership 37% indicates 
the levels of income and poverty amongst the urban dwellers, most of whom (51%) stay in 
mainly single room tenements (in Uganda, they are known as “muzigo”). This added to the 
3% who dwell in huts and the 9% in dwellings of no specific description shows the extent of 
urban poverty and deprivation in Uganda. Most of the unemployed or under–employed urban 
dwellers find such tenements affordable relative to their incomes. It is not uncommon to find 
two to five, or more unemployed persons living in a single room of 10ft by 10ft, usually 
without water supply, electricity and toilet facilities, whereby such people especially the 
youth, pull together to contribute for the rental cost of such a room.538 This is common 
amongst the hawkers, car–washers, wheel–barrow pushers water vendors, evening markets 
vendors, prostitutes, shoe cleaners, “boda–boda” cyclists, etc.  
 
The problem of housing in Uganda’s urban sector is compounded by the fact that the projects 
of low–cost housing schemes, which would cater for the housing needs of the poor sections 
                                            
537 MWHC, ibid p 40. 
538 See Augustus Nuwagaba “Urbanisation and Sustainable Human Settlements: The Case of Uganda” 
www.gruppo-cerfe.org/pdf/nuwagaba about 56% of Kampala residents live and share a room (average 4 – 6 
persons). 
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of the urban society, who are the majority, are inadequate. The attempt by the government of 
Uganda to implement a low – cost housing scheme was done in the early 1990s at 
Namwongo, in Kampala at a cost of US dollars 4.2 million funded by United Nations Centre 
for Human Settlements (UNCHS), Shelter Afrique and the Uganda government. This was 
intended to construct 500 houses for the poor who were living in one of the worst slums at 
Namwongo. However, the Namwongo project disadvantaged the poor further. The rich 
people as well as Senior Civil Servants in Kampala used their influence in KCC, secured the 
grant money, bought off the poor from their plots of land and constructed executive houses. 
The result was that the poor people created another their little income slum in the swampy 
area in the neighbourhood of Namwongo539. 
 
The problem of appropriate housing in Uganda is further exacerbated by two critical factors: 
these are the land tenure and the financial credit system. The Constitution of Uganda vests all 
the land in the people of Uganda. Article 237 of the Constitution states: 
Land in Uganda belongs to the citizens of Uganda and shall vest in them in 
accordance with the land tenure system provided for in this Constitution. 
 
The Constitution, Article 237 (3) prescribes four systems of land tenure: (a) customary, (b) 
freehold, (c) mailo (mile land) and (d) leasehold. Under these land tenure systems, the 
security of bonafide occupants of the land is guaranteed by the Constitution. Whereas, the 
tenure system guarantees the rights of citizens and entrenches their private interests in the 
land, there is one dimension that has been left unattended; this is the role of urban authorities 
in the matters of planning. Article 237 (7) provides that Parliament shall make laws to enable 
urban authorities to enforce and implement planning and development. Such laws are not in 
place. This has complicated the task of planning development in all urban areas. For example, 
in Kampala, most of the land belongs to “mailo” landowners, 45 percent. This makes 
planning difficult on the part of the city authorities. 
 
 
                                            
539 Since the Namwongo “fiasco”, no other such project has been developed by either the central or the urban 
local authorities. The new slum area near Namwongo is known as “Soweto”, a worse slum than Namwongo 
was. See also Frederick Temple and Nelle Temple “The Politics of Public Housing Nairobi” in Merile. S. 
Grindle, Politics and Policy Implementation in the Third World Princeton University Press, New Jersey 1988. 
These authors found that a similar low – cost housing scheme in Nairobi was taken over by the middle and 
upper income groups. 
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Table 16: Showing Land Distribution in Kampala 
   Agent % 
Uganda Land Commission 
Kampala City Council 
Freehold 
Kabaka 
Mailo 
10 
15 
3 
27 
45 
Total 100 
Source: Kampala Urban Study 1994 
 
The table above demonstrates the dilemma of KCC authorities in managing developments on 
land that they do not own. In Kampala, particularly traditional mailo landowners have been 
intransigent towards the policies of the city authorities. These landlords sell land, as and 
when they wish, in very small bits, leading to erection of over–crowded, unplanned and 
unserviced housing establishments. Other landlords simply do not want to sell the land, even 
if they have no capacity to develop land, sometimes located in prime areas. They simply turn 
the land to subsistence agricultural use sometimes in the heartland of the urban area. Such 
uncoordinated development has contributed significantly to the ever-increasing slums in 
Uganda’s urban areas. 
 
The other factor that has undermined the establishment of proper housing in Uganda is lack 
of housing finance. Most commercial banks in Uganda prefer to lend out monies on short 
term rather than long-term investment basis. They also charge high interest rates currently 
standing between 18 to 25 percent per annum. With these kinds of interest rates very few 
people do dare to borrow for long term investment such as housing. The state–owned 
Housing Finance Company gives out loans especially for buying houses. This one too, 
charges high interest rates of about 10% per annum. Moreover, for Housing Finance 
Company to advance a housing loan, the prospective borrower must possess a land title, an 
approved building plan, bills of quantities, etc. These processes have high costs attached to 
them, which most ordinary developers are unwilling or unable to bear or would avoid if they 
could. The bank (Housing Finance) also has lengthy procedures that a prospective borrower 
has to follow.   Besides there are allegations by some borrowers that bank managers demand 
kickbacks before processing and releasing loans. As a result, many poor people have to do 
with the over–crowded tenements or putting up illegal and unplanned structures. 
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Overall, in most urban areas the majority of the people live in unhealthy and squalid 
conditions. Such conditions continue unabated despite the clarity of law regarding public 
health. For example, the law gives powers to local authorities in respect of ensuring public 
health thus: 
It shall be the duty of every local authority to take all lawful, necessary and 
reasonably practicable measures for preventing or causing to be prevented 
or remedied all conditions liable to be injurious or dangerous to health 
arising from erection of dwellings or premises on unhealthy sites or sites of 
insufficient extent or from overcrowding, or from the construction, 
conditions or manner of use of any factory or trade premises, and to take 
proceedings under the law or rules in force in its area against any person 
causing or responsible for continuance of any such condition.540 
 
Whereas The Public Health Act empowers the local authorities to prevent erection of 
buildings unsuitable for human habitation, the urban authorities have not been successful in 
this respect. It is now generally believed by many prospective land developers that once a 
building has been erected (with or without an approved plan) the urban authorities would find 
it difficult to demolish it. This belief is reinforced by the corrupt tendencies on the part of 
some law enforcement agents of local authorities. Otherwise, The Public Health Act sections 
72 and 73 grant authority to local authorities to demolish buildings constructed without 
approval of the local authority. Illegal buildings however, are politically condoned by both 
lower councils and councillors at higher levels of local authorities for the sake of populist 
votes541. 
 
Inadequate service delivery and failure to enforce regulations can not all be blamed on the 
failures of urban authorities. Several other factors have greatly contributed to the sorry state 
of services in Uganda’s urban sector. First, local authorities are operating against the 
background of the many years of economic decline in the country which affected both rural 
and urban populations. Secondly, the failure by the central government to adequately fund 
local authorities. Thirdly, the local authorities are conscious that they are dealing with vast 
majorities of people who are highly impoverished. Fourthly, some of the public services lie 
                                            
540 The Public Health Act (Cap. 269, Laws of Uganda) Section 58. See also The Monitor March 6, 2000, The 
Mayor of Kampala said most of the buildings had no approved plans. 
541 Lower Local Councils (LCs) especially LC1 members have tended to resist the Law Enforcement agents 
urban of councils, especially when attempting to demolish illegal buildings in their area. 
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with other bodies (public and private) over which the urban authorities have no control. For 
example, Uganda Electricity Board (UEB) now privatised to Umeme Company is responsible 
for electricity supply throughout the country. The inadequacy of electric power whose supply 
currently stands at 44 percent in urban areas and 2. 4 percent in rural areas can not be blamed 
on local authorities. Electric power supply is not only inadequate, there is constant rationing 
(or load shedding), its cost is prohibitive and discourages the poor from getting connected to 
it. As Shs. 420 per unit consumed, which on average for a two–roomed home comes to about 
Shs 40, 000 – 60, 000 per month, in a country where 38 percent (9, 2 million of the 26, 8 
million Ugandans in 2005) of the people live on less than one US dollar per day, that cost of 
electric power leaves most of the poor and even some so–called middle class people with 
limited options, but to seek for alternative sources of energy, including candles, paraffin (tin 
lamp) – for lighting homes at night, charcoal and firewood for cooking food. These 
alternatives are certainly destructive to the environment and are health hazards to the people 
using them542. 
 
Finally on this section of the chapter, a discussion must be made of the nuisance of garbage 
(solid waste) in Uganda’s urban areas. This is one critical area where urban authorities have 
registered the worst score in their performance. Heaps of uncollected garbage constitutes 
what the Public Health Act describes as “nuisance”. In Uganda’s urban areas, this is indeed a 
nuisance everywhere. Although the Public Health Act obliges “every local authority to take 
all lawful, necessary and reasonable practicable measures for preventing occurrence of, or for 
dealing with any outbreak or prevalence of, any infections, communicable or preventable 
disease, to safeguard and promote the public health . . .”, this function of urban authorities 
has posed a key challenge to them543. It has been suggested that most of the towns lack the 
financial resources and equipment to collect all the solid waste produced in Uganda’s urban 
areas544. The large amount of solid waste in Uganda’s urban areas is also attributed to the 
nature of food consumed in the country, which is largely green bananas (matooke), cassava, 
                                            
542 See New Vision, March 24, 2005 report of Uganda Bureau of Statistics, which indicates that 75 percent of 
Uganda households use Kerosene candles (tadooba) to light houses, and 97 percent of them use firewood to 
cook meals. 
543 In 1998 local councils election the Mayor of Kampala Christopher lga was voted out on grounds that the city 
was littered with garbage. He was referred to as “cholera” or Kasasiro, due to the cholera out break at the time in 
the city. The Mayor of Mbarara municipality Robert Rutehenda was also called Kasasiro (garbage) and voted 
out in 2001. 
544 See Gordon Mwesigye and Sabastian Bigirwenkya “Challenges of Urban Management in Uganda” Basic 
Principles of Decentralisation UMI, 2004 
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yams, potatoes, and fresh beans etc, all of which contribute significant amounts of solid 
vegetable waste. It is estimated that on average households produce 0, 8 kilograms per head 
of solid waste in Kampala545. This would infact, has not been a big problem if it were 
collected regularly and in time and perhaps recycled. By its nature, vegetable solid waste is 
easier disposed off, and left to decompose, unlike industrial waste, which needs sophisticated 
processes of recycling and management. At present, due to the low level of industrialisation, 
Uganda has not yet experienced serious problems of industrial waste disposal. Nonetheless, 
in most urban areas in Uganda, vegetable solid wastes are left to decompose at market places, 
hotel premises, road pavements, motor vehicle parks and residential premises. The solid 
waste skips are left uncollected, full of garbage for weeks overflowing by the roadside, 
swarmed by flies and vermin, releasing dangerous and stinking gases in the environment, 
accelerating the transmission of communicable diseases especially in areas occupied by the 
urban poor546. 
 
The problem of solid waste disposal extends beyond the places where it is produced and the 
collection of the garbage itself. It affects other areas, especially where it is finally dumped. 
For example Kampala City Council (KCC) dumps its solid waste at Kitezi in Wakiso district. 
This garbage is not treated but left to decompose naturally. The people of Kitezi have 
complained that the water sources in the area have been contaminated by the leakage of 
metalic and medical substances from the dump site. Kampala residents produce about 750 
tons of solid waste every day. This garbage is simply collected and dumped without being 
sorted. The consequences of such garbage dumping at Kitezi have been severely negative on 
the population there. The chairman LC III of the area has reported that recently, twenty heads 
of cattle died, and the fish farmers have complained that their stock is dying mysteriously547. 
 
In the final analysis service delivery in most urban areas remains inadequate and more 
seriously so in the smaller built up areas – trading centres, which do not receive any form 
                                            
545 See Philip Amins, Urban Management in Uganda: Survival Under Stress 
(unplushed research report). Birmingham Administration Group, University of Birmingham, 1992 
Amis found that 93% of the solid waste was of vegetable matter. 
546 See, Orumuri November, 11, 2000, where residents of Mbarara municipality were petitioning the new mayor 
over the return of garbage in a town that had seen improvement in cleanliness over the last four years. 
547 See the New Vision, March 7, 2005. The Chairman LC III Mr. Cephas Kasozi reportedly said “we have no 
where else to go but an irritating smell engulfs the area especially during the rainy season. As a result, the value 
of houses has gone down”. 
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central government or even district financial support. It is in such areas that the willingness of 
the people to provide some would be urban services to themselves is more evident than 
anywhere else. This is not to suggest that in bigger urban areas the situation is much better. A 
consultancy study carried out in Jinja municipality council conceded that it “seemed to be 
confused in that Jinja (was) a clean urban area yet the municipal SWM (solid waste 
management) system barely functioned. The answer is of course, the very high percentage of 
waste that households directly recycle548“. We should add, as our findings suggest in the next 
sections of this chapter will show, that in most of the urban areas where service deficits do 
exist, the people simply improvise. 
     
5.5 The State of KCC in the Provision of Services 
Kampala City Council (KCC) is the case study for this thesis. The choice of KCC as an 
organization was deliberate. Kampala City is a prime urban centre in Uganda – being the only 
one with a population of over 100, 000 people (its population being 1.208.544). It is the main 
industrial and commercial centre, as well as the capital city of Uganda. It is therefore, a 
relevant and appropriate place and organization to study. My view is that the ramification of 
policy initiatives and change in KCC have wider implications for the rest of the urban sector 
in Uganda. 
 
A brief history of Kampala reveals that, it is the oldest urban establishment in Uganda with a 
dual character (traditional and modern). It is originated from the pre - colonial establishment 
of the Kibuga and later the colonial fort and commercial centre549. Established at around 
1890, the colonial city of Kampala began and continued to grow through the century that was 
to follow and has entered another one. In 1906 Kampala became a planning area and was 
declared a township in 1913. On 1st January 1949, Kampala was upgrated to a municipality 
with appointment of 31 councillors and a mayor for the first time. 
 
Kampala received a charter as a city council in September 1962, a few days before Uganda 
was declared independent on 9th October 1962. During all this time Kampala had remained a 
smaller planning area comprising mainly the areas of old Kampala, Nakasero and Kololo. 
                                            
548 Philip Amis, ibid p 67. 
549 P. Gutkind,opcit, The Royal Capital of Buganda. Kibuga refers to the King (Kabaka) of Buganda’s royal 
capital which the colonial administrators found in existence at this site. The colonial office was moved to 
Entebbe in 1893 which acted as the capital of Uganda until independence in 1962. 
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The expansion into Greater Kampala occurred in 1968 when the Mengo Municipality, 
Nakawa Town Board and Kawempe Town Board were incorporated into its boundaries to 
expand the city. This expansion brought areas like Makerere, Lubaga, Namirembe, Mulago, 
Lungujja, Nateete, Ndeeba and Makindye into the city. Greater Kampala became a city of 80 
square miles550. Kampala today is approximately 238 square kilometres551. 
 
The present city of Kampala, apart from being a busy commercial and political capital, is 
unique in its set up, relative to other urban and rural local governments in Uganda, it is also a 
district552. It is divided into five divisions, namely: Central Division, Kawempe Division, 
Nakawa Makindye Division, and Lubaga Division553. Each Division has its own elected 
chairperson, its own council and administrative structure. However though the Divisions’ 
Councils are not subordinate to the Kampala City Council and have separate mandates by 
law, the administrative structure of the Divisional Councils are subordinate to the KCC 
administration in many respects. All the administrative personnel at the Divisions are 
appointed by the Kampala District Service Commission. They are posted and supervised by 
the Town Clerk of Kampala, who is the Chief Executive Officer of the whole city 
administration. In other words the Divisional Officers owe allegiance to two masters. On the 
one hand, they have to serve the council of the Division, which has the powers and the 
mandate over all the employees within its jurisdiction. On the other hand, they have to serve 
the higher authorities at the “centre” i.e. KCC, as the Divisional Officers call it. Nevertheless, 
in daily operational terms, each Division Council has its own budget, raises its own revenue 
and spends on the basis of its own decisions. The role of the ‘centre’ (KCC) is in the areas of 
policy coordination, human resource management, relations with the central government, 
relations with the foreign funders and streamlining management at all levels. 
 
Establishing the state of Kampala city and its administration, KCC requires careful analysis, 
which I attempt in this section of the chapter. I have utilized documentary review to capture 
some elements of its pre–decentralisation period. I have used the interviews conducted in 
Kampala with Local Councillors, KCC officials and other informed citizens to evaluate the 
                                            
550 See KCC, Kampala City Handbook, 2000 
551 ibid, KCC P 17 
552 All other municipalities and towns are located within rural districts. Kampala city is the only district that is 
urban. 
553 City Divisions have the  Status of municipalities under the Local Governments Act, 1997 (as amended in 
2004) 
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opinions that they have on the state of KCC, especially as regards its capacity and efficiency 
in delivering services. At the same time, I carried out a non–probability sample of three 
hundred (300) adult residents of Kampala, of whom two hundred and eight (208) filled 
questionnaires and returned them from October 2003 to April 2004. Although the sample was 
based on non–probability sampling method, it targeted areas that are “traditionally” less 
endowed with services. 
 
All the above listed areas, where the questionnaires were administered lie in the marginalized 
slumy suburbs of Kampala. These are areas where the majority of the city dwellers live and 
where services are critically needed. Although I observed some service deficiencies in the 
posh, rich people’s areas such as Nakasero, Kololo, Bugolobi, Mbuya and Upper Naguru, 
such deficiencies do not include lack of say, water or food in the homesteads. I thought that 
administering questionnaires in the latter areas would possibly reveal little in respect of 
improvement or absence of it, as a result of implementation of decentralisation in Kampala. 
Issues concerning both the better to do and the less endowed areas were captured through 
interviews with key informants, official reports and minutes of the local councils. 
 
5.6 A Retrospective Look at KCC 
There is no doubt that the design of this study was largely guided by Kampala’s recent 
history. The older residents of the city talk of “the glorious days when life was good554“. In 
the 1960s and early 1970s the city had a well maintained road system and reliable, clean 
running water, while solid waste was promptly collected and disposed of. In terms of 
administration, KCC was an efficient and effective organization. The KCC of those times 
was self – sufficient financially555. The council was supposed to be elected according to the 
Urban Authorities Act, 1964 but this was not the case. Then the Minister for Regional 
Administration issued a statutory instrument declaring that all the councillors be appointed by 
the Minister. The Mayor and the Deputy Mayor were also appointed and were ceremonial556. 
However these two people had to be persons of integrity and high social standing in society. 
For example, Mr. Walusimbi–Mpanga the Mayor of Kampala (1971 – 1982) was a wealthy 
                                            
554 This sentimental reference to Kampala was revealed to me by Mr. Charles Sempewo, former Senior 
Committee Clerk (KCC), 1966 – 1995 in an interview with him on May 10, 2004. This was in reference to a 
clean city, splash gardens, dancing halls and efficient administration of that time. 
555 Interview with Charles Sempewo, Mary 10, 2004. The main source of funding at that time was property rates 
and ground rent which the urban residents were willing to pay because services were also good 
556 Hon was Minister for Regional Administration during the 1960s (Interview with Charles Sempewo). 
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man, who if salaries for KCC workers delayed due to shortage of money in KCC, would 
guarantee in the bank and salaries would be paid. He would also donate all his sitting 
allowances to charities such as Sanyu Babies Home (a home for disadvantaged children). 
These councillors worked largely through committees and for this, they were not paid. It was 
a public services. They would only receive sitting allowances when they sat as a council557. 
 
The day–to–day administration of the city was under the Town Clerk, who was a civil servant 
(chief executive officer) of the city, appointed by the Public Service Commission. The Town 
Clerk was a senior civil servant. He was responsible to the council and the Minister for 
Regional Administration. It is understood that though the appointment of Town Clerk was 
through the Public Service Commission there was always some politicking for this important 
position558. This was done in part, to promote the interest of the ruling party, the Uganda 
Peoples Congress (UPC)559. Despite the political interests of the ruling party in the 
appointment of senior administrators, there was no compromise on the question of effective 
service delivery and accountability to the council. The council was the policy making body 
and administrators had the responsibility of implementing the policies, which they were able 
to do to the satisfaction of the council. It is however important to note that the services 
delivered by KCC in the 1960s and early 1970s were relatively satisfactory partly because of 
four factors: first the population of Kampala was relatively small. Secondly the size of 
Kampala city before 1968 was also smaller, covering mainly the central business district of 
Old Kampala, Nakasero, Kololo and the industrial area560. Thirdly, the areas that constituted 
the “original” Kampala was inhabited at that time, largely by the more affluent Indian 
business and working class and the European professionals, business persons and 
administrators. This class of people were able to pay their taxes and to exert influence over 
the KCC to deliver services. Fourthly, even for Africans living on the fringes of Kampala, 
opportunities for gainful employment existed with the numerous industrial and commercial 
                                            
557 ibid, interview Charles Sempewo. According to Sempewo, councillors would meet for committee work after 
5: 00pm on days they appointed themselves. 
558 ibid, interview with Charles Sempewo. Sempewo revealed to me that for example, the Town Clerk of 
Kampala 1964 – 1971 Mr Yoshua Kaduyu was former President Obote’s Schoolmate and friend. The Chief 
Medical Officer of Health, another important position in KCC was held by Dr. Gesa, a personal physician for 
President Obote. 
559 This was a convenient way of taking care of UPC since most of the people in Buganda region and Kampala 
tended to Support the Democratic Party (DP), the opposition party. 
560 Kampala’s size greatly increased when in 1968, the Mengo municipality (covering a large part of the present 
Lubaga Division), Nakawa and Kawempe Town Councils were incorporated part of the greater Kampala 
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concerns that were coming up561. Although these could not absorb all people that needed 
jobs, the situation was not hopeless. Moreover, as soon as the post – colonial government 
took the reign of the government, it increased the threshold of minimum wage across the 
board for all the workers562. The wage policy had the effect of attracting more people from 
rural areas to urban areas, especially Kampala. Thus, Kampala’s population grew rapidly in 
the 1960s. The table below demonstrates Kampala’s population trends. 
 
Table 17:  Showing Population Trends in Kampala 
Year 
1906 
1915 
1949 
1962 
1969 
1991 
2002 
Population 
35, 000 
42, 000 
61, 000 
201, 000 
330, 700 
774, 241 
1, 208, 544 
Source: Figures for earlier years i.e. 1906, 1915, 1949 and 1962 are estimates obtained from 
Kampala City Handbook (2000) p 20. The figures for the later years: 1969, 1991 
and 2002 are actual figures based censuses. 
 
The growth of Kampala’s population would not have been so much of a problem if the 
facilities and services had continued to grow to match its needs. The years of economic 
collapse and political instability (1970s and early 1980s) brought the city services to a mere 
shadow of its former self. (This was discussed in chapter 4 of this time). 
 
Through the 1970s and 1980s, Kampala city services came to a near standstill. Politically and 
administratively, accountability to the population was non–existent as military men took over 
as councillors, especially during Idi Amin’s regime. Moreover, due to the callousness of 
Amin’s regime, the population had no avenues of articulating their demands into the political 
                                            
561 See Republic of Uganda, Water for Progress: Uganda’s Second Five – Year Plan 1966 – 1971, (1966). The 
plan shows several planned and actual industrial and commercial concerns financed by both the government and 
the private sector. There was also a deliberate employment policy, encouraging Africans to enter formal 
employment (cf chapter 12 of the Plan). The Plan was not fully realized as it was interrupted by Amin’s Coup in 
1971. 
562 See Vali Jamal and John Weeks, Africa Misunderstood or Whatever Happened to the Rural –Urban Gap, 
(1993) p 37 discuss the trends of increment in wages since 1957 through to 1967. According to these authors, 
there were a buoyant wage increases over this period. This was to see a dramatic decline between 1972 and 
1980 (when a monthly wage could only fetch a week’s food for an average household). 
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system. The whole system of local government was militarized and the people lived in 
perpetual fear for their dear lives. 
 
Economically, Amin’s expulsion of business people of Indian origin in 1972 marked the 
beginning of Uganda’s economic woes. Basic needs of life such as salt, soap, sugar, etc 
became scarce and were rationed by the local officials. Only the politically–connected people 
could access sugar and other basic needs of life563. Indian business concerns, buildings and 
factories were allocated to Amin’s soldiers and political cronies, who had no experience in 
running such businesses. The new economic class came to be known as mafutaming564. This 
was a non–productive class, to the extent that it lived on rentals from buildings they did not 
erect and the one–time wholesale shops were turned into shops for selling bananas and 
second–hand clothes and other petty items. 
 
The return to civilian rule after the disputed elections of 1980, that brought back Milton 
Obote to power as president was unable to revitalize the system of local government to what 
it was in the 1960s. Kampala remained a ghost city – littered with garbage, roads and 
pavements remained unattended, water supply was eratic, streets     were unlit and KCC as an 
organization was perpetually broke. Moreover, the high levels of corruption in KCC were 
untamed. 
 
The consequences of economic decline and political instability on Kampala and KCC were a 
“fairy tale”. KCC’s capacity to deliver any meaningful services crippled over the years. The 
table below demonstrates this. 
 
                                            
563 opcit, Yoramu Barongo, “The De – Embourgoisement of the Ugandan society”. 
564 Mafutamingi meant a well –oiled ‘money’ class. This literally meant people who had “fallen into free 
things”. 
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Table 18: Showing KCC’s Position of the Engeneering Plant and Equipment, 1970 & 
1988 
 
PLANT TYPE No. (1970) No. (1988) 
Mobile air compressor 1 0 
Bitumen heating kettle 3 0 
Berber green mixer plant 1 0 
Bitumen sprayer 1 1 
Cesspool emptier 1 1 
Concrete mixer 8 0 
Tipping lorries 12 2 
Flat lorries 3 2 
Road rollers 8 2 
Vibrating rollers 8 2 
Water tank 1 1 
Water pump 3 0 
Tractors 5 7 
Mortuary van 1 0 
Refuse lorries 12 10 
Three – wheeled road roller 4 0 
Vans/pick – ups 8 1 
Trailer 1 0 
Cars 2 2 
Road burner 1 0 
Hand Mowers 118 5 
Traxcavator 1  
Towed mowers 18 3 
Platform lorry 1 0 
Compactor 2 2 
Grader 2 2 
Dozer 1 1 
TOTAL 227 44 
Source: KCC, Strategic Framework for Reform: A Way Forward (1997) 
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As the table above demonstrates, the City Engineer’s department, which is the main service 
sector in the city lacked most of the equipment necessary to deliver the much needed services 
in the city. By 1988, it had less plant and machine capacity than it possessed in the 1970s. It 
could not repair roads because it had no loader, bitumen heating kettle, no concrete mixer, 
and no road roller. While KCC had twelve refuse lorries in 1970, it had only ten in 1988. 
KCC could not effectively cut bushes around the city because while it had 118 grass mowers 
in 1970, it had only 5 remaining in 1988. Worst of all, it had no mortuary van. This sorry 
state of affairs in KCC by the end of 1980s was deeply frustrating to its residents. 
 
A combination of inadequate municipal services and wide-spread poverty affected the lives 
of most of the people viciously. Yet, because the situation of rural poverty was equally 
alarming, many people especially the youth were flocking the city in search of work, which 
was unavailable. Many youth including reasonably well educated ones ended up in all sorts 
of odd jobs such as car-washing, selling water in slums, trading in informal markets and 
hawking565. This led to a continued increase in Kampala’s population. According to KCC,  
It is this uncontrolled influx of people into the city that places a serious 
strain on KCC service delivery system’s ability to cope. Although it is a 
statutory responsibility for KCC to provide numerous services (eg clean 
water, sanitation, healthcare, garbage collection, road construction, 
electricity, schools, traffic control, recreation) an uncontrollable population 
explosion demand, there are no sufficient funds to finance them. The result 
is public discontent566.        
 
Since the 1950s when 160km of roads were constructed, Kampala’s tributary and feeder 
roads have remained the same, and 90 percent of them are in a bad condition due to the lack 
of repair567. With the increased population, there is need for new roads. The result is that the 
traffic jam at peak hours in Kampala is a nightmare for motorists568. Due to the financial 
problems KCC has been grappling with the problem of roads. Most of the roads in the 
suburbs of Kampala are seasonal roads. When it rains they are slippery, and when it is hot, 
the dust clouds Kampala. According to KCC, it has no funds to engage in heavy capital 
                                            
565 A friend I studied with at school, who completed Advanced Certificate of Education worked as hawker in 
early 1990s Owing to failure to break even and upon my advice he returned home. See Jossy Bibangamba 
“Macro – level Constraints and the Growth of the Informal Sector in Uganda” in Jonathan Baker and Paul Ove 
Pedersen (eds) The Rural – Urban Interface in Africa The Scundinavian Institute of African Studies, Uppsala, 
1992 
566 KCC, opcit, Kampala City Handbook 2000 p 20 
567 Ibid,p. 20 
568 67 ibid KCC p 21 
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investment such as roads. KCC estimates that a kilometre of bituminized road costs between 
US$200,000–250,000 without taking into account compensation for owners of land and 
property along which the road will pass569. 
 
Table 19:  Showing the Nature and Location of Roads in Kampala City 
Division Earth Roads in 
km 
Gravel Roads 
in km 
Bitumen 
Roads in km 
Total 
Km 
% 
Central 
Kawempe 
Makindye 
Nakawa 
Lubaga 
2, 265 
0 
14, 311 
6, 217 
9, 923 
5, 030 
39, 277 
58, 271 
84, 270 
89, 864 
136, 790 
9, 393 
27, 035 
57, 611 
46, 653 
144, 085 
48, 670 
99, 617 
148, 098 
146, 440 
24, 5 
8,3 
17, 0 
25, 2 
24, 9 
Others 0, 348 0 0 0, 348 0, 1 
Total 33, 064 276, 712 277, 482 587, 258 100 
% 5, 6 47, 1 47,3 100  
Source: Uganda First Urban Project, Institutional Development Component, Final 
Consultancy Report, 30 June 1995, p 67 
 
The problem of service delivery in KCC has not been limited to poor roads. Other sectors 
also suffered neglect. For example, although KCC is responsible for the provision of primary 
school education in the city, the last primary school was built in 1958 during the colonial 
times570. Thus, over the years, private schools had become the main sources of education 
service, for example, by 1997 there were 78 public primary schools. At the same time 
sanitation in these schools was deplorable as most of the schools had pit latrines that 
threatened the health of the pupils. Water-borne diseases in schools have been prevalent. 
KCC asserts that water–borne toilets are “too expensive571“. After the introduction of the 
universal primary education policy by the central government in 1997, KCC estimated that to 
accommodate all the children in primary schools, it needed 1013 more new classrooms to 
implement the new government’s policy572. 
 
Other service sectors in KCC declined over the years but the worst case in terms of municipal 
responsibilities was its lack of capacity to collect solid waste (garbage). Most of Kampala’s 
                                            
569 With a grant of 6 million United States dollars given by Japan Government some traffic lights at major 
junctions of Wandegeya, Natete, Nakawa and Bakuli have been installed. 
570 See KCC, Kampala City Position, September 1997 p. 18. However, between 1992 and 1997 it had built five 
new schools at Kyambogo, Kansanga, Kiwatule, Busega and Namirembe. 
571 ibid, p. 20 
572 ibid, p. 19 
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residents feed on matooke (green bananas) and other fresh foods. The matooke meal 
preparation leaves large amounts of peeling and the meal is also cooked in banana leaves. 
These contribute significantly to the amount of solid waste in the city. It is estimated that on 
the average, Kampala residents produce 1kg of solid waste per capita573. With the ever 
increasing population in the city, the challenge of waste management has been enormous. To 
grasp the extent of the problem, it is estimated that by 1991 KCC had the capacity to collect 
only 13% of the garbage in the city574. The table below demonstrates this. 
                                            
573 KCC, Strategy to Improve Solid Waste Management in Kampala City (2002) p. 3 
574 ibid, p. 3 
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Table 20:  Showing Waste Generation and Collection in Kampala 
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Disposal 
Method  
used 
1969 330, 700 8, 929 12 Unknown 7, 000 78% Unknown 
1980 458, 503 13, 755 10 Unknown Unknown Un 
known 
Open 
dumping 
1991 774, 241 26, 000 9 320 3, 500 13% Open 
dumping 
2002 1, 208,544 36, 256 20 500 14, 000 39% Sanitary 
land 
filling 
Source: KCC, Strategy to Improve Solid Waste Management in Kampala City (2002) p. 3 
 
From the table above, it is clear that Kampala has been and remains a dirty city. For example, 
while the city population had grown to about two and half between 1969 and 1991, the 
capacity of KCC to collect garbage in 1991 was half of what it was in 1969. While KCC 
presently collects 39% of the garbage, the rest of 61% remains littered all over the city. Even 
with 500 refuse containers scattered in, and around the city, these containers are a nuisance to 
the population where they are located. The most common sight is that containers overfill and 
over flow with rotting, uncollected garbage, attracting blow - flies, vermins, and the stench 
coming from them choking the travellers and households in its neighbourhood. Diarrhoea 
diseases are associated with this uncontrolled garbage very common in Kampala. 
 
The factors responsible for poor solid management in Kampala range from high vegetable 
matter estimated to be 73. 8% of all solid waste575, to poor methods of disposal at household 
level, and the failure by KCC to provide small rubbish bins at various points along the 
streets576. The problem of solid waste management in Kampala is attributed largely to the 
cost of collection and disposal which is estimated to be Shs. 10000 – 25.000 per ton. KCC 
estimates that even if the lower costs of Shs.10, 000 is used, it needs Shs. 363 million per 
month, which translate into about Shs 4.4 billion a year577. Given the financial constraints 
                                            
575 ibid, KCC, p. 4 
576 For a person walking on the streets of Kampala it is a practical problem to get where to responsibly deposit a 
used napkin because there are no rubbish bins. Hence, even for the main street where vegetable waste is less, 
paper and other disposables litter the streets. 
577 Opcit. KCC, p. 5 
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that KCC has been experiencing, this amount of money seems to be big. Thus, KCC sums the 
problem of solid waste management this way: 
Solid waste management is currently one of the most critical services, 
whose quality and coverage causes serious public outcry. The major 
bottleneck in the provision of solid waste management service is the lack of 
adequate resources. The level of service coverage is still inadequate with 
serious negative environmental consequences. In addition to public health 
and sanitation issues, the uncollected waste finds its way into the drainage 
system, which gets blocked leading to widespread flooding and damage to 
property and infrastructure578. 
 
This is a candid observation and analysis of the consequences of service failure in solid waste 
management. Most of Kampala’s outlying areas face serious drainage problems as well as 
floods whenever it rains heavily. This is partly due to unplanned settlements which have been 
erected by their owners haphazardly without proper drains. On the other hand, it is due to the 
uncollected heaps of solid waste which block the existing drainage systems where they 
happen to exist. 
 
Floods in Kampala are a constant hazard to its residents. In areas such as Nateete, Kalerwe, 
Kamwokya, Bwaise, Kajansi and Katwe, the residents of these slum areas live under terrible 
conditions whenever it rains heavily. The housing structures of such areas are largely semi-
permanent or temporary, mainly occupied by the poor, thus when the floods come, they 
destroy their small properties and put their lives at risk. It is well known that residents in 
these areas sometimes seek refuge at other people’s homes fearing that floods could sweep 
their homes and take their lives. In terms of hygiene, these areas are the worst hit in Kampala. 
The floods usually break down their temporary latrines, releasing the faeces into their flooded 
environment, which further puts their health at the mercy of all sorts of epidemics. This 
deplorable environmental situation affects the lives of Kampala people in all negative ways, 
but KCC seems helpless or unable to cope with this problem which has been persistent over 
the years579. 
 
The situation of service inadequacies and failures in KCC have their historical roots in the 
fiscal crisis that KCC experienced over the years. As we pointed out earlier, the political and 
                                            
578Ibid. KCC. p. 7  
579 In recent years KCC has approached the Word Bank for a grant to deal with this problem but we shall deal 
with that issue in detail later. 
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economic crisis that befell the country in 1970s and 1980s gravely affected the whole public 
realm, including KCC. The available data shows that government’s funding for local 
governments declined in 1970s, and was critically very low in 1980s. The Table below 
demonstrates this. 
 
Table 21: Showing Recurrent Expenditure to Ministry of Local Government in the 
1980s to 1991 
Financial Year Millions of Shs. % of Total Budget 
1983 / 84 
1984 / 85 
1985 /86 
1986 / 87 
1987 / 88 
1988 / 89 
1989 / 90 
1990 / 91 
21, 6 
37, 6 
46, 9 
170, 1 
381, 5 
1, 409.4 
1, 648.6 
3, 763.2 
3, 58 
2, 13 
1, 13 
2, 12 
1, 40 
2, 42 
1, 62 
3, 47 
Source: Philip Amins, Urban Management in Uganda: Survival Under Stress 
Report of Development Administration Group, University of Birmingham (1992) p. 
13. 
 
From the above figures, it is evident that the funding of local governments constituted a small 
fraction of Uganda’s budget in the 1980s. Since the local government derived their funding 
from the Ministry of Local Government, the poor funding by the government also meant poor 
funding for localgovernments580. Moreover, most of the local governments, especially the 
urban ones, including KCC had lost most of their sources of revenue. In the case of KCC, its 
over dependence on graduated tax rather than property rates was a clear indication of loss of 
municipal revenue581. 
 
In KCC the critical problems of finances and financial management made service provision 
more difficult to attain. Not only were financial resources very scare in KCC, the little 
available was mismanaged or misappropriated. For example, a study conducted by Uganda 
First Urban Project revealed the following: first, that over the years, the Financial 
Procedures issued in 1963 had not been followed in the management of finances in KCC. The 
                                            
580 Amis opcit, shows that the priority of government funding in 1989/90 were ministries of Defence 37%, 
Finance 14, 6% and education 17, 1% respectively. 
581 Graduated Tax is a poll tax paid by every male adults of 18 years and above as well as women who are gain 
fully employed. Property rates could not be collected because of ownership problems of properties on the city 
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second observation is that KCC lacked competent managers, including finance managers. 
Thirdly, although KCC was allowed by the law to borrow for long term and medium term 
investments, it had not been able to borrow for those purposes. Instead it preferred short term 
borrowing in form of overdrafts from banks, which attracted high interest. Thus, KCC was 
perennially indebted to the banks. Fourthly, the financial management and accounting 
systems had totally collapsed582. For example, the report laments: 
KCC’s financial accounting was of very poor quality. It is also mentioned 
that KCC’s last statement of audited accounts produced without external 
assistance was for F.Y 1978 /79. Since 1986 a number of attempts have been 
made by consultants to prepare final accounts, but these were not successful. 
Loss of documents, poor recording of incomes and expenditure and currency 
restructuring influenced the accuracy of accounts. In F. Y 1988 / 89 accounts 
were reconstructed and balanced using assumptions583 ... (Emphasis mine). 
 
This state of affairs in respect of financial management and accounting combined with some 
corruption and misappropriation of funds left the financial health of KCC in a bad shape. For 
example it was reported in another study that market administrators responsible for collection 
of market dues on behalf of the city council were colluding with senior city administrators to 
levy high amounts of market dues on market vendors so that both could benefit illegally from 
the collections. In other words, most of the money collected from market vendors was not 
reaching the city treasury, but instead, ended up in the pockets of some individual employees 
of KCC584. This explains why in the case of Owino market, despite the dues paid by the 
vendors, no service improvements had been made by KCC since 1972585. This is not 
surprising, much of the money collected by KCC employees was “lost” since KCC as an 
organization had no reliable tax data base586. Generally it was observed within government 
circles that financial management in all local governments had virtually collapsed. The 
practice of banking money collected by public officials was no longer a normal practice. 
Much of the cash collected was usually given out as advance to the staff or councillors, and in 
                                            
582 Uganda First Urban Project, Financial Report on Institutional Development 30 June 1995 
583 ibid, p. 9 
584 Christie Gombay “Eating Cities: urban management and markets in Kampala” Cities Vol 2, NO 2, 1994 
585 ibid, p 89. Gombay explains that the big shots at KCC headquarters demanded that each senior market 
administrator was expected to deliver certain amounts of money to his or her boss in exchange for the security 
of his or her job at the market or else, lose it or get transferred. 
586 opcit, First Urban Project report, p. 4 
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many cases it was never returned. The financial records of local governments were totally in 
a mess. Duplicate copies of receipts and other documents were often not properly kept587.  
 
In terms of institutional capacity, most local governments during the years of economic and 
political instability declined. They lost the capacity to attract and retain competent, skilled 
and professional workers. This is partly because the salaries were extremely low. Thus, the 
morale of workers who remained was too low to deliver meaningful services. Moreover, they 
had no tools, equipment and systems to enable them to do their jobs properly. Ironically, 
there was over–employment in most local governments, including KCC, at the lower ranks. It 
was estimated that there were 24.955 workers paid by the District Administrations and 2.659 
paid by central government in all districts of Uganda by 1992588. This was despite the fact 
that the lowest employee salary scale (U8) earning Shs. 3, 400 per month and the highest 
salary scale (U1) was earning Shs. 138, 684 per month589. The large numbers of employees 
were complicating the matters of service delivery within the local governments because they 
constituted a drain on the meagre resources available. Besides, the proper channels of 
employment had for a long time faulted, many influential people in local government got 
their relatives and friends into the employment of local governments. Such people would 
enter as temporary workers only to rise to middle or top ranks of the local authorities by 
default590. As a result, most local governments were over – staffed prior to decentralisation. 
The Commission of Inquiry into Local Government found that this was clearly the case in a 
local government. It observed: 
Evidence was gathered that recruitment into the ranks of established staff 
was often locally manipulated and tailored to give advantage to those 
already servicing with authorities in the grouping scheme. This “in–
breeding” enabled men and women without any qualification, and without 
any in–service training, to start as messenger or road gang, and rise up to 
the top as administrative Secretaries or Supervisors of Works or Internal 
Auditors591. 
 
                                            
587 The practice of taking advances on mere chits even by the supervisors of cashiers had become 
institutionalized and was known as “104”. See for detail, the discussion within the government, of these 
practices, Report of the Decentralisation Workshop held October 2, 1992 (organization by the Ministry of Local 
Government). 
588 See World Bank, Uganda District Management Study 1992 
589 ibid, pp 40 - 43 
590  Republic of Uganda, Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Local Government System, 1997. 
591 ibid, Republic of Uganda, Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Local Government System, June 
1997 p. 79 
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Temporary appointment had become a disguised method through which heads of departments 
would get employment for their friends or relatives. This became a self-perpetuating 
tendency owing to the fact that most district service committees were malfunctional due to 
the low calibre of people appointed to such committees592. 
 
KCC suffered a situation of bloated staffing. By 1995, KCC had 2257 staff (both technical 
and support staff. A good number of them were not well trained593. Many of the lower cadre 
employees (support staff) were recruited on temporary terms. Recruitment was haphazard and 
merely expedient as noted by the UFUP report thus: 
Employees were recruited unlawfully on “temporary” terms (even up to 
1994), although it was known that the jobs should have been filled on 
permanent basis. In some Departments, an even more shortsighted policy 
was adopted, recruiting graduates and diploma holders as group employees. 
These expedients have added heavily to KCC staffing problems.594 
 
The situation described above simply shows the nature of the crisis–ridden KCC in the 1970s 
and 1980s, where employment relations were defined by the patrimonial tendencies. It was an 
indication of a failed organization because normal employment procedures had almost ceased 
to work. Staff were often assigned duties but without a specific post or designation. In such 
cases there were no staff evaluations595. Promotions were very rare, and in most cases 
depended on how one related with the boss, sometimes informally. As a result of this kind of 
situation, as well as very low pay, the morale of the workers was equally low. This was 
described as mere “survival” rather than devotion and loyalty to the work of the organization. 
 
These practices undermined the known organizational norms of human resource management 
such as incentives and equity, efficiency and effectiveness, professional conduct, loyalty, 
division of labour and unity of command596. With the kind of “management style” that had 
existed in KCC, there was little hope for both the old and the young that they could make a 
career in that organisation but worked merely to survive. For a modern organisation to 
operate with efficiency and effectiveness, Max Weber advises  
                                            
592 ibid, p 80. Evidence was gathered by the commission that there were “cases of hardly literate persons who 
had been appointed to Service Committees” of some districts. 
593 KCC, Uganda First Urban Project (p.10). It was noted that 50% of junior staff had no idea of book keeping.. 
594 opcit, Uganda First Urban Project report, p. 48 
595 ibid, p. 49 
596 Weberian principles of organization,see Max Weber, Economy and Society edited by Guenther Roth and 
Claus Wittich, University of California Press, 1968 Chap xi. 
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The official, who is not elected but appointed by a master, normally functions, 
from the technical point of view, more accurately because it is more likely that 
purely functional points of consideration and qualities will determine his 
selection and career597. 
 
The KCC of the 1970s and 80s did not fit the Weberian concept of administration and 
management, for it had lost the zeal for technical competences and its reward system was in 
quandary. 
 
All the issues discussed above put together reveal that a national crisis had been brewing for 
some years, and it affected the whole spectrum of public life. KCC which we have examined 
in retrospect, was not spared by the fiscal, political and administrative crisis that plagued the 
country. Hence, in discussing the crisis in KCC it has been useful to grasp the national picture 
because KCC was part of it. 
 
5.7 Decentralisation as a framework for Service Delivery in KCC 
When the policy of decentralisation was put in place by the government in 1992, a new 
political and administrative dispensation dawned on the country’s local government system. 
KCC which had become dysfunctional as an organization in almost every practical aspect of 
its operations gained a sense of rejuvenation. This section of the chapter describes KCC’s 
organizational framework under the decentralisation and analyses how it has utilised the 
opportunities and dealt with the challenges in the recent years. 
 
Politically, KCC is administered as any other district598. It has an executive Mayor, who is 
also the chairperson of the district. The Mayor is elected by universal adult suffrage by voters 
in the whole city (district). The Mayor of Kampala has powers conferred upon that office, the 
same as a chairperson of a district. These are specified in the Local Government Act (section 
14) which include the inter alia, monitoring administration of the district, coordinating 
activities of the municipalities and towns in the district, overseeing the performance of 
persons employed in the district, and performing all functions necessary for the good of the 
district. Section 14 (4) stipulates that in the performance of his or her duties, the chairperson 
of a district or city mayor shall be answerable to the District Council.          
                                            
597 Max Weber, Economy and Society Vol 2, (edited by Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich) pp. 960 - 1961 
598 Kampala City is the only urban council in Uganda with a status of a district. All other districts in the country 
are rural 
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The District Council in the case of Kampala (KCC) is composed of directly elected 
councillors. There are 72 councillors in all599. These represent constituencies, the women, the 
youth and the disabled persons. It is imperative to note that the law requires that at least one 
third of the councillors of any local government must be women600. According to the Local 
Governments Act (section 10: 11) a local council at any level of local government is the 
highest political authority within its area of jurisdiction and has both legislative and executive 
powers. Each local council is presided over by a Speaker or Deputy Speaker (in the absence 
of the former) both of whom are elected by the council601. Most work of the local councils is 
done by standing committees. In the case of KCC the standing committees are: Finance and 
Planning, Health and Environment, Education and Sports, Works, Traffic and Physical 
Planning, and Gender, Welfare and Community Services. The statutory boards are: the 
District Land Board, the District Service Commission, District Tender Board and District 
Human Rights Commission602. 
 
The two most active boards are the District Service Commission and the District Tender 
Board. The District Service Commission is responsible for all matters pertaining to human 
resources recruitment, disciplinary control and termination in the district. The District Tender 
Board on its part is responsible for matters of procurement of goods, services and work in the 
district. Every urban council is authorized by the law to create its own tender Board603. The 
District Tender Board is the only procurement authority in the district. Procurement is 
normally done through competitive bidding although selective bidding is also allowed. The 
KCC political structure, like all other districts has a sub district level known as Division. 
Kampala has five divisions, namely Lubaga, Kawempe, Central, Nakawa and Makindye604. A 
city Division under the law is equivalent to a municipality, but in a rural district, it is 
                                            
599 KCC, Kampala City Council’s Position (Paper) September 1996, p 4 
600 Local Governments Act Section 11 (e). 
601 Before decentralisation, the councils were presided over by the Chairperson of the district or Mayor. In the 
case o Kampala the Mayor was ceremonial and had no executive powers i.e. up to 1987. 
602 KCC is the only district council with a human rights Commission. Its mandate is to monitor human rights in 
the city. It was created by KCC in 1998. 
603 Local Governments Act (Section, 95). This particular provision was a point of contention between the former 
chairman of Kampala central Division Mr. Ziritwaula and the City Mayor Sebana Kizito as to whether or not 
Divisions could not have their own tender Boards. This law was amended to allow city Divisions have their 
Tender Boards. However, no Division has done so on account of expenses involved. 
604 Although Makerere University and Kyambogo University have always been represented in KCC as 
“Division”, due to their high concentration of population, high tax returns and need for specific services, they 
have never been gazetted as such. 
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equivalent to sub-county .The exception though is that unlike any other municipality605, a city 
Division does not have lower local government. And unlike a rural sub-county, a city 
Division has more resources and more specialized urban services. What is important to note 
is that the Divisions in the city are local government in their own rights under the law. They 
have their own elected chairpersons (who are not entitled to the title of mayor606), their own 
elected councils, technical staff and control their own revenue and expenditures. The Division 
are closer and directly accountable to the people. 
 
As we have noted above, although Division Councils are lower local governments, they are 
not subordinate to KCC. They have their independent legal existence especially in the terms 
of their decision making and planning powers. Division Chairperson too, are not subordinate 
to the Mayor except in matters which need their co-operation for the good management of the 
city. Secondly, parish and village councils are not local governments, they are administrative 
units. They have no legal corporate status. Thirdly, there is one exception to be noted with the 
administrative structure. Essentially, the personnel matters of KCC, that is, all matters 
relating to recruitment, discipline and promotions are handled by the District Service 
Commission. In matters relating to the practice of administration, all established offices are 
under the supervision of the town Clerk. In other words, all established staff at KCC 
headquarters and those serving in the Divisions are directly responsible to the Town Clerk607. 
 
Personnel “centralisation” has both advantages and disadvantages. The main advantage is that 
the personnel standards are maintained and irregular appointments are minimised. The other 
advantage is that these employees can be deployed to work in any part of the KCC, as the 
Town Clerk deems fit. On the other hand, the staff who work at the Division level suffer from 
the problem of double loyalty. At the Division they are responsible for implementation of 
Division Council decisions. For purposes of reporting, they have to report to the Town Clerk. 
This problem was captured by the Principal Assistant Clerk of Kawempe Division thus: 
The major problem with administrative accountability is double allegiance. 
The local politicians may want to pull you down, yet it is the Town Clerk 
who recommends for promotion608. 
                                            
605 Other municipalities in the country have lower local governments known as Divisions. 
606 Other municipalities have Mayors. 
607 The Division Councils have some powers to recruit support staff according to their needs. The Division 
Council pays these from its local revenue. 
608 Interview with Ms Ruth Kijambu, Principal Assistant Town Clerk, Kawempe Division, May 5, 2004 
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This is a real problem because the chairperson of the same Division had also expressed views 
which suggested that Division politicians were not happy with the present personnel system. 
He said:  
Technical people are still bureaucratic. They are not pro-people. Sometimes 
they tend to refer to the headquarters, instead of implementing Division 
Council decisions609 
 
What can be understood from the fore going is that local politicians want to maximise their 
power. At the Division, the local politicians do not want to hear anything to do with KCC 
headquarters. They feel that the headquarters should not have any role in local matters. Yet in 
reality Divisions are not self sustaining. They depend on the technical guidance given by the 
headquarters staff, as well as that of those stationed at the Division. In reality, the staff of 
KCC working at the Division level have misgivings about the local politicians. They contend 
that councillors tend to regard the council as if it were a career and they demand for money 
all the time. In other words, they regard the local council as a source of income. Beside, it 
was reported that Councillors spend a lot of money during their campaigns for election, 
hoping that they could recoup it from the council once elected, which leads them into 
frustration when they later discover that local councils are financially constrained, almost, at 
all times. Thus the councillors even go to the extent of attempting to do illegal activities such 
as lobbying for tenders to supply goods or services to the Council, an act prohibited by the 
law610. In the course of their pursuit of such deals, they are told by the technical staff that 
such a thing is illegal. In retaliation, the councillors try to wich-hunt the officers, calling them 
names or branding them “thieves” or accusing them of incompetence in the Council611. From 
this point of view, most officers feel that working at the Division is less enjoyable and 
hazardous. There is a strong sense that if the officers were not ‘centralized’ and protected by 
the law, they would find it difficult to work at the Division. 
 
Moreover, whereas some local politicians brand the technical officers “uncooperative” and 
“bureaucratic”, it is argued that if the local politicians were to have their way, they could 
                                            
609 Interview with the Chairperson, Kawempe Division Mr. Takuba on 23 April, 2004. 
610 This was revealed during a meeting with the technical committee of Kawempe Division on 20 April 2004. 
Many other interviewees working at the Division level also voiced it. The law forbids councillors from 
supplying their councils. 
611 Interview with one officer who did not want to be named 20 April 2004 
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simply drain the local council of its funds and no services would be provided. All Finance 
Officers interviewed for this study expressed the above sentiment. On their part, the 
councillors contend that the technical officers are corrupt and tend to undermine service 
delivery. They assert that the technical officers connive with tenderers and other suppliers to 
inflate the prices of goods and services with deliberate intentions of making personal gains by 
way of a given percentage of the price as commission. As one technical officer has put it 
there is a barrage of accusations and counter – accusations on both sides. He said: 
There is a tendency for some people to pursue their objectives rather than 
the objectives of the organization (KCC). Some people say “nfunila wa? 
Politicians come to council with a view of making ends-meet, not 
motivated by service delivery to the people. Yet some officials are also 
self-serving612.  
 
It is argued that the way the whole system of local government operates, it lacks one 
fundamental thing – a system of values. It is observed that there are no core values. Such core 
values would have “efficient and effective service delivery”, “public spiritedness” and a 
“sense of commitment to organizational goals613“. Ideally a system of core values would have 
been expected to be the benchmark of excellence not only in the local governments but in the 
public service as a whole. However, such values were eroded by many years of social and 
political decay in the country, whereby civil servants resorted to their jobs as posts for 
“survival” rather than commitment to such values, and the system of popular representation 
had totally collapsed. Civic competence in the whole public realm declined significantly to 
the extent that leaders and public officials see little value in serving more of public interest 
rather than their own. As one a prominent public servant has pointed out: 
You can not be transparent when you do not know what to do and those 
you are leading do not know what to expect614. 
      
It is argued in this respect that the Ugandan society condones corruption, to the extent that, 
when a councillor or a civil servant becomes wealthy overnight, members of society perceive 
him or her as “smart” or “hard”–working”. The honest counterpart who serves the 
government with honesty and dedication is perceived as either “lazy” or “un–enterprising”. 
                                            
612 Expressed by Mr. John Gatheni, Senior Assistant Town Clerk, Lubaga Division. Interviewed on 25 May 
2005. Infunila wa? Literally means that almost every other person working for local councils has a tendency of 
saying “where do I gain?” 
613 Ibid, Mr John Gatheni. Expressed during Hamy interview with him on 25 May 2004. 
614 Kiwanuka Musisi, former chairperson, Mukono district and former Resident District Commissioner 
Kampala, Interviewed on 8 June 2004. 
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As a consequence, there is that latent drive by both local officials and politicians to maximise 
“self–interest” by illicit means in order for them to be better–off. This tends to undermine 
both political and administrative accountability. Accordingly, some observers say that local 
politicians who are supposed to be the “watch–dogs” for people’s interests have let them 
down. 
Nevertheless, it is not always the case that the people are not watching the graft and 
impropriety that take place in local governments. For example on 24 May 2004 a team of 
KCC officials visited Kisasi, a suburb of Kampala in Nakawa Division to inspect a road that 
was being fixed. The team found out that stone pitching had been done by the contractor 
without sufficient cement mix. As they were putting the case of bad workmanship to the 
contractor, the boda boda cyclists at the site interjected by saying “naffe twabilaba dda kyoka 
twatya okubyogela615. This exemplifies two things. First the ordinary people are keen 
observers of whatever the local officials are doing with public money, in such a case, 
delivering shoddy work. Secondly they lack an effective voice to articulate their disapproval 
of such lack of “value–for–money” projects. Poor service delivery is blamed by the 
contractors on the systematic of corruption in the local councils. The tenderers clearly state 
that “there is no such a thing as a free tender”. One contractor dealing in the paving of roads 
would often say, he takes no blame for poor road making, because he does the work 
equivalent to the money that remains after a ring of officials have taken their “cut”, which in 
some cases was in the range of 20 to 50 percent of the project fund, and as a businessman he 
also has to make profit. In such circumstances, a smaller fraction of the project fund was 
actually committed to the implementation of the project itself616. It is no wonder therefore, 
that most of the gravel roads done in Kampala last one or two years or less, because the right 
amounts of gravel were not used or drains were not done. Not only the gravel roads, a tarmac 
road done between Kasubi and Bwaise in 2003 is already worn out. This, I observed during 
the conclusion of my field work in 2004. The situation regarding abrogation of professional 
and public service probity is cyclical within all local governments, particularly in KCC. First 
it is a behaviour that has been inherited from “thuggery” of the past when unqualified and 
inexperienced people occupied public offices by virtue of patrimonial relations, and 
                                            
615 Literally meaning “we saw these faults longtime ago but we had no way of expressing them” Narrative made 
to me by Mr. John Gatheni (ibid) in an interview 25 May 2004. 
616 Interview with a road contractor who declined to be named 4 May 2004. The contractor declined to be named 
for obvious reasons he could lose contracts if he did. 
  
256
“plundered” the limited resources that were meant for public use617. It is no news in Uganda 
that until mid – 1990s, the civil servants would take months without getting their salaries, not 
because government had not released the cheques but because some influential person was 
trading with the money or slicing away some chunks for himself or herself in form of “ghost” 
payments618. The second associated problem has been the low salaries for civil servants and 
the gross levels of inequity they entail. Within KCC, this has been excerbated by the salaries 
that local politicians get vis–a–vis those of lower civil servants. For example the Mayor of 
Kampala receives well over 6 million shillings a month, and the Division Chairperson of 
Central Division receives over 5 million shillings a month. The other chairpersons of 
Divisions too, receive handsome salaries in millions of shillings per month. These salaries 
exclude luxurious four–wheel drive cars bought, maintained and fuelled by the local 
government funds, in addition to other legalese attached to their official positions. For 
example, during my fieldwork, it was revealed to me that the Chairmen of Central Division 
receives Shs.500.000 per week for incidental expenses and his mobile telephone bills were 
met by the Division. Senior civil servants though not formally highly paid enjoy the 
“benefits” of their offices. At the middle and lower ranks, the salaries are simply miserable. 
The lowest paid in the cadre of support staff earns Shs.80.000. Save for grand corruption that 
the better-paid officials practise in form of “kickbacks” on tenders and other trading 
activities, petty corruption is rampant and justified by lower ranking officials as “survival”. 
One version for explaining the petty corruption can be captured from this revelation: 
Our department of Law Enforcement is critical to all departments in this 
Division but it is the most marginalised. No good salary, no confirmation 
and no benefits. How do you expect him (a Law Enforcement Officer) not 
to accept Shs. 100.000 from an offender when he earns a salary of Shs. 120, 
000 a whole month619? 
 
                                            
617 This particular practice was very common during Amin’s regime when illiterate or semi – illiterate soldiers 
would be appointed Provincial Governors and other high-level offices. Such people had no regard for books of 
accounts or proper administrative procedures. To them receiving “gifts” for services rendered was normal. 
These negative legacies persist in the public service of Uganda. 
618 The Public Service Review and Re–organisation Commission found that the whole structure of Public 
Service including the teaching service, local governments, health service etc had “ghost workers” i.e. people 
supposedly working for government, whom government paid regular salaries, but were non – existent at all. 
Their salaries went to the bank accounts of their-would-be supervisors. For detail, Petter Langseth “Civil 
Service Reform Programme” in Petter Langseth & J. Mugaju Towards and Effective Civil Service Fountain 
Publishers, Kampala, 1996 p 55 
619 Interview Mr. Charles Bagenze (Senior Law Enforcement Officer, Kawempe Division) who also complained 
he had been in an acting position for five years without knowing why that should be the case (Date of Interview 
20 April 2004). 
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Another observer hinted in respect of the delays by KCC to approve building plans, that some 
property developers have found it “normal” either to “oil the system” of the officers at the 
KCC Planning Office or to “tip” the Law Enforcement Officers “to keep a blind eye” as he or 
she develops his or her property620. 
 
“Survival” as it is termed in KCC circles, has become so routinised and institutionalized 
amongst the KCC workers in all sorts of jargons that if one is not familiar with them, he or 
she may end up not receiving a service. Jargons like ovakko ki? (What can you give me?) are 
used lightly towards people who come seeking services at their offices. Because a jargon like 
this one carries an intonation of a slang, common offenders understand it well, they part with 
some money and get cleared quickly, especially within the ranks of the Law Enforcement 
Officers. The other clients of local governments simply wait for “normal” procedures to take 
their course. They may wait indefinitely until their luck comes. This intricate method of 
extortion keeps local government officials going, keeping their jobs jealously, leaving a 
casual observer wondering why they never resign or complain loudly like other workers in 
other sectors. The explanation lies in the unveiled “benefits” that they receive illicitly. The 
kind of unprofessional behaviour described above is most prevalent amongst the lower ranks 
of workers.  
 
The middle level managers who are the key persons in project implementation are equally 
dissatisfied with their conditions of work. This is largely due to two factors: they lack 
adequate tools and equipment to do their work efficiently and effectively. For example, in 
most essential departments such as public health, education, community and social welfare, 
engineering and production, not a single one had a departmental vehicle in all the five 
Divisions of Kampala. Officers interviewed for this study wondered how a Public Health 
Inspector or Inspector of Education would travel around the Division without a car. Public 
Health Inspectors for instance, are supposed to enforce public hygiene and trade orders, but 
this can not effectively be done due to lack of transport. Some vehicles at the Division level 
are shared but this means that departments have to do bookings in turns. In such cases, urgent 
cases can not be attended to. A case in point to illustrate this dilemma was in Lubaga 
Division. On the 1 May 2004, the Probation Officer was called upon by the Councillor of 
                                            
620 Godwin Othieno, Physical Panner, Nakawa Division. Narrated this to one during an interview, 1 June 2004. 
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Najjanankumbi area reporting a child neglected by her mother. The mother of the child would 
lock the child inside her house, and leave the child crying the whole day without food. The 
child had become terribly malnourished. When the neighbours noticed it, they reported the 
matter to the Councillor. This prompted the Councillor to urgently call the Probation Officer 
to immediately come to the rescue of the child. The Probation Officer could not take 
immediate action that day because there were no means transport to enable her to do so. She 
eventually got a vehicle from the Senior Assistant Town Clerk on the following day which 
she used to pick the kid whom she took to Mulago hospital’s Mwanamujimu Child Feeding 
Centre621. 
 
The point being made here is that in KCC, the few facilities therein, tend to be more available 
to the top administrators than the middle managers and lower level workers who do the actual 
work in the field. Another example is the planning departments in all Divisions. In all 
Divisions, physical planners complained of lack of equipment and tools such as maps, 
drawing pencils, theodolite and even drawing tables. For example, physical planners reported 
that they use their meagre resources to buy drawing pencils for use at workplace. In Nakawa 
Division, the drawing table in the physical planning office was a private property of one of 
the planners! 
 
Apart from inadequate or lack of tools and equipment, the issue of inadequate salaries comes 
up again. The middle managers such as the Medical Officers of Health, Engineers, all of 
whom are university graduates, some with some post–graduate qualification earn “pennies” 
for their hard work. For example, a graduate Engineer earns between Shs. 500, 000 – 700, 
000 (equivalent to about 300 – 400 US Dollars) a month. The tricky part of it is that these are 
the officers who handle projects and programmes involving large sums of money. For 
example one Engineer put it this way: 
Salaries in KCC are too inadequate. The ratio of the highest paid is 21: 1. 
The Engineer may be paid about Shs.500.000 per month and yet this is a 
person in charge of Shs.5 billion of project money per year. This is 
tempting622. 
                                            
621 Narrated tome by Ms. Restey Kabajwara, Coordinator of Welfare and Community services, Lubaga Division 
on 22 May 2004. 
622 Expressed by Mr. Ronald Sebanenya, Division Engineer Kampala Central Division in an interview with him 
on 13 May 2004. It should be noted the salaries for Local Government staff are pegged to the government salary 
scales across the board. 
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 Indeed, as pointed out above, the conditions of work especially in terms of remuneration are 
disappointing and tempting. All investment projects at the Division level, including the 
central government –funded Local Government Development Project (LGDP) activities are 
handled by the Division Engineer, and they run in billions of shillings yet the Engineer earns 
a mere Shs. 500.000 a month. The temptation for officers to engage in unprofessional 
collusion with contractors to over – invoice the local government is real and alive partly due 
to poor pay for officers. Through observation, I noticed that almost every officer at the 
Division possessed a personal motor vehicle. If it were to be the case that officers don’t get 
their money by other means other than salaries they receive from their jobs no officer would 
own and maintain a car, besides feeding themselves, their families and paying for their 
accommodation. This “temptation” is certainly not confined to local government workers 
alone, it spans through the entire public service of Uganda. This persistent problem of low 
wages was identified about fifteen years ago by the Public Service Review and Re – 
organisation Commission (PSRRC) that observed thus: 
The current extremely low salaries/wages paid to members of the Public 
Service can be taken as the number one contributory factor to corruption. 
The lowest paid staff (at that time) according to the Circular Standing 
Instruction No. 6 of 1990, is paid a salary of only Shs.2, 591 per month 
(about US Dollars 5.8) . . . The highest paid official receives a salary of 
Shs.12,155 per month, equivalent to US Dollars 2.7. . . (These) extremely 
low salaries make it impossible for the majority of staff to meet their daily 
basic needs, for example education of their children, feeding, clothing and 
taking care of the medical needs of themselves and their families. This has 
for a long time been a major contributory factor to widespread 
corruption623. 
 
That was about fifteen years ago. Since then, salaries have been revised upwards in all sectors 
of the public service. However, inflation and other factors have continued to eat into real 
incomes earned by civil servants. For example, while the rate of exchange for the Uganda 
shilling to a US Dollar in 1990 was Shs. 450, it now stands Shs.1750 to a Dollar. Government 
has not been adjusting salaries to cater for inflation. Infact, salaries have remained static for 
the majority of civil servants since mid–1990s except for political leaders such as Members 
of Parliament, District Resident Commissioners, Ministers, District Resident Commissioners, 
                                            
623 Extract from chapter 14 of the Report of the Public Service Review and Re – organisation Commission of 
Uganda 1989/1990 reproduced in A. Ruzindana et al, Fighting Corruption in Uganda  Fountain Publishers, 
Kampala, 1998, p 19 
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Ministers and other top politicians. Therefore, this gratuitous inequality in salaries within the 
whole of public service makes corruption attractive. As the PSRRC further observed, some 
sections of Public Service offer opportunities for corruption, this is termed as “eating” while 
others with less of such opportunities are termed as “dry” areas. Such opportunities for 
corruption have “negative impact on the morale of staff who continue to depend on their 
salaries and allowances [and] makes it difficult for any meaningful work to be performed in 
some districts624“. The report concludes by lamenting the fate of the more honest public 
officers, thus: 
They see so much corruption going on, apparently successfully and with 
impunity while they continue to suffer and tighten their belts because they 
have chosen to remain honest625. (Emphasis added). 
 
5.8 Kampala City Council Strategic Framework for Reform 
To a large extent, Uganda has been going through several institutional changes in the 1990s, 
with a view of transforming the way the public service works. The main transformative 
changes have hinged around liberalisation of the economy, public service reform and 
decentralisation. These affect one another in a number of ways, particularly in the areas 
affecting the realm of public organisation and how they are supposed to cope with new 
organizational cultures. This seems to be the fundamental problem. Many old ways of doing 
things still persist in their organisational framework. As experts of organizational ecology 
advise us . . .” in determining organisational change, cause and effect logic is blurred because 
some changes symptoms of organisational decline rather than causes of failure626. This seems 
to be the case with implementation of decentralisation in KCC. As we pointed out in earlier 
chapters and to some extent in this one, one thing seems to be starkly clear – that is KCC as 
an organisation was a shadow of its former self by 1990. Thus, if some of the things are not 
being done right, it is partly because of the general institutional decline in the whole 
governmental system and also because the newly introduced institutional arrangements are 
still in their infancy. Besides, organisational development itself, as a process is gradual, 
incremental and enduring, and its results are realized after a considerable length of time. It is 
for this reason I that turn to the review of KCC, ten or so, years. 
 
                                            
624 ibid p. 24 
625 locit. P. 24 
626 See Joel A. C. Baum, “Organisational Ecology” in Stuart R. Clegg, Cynthia Hardy & Walter Nord, 
Handbook of Organisation Studies Sage Publications London. 
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Although Kampala district began to enjoy decentralisation in the early 1990s and to deal with 
the challenges that it posed, KCC had not had a strategic plan for decades and possibly, never 
before. Its first strategic plan was drafted in 1997. My purpose in reviewing the Strategic 
Framework for Reform (SFR) is that it is the first “home–grown” policy that admits the 
pathetic state of affairs in KCC. In the identification of Kampala’s problems the SFR states: 
There has been general outcry by the citizens of Kampala about the pathetic 
level of services …Vehicles, equipment and tools needed for solid waste 
management, road construction and maintenance, street lighting etc at best 
could be described as scanty and run down …The total KCC budget in 
1988 was only 362 million shillings. These comparisons have no doubt that 
by 1988 the city was in shambles627. 
 
In taking stock of the problems of KCC and in designing a way forward, KCC took 1988 as 
the year when it began to re–examine itself and gain a sense of “self–examination, self–
criticism and accepting that something was wrong628“. The new directions in tackling these 
problems emphasised interalia: openness, innovations, team building and accountability. 
However in its effort to put things right it met obstacles. It states: “Despite many efforts by 
KCC to intervene in the process of  
service delivery, the desired effect was not achieved629“. 
 
A number of reasons are cited for poor service delivery. These include: 
◊ lack of strategic planning and management systems resulting in disjointed efforts in the 
implementing of various improvement programmes. 
◊ lack of commitment to organisation by its employees. 
◊ lack of finances to meet increased public demand for services. 
◊ inability to realise full potential in revenue collection due to unwillingness to pay and 
economic hardships of the debtors 
◊ unplanned changes in top management resulting in disruptions of Council programmes. 
◊ lack of effective financial management systems 
◊ inadequate and outmoded laws 
◊ absence of institutionalized communication and consultation procedures between the 
internal and external stakeholders. 
                                            
627 KCC Kampala City Council Strategic Framework for Reform, p. 2 
628 ibid, p. 5 
629 locit, p. 5 
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◊ undue political interference and procrastinations of decision making by Councillors, 
causing delays in the implementation of Council programmes. 
 
With the SFR in place the mission of KCC was conceived as: “To provide and to facilitate 
the delivery of quality, sustainable, customer–oriented services, effectively and efficiently”. 
 
This is fundamental to our understanding of KCC because as an organisation it had always 
existed without a stated mission. This could have greatly contributed to its perennial troubles. 
It acted for most of the time as a reactive and a crisis management organisation. It also acted 
very bureaucratically but inefficiently. Its organization was far from the ideal and productive 
bureaucracy. It lacked financial, physical and human resources to enable it do a good job or 
deliver services. Therefore, its adoption of the SFR was long overdue. 
 
The issue then is, how was SFR intending to help KCC recover? A number of proposals were 
put forward in SFR, interlia: 
◊ that KCC intended to shift emphasis from being a deliverer of services, to a regulator and 
enabler. 
◊ that it was to undertake reforms of its bureaucracy by “right – sizing”, and training its 
workforce into a well – knit productive resource. 
◊ that it was to strengthen its regulatory and enabling functions by operating with consensus 
and establishing rapport with its stakeholders, and to improve its public image. 
◊ that it was to undertake more prudent fiscal responsibility. 
 
In view of the above strategic goals, KCC critically observed that its conception of SFR was 
no “accident”. It had no choice but to embark on this, “having tried all other ways without 
success630“. 
 
The envisaged strategies to achieve the above goals were identified in the SFR to include: 
contracting out, privatisation, outsourcing non–statutory functions, divestiture of non–core 
assets, and rationalization of its organisation and creating an effective incentive system for 
staff motivation. Other strategies were: to put in place a sound financial management system, 
                                            
630 The highlighted strategic goals are contained in SFR document (ibid) p. 6 
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effective revenue mobilization and expenditure control. In addition, it proposed measures to 
establish benchmarks for good performance, accountability, monitoring and evaluation, 
effective audit systems and information management system. Apart from more effective 
revenue mobilization strategies, KCC intended to engage the government to disburse funds in 
line with article 193 of the Constitution. 
 
Critically, the SFR initiative though conceived at the behest of the World Bank through the 
Uganda First Urban Project (UFUP) was a step in the right direction for KCC. KCC had a 
bloated staffing structure, over– departmentalization, and lacked well qualified managers. 
These factors had negative effect on the implementation of the World Bank–sponsored First 
Urban Project (FUP) in Kampala. As a review of FUP points out: 
As part of the First Urban Project (FUP), launched in 1991 with funding 
from IDA and restructured in October 1993, it was agreed that KCC should 
concentrate on its actions to rebuild its organizational capacity and 
implement a plan of action to improve KCC’s finances and operations. 
However, the progress in achieving the targets put forth in FUP, was slow 
and fragmented and it was realized that fundamental changes in KCC’s 
organization and management, within the context of the evolving 
decentralisation, were needed631. 
 
As an example of revenue performance in KCC working within the FUP, the improvements 
were less than expected. The table illustrates this. 
   
Table 22: Showing  KCC’s Actual Income 1991 – 94 (Ushs.Million) 
Source Year Year Year % increase 
1991/2 
 
Projection 
1994/95 
 1991/92 1992/93 1993/4   
Markets 
Tax Parks 
Others 
608 
337 
79 
625 
345 
98 
629 
386 
83 
3.5% 
14% 
5% 
638 
588 
80 
Total    7, 5%  
Source: Uganda First Urban Project, Fourth Quarterly Report, 30 June 1995 p. 5 
 
As indicated in the above table the overall increase was 7, 5%. This low performance was 
attributed to lack of adequate commitment by KCC management to attaining the desired 
targets. It was also noted that “policy issues on contracting out collection of income from 
                                            
631 Core Team (World Bank experts) Overview of SFR and Progress (2003), p. 1 
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Markets and Taxi Parks got badly confused thus causing a delay” in implementation632. For 
example while it had been anticipated that KCC would collect an average income of Shs.100 
million from the Taxi Parks from June 1994, the Council received the average of Shs.42 
million per month, losing an income of Shs.60 million.”633 
 
Again, it is important to note that in policy terms, the SFR was a leap forward because it 
signified that KCC was ready to critically censor itself and accept criticism as an organization 
that had failed to deliver on its mandate to the people. It was also a realization that the 
“traditional” mode of management had miserably failed therefore, there was urgent need to 
do something differently. For example as indicated above, while KCC suffered cash crises 
year after year, it had not been able to collect revenue due to it because it probably 
understood that the people were less willing to pay taxes where there was no visible service 
delivery on its part.  
 
Furthermore, the organizational design and operation of KCC alienated it from the people it 
was meant to serve. Innovation and partnership had not been part of the ways KCC operated. 
KCC was popularly known for its corrupt ways and unresponsiveness which had always 
many property developers generally preferred to bribe KCC’s Law Enforcement Officers so 
that they would allow them to build rather than taking their building plans to the City Planner 
for approval. My finding from the respondents who filled the questionnaire reveals that 
69.2% who had built houses in Kampala had no approved plans. The reasons they advanced 
for this include: delays in approving plans by KCC (46.2), lack of land titles (80.8%), the 
process of approval requiring a lot of money (6.8%) and lack of knowledge about procedures 
50% while those conversant with them (42.3). 
 
Although the main factor contributing to erection of illegal structures around Kampala is the 
system of land tenure, the cumbersome process of approving and building plans in KCC 
tends to discourage developers from going through the proper channels of development. 
 
Finally, it is imperative to note that three interrelated factors explain the motivation of KCC’s 
move towards reforms contained in the SFR, these are: the government’s policy of 
                                            
632 Uganda First Urban Project, Quarterly Report, 30 June 1995, p. 5 
633 ibid. p. 5 
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decentralisation, the public service reform and the intervention of the external financiers 
especially the World Bank. Decentralisation placed new challenges on how local 
governments had traditionally functioned. It has placed the challenge of service delivery at 
the hands of the local governments. Local governments received finances from central 
government but they needed to collect their own revenues in order to be able to function 
properly. Efficiency in using resources became an imperative and a necessity. Organisational 
rationality and discipline became inevitable. In all these, the expectations of the people for 
better service delivery were higher than the previous times. More important they had a stake 
and role play legally defined in the statute books. In other words, the SFR initiative was a 
strategy that KCC could afford not to do if it was to implement decentralisation properly. 
 
The civil service reform which took place in the early 1990s required an initiative like SFR to 
be understood at the local level. Three key components of the civil service reform required a 
deeper understanding to be implemented. These are “right – sizing” the workforce, 
“rationalizing” the organization and changing the work modes to a “result – oriented” 
approach. Through “right – sizing” KCC reduced its workforce by retrenching 1302 staff 
between 1992 and 1995. Through rationalization, KCC merged most of its several 
departments into directorates in order to streamline the management and organisation of its 
bureaucracy as well as improving allocation of work tasks and efficiency. However, one 
element of the package of institutional change that has not been effectively implemented is 
result – oriented management. The explanation given is two – fold: there are still inadequate 
tools and equipment to enable workers to it, and the incentive system is still insufficient to 
see it through. In, other words, the wages are still very low and the morale of workers equally 
low. Nevertheless, there are clearer lines of authority, workers have specific tasks, top 
managers are hired on performance contracts and departmental budgets are followed. Above 
all, there is a functioning council, a political body that oversees the implementation of 
policies and presses technocrats for answerability. These not withstanding, KCC is still 
grappling to get things right. The levels of service provision are still poor as demonstrated by 
several examples given in the earlier sections of this chapter. This is attributed to budgetary 
constraints, poor tax returns, political interference, excessive expectations on the part of the 
population and rampant poverty afflicting the majority of Kampala residents. 
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Chapter 6 
 
Urban Management, Strategic Sector Reforms and the Politics of Service 
Delivery in Kampala 
 
6.1   Introduction 
Taking a retrospective look at Kampala, the city, capital and the main commercial centre of 
Uganda leaves no doubt that it has experienced serious institutional decline. As the country’s 
economic and political institutions shrunk into abyss, the city too, witnessed its own 
institutional demise. Yet again as the process of re-building the country gained momentum in 
late 1980s through the 1990s, Kampala also gained some sense of recovery. The linchpin of 
Kampala’s institutional revival was at the wheels of the policy of decentralisation. The basis 
of decentralisation has been discussed in the earlier chapters of this thesis. What needs to be 
understood more clearly is the new “ways of management” in Uganda’s local government 
generally, and whether or not, they constitute viable and effective mechanisms of service 
delivery, strategic planning, fiscal discipline and better resource management. In other words, 
have the new reforms produced management efficiency? The second issue that needs clearer 
grasp is the institutional framework that is set in motion by the “new managerialism” in KCC. 
There is need to understand the linkages among various stakeholders, the mechanisms of 
managing such linkages or what Rhodes would call “steering.”634 
 
The focus of this chapter is KCC’s recent drive towards the “new governance mode” that 
gravitates within an inescapable dualism. On the one hand, an organisation like KCC seems 
stuck in the “old bureaucratic mode”, while on the other hand, it is striving to adapt to the 
“new governance mode”. The latter produces its own complex set of values, goals, and 
outcomes for which the existing institutional set-up was not crafted to handle efficaciously. 
This notwithstanding, a process of learning has been taking place and KCC an organisation 
now has a mission, vision and specific goals – something that was lacking in the past. Using 
the evidence that was gathered during the fieldwork done in Kampala, I examine and analyse 
the reforms in KCC in terms of its organisational structures, rules and goals. As one senior 
officer in KCC put it: 
                                            
634 R.A.W Rhodes, “Governance and Public Administration” in R.A.W. Rhodes (2000) opcit. Also Mathew 
Flinders “Governance in Whitehall” in Public Administration, Vol. 80 No 1, 2002; Vivien Lowndes and Chris 
Skelcher, “Dynamics of Multi – organizational Partnerships: An Analysis of Changing Modes of Governance” 
in Public Administration Vol. 76, 1998. 
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Decentralisation is like raising a football team. Its success depends on the 
kind of team you field, how effectively it is trained, how effectively it is 
equipped and the level of motivation you put in place for their motivation 
to attain excellence in the field635. 
 
This kind of thinking underscores the higher morale that is now reigning in KCC – a positive 
and optimistic view of the process of reforms taking place in KCC. Under the decentralised 
mode of governance, the administration of Kampala has changed in various ways: in the way, 
the headquarters deals with its sub–governments (divisions), in management of human 
resources, fiscal management, popular accountability and control, and methods of work. 
Despite these changes in KCC, however, a host of weaknesses persist. The discussion that 
follows from here focuses on these issues. In this chapter, we are concerned with how KCC 
has implemented reforms initiated as part of the Strategic Framework for Reform (SFR), and 
how such processes have been achieved in terms of service delivery in Kampala. 
 
6.2 Background to Reform   
By the end of the 1990’s Kampala City Council had lost most of the material, human and 
financial capacities that it needed to deal with the problems afflicting the city. Two 
developments have been instrumental in “breathing fresh air” in the working of KCC through 
the 1990s to date. These developments are: the implementation of the policy of 
decentralisation initiated by the government and the organisational reforms supported by the 
international donors. While decentralisation activated political and administrative changes in 
all local governments, including KCC, by making local bureaucratic officials answerable to 
elected officials (local councils); the reforms were designed to restructure, review and change 
how KCC could operate more efficiently and effectively as an organisation. The reforms 
were designed within the context of decentralisation. Decentralisation made local 
governments corporate entities with a full range of responsibilities, mandates and resources. 
The gist of the reforms was to enable the local governments become accountable, self–
sustaining, and transparent and service–deliverers. 
 
In KCC, the reforms started back in 1991 when the First Urban Project (FUP) was initiated 
and implemented with the World Bank’s IDA funding, channelled through the Uganda 
                                            
635 Mr Steven Higobero, Principal Assistant Town Clerk, Central Division in an interview with him on 4 May 
2004. 
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government. The main goal of FUP was to re–build institutional capacity and to initiate 
infrastructure investment of KCC636. However, after two years of implementation, FUP noted 
that it was “evident that sustainable capacity building after a long period of institutional 
deterioration involves processes, which take longer than the stipulated two years of 
consultancy support.”637 Drawing lessons from the FUP, it was noted and recognised that, 
“fundamental changes in the way KCC [was] managed and run needed to be made in the 
context of the overall policy of decentralisation in the country whereby financial resources 
and functions were being devolved to lower levels of government to ensure more efficiency 
and effective delivery of basic services.”638 In attempt to get reforms done in KCC, the SFR 
was evolved by a combination of efforts of World Bank technical experts, KCC managers, 
councillors and the KCC labour union. The main elements of SFR are: 
(i) rightsizing of KCC’s staff in order to retain only the core staff for functional 
responsibilities associated with moving KCC from the traditional department–based 
organisation to a service–based centre structure; 
(ii)  contracting out selected functions (both service and management) and 
(iii)  improving financial management.  
 
The concept of alternative service delivery mechanism (ASDM) was initiated within the 
context of the above parameters639. In view of this concept, KCC has since the mid-1990s 
undertaken, first to bring private sector service providers on board. This has been done 
through contracting out service delivery functions. The aim is to reduce overhead costs of 
running the services as well as increasing efficiency in service provision. The second element 
has been gradual restructuring in order to maintain core staff at the headquarters since most 
of the services are devolved to the Divisions. The third aspect has involved improvements in 
financial management, for example, in areas of information management through the 
integrated information management and privatisation of revenue collection functions. 
Fourthly, non–productive assets have been divested. 
 
                                            
636 UFUP (1993) First Output Report reported that most of the components of the project were not achieved 
because of historical institutional bottlenecks in KCC. 
637 ibid, p. 1 
638 World Bank, Uganda Local Government Program Report No. PID 7841 (25 October, 1999) pp 9 
639 ibid, p. 10. 
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Given the aims and benchmarks of SFR, the KCC has re–organised itself to work as a less 
bureaucratic, and more of a service provider–organisation. Thus, the question that is pertinent 
is whether or not, KCC has, in the last ten or so years, acted as a more efficient, effective and 
accountable organisation in terms of service delivery to the people it is meant to serve. As 
experts on local government remind us: 
Local government performance is a primary concern to every citizen in the 
community because there is an expectation that all government resources 
are to be used efficiently in providing the highest level of public services. 
In turn, the local government has the responsibility to ensure that the 
programs that it provides meet their stated objectives and are cost 
effective640. 
 
Performance measurement therefore involves, controlling costs, comparing processes (i.e. 
terms of technology, approach or procedure, maintaining standards, and comparing sectors 
(i.e. whether a service is better provided by public or private body641). While such 
performance indicators are clearly of technical nature, they may not adequately tell a true 
picture of what happens in local governments. They may therefore, be inadequate in that 
sense. Local governments are not profit–making organisations, they are public bodies, whose 
performance measurement is political and social. They produce public goods consumed by a 
variety of people who hold differing perceptions of satisfaction and appreciation of services. 
Thus, while internally, a local government needs to contain costs, use resources prudently and 
motivate its staff to do a public job, the measurement of performance is what the citizens say 
about the level and quality of service. For our study, this is the strategy that was taken. By 
interviewing the people and observing what KCC has done or not done, we are able to tell 
whether the KCC reforms are productive or not. 
 
Through interviews and the survey, the first step of our study was to establish through a 
random, non–probability sample of 208 adults who filled the questionnaire citizens’ 
perceptions concerning living conditions in the city. The key indicators we chose were: 
housing, source of power, (domestic fuel), education for children, type of road to one’s 
residence, medical services and waste disposal. This list includes the key services that most 
municipal governments provide. The logic behind our enquiry was geared towards attaining 
                                            
640 Michael Schaeffer, Municipal Budget, World Bank, 2000 p. 30 
641 ibid, p. 31 
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greater understanding of what the kind of services have been provided by KCC, and to what 
extent the ordinary citizens in the city are satisfied with them or not. 
 
Roads are the main challenge to service provision in KCC. The road network in Kampala is 
estimated to be about 900km. Most of the roads in Kampala are gravel (600km) while 300km 
are tarmac. The challenge is that these gravel roads need regular maintenance as rains wash 
their surfaces away every rainy season. At the same time, the tarmac roads are not in any 
better shape as they require higher maintenance costs. KCC estimates that a kilometre of a 
tarmac road costs about 200.000 US Dollars. Moreover, apart from the central business 
district and its vicinity, the greater Kampala roads have no street lights. By 2003, only 77 km 
of the 900km of Kampala roads had security lights642. What seems to be important to note 
seriously is that although KCC has been building capacity to provide the much–needed 
infrastructure, it still falls far bellow its targets. The table below demonstrates this in respect 
of the road service provision.    
 
Table 23: Showing Road Service Provision in Kampala City Council in Kilometres 
 
Ite
m 
Activity 1999/ 
2000 
Target  
1999/ 
2000 
Achieved 
2000/ 
2001  
Target 
2000/ 
2001  
Achieved 
2001/ 
2002 
Target 
2001/ 
2002  
Achieved 
 
1 
Patching 
pothole son 
tarmac roads 
 
100.000 
 
31.000 
 
130.000 
 
50.000 
 
100.000 
 
38.000 
 
2 
Periodic 
maintenance 
(tarmac 
roads) 
 
170 
 
35 
 
200 
 
23 
 
150 
 
24 
 
3 
Construction 
of side walks 
600 - 600 - 600 - 
 
4 
Repair of 
side walks 
20.000 - 20.000 - 20.000 - 
 
5 
Light 
grading of 
gravel roads 
 
 
600 
 
235 
 
600 
 
125 
 
600 
 
28 
 
6 
Periodic  
maintenance 
of gravel 
 
600 
 
150 
 
600 
 
108 
 
600 
 
100 
                                            
642 KCC, Kampala District Budget Framework Paper 2002/3 p. 5. There are 2780 installed street lights out of 
the desired 16. 000. KCC estimates, it needs Shs. 26 billion to light up the whole city. 
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roads 
 
7 
Replacement 
of manhole 
cover 
 
500 
 
20 
 
500 
 
100 
 
500 
 
90 
 
8 
Installation 
of culverts   
1000 120 1100 130 1000 200 
 
9 
Upgrading 
of round 
abouts 
5 5 2 - 3 - 
Source: KCC, Kampala District Budget Framework Paper 2002 / 2003 
 
From the table above, the evidence is that most of the planned road improvements over a 
period of three years continuously fell far below the targets. There were no plans for 
construction of new tarmac roads. Thus, not only are most of the tarmac roads in Kampala 
full of potholes, the gravel road too, are in sorry state. Worse still, the way the main roads in 
the city were constructed leaves one wondering as to why they have no side walks to the 
extent that cyclists and pedestrians have to move along the road with motor vehicles. The 
situation of road use has been worsened further by the boda–boda (motor cycles) whose 
riders seem not to understand traffic rules or follow traffic signs, which has resulted in 
unnecessarily high occurrence of accidents643. 
 
The low and poor level of performance in the road sector is attributed to lack of adequate 
financial resources in KCC, high costs of road construction and maintenance and the heavy 
rains and floods that Kampala experiences644. This notwithstanding, the point that is rarely 
mentioned by the public officials is that of poor workmanship or substandard roadwork645. 
 
Our respondents in the disadvantaged areas reported that there had only been slight 
improvements in their road network construction and maintenance, compared to the period 
before 1995. Asked whether the access road to their homes was tarmac, 48, (23. 1%) reported 
yes, while 160 (76. 9) reported no. On the question of the regularity in maintenance of gravel 
roads, the following were the responses. The table below shows the reported number of times 
a year a murram road is respondents’ residential neighborhoods. 
                                            
643 One ubiquitous observation is that Kampala city lacks road signs and road markings. This contributes not 
only to the high number of accidents but also traffic jams and offences. 
644 During the financial year 2002/2003 KCC re – gravelled only 19. 5km of it roads. 
645 This author observed a road that was being re – sealed between Old Kampala Police junction and Namirembe 
road which lasted only about a month to wear. 
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Table 24: Showing  number of reported times a murram road is paved 
Times Frequency Percent 
Atleast once a year 
Never at all 
We do it ourselves 
I don’t know 
56 
72 
64 
16 
26.9 
34.6 
30.8 
7.7 
Total 208 100 
 Source:  Field survey findings 
 
From the table above, it is clear that in most areas the conditions of gravel roads, especially in 
the congested areas is still poor. While 26.9% of the respondents reported that their access 
roads are maintained by KCC at least once a year, the majority, 34. 6% reported that their 
roads are perennially in a bad state while 30.8% maintain their access roads, by mobilising 
communal labour or village council executive collecting some money from residents to pay 
labourers to fix their access roads. 
 
The significance of what of what was reported by the respondents can be correlated with 
what KCC reports to have done. For example during the financial year 2002/2003, KCC re–
gravelled only 5.7 km in Lubaga Division, 6.5 km in Makindye Division, 9.3 km in 
Kawempe and 6.3 km in Nakawa Division. Although Central Division also has some gravel 
roads, no works were done on them. During my field study (August 2003 to June 2004) we 
were able to observe some improvements on road works, for example, the following roads 
had been paved or re– ravelled: 
Table 25: Showing roads that had been improved in 2004 
Name of Road Division State of the Road 
Bwaise – Kasubi Kawempe/Lubaga Tarmacked 
Kalerwe – Bwaise Kawempe Tarmacked 
Kawempe Police – Mbogo Kawempe Tarmacked 
Kibuye – Makindye Makindye Tarmacked 
Salama Road            Makindye Tarmacked 
Ntinda – Kisasi  Nakawa Tarmacked 
Bwaise – Lugoba Kawempe re–graveled 
Kamwokya – Kyebando Central/Kawempe re–graveled 
Mengo – Balintuma Lubaga Tarmacked 
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These are few of the examples of the roads that we observed. During the interviews with 
chairmen of Kawempe and Lubanga, each of them had an ambitious programme for roads 
that were either to be opened or re – gravelled. Two observations need to be made about 
roads works. First the political leaders have roads as a priority because a new road or a re – 
gravelled road is a “vote–catcher”646. Roads are more visible as political projects, that is, they 
are, relevant as a point of reference when political leaders are counting their achievements 
while in office to their voters. Secondly, roads are a priority of the central government’s 
programme of poverty eradication campaign. The road sector therefore, gets priority funding 
from the government to local governments. This priority has been greatly assisted by 
availability of the World Bank–funded Local Government Development Project (LGDP) 
which has availed funds to the government, specifically for investment by local governments 
in local–level projects, among which, roads are a key priority. The idea behind this kind of 
local investment is that if the citizens see projects being implemented in their localities, this 
could increase their willingness to pay taxes to local governments. Thus in most areas we 
visited during the course of this study, we observed that most roads were being worked on. 
However a large sign–post was always placed with words “This is a local Government 
Development Project (LGDP)”. To the ordinary people, whether the financial resources for 
LGDP came from World Bank or KCC is not something they are seriously bothered about. 
What they mind is that a road or any other project is done in their locality by their local 
government647. 
 
Apart from roads works being a key source of “political capital” for local leaders, they are a 
meaningful economic investment for local governments. Whenever a good access road is 
opened in an area, the value of the property of the residents appreciates considerably because 
tenants want to live in places which are more easily accessible especially, by public transport. 
Thus, during our interviews with all Engineers in Kampala’s five Divisions, roads were 
                                            
646 In an interview with Mr. Takuba (Chairman Kawempe Division) on 23 April 2004, he listed the number 
roads done under his tenure ( so far 3 years) in office, in fulfilment of his election manifesto as including: 
Kafero road, Kiwonvu, Kyabakadde, Church road, Kimera, Mukalazi, Muganziwaza, Jakana, Lugoba, Tula, 
Spencon, Komamboga, Kizanyilo, Nakamilo and Nabukalu. He said when he meets people on his tours through 
the Division, the voters are appreciating his work. 
647 According to one key informant at Makindye Division, sometimes local leaders get false credit for roads 
done by central government in the city. Under the Local Government Act, trunk roads are a responsibility of the 
central government. When the government works on them, local residents come to praise local leaders for the 
work they “have done”. 
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number one priority for most of the parish development committees that requested for 
projects under the LGDP funds. 
 
The challenges involved in providing infrastructural services in Kampala are numerous. The 
first is technical (both human and physical). In all the five Divisions of Kampala, there is one 
qualified Engineer in each Division648, against the established posts of five per division. On 
the side of the plant and machinery, the Divisions, which are the nerve–centres of service 
provision, share one grader between themselves. In other words, the capacity of the Divisions 
to routinely maintain roads is severely constrained by lack of equipment. These two problems 
are compounded by another problem of inadequate financial resources. For example, the 
problem is of Central Division that most of the roads under its jurisdiction are tarmac. On one 
hand this may appear like an advantage, on the other, this is real a problem because roads in 
the central business district wear out quickly due to heavy traffic, which means that they have 
to be fixed routinely. Yet, the cost of fixing tarmac roads is not comparable to that of gravel 
roads. Tarmac roads cost far much higher. It is estimated that the cost of tarmacking one 
kilometre of a road is shs.500 million equivalent to about US Dollars 300.000. In one way or 
the other, this is responsible for the persistent complaints from Kampala residents about the 
poor workmanship evident on the streets, which is so ubiquitous, to the extent that many 
observers sometimes wonder whether some of the road works were done under supervision of 
a qualified Engineer. However, one Engineer explained: 
Inadequate finances are the cause of the kind of sub – standard roads you 
sometimes see or some people complain about. Me, as an Engineer can’t do 
sub – standard work, it is against my professional training and ethics, but 
when you requisition for money from the authorities based on the bills of 
quantities for a specific work you are to undertake, they say “there is no 
enough money take this and see how to do it”. As a public servant, I can 
not refuse to do what I am told to do, so I do whatever can be done with the 
available funds649.  
 
These are the words of the Engineer in charge of Central Division, who further gave an 
example of work done on Kiyembe lane in the central business district of the city where they 
had to fix the road with stone chippings instead of asphalt concrete, due to the financial 
                                            
648 During our study visit, we found that the Engineer in charge at Kawempe was an Assistant Engineer; there 
was no substantive Division Engineer. 
649 Interview with Mr. Ronald Sebanenya, Division Engineer Central, on May 2004 
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limitations. The road lasted only two years before wearing out, and needed to be worked on, 
again. 
 
The other challenge associated with the road sector service provision is the unplanned built-
up locations. Since most of the land use in Kampala is unplanned, people built structures 
without due regard for the existing structure plan of the city. Some structures stand on areas 
that are planned for roads. In such cases, opening a new road is a big problem for KCC 
authorities because of the difficulty involved in demolishing those structures. Local 
politicians and popular opinion leaders prevail to the extent that if the structures are to be 
demolished for public works, the owners have to be adequately compensated. This is done 
regardless of the legal status under which one occupies the land. This complicates the whole 
process of road construction in Kampala city.  Further complication originates from the land 
tenure system  in the city where most of the land is under mailo land tenure system. For 
holders of this tenure, their rights to any form of land use is a constitutional matter. They 
have absolute rights over their land. Thus, for KCC to undertake any public works it has to 
seek a judicial order declaring that the land is needed for public works that are in public 
interest. Even then, compensation to such a land owner must be done at competitive 
commercial rates. According to Physical Planners interviewed for this study, the owners of 
mailo land have been partly responsible for retardation of development in the city because 
they lease their land to small– plot developers who congest the locations with unplanned 
structures. In turn, when KCC decides to extend services to those areas, there is lack of land 
on which to lay them650. 
 
In the financial analysis, KCC finds itself in a “catch–twenty two” situation. Whereas 
previously, that is, before decentralisation, the municipal services were limited to a few 
planned places, today decentralisation has increased people’s expectations for services, 
including the marginalised areas. Thus, when the local authority completes fixing a road in 
one neighbourhood, the next one places its demands for its area. This is partly due to the 
historical legacy of marginalisation of most of the areas in Kampala. For most people in these 
                                            
650 In interview on 19 May 2004 with Mr Robert Ndiwalana, the Physical Planner for Makindye Division, he 
underscored the point that mailo land was a big problem for development in Kampala. He said most of the under 
– development in Makindye and Lubaga division is due to mailo land tenure. He attributed the development in 
Nakawa division to existence of public land, which is controlled by KCC. He attributed the rise of  “rich man’s” 
slums in Kisugu, Kansanga, Muyenga to mailo land tenure 
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areas, municipal services are not a given, they come as god–sent. Thus as Samuel Humes puts 
it, local governments face a daunting task of providing an environment for economic and 
social development since indications are that there is “paucity for these amenities so essential 
if progress is to be achieved651“. Indeed, advocates of decentralisation argue that the primacy 
of local government in infrastructural service provision lies in factors such as: identification 
of local preferences, application of relevant technology, appropriate costs (local people know 
the right prices), increased accountability through participatory decision making and equity, 
by choosing the type of infrastructure beneficial to large sections of the community652. Thus, 
taking the case of Uganda in the period of decentralisation, the tasks of infrastructure 
provision were assigned to local governments. This however, seems to have posed a big 
challenge to the latter. Not only do local governments complain of the high costs of providing 
services, they also complain of being overburdened by the central government with too many 
of these responsibilities, yet financial resources raised locally and from the central 
government are insufficient to cope with them. 
 
Local government investments have only become possible because the World Bank is 
responsible for funding most of them. In 1999, the Uganda government received credit of 
80.9 US million Dollars from the World Bank under the Local Government Development 
Program for purposes of financing local investments by local governments. The rationale for 
World Bank involvement is underpinned by the belief that such investments would create 
capacity at the local level by increasing the willingness of the people to pay taxes to local 
authorities, alleviating poverty and enhancing community participation in decision-making 
and project management.  
 
6.3 The Local Government Development Programme     
The Local Government Development Programme (LGDP) was conceived by the government 
of Uganda and supported by the World Bank. The specific objectives of the LGDP are: to 
enhance locally generated revenue base, create affordable local investments, increase 
participation of the local communities in development activities, and to help local 
governments experiment with alternative ways of raising revenue and providing services. 
                                            
651 Samuel Hulmes, “The Role of Local Government in Economic Development in Africa” Journal of 
Administration Overseas Vol. 12, No 1 (1973) p. 21. 
652 See Jessica Seddon, “Decentralisation of Infrastructure” in Jannie Latvak and Jessica Seddon, 
Decentralisation: Briefing Notes (opcit) 
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These objectives were informed by a realisation that most government projects have tended 
to be “top–down”, which has limited the involvement of key stakeholders and target 
beneficiaries. As a result, the perception of the people towards such projects is one of seeing 
projects as ‘external’ to their community, leading to failure to own them – which undermines 
the sustainability of such projects653. LGDP therefore requires 10 percent contribution from 
the beneficiary community as counter funding for project resources originating from the 
LGDP fund. This is intended to enhance community ownership of the project, and involve 
local communities in the project in their areas so that they have a stake in it. Moreover, the 
project idea is supposed to originate from that community itself. As the World Bank asserts: 
Successful implementation of this project is, therefore, dependent on a 
strong sense of ownership by the clients, effective community participation 
and consultation, identification of the most appropriate, affordable, cost–
effective solution . . . proper design [and] proper provision for operations 
and maintance654. 
 
These benchmarks, it was envisaged, would be operationalised through the parish 
development committees (PDCs) which would conceive, discuss and forward project 
proposals to the higher levels of local government. Our finding on this “participatory 
approach” bears some contradictory results. In some areas, the ordinary people were 
consulted, in other areas, such consultation never took place.  
 
6.4 Participation and Consultation in Local Public Investments 
In Kamwokya (Central Division) in Kampala, LGDP funds to the tunes of Shs.38 million 
were earmarked for that parish. A parish council was convened to determine the priorities, 
these were: street lighting, safe water provision and drainage.  The parish council 
immediately identified drainage as the main priority for the area.  The Shs.38 million, 
however was not sufficient for the drainage project. The councillors approached an NGO 
called Concern International, which agreed to counter fund the project by giving another 
Shs.38 million. The project was successfully implemented655. On the other side there is a 
Kagugube case (also in Central Division). The Division decided unilaterally to set up a public 
                                            
653 World Bank Uganda Local Government Project, Report No. PID7841 (1999). 
654 ibid p.5 
655 The narrative was made to me in an interview with Mr. James Kakooza, Chairman LC1, Church Zone 
Kamwokya II, on 29 April 2004. I observed that the drainage channel was being built and the Northern side of 
Kamwokya no longer floods. 
  
279
water–borne toilet in Kivulu, Kagugube parish.  The toilet is reported to have cost Shs. 47 
million. According to the residents interviewed in this area, their councillor at the Division 
decided to request for the construction of the toilet without consulting the residents of the 
area. For many years, the toilet had no water connected to it. During these years, thugs 
vandalised and stole the installations.  Because the community was not consulted, the facility 
was never utilised by its members. A proprietor of a private school in the vicinity, whose 
school had no toilet facilities, requested the local leaders to allow his students and staff to use 
the toilet. When his request was granted, he replaced the installations, connected water to the 
“public” toilet and “appropriated” it for private use. 
 
Between the two examples there is something to learn about people’s participation in LGD 
projects. For example, of the 208 respondents who were asked whether they are regularly 
consulted on local projects, 96 (46.2%) said “yes” while 112 (53.8%) said “no”. This is 
significant because in some areas of local, residents are consulted on development projects 
while in others, they are not. 
 
 
Table 26:  Showing indicators of the projects in which Kampala residents have been 
consulted 
 
Activity Frequency Percent 
Road construction 
Water and drainage 
Sanitation and toilets 
School construction 
Street lights 
Poverty eradication projects 
Garbage collection 
32 
48 
8 
8 
8 
8 
8 
88 
15.4 
23.1 
3.8 
3.8 
3.8 
3.8 
3.8 
42.3 
Total 208 100 
Source: Field survey findings   
 
Roads, water and drainage have a strong showing in the table because these are the areas 
where KCC activities have been more visible. The majority of the respondents 88 (42.3%) 
indicated garbage collection because gave it is a nuisance in Kampala city. It is reported that 
almost every meeting of local residents, the issue of garbage comes up frequently. 
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Table 27: Showing Profile of Some of the KCC Projects respondents identified in their 
area 
Area Project 
Luzira Stage 7 Zone, Nakawa Division KCC through Kampala Urban Sanitation 
Project (KUSP) put a large water tank, at 
Luzira C.O.U. Primary School. Under the 
same project, public toilets and piped water 
have been planned for the area. 
Bukasa, Katongole Zone, Makindye 
Division 
KCC has built a new primary school, Bukasa 
KCC Primary School. There is also a BEUPA 
school. 
Sebina Zone, Kawempe Division KCC has worked on the drainage channels 
Kimanyi Zone Kawempe Division KCC has constructed a public toilet in the 
area 
Kitamanyagamba Zone, Central Division KCC has put in place street lights 
Serwadda Zone, Kabowa, Lubaga Division KCC has worked on Wamala – Kabuusu road 
Church Zone, Kamwokya II, Central 
Division 
KCC has graded Kisalasalo – Kyebando road. 
Drainage channels have been dug in 
Kifumbira Zone 
Kibe Zone, Kawempe Division 
 
KCC has put in place ecosan toilets in two 
Zones ie Kibe and Kiggundu 
Nakamiro Zone Kawempe Drainage channel was done 
Komamboga Kawempe Division Protected spring was done 
 
 
In most cases, residents reported that their leaders do not always consult them on 
development projects and many areas (at LC1) have no such projects. Residents in Bukasa, 
Makindye Division reported that although they are usually consulted, their ideas are rarely 
implemented. This is sometimes due to the perceived pecuniary interests that local leaders 
have in the implementation of projects.656 For example, the residents of Mukalazi Zone in 
Bukoto, Nakawa Division reported that they are usually consulted by LCs at the early stages 
of conceiving projects but not in the implementation process because, “We shall ask how 
much money they were given for the project which they are usually unwilling to reveal, so 
we are consulted on the project but not on money spent.”657 On the other hand, the residents 
of Nanfuka Zone, Nateete in Lubaga Division were consulted on the construction of a road in 
                                            
656 Similar findings were reported in another study, Republic of Uganda, Uganda Participatory Poverty 
Assessment Report ,2000 pp 106 – 110. It is reported that ordinary people think that corruption and self – 
enrichment by leaders in government from top to bottom are the cause of failure of government – sponsored 
projects in the local communities. 
657 Focus group discussion with the residents of Mukalazi Zone, Bukoto in Nakawa Division held on 29 May 
2004. 
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their area but some of residents ‘frustrated’ or obstructed the proposal altogether. A 
respondent said: 
KCC officials came here and met with us. We had a village council 
meeting where we decided that a road connecting this area and Mutundwe 
(the adjacent village) be constructed. However some people down the 
stream frustrated the idea because their houses would be demolished in the 
course of constructing the road. Up to this day, we have not had the road, 
we have to go all around to get to Mutundwe658. 
 
In another area, Kikuubo Zone in Kawempe Division, the respondents reported that the 
problem with consultations is that they are done when the policy makers have already made 
up their minds about what they want and that the “consultation” becomes a mere formality. 
One respondent asserted: 
We have been consulted on the garbage collection fee that is about to be 
introduced. Although many residents here do not approve of it, we know 
that KCC and private companies have already fixed the fee659. 
 
From the above perspectives, it is clear that the modes and rationale for consultations or 
participation are varied. The dominant perception amongst the ordinary citizens is that 
corruption in government structures is widespread, they are merely cosmetic and that popular 
decisions are not always implemented.  
 
At the lowest level (LC1) i.e. zone or village, the majority of the residents reported that the 
frequency of village council meetings was satisfactory as the table below shows. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 28: Showing Frequency of Meeting at LC1 (Village Council) 
Period for meeting Frequency Percent 
Once a month 136 65.4 
Once every 3 months 56 26.9 
Once in 6 months 8 3.8 
Others 8 3.8 
                                            
658 Respondent in Kikuubo Zone, Kawempe Division (interview held on 24 May 2004). 
659 Respondent in Kikuubo Zone, Kawempe Division (interview held on 24 May 2004). 
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Total  208 100 
 
From the table above, there is evidence that regular consultations do take place at the lowest 
level (LC1) as 65.4% reported that village council meetings take place very month. If that is 
added to 26.9% where some villages have their meetings at least within three months, that is 
more than 90% indication of local – level consultation. Moreover, when respondents were 
asked whether they personally attend such meetings, the findings pointed in a similar 
direction as the table below shows. 
 
Table 29: Showing attendance of LC1 Meetings by the area residents 
Attendance Frequency Percent 
Yes 
No 
192 
16 
92.3 
7.7 
 208 100 
  
When the same respondents were asked what key issues they are consulted about, the results 
were that 144 (69.2%) reported the issue of security of their neighbourhoods was the main 
priority at all meetings. A miserable 48 (23.1%) scored development projects as a key issue at 
the village council meetings. “Other issues” scored 16 (7.7%) as their key priorities. Security 
is indeed, a priority because the LC1 is in–charge of its neighbourhood security affairs. For 
example, they employ locally hired militia known as Local Defence Forces (LDF), who are 
supervised by the LC1 Chairperson and his / her Secretary for defence. The LDF patrol the 
area at night. They are fully armed, and are usually in constant communication with the 
police. This partly explains why most areas in Kampala are relatively safe. Incidents of crime 
do occur and when they do, they are a subject of discussion at LC1 meetings. The residents 
on their part voluntarily pay Shs.1000 per homestead each month for this purpose. 
 
6.5 Conduct of Local Council (LC) Executive and Other KCC Leaders 
In several cases, as has been noted, the residents were not consulted on development projects. 
There is therefore paucity of knowledge about what their LC’s, or higher local governments 
have done in the area. The reasons advanced by respondents for failure by the LC’ s and local 
governments to consult them, include: the corrupt tendencies on the part of LC executives, 
incompetence of some LC chairpersons, some LC leaders lack programmes for their areas, 
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the failure of higher local governments to remit the statutory 25 percent, LC executives are 
pre – occupied with “survival” rather than doing their public duty660.  
 
As respondents reported, some LC leaders in Kampala, are engaged in extortion of monies 
from traders, by imposing illegal levies which generate monies that end up not in the KCC 
treasury but in the private pockets of LCs. It was reported for example, that LCs create illegal 
markets that are not gazetted by KCC. For example, street trading along Nakivubo and 
Channel streets has persisted, despite KCC’s efforts to clear the streets of such activities. It is 
reported that the LCs levy and collect money from the street vendors for private gain. 
Another case is that of “Arua” park in Central Division. The former Resident District 
Commissioner (RDC) of Kampala661 reported to this author that LCs of that area impose 
unofficial levies on the trucks which park there. During his tenure as the RDC, he received 
complaints from the truck owners, he intervened on their behalf by directing the LCs not 
impose unofficial and illegal charges on the business people, but to no avail. According to 
him, the LCs “would find other ways of going about it”. These tendencies have had some 
negative effects on the way LC officials conduct their official business. 
 
In Central Division, especially in the central business district, most LC chairpersons have 
been in office since 1980s to date because the LC activities, are positions from which they 
make a living, thus at election time, they will do anything possible including bribing voters, 
so that they keep them in office. The other tendency is that in the central business district the 
LC officials have created cliques around them. Once a chairperson is elected to LC office, he 
makes sure that he nominates an executive committee composed mainly of his friends, who 
will “cooperate” with him.  
 
These tendencies are difficult to eliminate because in Kampala, they constitute an election 
machine for local leaders. Leaders vying for higher positions in local government depend on 
the LC leaders at the LC1 level to mobilise voters for them. Thus, once elected, the leaders in 
higher positions of local government find it difficult to check the illegal activities of the LC 
leaders at the lower level. Because there is excessive abuse of power by LC and local 
                                            
660 LC executives work on voluntary basis that is they are not paid for the public duty. This, to some extent has 
discouraged the more respectable people from accepting to be elected in those positions. 
661 The former RDC of Kampala is Mr. Kiwanuka – Musisi (interview with him on 8 June 2004). 
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government officials, some people now believe that the city was better managed before 
decentralisation. One key informant holding this view gave the example below to illustrate 
his point. 
In 2003, the State Minister of Health, Mr. Mukula closed on informal food 
market on Channel street, where about 500 people operate, due to the poor 
sanitary conditions of the place. That food market is in the neighbourhood 
of an open sewer, where flies originating from the sewer swarm the food. It 
was suspected that these people were cooking their food with dirty water 
from the channel. When the Minister inspected the place, he closed that 
food market but the LCs of the area appealed to our chairman (Central 
Division) who ordered that the market be re–opened. Now, if the Minister 
can be defied what about a mere health worker like me662. 
 
This example illustrates clearly that the people occupying positions of leadership in local 
government in Kampala have become predatory through client – patron networks. These 
networks have become so institutionalised that they have alienated the ordinary people whose 
trust in the local council system has waned over time. The networks also frustrate local 
government civil servants from doing their work properly. These networks seem to 
characterise the whole political realm in Uganda under the NRM regime which has 
entrenched these client – patron relations as a basis of retaining political power both at the 
centre and the local level. As one study observes “In recent years in Uganda, becoming an 
MP (or local councillor/leader) has often been referred to as “getting a job”663. 
 
Within this context, LCs and local governments have suffered the crude forms of corruption, 
lack of internal probity and a silent crisis of legitimacy. As a result, local officials are treated 
by the people with suspicion which engineers a general feeling that their motives are to serve 
self interest rather than the public good. This has undermined their credibility as “watch – 
dogs” of the people’s interests, for example, in supervision of the works done by contractors 
in their area. For instance one opinion written in the Ugandan Press “Kampalans don’t trust 
KCC” laments thus: 
Simple as it is, KCC is not an organisation with a very honourable track 
record and therefore does not earn a lot of respect from the ordinary town 
                                            
662 Narrated by Mr. John Lule, Inspector of Public Health, Central Division in an interview held on 17 May 
2004. 
663 See Donna Punkhurst “Women and Politics in Africa: the case of Uganda” Parliamentary Affairs, Vol. 55, 
No1, (2002), p. 122. Also M. Mamdani, And Fire Does not Always Beget Ash: Critical Reflections on the 
NRM, The Monitor Publications 1995. 
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folk. When it is not controversial, it is inconsistent, lacks seriousness and is 
at times drowned in malfeasance and outright corruption. 
 
The opinion writer adds: 
By the time a typical city dweller gets home amidst dust–filled atmosphere, 
he has passed through the garbage–littered, traffic gridlocked and at times 
flooded streets. He has had to dodge prominent water–filled potholes. 
(Meanwhile) . . . those who are lucky to own television set may catch a 
glimpse of a smiling mayor easing out of the comfort of his car complete 
with personalised number plates. All these facilities courtesy of the lean 
coffers of a city that does not seem to work. 
 
 This near–poetic description of Kampala’s situation is, but a representation of reality of what 
KCC is. Most press reports indicate that KCC leaders are “grabbers” and are short on 
accountability. For example, it was reported that the head teacher of Kiswa Primary School in 
Nakawa Division charged each student in the school Shs.5300, which totalled to Shs.9 
million for construction of a pit latrine at the school, whereas the actual cost of the work was 
Shs.5.5 million, of which KCC paid Shs.4.5 million and Nakawa Division Shs.1 million664. 
 
The failure of accountability in KCC forced the World Bank in 2001 to appoint its own 
Director of Finance for KCC. The officer, however, quit KCC in February 2003 citing 
“massive corruption in KCC which was hampering service delivery665“. Surprisingly, it 
seems that corrupt officials in the local governments have their patrons in the central 
government to cushion them. For example, it was reported that the former Minister of Local 
Government, Bidandi Ssali, while opening a seminar on accountability for District Chief 
Administrative Officers (CAOs) said: 
Sometimes I laugh when I hear that a CAO has “eaten” Shs.800 million . . . 
It is only that he has failed to account because he lacks the capacity to do 
so. Losing a receipt does not mean he didn’t buy the items in question . . . It 
is a few rotten tomatoes making the whole basket appear rotten666. 
 
Comments of this kind, coming from a central government Minister may imply that the 
government is not keen on curbing corruption that is rampant both in central and local 
                                            
664 See Sunday Vision 1 February 2004 under its special report “How decentralisation took corruption to the 
districts” Several other cases of similar nature in other districts, cf The Monitor, 8 October 2002 “AG orders 
Mbarara to account for Shs. 1.5 billion”, The New Vision 25 February 2002 “KCC Poorly Managed”. 
665 The Weekly Message 4 – 10 February 2003. 
666 The Monitor 19 November, 2002, p. 2 
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government departments. They encourage local officials to continue perpetuating graft in 
local government projects. Such practices are not in tandem with the principles of good 
governance. The net losers are the intended beneficiaries–the ordinary people. For example, it 
has been reported that the government lost about Shs.15 billion in poor classroom 
construction under the School Facility Grant that it extends to districts to put up schools for 
universal primary education. It is revealed in this context, that in a value–for–money audit 
done at 140 school construction sites, 45 percent were unsatisfactory667. Taking this as a case 
in point, the statement by the Minister referred to above, tantamounts to excusing or giving a 
blessing to this level of fraud in local governments. Such attitudes and behaviours seem to 
undermine the stated and the envisaged benefits of the local government development project 
in public investment whose goal is “to ensure improved delivery of basic services to the civic 
society and in the process, promote efficiency, effectiveness, transparency and 
accountability668“. 
 
6.6 Alternative Service Delivery Mechanisms 
KCC’s Strategic Framework for Reform (SFR) whose main objective was to transform KCC 
from a “supply-driven” to a “demand–driven” organization was an innovation that could have 
become a “white elephant” if it had not received substantial funding from the central 
government and the donors. This is particularly so because the local revenue base of KCC has 
remained narrow despite tremendous efforts by KCC officials to improve it over the years. At 
the same time, KCC as an organization remained bureaucratic, and lacking essentials tools to 
do its job of delivering serving effectively and efficiently. 
Thus, KCC’s move to experiment with alternative service delivery mechanisms (ASDM) was 
an idea that was likely to see SFR’s goals to reality. The alternative service delivery 
mechanisms aim at: 
(a) contracting out and privatisation of service delivery functions 
(b) financing and management of key prioritized infrastructure, 
(c) mobilization of revenue and prudent financial management measures and 
(d) improvement of the KCC institutional capacity to deliver services. 
 
                                            
667 The New Vision 7 April 2005. The New Vision reporting the findings of Anti – Corruption Strategy Report 
(2005). 
668 World Bank, (opcit) Local Government Development Program, p. 2 
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The ASDM was borne out of realisation within KCC that services were poorly delivered. For 
example most anti–malarial drains, especially in slum areas of Ndeeba, Nateete, Bwaise, 
Kisenyi, Kalerwe, Katanga and others, were inadequately tended, they had become 
overgrown with bushes and utilised by some residents for disposal of solid waste as well as 
human excreta, thus posing a threat to human life in terms of being breeding grounds for 
malaria–carrying mosquitoes and other organisms likely to cause communicable diseases. 
Besides, KCC garbage collection and disposal has been at a minimal level, leaving the 
residents to find their way of dealing with this problem. Physical infrastructure in the areas of 
road maintenance, street lighting and construction and repair of schools has been in a bad 
state. Simple works like filling potholes on aging roads could not be done. 
 
 Basic services like the examples given above could not be provided by KCC because its tax 
base has been narrow and most tax avenue sources have remained unexploited.   This has 
largely been due to its lack of adequate information, poor record system, poor financial 
management, poor management and wastage. 
 
In response to the above, ASDM was geared towards targeting areas that could enhance 
service delivery and in the process improve people’s perceptions of KCC’s image. In so 
doing, the people could pay taxes which KCC could use to reduce its financial deficits and 
plan investments. In assessing the internal capacity of KCC for instance, the World Bank 
observed: “The bottom line is that KCC still remains financially dependent on external 
resources to meet its capital investment needs669“ 
 
6.7 Fiscal Decentralisation and Management in KCC 
The World Bank estimated that KCC revenues per annum were in the range of US dollars 10 
to 12 million, of which recurrent expenditure was about 10 million US dollars, leaving a very 
marginal surplus for capital investment670. Based on this estimate, the World Bank projected 
that it would take KCC about eight years (from 2000) to be able to meet its operational and 
investment costs from its own resources. The issue raised by the World Bank on KCC on 
revenue dependence is, indeed critical. For example during the financial year 2001/2001, the 
budget of KCC indicates that for its budget of Shs.93.6 billion, its own local revenue was 
                                            
669 ibid World Bank (1999) p. 23 
670 ibid, p. 23 
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estimated at Shs.26.2 billion, central government contribution was Shs.16.7 billion, while 
external funding stood at Shs.50.7 billion671. This means that KCC’s own revenue 
contributed less than 30 percent of its budget. 
 
Looking at specific sources of revenue, the SRF objective of progressively raising revenue in 
KCC seems to be critical. The main sources include graduated tax, property rates, markets, 
trading licenses and motor–vehicle parks. 
 
6.7.1 Graduated Tax: Its Contribution and Controversy  
Graduated tax; this is a form of lead tax with varying rates depending on one’s income, 
payable annually by all males of 18 years old and above, as well as females in the same age 
bracket, who are in gainful employment. This traditional form of tax was for a long time the 
main source of revenue for most local governments, including KCC. Despite tax incentives, 
including local government investment in services, the revenue from this tax has been 
declining. The table bellow illustrates this.   
 
Table 30:  Showing Graduated Tax Collection Performance 
Year Estimate Actual 
Collection 
Variance Percent 
Performance 
1998 / 99 
1999 / 2000 
2000 / 2001 
2001 / 2002 
July/ October 
4.700.000.000 
4.706.250.000 
5.070.950.000 
3610.643.000 
1.203.457667 
3.862.608.912 
3.636.195.352 
3.192.993.000 
 
393.312.167 
-837.393.088 
-1.070.054.646 
-1.877.957.000 
-810.312.167 
82 
-22.7 
63 
 
33 
Source: KCC, Budget Framework Paper 2002 / 2003 p. 36. 
Kampala as a district had obvious advantages over all other districts and municipal local 
governments in terms of collecting revenue from graduated tax because of being a capital 
city. Most senior civil servants, powerful industrialists and business people live and work in 
Kampala. These are high income citizens or workers. Since graduated tax as a personal 
income tax is deducted directly by the employers from their wages and remitted directly to 
KCC, this is a viable source of revenue for the KCC local authority. Moreover, because most 
of the senior civil servants and business executives have higher income compared to peasants 
in the rural districts, they normally pay the highest annual levy of Shs.100.000 per person. 
                                            
671 KCC, Local Government Budget Framework Paper 2002 / 2003, pp. 33 – 35. 
  
289
According to KCC, this source of revenue had been growing over the years, for example 
from Shs.3.5 billion in 1997/8 to Shs.3.8 billion in 1998 / 99 but steadily declined since 2000. 
 
The reason advanced by KCC for low returns on graduated tax include: poor assessment of 
tax–payers, late printing of tax tickets, most workers in Kampala paying graduated tax in 
other district surrounding Kampala, political interference (for example councillors discourage 
their residents from paying taxes672) and enforcement of graduated tax is usually late673. Of 
all these factors, the most critical one in reducing payment of local taxes to local authorities is 
a period during which elections are held. For example, in the year 2001 and 2006 there were 
elections for president, parliament and local councils. Presidential candidate (incumbent) 
Yoweri Museveni directed that the lowest thresh hold be reduced from Shs.10.000 to 
Shs.3.000. On the other hand, his closest political rival Kiiza Besigye campaigned on grounds 
that if he were elected he would abolish graduated tax. Besigye argued that all local 
governments in Uganda collect about Shs.40 billion and that this was a small fraction of 
Uganda’s annual budget, which should not bother an ordinary person since it could be footed 
by central government if graft and wasteful tendencies were minimized. Graduated tax was 
still the centre of debates during the local councils’ elections that followed the presidential 
ones. Because this tax was so much politicized, most local government collected lower 
revenues from this source. Since 2001, the debate on abolition or retention of this tax has 
raged on, including in parliament. In the parliament, a private members’ motion was tabled 
aiming at abolishing graduated tax674. The reasons advanced in the motion. (a) it is a colonial 
tax which was introduced as poll tax to force local people to work for cash and pay direct tax, 
which was hated, (b) it is a regressive tax to the extent that the poor people pay proportionally 
higher tax compared to the rich and (c) its assessment is usually corrupt and unfair and its 
collection is ruthless and inhuman. Above all, the motion argues that its contribution to local 
government revenues, though the largest, is a small percentage of the total revenue in relation 
to grants and donor contribution. As a contribution to the national revenue it is a mere 3%. 
The motion further argued that the costs involved in collecting graduated tax are as high as 
                                            
672 In all Divisions where we conducted this study technical officers blamed low returns on taxes on councillors, 
whom they use populist politics to discourage their voters from paying taxes, yet councillors get heir allowances 
from these taxes. 
673 Graduated tax payment is enforced crudely by local police, mititia, and chiefs arresting tax defaulters 
forcefully tying their hands and bandling them on trucks 
674 The motion was proposed by Hon. Y. Okullo – Epak. See The Monitor 16 April 2004. Epak is quoted to have 
told parliament that graduated tax is “a levy with high nuisance value”.  Graduated has actually been avolished. 
  
290
50% of the total collection. Moreover, other countries in East Africa such as Kenya and 
Tanzania had abolished it. Scholars who have studied this form of tax as far back as the 
1960s have similar views as those contained in the motion. Southhall and Gutkind say: 
The introduction of a system of graduated tax in 1955, even with the low 
ceiling of Shs.120 per year maximum, gives the better off a slightly grater 
incentive to evade payment and throws the primitive nature of the system 
of collection into sharper relief675. 
 
These authors also observed that, at that time, the practice of chiefs in apprehending 
graduated tax defaulters was such that they tended to zero on pedestrians (or the poor) rather 
than “those on bicycles and still more, those in cars (because these were perceived to be) 
respectable citizens or chiefs or other persons of high status whom it would be insulting and 
improper to interogate676“. Unfortunately, this is still the practice677. The local chiefs who 
stage road – blocks to check the tax defaulters rarely bother about those sitting in their cars, 
their main prey are pedestrians. 
 
More recent studies of local government taxation, also point to the fact that graduated tax is 
very regressive and administratively difficult to collect678. 
 
It is important to note that although the Uganda government decentralized responsibilities to 
local governments; it did not create significant avenues for them to raise revenues to finance 
them. The revenue system has remained static while responsibilities have expanded 
                                            
675 Opcit.See Southall and Gutkind, opcit, Townsmen in the Making (1956) p. 204 
676 ibid p. 204 
677 See Price Waterhouse Coopers, Local Revenue Enhancement Study (a report done for Local Government 
Finance Commission) November 2000. The report recommended that since the cost of collecting graduated tax 
was very high, the government should explore the possibilities of introducing a Rural Development Tax based 
on the acreage of land. The report says that this alternative tax would be much easier to administer than 
graduated tax. However this recommendation has never been implemented. Instead, government officials 
rejected the motion in parliament for abolition of graduated tax, saying that the proponents of the motion had not 
suggested an alternative source of revenue to replace graduated tax. This report also dispelled a widely held 
view that there is “anti – tax payment” culture amongst Ugandans. Their findings are similar to ours, in the 
sense that tax payers attach their preference to tax payment in relation to services rendered. See The Monitor 14 
April 2004, angry residents protesting the behaviour of KCC tax agents who even checked people’s homes, 
invading their privacy. One resident is quoted to have said. “They invade your home as if you have stolen 
millions of shillings”           
 
678 Ian Livingstone and Roger Carlton, “Financing Decentralised Development in a Low income country: 
Raising Revenue for Local Governments in Uganda” Development and Change Vol 32 No 1, 2001. See also, 
Uganda Government, Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Local Government System (1987) p. 93. 
paragraph 242 where it was argued that graduated tax was “primitive, arbitrary in its methods of assessment . .. 
expensive to collect and that the collection exercise leaves room for extra–judicial extortion by the unscrupulous 
officials. 
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considerably. When we interviewed respondents in Kampala about their willingness to pay 
taxes, the following were the responses in the table below. 
 
Table 31: Showing residents’ willingness to pay local taxes 
Issue Frequency Percent 
Willing to pay if tax leads to development  56 26.9 
I would dodge taxes if I can 32 15.4 
I would pay some taxes and not others 8 3.8 
I would pay those taxes that correspond to services rendered 96 46.2 
I have no option but pay 16 7.7 
Total 208 100 
 
From the table above, there is evidence that most citizens are willing to pay taxes, if the taxes 
lead to development 26.9% and if they lead to better service delivery 46.2%. Only a minority 
15.4% say they are unwilling to pay taxes. It should be further noted that for most ordinary 
citizens, local tax payment is synonymous with graduated tax, which is a compulsory annual 
tax levy. It is possible that our respondents were referring to graduated tax. Therefore given 
the high percentage of people willing to pay taxes, the problem of failure by KCC to raise 
revenue is largely due to poor or lack of services that the citizens expect it to offer679. Indeed, 
the Local Government Finance Commission (LGFC) a statutory body responsible for inter – 
governmental relations in Uganda has also observed that there is a relationship between 
citizens’ willingness to pay taxes and service delivery. LGFC argues that citizens are likely to 
trust government only to the extent that they believe that it will act in their interests, it will be 
fair and reasonable, and likely to reciprocate the trust680. This trust seems to have been eroded 
during the many years when service delivery by government came to a standstill. However 
even after decentralisation, severe financial constraints and mismanagement still lead to 
unsatisfactory service delivery by local governments. 
 
Kampala’s unique position as a capital city makes it appear rich compared to other districts 
and municipalities in terms of revenue generation. In the year 2000/2001, KCC collected 
Shs.22.490.178.00 while total collection for all local governments (including Kampala) was 
                                            
679 See Bukedde 30 August 2004, the residents of Bwaise complained that KCC was not attending to Nsoba 
drainage channel. That, KCC worked on 8 kilometres.  The rest was bushy silted, leading to pay taxes because 
their environment  is not properly attended to, by KCC. 
680 LGFC, Mobilising and Generating Local Revenue, report of the Regional Workshops on the Best practices in 
mobilizing and generating local revenues, February 2004. 
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Shs.43.850.783.994. In other words, KCC alone collected about a half of what all other local 
governments collected. The problem however is that KCC caters for almost half of the urban 
population in Uganda, put together. In comparison with the rural districts, KCC service sector 
is relatively more expensive.  For example, the rural districts do not have the responsibility 
for tarmac roads, which KCC shoulders. Rural districts do not have to cater for street lighting 
or street cleaning or garbage disposal. There is hardly any electricity in rural areas and rural 
dwellers utilize their solid waste for manure. In other words, per capita expenditure in rural 
areas for rural services is likely to be much lower. 
 
6.7.2 Rates as a Key Revenue Source for Funding Municipal Government 
As we noted above, graduated tax still constitutes a bulk of revenue that KCC collects 
although its percentage of all collections has been gradually falling since mid 1990s. The 
dominance of graduated tax revenue has been largely due to failure by KCC to collect 
property rates. Property rate is a tax on properties (e.g. private houses, commercial premises, 
factories etc) based on their rental value. In Uganda this tax is mainly levied on urban 
properties under the Rating Decree (1979). Despite the existence of this law, KCC has not 
been collecting this tax effectively because most properties had not been valued for years. 
According to one of key informants, between 1972 and 1992, there had not been any 
valuation in Kampala, yet this is supposed to be done every five years. However with 
assistance of the World Bank funding under the First Urban Project, valuations were done for 
most of the 15 rating zones in Kampala which was completed in 1994681. The table below 
shows improvements in the contribution of property rates to the revenue of KCC.  
 
Table 32:  Showing the Contribution of Property Rate to KCC Revenue 
Year Estimate (Shs) Actual (Shs) Variance (Shs) Percentage 
1998 / 99 
1999 / 2000 
2000 / 2001 
2001 / 2002 
July – October 
3.485.386.00 
3.372.074.277 
3.821.076.677 
3.197.599.000 
11.065.866.333 
1.568.288.475 
2.105.169.196 
2.884.013.000 
 
877.507.992 
-1.917.097.525 
-1.266.905.081 
-937.063.677 
188.358.341 
45 
62 
75 
 
82 
Source: KCC, Budget Framework Paper, 2002 / 2003 
                                            
681 Another Valuation was taking place at the time of this study (2004) ten years later. After the expiry of the 
first five years, the Valuation was extended by a ministerial order 
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Figures were for three months (July – October).682 
 
Evident from the table is the fact that even in recent years, property rates still contributed less 
revenue to KCC than graduated tax. Inspite of this, there has been tremendous improvement 
in the collection of this revenue, partly because the World Bank insists that KCC must do 
everything possible to ensure that property rates become the main source of revenue, the very 
reason the World Bank has directed some of its KCC funding towards improvement of this 
revenue source. A comparison of 1991 and 2003 reveals that revenue collection from 
property rates have actually increased about nine times. For example, KCC was collecting 
from this source Shs.405 million in 1991 compared to Shs.2.88 billion in 2000. During the 
period of this study it was revealed that improvements had been made in collection of 
property rates. For example, while Makindye Division collected Shs.238 million in 
2002/2003, they collected Shs.630 million in 2003/2004. However, the arrears owed to the 
Division amounted to Shs.7.2 billion683. Thus, despite improvement in the collection of this 
revenue, the arrears owed (in rates) to KCC are alarming. Key informants attributed people’s 
failure or unwillingness to pay rates to a number of reasons. It was reported that the rate–
payers complained that there is no value-for–money in terms of service rendered by KCC. 
Rates are normally paid to local councils so that they may provide services. The key 
informants (who are KCC employees) argue that it is a case of an adage of “what came first, 
the chicken or the egg”. The question they pose is: “where should KCC get the money to 
provide the services, if not from the tax payers?” Ordinary citizens interviewed on their part, 
argue that KCC acts like an extortionist organization, that its agents turn up, collect money 
and no visible services are rendered to their area684. In Nanfuka zone in 2003 there was a 
protest against taxation. Several other factors militate against collections of property rates. 
First, KCC does not do valuations in time to keep in tune with the new developments in the 
city685. Secondly, most of the developments in the city have no approved development plans, 
thus, it is difficult in some cases for KCC officials to know where new structures have been 
                                            
682 Source for 1991 figures, KCC, First Urban Project Output Report, September 1993, (appendix 3). 
683 Interview with Ms. Margaret Banura, Division Finance Officer, Makindye Division, on 23 May 2004. She 
intimated to me that KCC had wanted to cancel arrears but donors refused. 
684 Group discussion with the residents of Nanfuka Zone, Nateete, Lubaga Division, 13 May 2004. 
685 Valuations are supposed to be done every five years. Under the First Urban Project of the World Bank, 11 
out of the 15 Rating Zones in Kampala were done (39.000) valuations in all by 1995.KCC blames its failure to 
do five – yearly valuation to two factors: (i) it has to go through the office of Government Chief Valuer to do 
valuations which is not only ill – equipped and understaffed, (ii) KCC needs lots of money to have valuations 
done periodically as stipulated in the Rating law, which is usually a problem to raise. 
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established. Thirdly, most private houses are owner – occupied. Key informants argue that it 
is “practically difficult to evict or auction someone’s house. In Mankidye Division, for 
instance, ninety percent of the property is owner–occupied686“. 
 
Besides, property rates are politically sensitive in Kampala because most of the properties 
belong either to politicians, or politically–connected business people. Others belong to 
members of local councils. Apart from that, whenever KCC issues a demand note for 
property rate, a good number of tax–payers run to whoever politician they know to appeal on 
his or her behalf. This “politics” of taxation is more complicated by the fact that Kampala 
district is dominated by multiparty leaders, that is, most of the members of parliament, 
Division chairmen and the city mayor are multipartyist, something that does not go down 
well with the people in the Movement government. In many cases as the leaders in central 
government have been supportive of ordinary people to evade local taxes. For example some 
of the government leaders have been telling ordinary people that the government will fight to 
oust local leaders in Kampala including the mayor of the city because they do not support the 
Movement687. Our respondents observe that politicisation of tax collection is a major issue of 
concern for local governments, particularly in Kampala. A key informant in Makindye 
Division observes: 
In this area (Makindye Division) the multipartyists do not want to pay 
taxes, yet if you arrest them, the government will turn around and say “you 
are anti – Movement, you are undermining the Movement. On the other 
hand, the local leadership will also accuse you of arresting them because 
their political orientations688. 
 
Another respondent in the same Division sounded the same message saying: 
Sometimes when you are trying to enforce the payment of taxes someone 
may call the (Division) chairman. . . The chairman may call you ordering 
you to leave the tax payer alone. The chairman is our political boss, you 
have to comply with his order, this is the reason why tax returns are still 
very low689. 
 
                                            
686 Interview with Ms. Margaret Banura . 
687 See The Monitor 17, November 2004. The Monitor quoted the Presidential Political Assistant, Moses 
Byaruhanga telling people in Kisenyi II in Kampala at a meeting called by Minister Hon. Babu, the area 
Member of Parliament. 
688 Interview with Ms. Margaret Banura, Division Finance Officer, Makindye Division.   
689 Interview with Mr. Gidion Biryazahe, Council Agent Kibuye I, Makindye Division, 25 May 2004. 
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From these two related narratives; one is able to tell the level of political interference in 
matters of tax collection at the local level. Although Uganda collects one of the lowest taxes 
in Sub-Saharan Africa, that is 12 percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), still both the 
government and local authority leaders have not been keen to encourage the people to pay 
taxes. The government leaders have been pursuing a populist ideological line to secure a 
political base in Kampala, hitherto, controlled by multipartyists. On the other hand, the local 
leaders are doing everything possible to keep their constituencies, so that they may be re–
elected. Both sides are pursuing lines of political survival, which have adversely affected the 
proper functioning of local government. Technical staffs are caught in–between these 
positions. For example, a Council Agent told me that councillors in his area have almost 
“taken over” the role of the Council Agent. They interfere at every point he tries to enforce 
any council order. In local vernacular he said “bakulemesa” – (they make you fail). 
 
Apart from politicisation of tax collection, other technical and logistical issues have been 
raised in regard to collection of property rates. First of all, there is a problem of ageing 
properties. Since valuations are not regularly done, the owners of such properties usually 
contest the value that would have been attached to the property ten years ago. Secondly, some 
of the properties belong to people who work and live abroad. They are either under a care–
taker or tenant. Neither of these, is willing or has responsibility to pay the rates. Thirdly, there 
is an issue of ageing families or individual members of families without proper sources of 
income. Some are widows. There is also no law to cater for such property owners, who live in 
their own home but without proper income. Fourthly, there is a problem arising out of KCC’s 
lack of structure plans.  
 
There are several properties without access roads, street name or proper location. In such 
cases, rate collectors seldomly fail to deliver demand notes. This inevitably complicates the 
task of collecting property rates. When this factor combines with the frequent complaint by 
the technical staff that they lack basic logistics like official transport to enable them move in 
the field to oversee to the collection of taxes this explains why arrears of Shs.7.2 billion in 
rate arrears (in Makindye Division alone) can not be effectively collected. 
 
6.7.3 Trading License Fees 
  
296
Trading license fees, though established as a means of enforcing trade orders are a major 
source of revenue to local authorities in Uganda, and in particular to KCC. Depending on the 
size of business, such as wholesale shop, retail shop, workshops, salons, factories etc, the 
business person(s) must obtain a license from the local authority to operate in their area of 
jurisdiction. The Licensing Act (1969) governs this fee. It requires that the officials of the 
local authority to satisfy themselves that they are appropriate for the purpose of the business 
being established and inspect the business premises. 
 
Like other sources of revenue to local authorities, licence fees were not being collected 
properly in the past. The table below shows the revenue of KCC from licence fees in the 
1990s. 
 
Table 33:  Showing KCC’s Revenue Performance from License Fees in the 1990s 
Year Estimate Actual Variance 
1990 / 1991 
1991 / 1992 
1992 / 1993 
1993 / 1994 
1994 / 1995 
460.000.000 
529.000.000 
591.000.000 
503.000.000 
916.000.000 
430.000.000 
469.000.000 
416.000.000 
599.000.000 
768.000.000 
-30.000.000 
-60.000.000 
-175.000.000 
+96.000.000 
-148.000.000 
Source: Computed from the Overseas Development (ODA) report No. CNTR954387A for 
Uganda Government, Uganda Enhancing District Revenue Generation and 
Administration (1996)  
 
From the table above, it is clear that in the early 1990s licence fees, despite lower collections 
than the later years, were already a major and stable source of revenue for KCC. In 
1990/1991 for example, license fees fetched Shs.430 million far higher than the revenue from 
grants from the central government to KCC which on average were Shs.8 million to Shs.10 
million between 1900 and 1994. 
 
In recent years, license fees contribute of millions of shillings to KCC. For example, in 
1998/99, Shs.1.632.118.000, 1999/2000 Shs.1667.498.882, 2000/2001 Shs.2.587.775.000690. 
Despite the astronomical rise in revenue from license fees, a number of issues were raised by 
our key informants about KCC’s reliance on this source strictly in terms of revenue 
collection. It is argued that trading licences are primarily intended not to boost the revenue of 
                                            
690 KCC, Budget Framework Paper 2002 / 2003. 
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KCC, they are supposed to be nominal fees for enforcement of trade orders. By making trade 
licence a source of revenue, KCC tends to relegate their primary function. Thus, many 
unlicensable premises are licensed for the sake of getting revenue for KCC treasury. This 
may lead to licensing of some businesses whose operations are injurious to the environment 
or human health691. Other arguments advanced by the key informants suggest that the drive 
by KCC to levy high licence fees as a major source of revenue tend to “kill” the small 
businesses. Further, it is suggested that owners of big businesses in the city, already pay 
multiple taxes to the Uganda Revenue Authority (URA) such as income tax, Value–Added–
Tax, (VAT), import tax etc.  to the central government and graduated tax to KCC, thus, it is 
not wise for the licence fees to appear as if they were another tax rather than a trade order fee, 
which should be a nominal fee692. In other words there is a strong view that KCC should not 
over–emphasise licence fees as a source of revenue, instead, such a fee should be attached to 
improvement of business environment, public health concerns and promotion of small 
enterprises to fight rampant poverty afflicting the majority of poor people in the city. 
 
 
 
6.7.4 Parking Fees 
Parking fees are a city levy on motor vehicle e.g. cars, buses, trucks and omnibuses that park 
in the city. These fees are levied at two levels: (i) bus, omnibus, truck and cars–for–hire 
parks, and (ii) street parking. In case of vehicle parking in designated parks, a monthly fee is 
imposed on each vehicle as well as daily fee. In case of street parking, this affects vehicles of 
transiting motorists. In the latter case, a rate is fixed based on per hour of parking, thus the 
charge is time–bound.  
 
An important issue to note is that parking fees were in the past, not a major source of revenue 
to KCC. For example, KCC raised Shs.285 million from parking fees in 1990/1991. This has 
been increasing tremendously over the last few years. When street parking was first 
contracted to Greenboat Company, KCC was receiving Shs.30 million per month. When it 
was re-tendered to another company, Multiplex Limited KCC now receives Shs.80 million 
                                            
691 Interview with Albert Mukundane (Trade Development Officer) Makindye Division on 5 May 2004. The 
Minister of State for Planning Isaac Musumba accused KCC of licensing a metal workshop next to his 
residential house in Ntinda which he was forced to abandon (See New Vision 30 August 2004). 
692 Interview with Remmy Kagurusi, Licensing Officer, Central Division on 13 May 2004. 
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per month from this source. Parking fees from the city parks (for buses, trucks and cares) 
have also been earning KCC handsomely. Since 1990/91, increased revenue from vehicle 
parking fees reflects a growing interest and vigilance on the part of KCC to effectively 
oversee collections in parks, by setting clear targets and enumerating vehicles, which the tax 
agents of KCC were usually keen to under - state693. 
 
In the past, Uganda Taxi Operators and Drivers Association (UTODA) that collects parking 
fees, had been left with a free hand. They would collect as much money as they wished and 
give a small proportion of the collections to KCC as revenue. This had the effect of 
increasing taxi fares, which they would unilaterally increase to the chagrin of the poor 
travellers, who have no say whatsoever. The intervention by KCC in the affairs of the 
UTODA’s management of vehicle parks has somewhat helped. KCC has fixed a charge of 
Shs.3500 for each taxi operating in its parks. This notwithstanding, UTODA has several 
agents all over the city. These agents impose extra charges as passenger “loading fees”. These 
charges have no accountability of any kind as taxi touts at various stop–overs never give any 
receipts for the charges they impose. It has taken a court order to limit these illicit and to 
some extent, extortionist acts694. The point to note here is that although KCC has increased 
revenue from vehicle parks, neither the quality of service nor efficiency in management has 
improved.  This is a serious issue because after the government divested its interest in the 
state-owned Uganda Transport Company (UTC), all transportation was left in the hands of 
the private sector. The theory is that competition makes the private sector more efficient than 
the public sector. In the case of Kampala’s transport system, which relies mainly on private 
taxis (omnibuses) such efficiency gains have not accrued to the poorer sections of society. 
 
The findings of the National Household Survey (1997) revealed that in general, fuel and 
transport take twenty percent of urban dwellers’ incomes. For the self- employed persons, his 
income varies according to demand for one’s stock. Transport costs can eat up into the 
business capital.   The situation for transport is much worse for government employees in the 
lowest ranks who earn about Shs.100.000 – 150.000 a month. In most cases, they walk to 
                                            
693 In a recent enumeration exercise by KCC, it was found that taxis operating in Kampala were 7000. while 
UTODA (the tax agent) was always giving an estimate of 4000 taxis. Presently UTODA pays Shs. 260 million 
per month to KCC. 
694 A group calling itself Uganda Taxi Owners Association sued UTODA over these extensive illegal charges on 
their taxis. In a ruling by Justice Kiryabwire of the Commercial Court in May 2005, ruled that those extra 
charges on taxis were illegal and uncalled for. 
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their places of work because they cannot afford the cost of public transport. These include 
primary school teachers, police, clerks etc. People in this category try their level best to get 
accommodation near their workplaces695. 
 
6.7.5 Market Fees 
Like the other sources of revenue for KCC, the markets have become a major source of 
revenue. While KCC collected Shs.533 million from the markets in 1990/1991, by 2000/2001 
the actual revenue from this source was Shs.1.147.530.000. This means that the revenue 
almost tripled. The increase of revenue is attributed to two factors: first, KCC with a loan 
from the World Bank under the First Urban Project, rebuilt and expanded the markets in the 
city. In the markets are: Owino market, Bugolobi market, Nakawa market and Nateete 
market. The expansion meant that stalls increased, working conditions improved, and fees 
collection was streamlined. This improvement of markets has a direct relationship with the 
increase in revenue collection. It is an indication that when public services are improved, 
there is a higher responsiveness and willingness on the part of beneficiaries to pay municipal 
fees. The second factor that has contributed to more revenue from the markets is privatisation 
of collection. As we noted in the previous chapter, KCC officials engaged in collection of 
market revenues were corrupt to the extent that a bulk of revenue was not reaching KCC’s 
treasury because its officials colluded in diverting it to their personal benefit696. Today, all 
KCC’s markets are tendered to private collectors of market fees. 
 
Increased market revenue notwithstanding, KCC still faces serious challenges in the 
management of markets. First of all, the project of expanding and modernising markets was 
conceived in the spirit of fighting urban poverty. The goal was to reduce unemployment and 
increase incomes of the urban poor. The primary goal was not to increase revenue for KCC. 
Secondly, the goal of modernising the markets was to create order in the city by reducing 
illegal and disorderly hawkers who crowded the streets of Kampala, increasing incidences of 
criminality. Today the challenge for the city authorities is to balance the primary goals of 
modernisation of markets and the secondary goals of generating revenue from the market 
                                            
695 One of the reasons why most slums are located near the central business district of Kampala is that lower 
income workers, including government employees, find accommodation in these areas. For school teachers, one 
of their survival strategy is to introduce and conduct illegal extra lessons for the pupils whose parents are willing 
to pay 
696 See First Urban Project Output Report September, 1993, p. 30. In June 1993 a Task force sent by KCC to 
check on cashiers’ receipts and banking found that KCC was not receiving all the money collected on its behalf. 
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vendors. The secondary goal seems to have overrided the primary goal in the sense that, the 
privatisation of revenue collection has eaten into the profitability of the poor vendors working 
in the market because the levies are exorbitant. Almost invariably, KCC increases market 
levies every financial year697. In a recent increase of market levies, which the vendors 
resisted, the Kampala Town Clerk said: 
We have revised them (market levies) because our charges are lower 
compared to surrounding districts and municipalities. Inflation also led to 
the revision698. 
 
The Town Clerk is not revealing the real issues that KCC is confronted with, which are 
responsible for increasing the burden of levies on the poor market vendors.  These are the 
World Bank loan and the failure of KCC to reduce its costs of administration. Since 1990, 
KCC has been securing loans from the World Bank under the First Urban Project and the 
Nakivubo Channel Rehabilitation Project699. The KCC repayment commitment to the World 
Bank per annum stands at Shs.1.7 billion. This amount of money imposes a heavy burden on 
the financial situation of KCC. The second issue is that KCC, despite the recommendations of 
the World Bank and its own Strategy for Reform (SFR) to drastically bring down its cost of 
administration; this has not been the case700. As a result of high levies in the markets, some of 
the vendors have left the market and returned to street hawking. Illegal street hawkers are a 
“headache” to KCC because they invite problems to it. They overcrowd the streets and make 
orderly business untenable. This raises complaints from the bona fide traders owning shops 
because hawkers undercut their prices and lower the volume of their business turnover. Other 
complaints are also raised by tenderers of the markets who are collecting revenue for KCC. 
As the number of market vendors decreases in markets, the revenue also decreases, hence the 
failure of the tenderers to meet the revenue targets set by KCC. In other words, KCC faces a 
“catch twenty–two” situation in regard to the purposes and goals of the city markets. 
                                            
697 In an increase affected in 2004, the rates increased from Shs.75.000 to Shs.100.000 in Nakasero market, and 
an increase 25% affected all stalls in all KCC’s twenty – seven markets. 
698 See The Monitor 6 November 2004. The Town Clerk also added that the increase was due to the cost of 
delivering services owing to increases in the costs of fuel and electricity. 
699 See Kiggundu Tamale, “Nakivubo Channel Rehabilitation Project (CR – 3203 – UG) and Local Government 
Development Program CCR. 3295 – UG” Paper Presented to KCC Stakeholders’ Workshop at Botanical Beach 
Hotel, Entebbe, March 2004 
700 It was originally arranged between the World Bank and KCC that since most of the service delivery was to 
be done by contracting out to private providers and some non–core assets were to be sold out, KCC world retain 
a small staff to oversee the performance of the private providers. However, this was not done as per schedule, 
hence KCC still has large staff costs. See World Bank, Local Government Development Program Report (UGPE 
2992) opcit, p. 45. KCC estimates that it requires US 2 million dollars to lay off some staff (retrenchment) to get 
to the optimal size. KCC says it does not have the money to implement the exercise of “right sizing” 
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Nonetheless, KCC has lacked focus in respect of these goals701. It has tended to emphasise 
revenue collection from the market vendors in total disregard for the primary goal of poverty 
reduction, to the extent that another successive hiking of market levies led to a protest by the 
vendors in Owino market702. Moreover, by KCC privatizing the collection of market levies in 
the markets, it undermined the local organisations that collectively articulated the interests of 
the market vendors703. It is a contradiction that KCC needs to resolve. 
 
6.8 Trends in Revenue Collection and Management in KCC 
As we have shown above, all the key sources of revenue for KCC have shown growth over 
the years. However, much of this growth is due to the new drive towards privatisation of the 
collection of revenue on behalf of KCC.  It is a testimony to the fact KCC had failed to 
collect revenue. Improved revenue performance in KCC is largely a result of privatisation of 
revenue collection. Evidence exists to support the suggestion that privatisation of revenue 
collection reduces administrative costs in revenue collection and greatly improves revenue 
growth for local governments704. Also, the Local Government Act 1997 provides a sufficient 
framework for effective provision of services by the private sector through the District 
Tender Board. Competitive tendering serves as a means of bringing more efficient private 
sector actors on board. A comparative look at the revenue from various sources of revenue 
before and after full scale contracting out in KCC shows that the latter works better. 
 
In mid – 1990s, Kampala City Council experimented with contracting out nine out of its 
thirty nine markets. In 1994/95 the revenue from the markets rose from Shs.50.8 million to 
Shs.61.75 million a month. At the same time the annual costs of administering the markets 
fell by half from Shs.173.8 million to Shs.88.2 million. Market administrators were reduced 
from 215 to 35705 . 
 
                                            
701 KCC, Budget Framework Paper 2001/2002 p. 42. KCC admits that it lacks information on markets and 
market activities and that the basis of its decisions is the statistics of 1994. 
702 See The Monitor, 13 January 2005. The Vendors have resisted the new rates imposed by KCC and Victoria 
International the company managing the market. Also in 2004, See New Vision January 17, 2004. 
703 Some of the Vendors associations include: Nateete Market Vendors Association (Nateete market), Mengo – 
Kisenyi Market Vendors Association (Kalutusi Market), Nakawa Maket Cooperative Savings and Credit Society 
(Nakawa Market), etc 
704 ODA, Uganda: Enhancing District Revenue Generation and Administration opcit p. 54. 
705 ibid, p. 54. 
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Table 34:  Showing KCC (before privatisation) Sources of Revenue (October 1991 to 
June 1992) in Millions of Shillings 
Source of Revenue Actual Income Performance (percentage) 
Housing 
Graduated Tax 
Ground Rent 
Rates 
Markets 
Car Parks 
Licenses 
Abbatoir 
Weigh bridge 
Other income 
34.2 
846.5 
78.3 
616.9 
448.5 
250.3 
351.3 
33.2 
24.9 
70.1 
1 
31 
3 
22 
16 
9 
13 
1 
1 
3 
 2.754.2 100 
Source: KCC Treasurer, Income and Expenditure Statement October 1991 to June 1992 
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Table 35:  Showing Revenue after Privatisation of Revenue Collection (Millions of 
Uganda Shillings) 
Source of Funding 1999/2000 1999/2000 2000/2001 2000/2001 2001/2002 
2001/2002 
July – Oct 
2001 
KCC Local 
Funding 
Estimates Actual Estimates Actual Estimates Actual 
Graduated Tax 4.706.250.000 3.636.195.352 5.070.950.000 3.192.993.000 3.610.643.000 393.235.500 
Property Rates 3.372.074.277 2.105.169.196 3.821.076.677 3.197.599.000 3.197.599.000 877.507.992 
Ground Rent 350.000.000 442.350.987 535.924.782 727.199.000 727.199.000 133.472.045 
Housing 329.675.263 310.865.290 348.920.350 347.260.000 347.260.000 81.762.660 
Licences 1.667.498.882 1.821.310.856 2.600.000.000 2.684.587.000 2.684.587.000 797.966.950 
Vehicle Parks 2.189.940.000 1.955.133.200 3.548.905.200 3.718.700.000 3.718.700.000 712.771.650 
Markets 839.309.000 329.447.151 1.454.765.500 1.517.204.000 1.517.204.000 491.158.008 
Debt Realisation 3.094.707.920 1.146.881.267 6.027.449.630 9.437.852.000 9.437.852.000 9.673.095 
Other Income 1.766.784.056 2.187.171.097 2.006.380.817 1.558.622.000 1.558.622.000 1.562.771.857 
Capital 1.506.364.000 1733.742.489 1.655.810.809 1.920.000.000 1.920.000.000 2.013.889.379 
Total Local 
Funding 
19.822.603.39
8 
16.168.266.85
5 
27.070.183.76
5 
28.719.666.00
0 
28.719.666.00
0 
7.074.209.136 
Source: KCC, Budget Framework Paper 2002 / 2003 
 
A comparative look at the above tables shows that in 1991/92 KCC was collecting a mere 
Shs.2.7 billion in revenue. By the end of the financial year 2000/2001, it collected Shs.22.1 
billion, a leap of ten times, in actual collections. Some of these sources of revenue have 
continued to grow for example, collections from vehicle parks presently contribute Shs.4 
billion to the coffers of KCC, that is, Shs.3.2 billion from the main parks and Shs.828 million 
from the street parking per annum706. KCC also privatized collection of other fees and rates. 
For example KCC contracted the collection of licence fees in the Central Division to Victoria 
Insglass at Shs.2.52 billion per annum. It has raised the collection of revenue from this source 
by 80 percent in recent years707. The privatisation of market levies has increased income to 
KCC, for example when Owino market (the largest market in Kampala) was being managed 
                                            
706 KCC (Central Division), Budget 2003/2004 
707 ibid. 
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by Owino Traders Association; it was contributing Shs.50 million per month to KCC’s 
coffers. However after fully contracting it to a business company, it fetches for KCC Shs.104 
million a month that is Shs.1.08 billion a year. This is more than double the amount the 
association of the Owino traders were paying to KCC.  
 
Other contractors for rates and licences include: Transmedia in Makindye Division which 
collects property rates. In the year 2003/04 they hit the target of Shs.450 million in 
collections and in 2004/2005 their collections reached Shs. 600 million. Another revenue 
collector, Ruseru Entreprises for Makindye Division collects licence fees. This has seen the 
growth of revenue from this source grow from Shs.130 million in 1997/87 to Shs.296 million 
in 2002/2003.As the above sample figures show, there has been rigorous efforts by KCC to 
collect revenue through contractors. The revenue yields indicate that KCC has done much 
better in revenue performance than before. This seems to be an indicator that the 
organisational and administrative framework created by decentralisation is appropriate for 
local governments to raise their own revenue and in the process, increase their autonomy in 
relation to the centre. This is however exceptional to KCC with multiple taxable sources, its 
problems notwithstanding. 
 
6.9 Challenges of revenue collection and the politics of privatisation 
Almost invariably, with exception of KCC, all other local governments in Uganda have 
experienced declines in their local revenue since 1997/98. This has caused serious concern in 
the government. For example, the chairman of the Local Government Finance Commission 
(LGFC) Dick Odur wrote to the President of Uganda on 8 April 2004 an advisory note that 
says in part, “The purpose of this advisory note is to bring to the attention of Government the 
issues perpetuating the decline in collection of local revenues by local governments” In the 
note, the chairman said: 
Whereas transfers from Central Government have been growing rapidly 
(from Shs.204billion to in 1997/98 to 616 billion shillings in 2001/02) the 
growth in local revenue has been disappointing. 
 
It was noted in his advisory note that whereas the local revenues of the districts had grown to 
Shs.109 billion, they had declined to Shs.93.8 billion by 1999/ 2000. The reasons advanced 
by LGFC for the decline in local revenues include:  
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◊ There has not been a general reform in the collection and management of local revenues 
as was done in the case of central government where Uganda Revenue Authority was 
created and significant reforms undertaken. 
◊ There is excessive local political interference with the taxation at the local level. 
◊ There is poor tax administration at the local government level including weaknesses in 
assessment, collection and management. 
◊ There are no tax registers in local governments for graduated tax, property tax, user 
charges, licences and fees. 
◊ The system of billing liable tax–payers is generally poor and non – existent in most local 
governments. 
 
The LGFC Chairman’s letter concluded thus (opcit.) 
There is decline and low local revenue to sustain improvements in service 
delivery, and how to handle the future maintenance requirements of assets 
now being created in local governments. 
 
The purpose of capturing the issues raised by the LGFC to the President of Uganda is to 
underscore the fact that whereas KCC was able to raise its tax base following its SFR and 
some other reforms pushed by the World Bank, the rest of the local governments in Uganda 
did not follow suit hence, the decline in their local revenue. It is also imperative to note that 
despite the growth in KCC’s revenue, its local collections constitute only 34 percent of its 
budget per annum. This too, is not an enviable position. The bulk of the service requirements, 
especially the capital expenditure area is financed by the central government and donors708. 
 
KCC itself has had its share of difficulties in implementing its fiscal reforms. On the revenue 
side, there have been problems of internal as well as external nature in KCC’s efforts to raise 
revenue. Internally, KCC faces a host of problems. First it is dealing with a city whose largest 
section of population are living in dire poverty, hence with limited capacity to pay taxes. 
Secondly, due to many years of institutional decline, KCC’s capacity to deliver services was 
severely crippled. Thus, lack of a link between service delivery and taxes increases people’s 
resistance or willingness to pay taxes. Thirdly, some taxes such as property rates were 
neglected over the years, thus getting people to pay them again, is a hurdle that KCC is 
                                            
708 See KCC, Budget Framework Paper 2002/2003, p. 9. KCC planned to spend Shs.81.5 billion but even with 
government and donor contributions, there was a shortfall. 
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attempting surmount, albeit with difficulties. Fourthly again in respect of property rates, most 
owners of properties in the city have accumulated arrears in rate payments. In some cases, 
these are very large sums of money probably beyond the ability of the property owner to pay. 
 
Privatisation and contracting out of revenue collection in KCC has also had partial success. 
Sourcing qualified and competent firms to a do good job for KCC has not been easy. Most 
firms which apply for tenders to collect revenue or to offer services are either lacking in 
experience or finance capital to execute the jobs to the specifications and standard required 
by their employer, KCC. There are also, allegations of in–house trading, nepotism and 
corruption and collusion in the biding processes. For example during the budget conference 
for Makindye Division held on the 27April 2004709, it was noted that while UTODA, was 
contracted to oversee parking of vehicles and collect revenue for the Division in the year 
2002/2003 the Division received only three remittances from this source. In the case of 
Ruseru, a company charged with collecting licence fees, the Division officials noted that the 
company had lost or mismanaged data. This has led to some business units being our over–
assessed, leading to resistance to tax compliance. Other cases reported in Makindye Division 
include Mahogany, a company that was contracted to check on illegal developers in the 
Division, but failed because it “lacked the capacity to effectively monitor, control and enforce 
planned development.”710 Three other companies were suspended for failing to live to their 
expectations after securing contracts with Makindye Division711. 
 
The processes of privatisation in KCC have been undermined by politics, collusion and 
influence peddling. Some cases standout very clearly and are detailed here. First there is the 
issue of graduated tax. This has been declining in all local governments largely because of the 
politics involved in it. This very factor made it difficult to privatize its collection. As pointed 
out earlier, it has been an election issue for both national and local electioneering. In 
particular, President Museveni when attacked by his rivals as well as popular opinion for 
scrapping this decadent tax during the 2001 presidential election campaigns, responded by 
issuing a directive to the affect that the unemployed youth could pay only Shs. 3000 a year 
                                            
709 KCC, Makindye Division, Proceedings of the Budget Conference held at Hotel International Muyenga. 
710 bid, p. 71 
711 The companies whose contracts were terminated are: Mohogany, Namba and Highway Trading Co. 
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and those aged beyond 60 years should be exempted. In Nyendo, Masaka district, Museveni 
directed: 
The Movement government has streamlined the administration of 
graduated tax. I have directed that unemployed youth should not be made to 
pay more than Shs.3000 per annum while 60 – year old Ugandans should 
be exempted from paying graduated tax712. 
 
The effect of this presidential directive has been felt by most local governments, including 
KCC. KCC, in particular has been collecting graduated tax from its residents without proper 
assessment. For this reason, most of the youth, who are either in disguised employment or are 
unemployed simply pay Shs.3000 as per residential directive. Others simply go to the 
neighbouring districts of Wakiso, Mukono and Mpigi and pay Shs.3000. Thus, although KCC 
had for long failed to privatize the collection of graduated tax due its complicated nature of 
collection, the presidential directive to the effect of a minimum tax of Shs.3000 made it even 
more difficult and uneconomical to contract out its collection.  
 
Privatisation of revenue collection in the markets of Kampala has been the most controversial 
and least transparent of all the privatisation deals in KCC in recent years. 
 
6.9.1 Controversial Deals in the Privatisation of Revenue Collection in KCC 
On 28 November 2002, KCC handed over two of its main markets of Owino and Nakasero to 
two companies owned by a powerful local businessman called Hassan Basajjabalaba. The 
companies are Victoria International Trading Company which took the management of 
Owino market and Sheila Investments Uganda Limited which took overt the management of 
Nakasero market in the city centre. The two companies won their tenders in a controversial 
process that was questioned by the Council and which prompted the interdiction of the Town 
Clerk and intervention of the Minister of Local Government. First, of all, the KCC Tender 
Board in considering the awards of tenders to these two companies may possibly had not 
been aware that the companies belonged to one main proprietor713. Secondly they both 
offered the highest bids compared to their competitors. For example, Victoria International 
Trading company offered to manage Owino market at Shs.1.25 billion a year while the 
                                            
712 The New Vision 10 March 2001. Museveni said this in the heat of the 2001 presidential elections campaigns. 
Though he was a candidate he was also still the president so the directive was effected. This saw the dramatic 
fall in the local revenues of most local governments as this is the main source of revenue especially for rural 
district governments. 
713 Victoria International Trading Company is registered by Asuman Irungu and Aisha Murungi while Sheila 
Investments is registered by Sheila Nagitta and Bruhan Banuwine as directors 
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company that was managing the same market, Owino Traders and Transporters offered 
Shs.500 million714. Moreover, Victoria International Trading Company offered to pay all the 
money it offered for the tender at once (which it did on signing the contract). 
 
The above notwithstanding, the Tender Board seems not to have bothered to check who the 
real owner of the companies was. This is important because the Tender Board, by its rules is 
not supposed to allow any particular company or individual to monopolise the tenders715. At 
the same time, when the Minister of Local Government learnt that Basajjabalaba’s companies 
had taken monopoly of managing the city market he checked with the registrar of companies 
and found that the companies were not duly registered716. He ordered KCC to resind its offer 
but to no avail. There is a possibility that KCC Tender Board overlooked some if the key 
issues in offering tenders to these companies. Ordinarily, a tendering company is required to 
produce a certificate of registration, certificate of incorporation, tax clearance certificate, the 
names of its bankers and the names of its directors. If these were in place, there is no 
rationale for questioning the authenticity of the company in question. The other issue 
however is that these two companies had no previous experience of managing markets and its 
named directors are not well known business people. Experience in managing certain aspects 
of a particular business is one of the key prerequisites for awarding tenders. For example, the 
Minister of Local Government wrote to say, “It is inconceivable for a local government to 
award a tender to people who do not exist as business entities717“. The minister added,  
It is now evident that the way in which the tenders were processed and the 
manner in which the awards were made lacked transparency and is likely to 
cause financial loss to KCC718. 
 
The minister insisted that he had obtained information from the chairman of the Tender 
Board that the members of the Tender Board exhibited “irregular behaviour” at the meeting 
that awarded the tenders to the two companies. The Minister said, he suspected that some of 
the members of the Tender Board could have been bribed. 
                                            
714 Sheila Investment Uganda Limited was offered Nakasero market at Shs. 300 million. Other companies 
belonging to the same individual have taken KCC tenders for managing the city abattoir and Kalutusi market. 
715 Basajjabalaba had also earlier offered to re–develop the constitutional square into a shopping complex and in 
another bid he wanted KCC to lease to him the Nakivabo Channel so that he constructs shops. 
716 See Sunday Vision November 24, 2002. Despite the insistence by the Minister that the two companies were 
not registered, the Assistant Registrar wrote on 14 November 2002 to KCC authorities pointing out that the two 
companies were fully registered. 
717 ibid. See also, Sunday Vision, 24 November 2002. p. 2. 
718 ibid. 
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These controversial tenders caused accusations and counter – accusations. The lawyer for the 
two companies accused Mr. Bidandi Ssali, (the Minister) of having interests in Owino 
market, to which the Minister replied “I laugh off the silly assertion that I have a personal 
interest in Owino market, if I had that type of interest I would be the richest person in the 
city.”719 
 
The Town Clerk (Mr. G. Mwesigye) received his share of blame. On 22 November 2002, a 
full council of KCC sat and a motion was moved that Mwesigye, the Town Clerk be 
interdicted on grounds that he had interdicted the Secretary to the Tender Board720, and that 
by ,so doing he was likely to cause financial loss to KCC. He was also accused of under 
declaring the stalls and shops in Owino market and that he had personal interests in the 
tendering process. The motion for the interdiction of the Town Clerk was supported by the 
majority of the councillors who immediately instructed that he takes leave from further 
conducting the business of council until further notice. In his defense, the Town Clerk 
claimed that he had at no time got directly involved in the tendering process. He explained: 
The executive committee discussed at length the tender for both markets. 
His worship the Mayor appraised the executive of the steps he had taken to 
let Basajjabalaba known of the developments and asked him to pick one 
market of his choice … and leave the other for someone else721. 
 
The Town Clerk further explained that the Mayor was of the opinion that it would not be 
politically correct for Basajjabalaba to take both markets, and that the executive committee 
had concurred with the Mayor who had instructed him before leaving for a trip to Paris to 
ensure that the Tender Board should not issue letters of award to anyone722. He argued that 
his act of suspending the Secretary to the Tender Board was in line with the instructions of 
the Mayor. He defended himself in respect of the stalls in Owino market, arguing that 
appropriate council organs had visited the market and established the actual number of stalls 
there. 
                                            
719 The Town Clerk had suspended Mr. Fred Baguma, the Secretary to the Tender Board for disobeying his 
instructions not to communicate with the tenderers. Baguma alleged that the Town Clerk had advised him to 
“fall sick”. 
720 The Town Clerk had suspended Mr. Fred Baguma, the Secretary to the Tender Board for disobeying his 
instructions not to communicate with the tenderers. Baguma alleged that the Town Clerk had advised him to 
“fall sick.” 
721 New Vision January 8, 2003 p. 5. 
722 ibid. 
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This story is a classic case of how privatisation has been handled in KCC. Many of such 
cases go unreported. This particular case became public because the various contending 
interests were unable to agree–the minister, the Mayor, the Town Clerk, the Council and the 
Tender Board. KCC tenders are complicated and enmeshed in a sophisticated web of 
powerful interests based on “unwritten rules” of give and take. It appears, this time around, 
some more powerful forces were at play, hence the failure of the city barons failure to agree 
on how to eat their cake and have it at the same time, for at the end of the day, 
Basajjabalaba’s companies look the tenders up to this day. As one newspaper columnist in a 
related analysis has asserted: 
No body should ever deceive himself that the government has no interest in 
Basajjabalaba’s empire. No government in the world can allow unfriendly 
forces to take over most of the strategic businesses in town. … the point I 
am making is, although Ugandans would feel happy to have one of them 
roaring all over the town, they would still remain in total wonder and 
bewilderment as to how the man has accumulated the billions723. 
 
The commentator’s views, though focused on the “empire” of one man whose companies 
won the controversial tenders are revealing on the implicit political forces that possibly lie 
behind the sprawling “empire” under one man724. Under such circumstances, the local 
officials bargaining for their political survival succumb to the whims of the more powerful 
political forces, even if the rules of the game are fraudulently undermined with impunity. The 
case we have analysed above is a test case, as to whether KCC has what it takes to operate on 
the basis of transparency and fairness even under its own Strategy for Reform that calls for 
such values to be ingrained in its work methods. 
 
6.9.2 Other Controversial Deals in KCC 
The case detailed in the previous section is not an isolated incident in the award and 
management of tenders in KCC. In 1997, the Minister of State in the Local Government was 
petitioned by some concerned people that in the process of re-developing KCC’s markets, 
there were irregularities and elements of corruption. Consequently, a probe committee was 
                                            
723 Ishaq Kintu Nganda “Let Bidandi Chair KCC tender board” in Weekly Message, 3 – 9 December 2002. 
724 See New Vision 20 May 2005. It reported that President Museveni ordered Bank of Uganda in 2004 to pay 
United States dollars 14 million to Standard Chartered Bank for a loan that Basajjabalaba had failed to pay. It 
reported that the directors of the International Monetary Fund had asked the government of Uganda to stop 
bailing out private businessmen because that contributed to the domestic debts. 
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set up to establish among other things: (i) whether Mr Steven Higobero, the coordinator for 
re- development of markets had been awarding sub–contracts to his own company M/S 
Midland Famusa Construction Company; (ii) whether vendors of Owino market were 
forcefully made to pay Shs. 200.000 in order to be included on the register for the new sub– 
divided stalls while they were already registered vendors; (iii) to ascertain whether M/s Alcon 
Inter national Uganda Limited was fairly awarded the contract to construct Nakawa market 
and (iv) to establish whether vendors’ associations were in the whole process of re-
development of the market in Kampala. 
 
The findings of the probe committee revealed that M/s Midland Famusa Construction 
Company was formed by the Chairman of Owino Market Vendors Association Mr. Kayongo 
and the Coordinator of markets’ development project, a Senior Official of KCC, Mr. Steven 
Higobero. It was revealed that Mr. Kayongo’s daughter, Barbara Nabisera (a minor) was the 
chairman of the company and Mr. Higobero’s son Nicholas Khijoma (a minor)725 was the 
company’s vice–chairman. The secretary to the company, David Kasiboka also a minor726 
was a son of Mr. Kanyana (a Senior Market Administrator). However the signatories to the 
company account and documents were the parents of these children. 
 
In the case of re–development of Owino and Nateete markets, Midland Famusa Construction 
Company had taken sub–contracts for building slabs in the stalls without informing the 
committee that slabs were constructed at a cost of Shs. 110.000. The company had offered to 
build the slabs and be paid later. Despite the irregularities in the formation and composition 
of the company’s directors (minors) and the fact that KCC employees in charge of markets 
were involved in tendering through this company, the probe committee’s view was “Quality 
of the work of M/s Midland Famusa Construction Company Ltd was satisfactory and there 
was no complaint whatsoever on the quality of their work727“. The committee though 
recommended that Mr. Steven Higobero “should be withdrawn from being a market 
coordinator so that his role in the M/s Midland Fumusa Construction Co. Ltd does not 
                                            
725 A p.3 pupil at Kitante Primary School 
726 A pupil at Nakivubo Settlement Primary School. 
727 KCC (undated) The Report of the Probe Committee into the Alleged Corruption in the Redevelopment of the 
Privatised Markets of Kampala City Council, p.52. 
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conflict with his duty as a Market Coordinator in KCC728“. … Cases of this nature needed 
KCC to take strong corrective measures on the officials who are engage in breaking the law. 
For example according to the Local Governments Financial and Accounting Regulations, 
1998, under Regulation 73 the District Tender Board is required to abide by the standards set 
by the Central Tender Board. But of more particular relevance in this case is Regulation 79 
(4) which states “Councillors and members of the Tender Board and employees of council are 
prohibited from being suppliers or contractors of council either directly or indirectly”. Thus 
under this Regulation, there is  a prima-facie case that the KCC authorities should have 
brought against the officials involved in the executions of contracts while they held their 
positions as officers of Council. 
 
6.10 The Politics of “Boda-Boda”729 
Kampala city may be described as a “boda-boda city” because “boba-boda” cyclists plying 
the ups and downs of a city are a common sight. Because there is no formal municipal public 
transport e.g. buses, trams, etc public transportation is in the hands of the private omnibuses 
whose operations are non–scheduled, confused and prone to intermittent delays for a traveller 
keen to keep his or her time schedule.  The “boda-boda” cyclists emerged as a spontaneous 
response and an alternative to the omnibus transport. The ‘boda-boda’ transport also came up 
because thousands of unemployed youth in the city were looking out for a means of survival. 
The boda-boda youth are organised in their group associations and have their own code of 
conduct, for example, their work ethic includes a high standard of honesty and fair charges 
for their clients730. Because of these virtues, this form of transport has grown tremendously in 
recent years. By mid–1990s, there was no tax levy on “boda-boda” activities. However as 
their activities increased in the city, KCC began to regard their activities as a taxable source 
of revenue. For example in 2002 Centra Division estimated that there were 865 operators in 
its area of jurisdiction. A levy of Shs.10.000 per month was imposed on each operator. This 
means Shs.120.000 per year. Cental Division estimated its budget of 2003/2004 to raise to 
Shs.1518 million from “boda-boda” operations. This is an addition to Shs.5000 each “boda-
                                            
728 ibid, p.55. The committee simply recommends that the Markets, Coordinator simply be “withdrawn”. The 
official is still a senior person in KCC 
729 Boda-Boda” – is a popular term applying to motor – cycles and ordinary bicycles which are hired for 
purposes of public transport by travellers around most towns in Uganda. 
730 0  It is the rarest of cases that these ‘boda-boda’cyclists commit crimes against their clients. 
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boda” cyclists is required to pay for KCC number plate731. Although “boda-boda” levies are 
not reflected in KCC budgets, it was estimated they could raise for KCC about Shs.700 
million per annum. 
 
The “politics of “boda-boda” then began with their operators resisting the payment of levies 
imposed by KCC authorities. The operators complained of harassment and excessive 
“extortion” by the companies that were tendered by KCC to collect levies from them. It was 
noted by Makindye Division authorities: 
In F/Y 2002/2003, the District mooted an idea of registering all Boda-Boda 
and issue the same with registration numbers in the Divisions of operation. 
Makindye received 800 number plates and sold only 450 plates. The 
balance is still in the store. On top of paying for the number plates (Shs. 
5000), the registered cyclists was to pay Shs. 9000 monthly fees. However 
the boda- bodas who bought the number plates, paid Shs. 9000 only once 
and that was all732  
 
Whereas such a tax is provided for under Section 13 (g) and (h) of the Fifth Schedule of the 
Local Government Act, as bicycle licences and parking respectively and as sources of 
revenue for local governments, many central government officials in support of “boda-boda” 
cyclists resisting KCC and levies denounced the tax as “exploitation of the poor” or that such 
taxes are not authorised by the Act733. KCC on its part insisted that the “boda-boda” had to 
pay the levies since they used the city infrastructure. The Mayor of Kampala said: 
As a council we took a decision that all boda-boda operators pay a fee. We 
contracted firms that are collecting the money on our behalf. If they refuse 
to pay we are going to tell them to shift to another district734. The Central 
Division Chairman echoed similar sentiments, saying “We’re going out 
bravely to collect taxes from boda-bodas and whoever feels that what we 
are doing is wrong, should take us to court.”735  
 
These assumptions on part of KCC officials seem to have underestimated the political weight 
behind the boda-boda operations. On 2 June the Acting Private Secretary to the President of 
Uganda, wrote to KCC authorities advising them to halt the taxation of boda-boda since the 
levy was “illegal”. He argued that Shs.10.000 levy on each boda-boda per month was too 
                                            
731 The motorcycles are already registered and licenced by the Uganda Revenue Authority (URA), the tax body 
of the central government. Thus, “KCC registration” is an additional fee and second registration. 
732 KCC (Makindye Divi sion) Budget Conference Report 27 April 2004, p. 12. 
733 The Act actually allows local government to collect such taxes 
734 New Vision, 21 May 2004 
735 The Weekly Message 22 June 2004 
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high. He argued further that there were 11,000 boda-boda in the city which meant that KCC 
was collecting Shs.110 million from them every month. He said that this was unfair because a 
person owning a shop pays license fee of Shs.70.000 a year while a boda-boda person pays 
Shs.120.000. 
 
The logic of central government officials appears sound in terms of equity and fairness of 
taxation of the boda-boda. However, the whole saga centres on politics. First, ever since the 
NRM came to power in1986, most of the parliamentary seats in the city have been won by 
the politicians from the opposition.  Since 1996 the mayoral seat and most of the KCC 
councillors have been people who subscribe to the opposition. As one newspaper reporter has 
put it: . . . “in Kampala it is government which is the “opposition736“. These politicians draw 
most of their support from the rank and file of the “boda-boda”, the unemployed and other 
youth in the lower classes. The strategy of the government appears to target these groups for 
future electoral victory on its side. It is reported that State House officials set aside Shs.170 
million which they used to purchase 120 motor–bikes (boda-boda) and distributed them to 
various individuals through a State–House microfinance institution known as UMEA, which 
advances loans for the above purpose, payable in nine months737. Therefore, by KCC 
attempting to tax the boda-boda, it happens to be treading on the interests of State House. 
 
Secondly it is admitted by State House officials that boda-boda operators also act as under–
cover agents for the state. In the course of their operations, they collect information for the 
state security organisations738. Thus, the issue is not whether KCC has the legal rights to tax 
boda-boda operations or not, it is a much wider issue spiced up by strategic political interests 
and other considerations.  
 
KCC itself, however, seems to have been unfair to the boda-boda operators because the levy 
appears exorbitant. As the ODA study pointed out sometime back, local governments need to 
put forward a positive image especially amongst the groups trying to survive. The report 
noted: “a particularly futile tax is that of boda-boda ... where the registration plate costs more 
                                            
736 106 Sunday Monitor 13 June 2004 
737 ibid. 
738 ibid. 
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than the value of the license739“ What seems to be emerging in KCC’s drive towards 
mobilisation of more resource to finance service delivery is that, the process tends to target 
the weaker individuals and organisations such as the boda-boda. On the other hand the 
intervention of the central government officials in the matters of boda-boda is not a clear sign 
of enthusiasm that they are concerned with their economic plight but to exploit them, 
politically. As Kent Eaton has pointed out, national leaders will tend to support 
decentralisation only if it gives electoral advantage to their party’s fortunes740. In the case of 
Kampala, the reverse has been true for the ruling NRM, hence the grounds for manipulating 
small groups such as boda-boda. 
 
 
6.11 Political and Bureaucratic Patronage in Service Delivery 
Decentralisation in Uganda and particularly in Kampala has ushered in a new regime of 
patron–client relations involving both local government officials as well as the central 
government ones. Almost every local government business is politicised–be it collection of 
revenue, awarding of tenders or delivering a service to a particular group. The point is that by 
its very nature and design, decentralisation is political; the only difference in this case being 
that the “politicisation” of the decentralisation process and its outcome in KCC undermines 
the rules of the games and the principles of good governance. In other words, decentralisation 
in KCC seems to undermine Chambers’ 3-P model (Procedure, professionalism and Personal 
Commitment):”procedure and rewards with more down–ward accountability, professionalism 
which values and respects people and the individual and personal commitments which seek 
to serve those who are weaker and more deprived741“. What the model implies is that 
decentralisation is supposed to create a reversal to the formerly centralised system through 
these principles. 
 
In Uganda, both political and bureaucratic patronage systems seem to have been further 
entrenched by decentralisation. As one central government Minister publicly announced: 
                                            
739 ODA, Uganda: Enhancing District Revenue Generation and Administration, opcit p. 57 
740 Kent Eaton “Decentralisation from above in Chile and Uruguay” Comparative Politics Vol. 1, No 1, 2004. 
741 Robert Chambers, “Public Management: towards a radical agenda” in Martin Minogue (et al) editors, 
Beyond the New Public Management: Changing Ideas and Practices in Governance (opcit) p. 118 
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Some people will get to know that the days of honeymoon are over. Even 
simple tenders will go to our people (Movement supporters). How can we 
give you potatoes and you throw stones at us?742. 
 
The same Minister again is quoted to have told a press conference thus “NRM pockets are 
deep”743 to the extent that the NRM was going to facilitate the District chairpersons, who are 
Movement mobilisers and sopporters744. The statement made by the Minister tended to 
conflate the policies of the government and those of the ruling Movement.  This means that 
there are those in the government circles who see decentralisation not in terms of what the 
local authorities can do for their people, but in terms of entrenching wishes of the ruling 
party. Thus, this seems to explain why some government officials meddle in the affairs of 
local authorities. 
 
Indeed available evidence shows that in KCC, some groups and individuals who are well 
connected to the state have held tenders for management of certain services, regardless of 
their performance. For example, the Uganda Taxi Owners and Drivers Association (UTODA) 
which manages the taxi parks is untouchable because “big people” in government lend them 
covert support to retain their tender745. As one key informant pointed out: 
Some of the contractors of services usually happen to be powerful people, 
may be not powerful companies but powerful people who feel more obliged 
to answer to the Mayor or a Minister rather than the Division authorities. 
This has made our work difficult. They say that they are managers of the 
service, for us as officials of the Division; we have no role in their business 
affairs746. 
 
The key informant pointed at UTODA, specifically by saying: 
                                            
742 See The Monitor, 21 April 2004. The statement is attributed to Hon. Mike Mukula, Minister of State for 
Health while addressing people at the concentration of the Bishop of the Source of the Nile – Bishop Kamanya 
Lubogo. 
743 See The Monitor 6 November 2004 will be paid a salary of Shs. 2 million per month from the Consolidated 
Fund. The district Chairpersons have been receiving their pay from local revenues. 
744 In the new government policy, the district chairpersons started receiving their salaries of Shs.2 million a 
month from the Consolidated fund beginning with the financial year 2005/2006. Previously each district 
determined the emoluments for its Chairperson and other political leaders. Contrary to what Hon. Mukula was 
putting across, it is not only the NRM mobilisers who will receive the new pay. It will cut across. 
745 UTODA is known to rush to top offices of government whenever they feel threatened by other competitors 
e.g. when KCC was working on a proposal to streamline public transport in the city by getting a bus company to 
provide city transport services, UTODA is reported to have gone to the President. Up to now the bus service 
never took off. 
746 Revealed by a Senior Central Division Official in the Finance Department. 
  
317
Taking the example of UTODA. They collect lots of money daily but they 
are defaulting on their payment to us. UTODA has been giving us bouncing 
cheques but no one is touching them. In the past, some competitors came 
up to compete with UTODA for the tender for management of the taxi 
parks but these are simply untouchable whether they pay or not747. 
 
The above narrative shows clearly that KCC officials have problems in management of 
contracted services. They feel they are powerless in the face of these “powerful” contractors. 
The principles adopted by KCC are such that tenders should be awarded on competitive 
basis. This however, is not always the case. For example, the Central Division Budget 
2003/2004 notes in the case of UTODA thus: 
The contract expires at the end of September 2003. There is need for early 
advertisement in order to get more competitive bids and have ample time 
for evaluations. We have conservatively budgeted at the current contract 
sum748.  
 
The problem with contracts management is not limited to the powerful forces that seem to 
over–rule KCC but also, the working relations that exist between the District Tender Board 
and the Divisions. There are persistent complaints at the Division level that the District 
Tender Board does not adequately consider the wishes of the Division in the awarding of 
tenders to service operators in their area. This itself, is a source of conflict and failure of 
control. The point of disjuncture is that on the one hand, the Tender Board awards contracts, 
and on the other, the Divisions officials are supposed to supervise the execution of the 
contract. What complicates the whole issue is not the process but the actual behaviour of the 
contractors, who tend to think that they are answerable to the Tender Board, the KCC 
headquarters or some influential councillors (who sometimes canvass for them to get the 
tender) rather than to the Division officials – the contract supervisors. The irony is that the 
contractors tend to think and behave in ways which suggest that they believe they have no 
contractual obligations to the Division and its officials749. This has caused strained relations 
between the Division politicians and the KCC headquarters’ and the Mayor. For example 
Central Division politicians have been accusing the KCC Tender Board of “delays in 
awarding tenders and contracting “quacks” who produce shoddy work750“. 
                                            
747 ibid, The same Central Division Official. 
748 KCC, Central Division Budget, 7 June 2003 
749 Interview with Ms. Olive Kitui Deputy Speaker, Kampala Central Division 13 May 2004. 
750 This has been a source of conflict between the Central Division Chairpersons and the Mayor. In 2000, Mr. 
Ziritwaula (the chairman) of Central Division wanted his Division to have its own Tender Board since 2001, the 
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Rather than achieving economic efficiency and improved service delivery, tender processes 
and awards have tended to follow political bargaining and considerations. The whole process 
of managing tenders is based on balancing political factors and forces. For KCC, this has 
been complicated by the fact that most of the local political leaders are multpartyists while 
the national leaders are Movementists. In that delicate situation, the local leaders wanting to 
fend off the accusation from their national political adversaries, that they are favouring fellow 
multiparty supporters in these tender awards, do allow those who are connected to key state 
actors to secure the contracts regardless of the business credentials (such as experience, 
efficiency levels, capital outlay etc). This has been the case with large contracts like the case 
we have detailed above, such as markets, taxi park management, bus park management and 
many others. As a result of such considerations, the levels of service delivery have not only 
been questionable, they are also said to be either unsatisfactory or unfairly exploitative751. 
Rewarding political supporters of whatever kind has become the modus operandi of contract 
management.  
 
The foregoing discussion may have given a picture that the struggles for control of tenders 
are between those connected to the state and the district officials only. At the local level too, 
there are scrambles for the same. Councillors, are particularly frequently cited as interested 
parties in getting contracts though the law forbids them from doing so. The explanation 
usually given is that … “Councillors spent a lot of money during the campaigns for their 
elections. They spent money for that purpose and are looking for money (from the 
council)752. It is further argued that …”politics is an investment, and no one invests to lose. 
                                                                                                                                        
new chairman Mr. Serunjogi has been pursuing the same goal but without much success. The Mayor, Mr. 
Sebaana Kizito believes that there should be one Tender Board for the whole of KCC. Since the personnel of the 
District is still centralised KCC would be reluctant to appoint a Secretary to the Division Tender Boards, even if 
Division Tender Boards were appointed. Under the Local Government Act, the law authorises Divisions in the 
city to have them, and if they can support them financially. The Mayor however insists that KCC as a district 
should operate as one entity. See The Monitor 2 January 2004 and also, revealed by Ms. Olive Kitui, in my 
interview with her. 
751 See Procurement News, 28 June 2004. For an example is cited of bus park management under Uganda Bus 
Operators Association (UBOA) which levies fees on each bus daily, yet the same buses are required also, to pay 
another Shs.50.000 for a monthly sticker. The bus operators say they are over – exploited by too many levies, 
yet the UBOA management has not shown any improvement on the bus terminal. UBOA in turn says its plans to 
re – develop the bus terminal have been frustrated by KCC which has not approved their plans. KCC on its part 
could not approve the plans because UBOA planned to erect a fuel station in the bus terminal contrary to the 
laid out plan of the area. 
752 Argument advanced by Councillor Joy Turyamureeba (Kyebando), Kawempe Division in an interview with 
her on 3 April 2004. 
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This is so whether at national level or local level753“. As a result of this perception, two 
tendencies have unfolded at the local level. One is that of conflicts within the local councils 
and another, is that of appeasement. Since there are no enough contracts to go around for all 
councillors, the more influential ones tend to continuously “eat” while the less influential 
ones “starve754“. The ensuing conflicts revolve around the “haves” and “havenots755“. In 
order to stave off bitter disagreements and conflicts arising from the wrangles amongst 
councillors as to who takes what, most of the chairmen and their executive committees, 
quietly apportion tender awards to the “big headed” councillors so that they may “keep quiet” 
and cause less trouble. Thus, although tenders are awarded at the district level by the District 
Tender Board, the footwork is done at the Division level by the technical staff and the 
Division executive committee, as to which company should actually get the tender for this or 
that. The Tender Boards follows all the procedures, they look meticulously transparent but 
the actual process that leads to the final decision of the tender award is done at the Division, 
and the Tender Board itself is aware of these intricate processes and their logics. As one 
councillor put it: 
The technical staff do their work properly. “Properly” also means listening 
to their bosses (the executive committee). They (the technical people) have 
to agree with what their bosses tell them to do because they have to protect 
their jobs756. 
 
The councillor further asserted “A toilet done in Kyebando at a cost of Shs.12 million is in a 
sorry state. What explanation can be given for that kind of work?757“, she asked  It is argued 
that the reason why the contractors do shoddy work is because the contractual sum is divided 
between the contractors and the councillors who fronted for their company to secure the 
tender, otherwise, the “uncooperative contractors” are “blacklisted” by their patrons. 
 
An example of alleged collusion between councillors, technical staff and the contractors is 
cited as Nicholas Enterprises, a company that won a contract for collecting license fees in 
Kawempe Division. The company’s credentials were questioned by the councillors, its 
                                            
753 ibid, Joy Turyamureeba 
754 At the time this study was being done, a conflict had rocked Kawempe Division Council based on this 
scenario. 
755 At the time this study was being done, a conflict had rocked Kawempe Division Council based on this 
scenario. 
756 ibid, Interview with Councillor Joy Turyamureeba. 
757 ibid, See also Procurement News 11 – 17 February 2004 The Minister of Local Government said he was 
aware tenders were influenced by political elites. 
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performance did not win their approval and the sub–contract that were offered under its 
supervision for collecting minor fees such as permits for wheelbarrow pushers, shoe–shines, 
street phone providers and evening markets etc were all, but contentious. Unlike its 
counterparts in other Division of the city, where collection of license fees improved in real 
terms, Nicholas Enterprises registered miserable results. In the meeting of the Finance and 
Economic Affairs Committee held on 8 November 2003, the members observed: 
there is little time left to the end of the year and M/s Nicholas Enterprises 
still owes the Division Shs.118 million which may be hard to realise in the 
remaining period of time758. 
 
In another meeting of the same committee, the members still queried Nicholas Enterprises. 
They alleged that Kawempe Division Council collected Shs.373.894.000 from license fees in 
2002/2003 using its staff.  After contracting out of this revenue source only Shs.381.919.500 
was realised, yet of this sum Shs.59.419.500 had already been collected by the council staff. 
They also queried several sub–contracts which were irregularly awarded under Nicholas 
Enterprises, whose agents were not giving out proper receipts to the tax–payers, were 
mistreating and abusing the latter and the citizens were protesting their conduct759. M/s 
Nicholas Enterprises was questioned about its failure to remit Shs.20 million per month as the 
contract reported under assessment of some of the tax payers, and lack of regular 
communication and reports to the council. The councillors argued that this was a breach of 
the contract760. 
 
The poor performance of the Nicholas Enterprises and its execution of contractual obligations 
was also a matter of concern to the chairman Kawempe Division who in his communication 
to the ordinary council meeting of 29 August 2003 said that their hopes for revenue as a 
council should be pinned on a new company Impact Associates which was collecting 
property rates as revenue from license by Nicholas Enterprises had greatly dwindled761. The 
irony surrounding poor performance of Nicholas Enterprises, however is that the chairman 
admitted that the sub–contracts which were partly responsible for loss of license revenue to 
the council had been given with approval of the office of the PATC (Principal Assistant 
                                            
758  
759 Min FC 142/12/2003 (Finance and Economic Affairs Committee, Kawempe Division) of the meeting held 6 
December 2003. 
760 ibid, the same Minute 
761 Kawempe Division Chairman’s comments from the chairman to the Ordinary Council meeting held on 29 
August 2003 at the Council Chambers Kawempe. 
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Town Clerk) with well–done terms of reference and approved by the executive762. This 
appears to be an uncritical admission that the failure by the contractor to execute his 
contractual obligations is partly shared by the executive committee and the senior 
management of the Division. Moreover during the course of the study, some councillors were 
pointing a finger at Nicholas Enterprises as one of those proxy companies fronted by the “big 
men” of the Division in securing this contract. They actually insisted that it belongs to 
them763. 
 
Despite the existence of influential forces who use their connections both within their local 
authorities and the state to  beat the system in order to serve their own selfish interest, there is 
still some vigilance on the part of the councillors to check whether to value–for-money is 
realised or not. For example, in Kawempe Division the works, transport and physical 
planning committee noted with concern the shoddy works exhibited by contactors in 
reference to Muganzilwazza road, where the culverts broke before the road was handed over 
to the division and Kawaala road where the murram was washed away by the rains764. The 
committee members subsequently visited these works and recommended that the division 
Engineer should ensure that the contactors do a more thorough evaluation before the work 
was approved and contractors paid. This was done. 
 
The implication of fraudulent practises in the privatisation process undermines 
decentralisation in a number of ways. First, the idea that decentralisation leads to link better 
service provision and improvement of tax payment is totally lost in this process. For example, 
in Kawempe Division the biggest tax payers are Makerere University and Mulago hospital, 
which have large population concentration, who are relatively well paid but receive minimum 
service from the Division. Both institutions bear the costs of maintaining their infrastructure 
such as roads and grass – cutting765. Secondly, because the contracting out process brings on 
board incompetent some companies, the quality of services rendered is in some instances, 
                                            
762 Ibid, Kawempe Division Chairman (Comments from the Chairman), 29 August 2003 
763 The Councillors requested for anonymity on this point. The “big men” refers to the executive committee 
members or some of them 
764 Min. WPHP, 05/11/2003 AOB, of the Works, Transport and Physical Planning Committee, Kawempe 
Division, meeting held on 11 November 2003. 
765 Councillor Goretti Mayanja (Makerere III and II) complained in an interview held with her on 5 May 2004. It 
was until the LGDP funds were released that Kawempe Division installed streetlights at Makerere University at 
a cost of Shs. 14 million. 
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worse than that previously done by the local authorities. Thirdly, the public has a problem of 
knowing who to blame in case of poor service delivery. Most citizens do not know the 
mechanisms of contracting out therefore they do not know where to report when things are 
going wrong.  
 
There is a general perception that local authorities are responsible for the taxpayers’ money, 
and are the ones to deliver the services. Indeed when we interviewed the citizens this 
confusion about private providers and local authorities was not easily understood by most of 
the ordinary people. One respondent said: Tulaba bakola nguudo, oba bani, nze simanyi” (I 
see some people doing the road, who they are I don’t know). 
 
In view of the above the respondents to our questionnaire reported the following results. 
 
Table 36: Showing Citizens Preference of a Service Provider in their Area 
Agency Frequency Percent 
Local Authority 
Central Government 
NGOs 
CBO 
Not Clear 
40 
24 
80 
56 
8 
19.2 
11.5 
38.5 
26.9 
3.8 
Total 208 100 
 
There above results show that there is a more positive image amongst the Kampala citizens 
towards NGOs and CBOs than that of both local and central government agencies in service 
delivery. This could probably be attributed to the feeling that the government agencies simply 
collect taxes and deliver less services or the population considers them as corrupt.  
 
Several reasons were advanced to this question that was open–ended. Their responses 
include: NGOs are not corrupt, their projects benefit the people directly, NGOs involve 
people in their projects and are transparent with money. On the part of the government 
agencies, the respondent reported that the central government had come up with a bod-boda 
scheme766 the local authorities were attending to drains and water sources. Surprisingly, 
although road construction and maintenance are the main local government investment 
projects in Kampala, very few respondents pointed out roads as a key service. This could 
                                            
766 Boda boda scheme of State House already referred to featured prominently, again to our surprise. 
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possibly explain the low rating given to local governments in comparison with NGOs and 
CBOs. It is also possible that citizens take roads as a prime responsibility of government 
hence they are taken for granted. Alternatively, because the majority people do not own 
vehicles, they perceive it that roads are not a service that directly benefit the poor lives. For 
instance, they may not be seeing the link between roads and poverty alleviation. This 
perception may also, be attributed to our methodology. Most questionnaires were 
administered in the economically disadvantaged areas of the city. The people in these areas 
are more likely to attach higher significance to CBOs and NGOs which deal with their 
poverty issues, directly than the local government- provided infrastructure. 
 
What also emerges from the above perception is that the local government officials have little 
contact with the people, in terms of consultations, debates and sensitisation over issues and 
programmes done in the communities. Only in cases where the community, largely through 
their local councils, have demanded for a project, do they appreciate the contribution local 
authorities. Otherwise, the assumption that the strategic framework for reform, would lead to 
demand-driven projects does not seem to have materialised in practice, albeit, in exceptional 
cases. Indeed the Minister for Local Government has observed that even officials at the local 
level “may not know which grant is supporting which project or how much the project will 
cost. They may not even have a hand in ensuring the quality of work although the project 
may be taking place in their sub–country.”767 
 
The Minister has insisted that the people where the project is taking place must know the 
cost, and the contractor, and must have a say in the quality of work being executed. He 
argued that . . . “if need be, before the final amount of money is paid to the tenderer, the 
beneficiaries should first approve the work.”138 The Minister however, seems to have waken 
up to this reality too late. The intended beneficiaries of local government projects rarely have 
any say or control over them. Until now, the Ministry has not issued any new guidelines for 
local project, beyond the rhetoric of its officials.  
 
                                            
767 See Procurement News 11 – 17 February 2004. The Minister said the Tender Boards inflate the cost of 
services by 10 to 15 times the actual cost. 
138 ibid. 
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It has been noted that KCC, at the best of times has been able to collect and dispose less than 
fifty percent of the garbage. The rest remains uncollected and the residents use private means 
to get rid of it. KCC in recent years has argued that since the individuals and groups in their 
homestead and work places are responsible for generating solid waste, they should equally be 
responsible for it. Also part of this perception in KCC was reinforced by the fact that many 
residents in various places were privately paying some small groups (either private 
companies or CBOs) to collect their solid waste. This is the background upon which KCC 
decided to design its current policy of privatisation of garbage collection. The policy is 
known as Kampala Waste Ordinance 2000. The key elements of the new policy as contained 
in the Ordinance are: 
 
(i) to get the private sector involvement in the management of solid waste with a view of 
getting greater efficiency, cost effectiveness and quality service delivery. 
(ii) To shift responsibility of solid waste disposal by paying fee to private collectors 
which KCC shall subsidise. 
(iii) To set standard fees for particular categories of solid waste collected. 
(iv) To control indiscriminate disposal of garbage and provide for proper methods of 
collection. Other methods of disposal other than the officially sanctioned private 
collection agencies constitute an offence which may attract a severe penalty. 
 
The ordinance was conceived within the goals of the Strategic Framework for Reform.  
According to Sebaana Kizito, the Mayor of Kampala, 
Kampala city cannot on its own manage the problem of garbage disposal. 
The Council lacks the resources to ensure efficient collection and disposal 
of garbage in the city, hence the need to involve private players is expected 
to result in improved service delivery while freeing some of the resources 
for KCC to attend to maintenance of roads, sweeping the city, running of 
schools and hospitals, street lighting repair of pavements etc768 
 
The ordinance, as the solid waste disposal policy reflects standard neo–liberal doctrine. 
Couched in the World Bank type of policies, this one too, goes ahead to emphasise individual 
responsibility for public services. The Kampala Mayor says: 
                                            
768 Interview with the Mayor of Kampala, in New Vision, 17 May, 2004, p. 12 
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it is important that the public recognises that the fundamental problem in 
garbage management in Kampala City has been lack of individual 
responsibility for garbage769  
 
Following the enactment of the above Ordinance, Kampala residents are expected to pay 
Shs.500 per day for garbage collection per homestead.  Congested area (slum) residents are 
supposed to pay Shs.1500 per month directly to the private collectors of the solid waste, who 
will provide a receipt for cash. Institutions, whether public or private are required to pay 
between Shs.50.000 to Shs.70.000 per skip (container) collected.  
 
The above rates are so exorbitant where the greater numbers of the urban poor live on less 
than one United States dollar a day, (that is Shs.1750 in local currency).  By KCC asking 
poor Kampala residents to pay Shs.1500 per month for collection of garbage is to deny them 
of an equivalent of a day’s meal. KCC argues that their rates are much lower than the market 
rates770. This is misleading because there is no “market” for solid waste in Kampala or any 
other municipality in Uganda. It is thus difficult to understand the basis of their rates. 
 
Moreover, it is a well established fact that a good number of children of the urban poor have 
dropped out of school under the universal primary education (UPE) where all children in 
government–aided schools are exempt from tuition and other charges simply because their 
poor parent do not afford school uniform, exercise books and pens. Why then, do KCC 
officials envisage that Shs.1500 will be afforded by the poor city residents? Looking at this 
policy, it is one of those that are not likely to succeed in the long run. The officials of KCC 
should have learnt from the LC1 official who collect on average Shs.1000 from each 
homestead as security fee per month. Situations have been witnessed when some residents 
simply close themselves inside their houses on hearing the voice of a member of LC1 
executive approaching to avoid payment of security fees. 
 
Other factors may not have been put under consideration in designing this policy such as the 
definition of a homestead. In congested areas of Kampala one building comprises several 
tenements (mizigo), may be five or ten; depending on the size of the building. Each tenement 
                                            
769 ibid 
770 ibid. 
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(one room) is a homestead. This fact is likely to affect the implementation of the policy in a 
significant way. 
 
It is possible that KCC will learn some lessons in the process of implementing the solid waste 
disposal policy since it is at the experimental stage in only two Divisions of Kampala Central 
and Kawempe. In Kampala Central Division, the tender was given to Nabugabo Updeal and 
in Kawempe to Engineers Investment Ltd. At this experimental level, the contactors are using 
KCC garbage trucks, while skips and truck drivers are paid by KCC. This has raised two 
questions.  The first one concerns people’s perception. It is argued that since the KCC trucks 
bought by the tax–payers are the ones ferrying the solid waste, the people are likely to 
perceive it that KCC is still the one doing the job, therefore there is no need to pay. The 
second one, concerns economic rationality of the whole project. “Indeed, since KCC is giving 
the trucks and the drivers, what is the contractor being paid for771?” Moreover, KCC meets 
the cost of running and maintaining the trucks. Most of the officials interviewed wondered 
the logic behind the contracting out of solid waste collection. Most of them are not sure that it 
will lead to cost–cuts or that their local governments will be able to benefit significantly. 
 
While it is true that in the more affluent areas of the city such as Muyenga and Kololo, the 
residents were hitherto making arrangements for their garbage to be collected by private 
providers, the persistent question that has been raised by these residents is the rationale for 
their payment of property rates. These rates are ordinarily supposed to enable KCC provide 
service such as solid waste disposal. This may probably explain why the tax payers’ 
willingness to pay this tax is low. 
 
The logical point in the implementation of this policy also arises. First there are areas which 
traditionally have never had any form of official collection of garbage. They have always 
improvised owing to their peculiar circumstances. Most of such areas are in slums where 
there is hardly any form of planning hence, inaccessible because there are no roads. There is 
no possibility at the moment that these areas can be accessed, even by the private collectors 
of garbage. Secondly, the initial enthusiasm on the part of some contractors has waned. In the 
case of Engineers Investments Ltd which had won contract to collect garbage in Kawempe 
                                            
771 Question posed by Mr. Murambuzi, Senior Assistant Town Clerk, Kawempe Division in an interview with 
him on 11 November 2004. 
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Division which worked for a few months and failed to deliver. It was observed that the 
company had no previous experience in this kind of business. It was supposed to sensitise the 
population which it did not.   
 
On commencing its operations, the population was not ready to pay or even to cooperate. 
When garbage heaps become worse than they were before, the residents complained bitterly. 
This also, then took a racial tone. The company belonged to Indian businessmen. The pre–
dominantly African neighbourhoods in Kawempe as well as some councillors put their 
questions in racial connotations: “does it take an Indian” investor “to come from India to 
collect garbage here? Can’t an African do the same?772“. This question, rings a popularist 
tone. Mixed with the fact that the company had hoped to make profit in a short run and had 
failed to deliver, the contract was cancelled. 
 
In the place of the above company, another one known as Norema Limited, was contracted 
for Kawempe Division. The new company had been one of the small groups that had been 
undertaking private collection of waste on private contract basis within the rich 
neighbourhoods, so it had some experience. It also engaged in sensitisation of residents, 
soliciting their support and explaining the benefits of their services. By the time of this study, 
it was not yet clear how much success the new company had registered. Whether the new 
company becomes successful or not, the intricate issues raised by the policy of privatisation 
of garbage collection will remain. There is the issue of the residents of Wakiso district, who 
live on the borders with Kampala, disposing their garbage in KCC skips. Although this has 
traditionally been a “normal” practice, however, now that the Kampala residents have to pay 
for their garbage collection, this may simply mean that they will be “paying for Wakiso 
residents”. 
 
The other intricate issue is that KCC has not come out clearly to explain to the residents, the 
kind of responsibility it has in the subsidisation of garbage collection. Most of the key 
informants in both Central Division and Kawempe Division where the experiment with 
private collectors of garbage is taking place did not know the extent to which KCC will be 
able to save money through this arrangement. Most of the ordinary residents interviewed, 
                                            
772 ibid. Murambuzi (interview). 
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complained that KCC was “cheating” them by imposing “another tax”. They argued that 
since they pay property rates and ground rent, there is no logic for KCC not to provide the 
service of solid waste collection. 
 
KCC on its part asserts that if the experiment with private garbage collection became 
successful it would be relieved of this burden. Indeed, in the case of Central Division where 
Nabugabo Updeal collects the garbage, there are signs of success. KCC maintains that it is 
already spending Shs.2 million daily on Kitezi landfill (where garbage is disposed of), and 
that it has improved the methods of disposal by sorting the solid waste. This means that KCC 
is spending about Shs.800 million a year on the landfill. 
 
Our observations in the areas where the private collection of garbage and those where KCC 
still directly provides the service did not lead us to any clear conclusion as to which of the 
providers (private or public) was more efficient than the other. Moreover, some key 
informants were of the view that KCC used a wrong method of contracting out the function 
of garbage collection by involving large companies. They argued out that this function should 
have instead, been contracted to small community–based–organisations (CBOs). This 
argument is favoured because it has merits of reducing unemployment especially among the 
youth while at the same time, that kind of arrangement would have empowered the CBOs773. 
On its part, KCC’s preference for large single private provider is based on the argument that 
if the services become unsatisfactory the contractor is accountable. The other argument is that 
a single contractor for a Division will be able to ensure that solid waste is disposed of in an 
orderly manner, and at the right time. Finally, as in other cases discussed earlier, KCC’s main 
motivation in the privatisation of services has been in terms of cost–cutting. Therefore, 
KCC’s preference for large providers takes into consideration the aspect of a provider who 
will not only deliver the service but also collect the service charge. The latter aspect is 
considered problematic for CBOs774. 
 
                                            
773 The CBO approach has been successfully used in Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania on the basis of similar arguments, 
See Mohammad Halfani, 1997 (opcit). 
774 It is not clear why KCC doubts the capacity of CBOs when several of them were already operating in almost 
every part of the city – collecting garbage and service charges for their ultimate use. 
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6.12 Non – Privatised Services 
From the preceding discussion, it is clear that ASDMs adopted by KCC targeted areas which 
could easily attract a service fee or could be provided by private dealers in the market. Some 
services have remained core responsibilities of KCC. These include: provision of public 
elementary education, public health and medical services, environmental management and 
sanitation, social welfare and community services, and planning. 
 
Whereas it has not been possible to establish  very clearly what KCC could have achieved 
through its adoption of the strategy of alternative service delivery mechanisms (ASDM) in 
terms of cost saving and efficiency, we have been able to demonstrate that its efforts in area 
of revenue collection have yielded greater positive results than the situation was before 
decentralisation. In other words, KCC is a much richer organisation through its improved 
collection of local revenue, and attraction of central government grants and donor funds. 
Against the background of improved revenue in KCC, and by examining its performance in 
provision and delivery of the basic services, then one is able to come to some understanding 
of whether or not, KCC is achieving its SFR objectives. We do this by critically analysing the 
key components of some of the basic non-privatised services.  
 
6.12.1 Education Services 
Provision of public elementary education is a function devolved by the central government to 
local governments. This is partly a shared responsibility between the central government and 
the local governments. The overall education policy framework is a responsibility of a central 
government. Under decentralisation, the central government identified education, especially 
elementary education, as a key priority area of the government’s effort to fight poverty. In 
pursuance of this goal, the government of Uganda introduced the policy of universal primary 
education (UPE). Under UPE, the state assumed responsibility for children’s tuition fees, 
running cost of schools and payment of salaries for teachers in all elementary public schools, 
in order to enable all children of primary school going age to attend. The government, 
therefore, meets most of the costs of primary education, including construction of new 
schools buildings. As a result of the UPE policy, enrollment in primary schools increased 
from 2.6 million in 1997 to 6.695.998 children in 2001775. 
                                            
775 Accessed at www.education.go.ug/statistics 
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Under UPE, the government releases funds on the basis of a capitation grant “which is meant 
to provide minimum facilities and resources necessary to enable Ugandan children of school 
going age to enter and remain in school and complete the primary cycle of education776“. The 
goals of the policy are basically two: (i) to improve equitable access to basic education by 
removing the burden of paying school fees from the parents and (ii) to enhance the quality of 
primary education by facilitating schools with resources necessary to run them. The main 
instrument for implementation of the policy is that of calculating the number of children in 
schools as well as a review of available school structures and facilities in each district. Thus, 
districts with large numbers of school children and poorer facilities than other districts 
receive higher capitation and school facility grants (SFGs). 
 
Since actual implementation of education policies is devolved to the districts and 
municipalities, the education grants are also devolved to these local governments. As noted 
earlier, the monies for payment of salaries for school teachers are also devolved to local 
governments as conditional grants777. So, once the financial resources reach the treasury of 
each local government it takes care of the needs of its schools and workers. 
 
Although UPE has tremendously increased enrolment in primary schools, it has its own 
problems. A high pupil–classroom ratio in all government schools which means the number 
of children sharing a classroom being as high as 144 (Pader district) 129 (Mayunge district), 
136 (Arua district) to as low as 46 (Entebbe municipal council) and 33 (Kalangala district)778. 
The issue here is that most schools are over – congested, making teaching ineffective in most 
government schools. The second problem associated with UPE concerns the motivation of 
teachers. Primary school teachers earn between Shs.100.000 – 150.000 (or on average 60 US 
Dollars) a month. This kind of salary can hardly motivate a teacher to do his job effectively, a 
part from the large numbers one has to handle in the classroom. 
 
                                            
776 ibid. 
777 It is important to note that the payroll for established staff at local government level is centralised, although 
they practically get paid by the local government authorities. 
778 opcit, www.education.go.ug/statistics. It is important to note that Kalangala is a sparcely populated island 
district while Entebbe municipality too, having been the colonial – capital of Uganda, is also sparcely populated. 
The indicative pupils’ performance, in these areas is not much better than in other districts due to other factors 
affecting UPE. 
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In the case of Kampala district, the situation is not very much different from other districts in 
terms of implementing UPE programme. In 2004 the pupil–classroom ratio in Kampala stood 
at 63. In the whole district there are 1.065 classrooms for 66.863 children in public schools. 
Data from KCC shows that Kampala district has the highest number of primary schools in the 
country. There are 793 primary schools, 459 pre primary schools 218 secondary schools and 
33 tertiary institutions779. Of these, the government owned primary schools are 83. However, 
the UPE programme is not limited to only the government owned schools. Thus, there are 
228government–aided primary schools. The rest are private schools. The enrolment in UPE 
schools stands at 130.339 pupils780.  
 
KCC employs 1413 primary school teachers. Despite this high number of teachers and 
schools, the teacher – pupil ratio is reported to be 1:110 in primary one and two and 1:55 in 
primary three to seven. Facilities are also inadequate, for example, the toilet facilities are at a 
ratio of 90 pupils per toilet781. The government UPE policy is that the pupil – toilet ratio 
should be 25 to 1. 
 
In terms of financing, KCC accords high priority to education. In its 2000/2001 budget, KCC 
spent 13.02 percent, (Shs.10.6 billion) on education. Education budget allocation was only 
second to Works and Technical services which consumed 44.6 percent (Shs36.3 billion) of 
the budget. This is clearly in line with KCC’s education objectives which include: 
improvement of the quality of universal primary education, service, greater enrolment and 
retention of children in the school system and development of capacity of its department of 
education to be able to deliver better and more efficient services. The policy goals include: 
provision of more school based facilities, well trained teachers, improvement of performance, 
effective planning, supervision and monitoring. The above objectives and goals indicate that 
KCC is committed to improvement and provision of quality education for the children of its 
residents. This too, is in tandem with the overall central government policy on education 
which aims at providing access to education to all Ugandan children under the UPE 
programme. 
                                            
779 KCC, Budget Framework Paper 2002/2003, p. 67. Note that the data from the Ministry of education under – 
states the number of UPE pupils (66863) while KCC figures are higher (130.339). It is possible that the Ministry 
based its data on pupils in government – owned schools. 
780 ibid., Important to note also, is that local governments, including KCC are not directly responsible for 
secondary and tertiary education. Their main responsibility is primary education. 
781 ibid 
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While the commitment of KCC to provision of quality education service appears sound, the 
reality on the ground shows that public schools under KCC are facing a real crisis. As 
indicated above, a teacher–pupil ratio of 1:110 is not conducive to effective teaching. A 
programme for special–needs–education has been initiated by government at Kyambogo 
University. However it is not replicated at lower levels of the school system.  Yet, KCC is 
handicapped by the government’s policy of staff ceiling. KCC receives the money for the 
payment of teachers from the government. And the latter releases the money on the basis of 
approved staffing levels. In other words, KCC has no liberty to increase the number of 
teachers in its school without approval of the government. On the other hand, KCC is to 
blame for poor facilities in its schools. KCC receives funds for school facility grants (SFG) as 
well as unconditional grants from the government. It also raises its own funds. With these 
funds KCC only needed to make school facility a priority, then improvement would be there. 
It is an incredible situation that ninety pupils have to line up for a toilet. Even in the area of 
constructing schools, most other districts have done much better with the SFG than KCC 
which has constructed only five new schools since 1997.This means that a crisis in provision 
of education in Kampala would have been rife had it not be for the large number of private 
schools. This again may be the explanation as to why many children drop out of schools after 
primary one or two. 
 
During the course of this study we were able to establish that while the official position of 
KCC is to have at least one primary school in each parish, this is not the case. For example, 
the following parishes have no public school: Kyanja, Mutungo, BukotoII, Kagugube, 
Bukesa, KololoI V782. Educationists blame the government for not giving sufficient support 
and incentives to the private providers of education783. There is also the issue of equity in 
access to education at two levels, at the level of gender and for children with disabilities. 
There is a general tendency for more girls than boys to enrol at the lower level of primary 
school, but girls tend to drop out in large numbers than boys as they progress to higher 
classes. In Kampala, by the time the children attend primary five to seven the gender is one to 
                                            
782 Mutungo Parish has no government owned school yet it has a population of 55.000 people. 
783 Private School Owners Association has been pressing the government over the issue of high taxes levied on 
their schools. They are arguing that they should not pay taxes since they are providing a public service that the 
government should have provided 
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one784. The higher drop out rate for female children is attributed to factors such as: 
employment in informal activities, AIDS illnesses, early pregnancies and the negative 
attributes of some parents towards females in attaining higher levels of levels of education. It 
was reported that most female children living in slum areas785 such as Naguru, Kataza, 
Katanga, Bwaise, Nateete etc have a very high incidence of dropping out of school in the first 
two or three years of the school system. 
 
Urban poverty which afflicts the greater numbers of Kampala residents affects the education 
of the poor. For example, while the government caters for tuition fees, teachers’ salaries and 
school facilities in UPE schools, the children are required to pay Shs.10,400 per term for 
school lunch. This is not a large sum of money but many poor parents fail to raise it. 
Although a child may not be excluded from school for non – payment of the lunch fee, he or 
she will be excluded from taking lunch. This gravely affects the psychological predisposition 
of the child towards learning which has led to some children dropping out of school. 
 
It is imperative to note that the Uganda government has been pursuing a policy of affirmative 
action for education of girls and persons with disabilities. The results have been 
encouragingly positive with access to education by females786. However, this has not been 
the case with persons with disabilities. Both the government and KCC have not put up 
schools that cater for special needs of the disabled children, especially at elementary and 
secondary level. Thus, despite the existence of the affirmative action for the people with 
disabilities to get access to equal opportunities in education787, not much facilitation exists for 
them to do so. 
 
In response to a high number of children’s failure to access elementary education due to 
varied reasons, KCC has responded by putting in place an improvised, community based 
                                            
784 Narrative made to me by Mr. Lawrence Nserekko, Division Education Officer, Nakawa in an interview held 
with him on 2 June 2004. In Kampala more girls stay in school than in rural areas. 
785 ibid. Lawrence Nserekko (interview). 
786 Due to affirmative action in admissions to higher institutions of learning, for the first time in the history of 
Makerere University, more females 54 percent of the graduates in 2005 were females as opposed to 46 percent 
males. 
787 A programme for special – needs – education has been initiated by government at Kyambogo University. 
However it is not replicated at lower levels of the school system 
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programme known as Basic Education for the Urban Poor Areas (BEUPA)788. This 
programme is crafted on the basis of attracting the youth, who have not had access to formal 
elementary education because of factors beyond their control such as those who are orphaned, 
those doing informal activities for their survival, as well as those whose parents are too poor 
to afford the basics to enable them attend formal schools. Such basics may include small 
things like pencils, pens, exercise books, shoes, and school uniform. The BEUPA schools are 
spread throughout the whole of Kampala. Some of the youth attending these schools may be 
as old as 16 years, while there are also younger ones. Some are working as house maids or 
servants. The programme is flexible so that they are taught for say, one hour or two, then, 
they return to their work. The objectives of BEUPA are to enable such youth to gain basic 
education.  The young ones are encouraged by their teachers to return to the formal school 
system. The teachers work on a voluntary basis, but KCC pays them a small allowance of 
Shs. 50.000 a month789. 
 
BEUPA is facing serious challenges. Although some residents in the communities offered 
their land to house BEUPA centres, some have turned around to make political capital out of 
it. For example, one lady councillor in Kibuli (Makindye Division) who offered to house a 
BEUPA centre on her land, threatened to evict them when she lost elections in 2001. 
 
Measures towards improvement of education in Kampala have been attempted. These 
measures include continuous professional development (CPD) for teachers. This is a 
programme assisted by the Agha Khan Foundation which works in partnership with KCC to 
train teachers in developing instructional materials as well as having workshops and seminars 
aimed at problem-solving790. At another level, each Division has a Coordinating Centre Tutor 
(CCT).  These liaise with school inspectors at the Division. This helps in coordination of 
education activities. In addition to the above, Parents-Teachers Associations (PTAs) have 
been strengthened. According to one key educationist, “these are more needed today than 
ever before because of the challenges involved in UPE. We need parents to appreciate these 
                                            
788 The programme is funded by Uganda government, KCC and German Technical Cooperation (GIZ). There 
are fifty six BEUPA Centres in the  whole city. 
789 The BEUPA teachers live in those communities where it is located. Those we interviewed said KCC is 
failing them. The token allowance does not come in time. It delays. 
790 The Agha Khan Foundation does this through its programme known as Enhancement of Universal Primary 
Education in Kampala (EUPEK). 
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challenges and to assist in the learning of their children791“. Besides PTAs, school 
management communities too, are being emphasised. 
 
While the above measures have been taken to strengthen implementation of UPE in Kampala, 
they have been very successful in stemming poor performance of public schools. PTAs which 
previously contributed to raising monies for topping up teachers’ salaries have been directed 
by the President not to do so792. 
 
Most of the public primary schools in Kampala which used to record excellent performance 
in national examinations are no longer able to do so793. This has forced most of the middle 
class parents to opt out of the public schools, and to take their children to private ones. This 
means that public schools serve mainly the children of the poor who have no options. While 
the government praises itself for introducing UPE as mass education referred to as boona 
basome (all must study), some cynical critics of the deteriorating standards in UPE schools 
call it boona bakone (all must be half–baked). 
 
Data from our survey shows that 76.9 percent of parents had primary school going children 
while 23.1 did not. When asked about their preference of school for their children (public or 
private) 69.2 percent reported that they take their children to private schools while 30.8 of 
those with school going children reported that they take them to public schools. This finding 
is interesting because our survey was done purposely in economically disadvantaged areas of 
the city, though the respondents were randomly selected. It would be expected that the 
majority of parents in poor areas such as Bukesa, Nateete, Kimwanyi, Bwaise etc take their 
children to public schools. When probed to state the reasons why they take children either to 
public or private schools, most of the parents who take children to private schools cited 
                                            
791 Emphasised by Mrs. Merab Kariisa, Senior Education Officer Central Division as an interview with her on 
17 May 2004. 
792 Museveni directed that parents must not be charged any extra money in UPE schools. This means that 
teachers have to do with the little salary the government pays. Museveni seems to be obvious of the high cost of 
living in urban areas. 
793 In the past, public schools such as Nakasero, Buganda Road, Kitante Hill, Shimoni, etc were reknown for 
their excellent performance record. The implementation of UPE and restrictions imposed by the government on 
the financial contributions by PTAs has negatively affected their performance. This has encouraged the 
unprofessional conduct by the teachers to illicitly solicit illegal payments from parents who desperately want 
their children to receive extra lessons and homework from the teachers, so that their children may improve their 
performance. This practice puts the children of the poor parents at a disadvantage because they are not able to 
make these illegal payments to the teachers, they receive little attention in class from the teachers. 
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reasons such as lack of government schools in their neighbourhood while there were several 
private schools in their area. For example, in the highly congested area of Bwaise there are 
nine private schools whereas there is no single government school. Most parents prefer the 
schools in their neighbourhoods because the children walk there to study, which cuts down 
the costs of transport. Although private schools are generally more costly than public schools, 
the parents are allowed by the school authorities to pay on a piecemeal basis which eases the 
financial burden on the parents. A good number of respondents also cited the deteriorating 
standards of performance in public schools as the reason for their preference of private 
schools. On the other hand, those parents who take their children to public schools say they 
are more affordable. For example, one respondent in Bukasa reported that KCC had done 
them great to construct a new public school in their area. Prior to that, parents had to walk 
their children to a Catholic mission school at Nsambya, five kilometres from the area. Thus, 
going by this logic, it reasonable interpret the overwhelming preference of private schools by 
the majority of parents interviewed, to absence of public schools in their neighbourhoods. 
Therefore, although KCC and the government are taking education, especially universal 
primary education as a key priority, the facilities, motivation of staff, instructional materials 
and the learning environment in the public schools are still inadequate and fall far short of 
parents’ and children’s expectations in Kampala. Had it not been for the large private sector 
investment in education, no one knows what kind of crisis KCC would be faced with.  
 
6.12.2 Public Health, Sanitation and Environment Management  
Under the Second Schedule of the Local Government Act, the functions of medical and 
health are decentralised to local governments. The district authorities are responsible for 
hospitals and clinics in their area (except the referral ones or those responsible for medical 
training), health centres, first-aid- posts, dispensaries, ambulance services, maternal and child 
welfare, vector control, health education, environmental sanitation, and primary health care. 
Medical and health services, like education, are a priority of the government as part of its 
policy to fight poverty. Thus, local governments have responsibility to ensure that they too, 
make it a priority. 
 
Kampala district, being urban, is considered to be better endowed in terms of health 
indicators relative to the national ones. The table below shows the indicators. 
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Table 37: Showing National and Kampala Health Indicators 
Health Indicator Kampala National 
Life expectancy 
Infant Mortality Rate 
Mortality Rate 
TFR 
Teenage Pregnancy Rate 
MR 
Routine Immunisation 
56  
83 
129 
5.21 
18.5 
- 
33.0 
43 
97 
147 
6.9 
16.6 
506 
47.4 
Source: KCC Budget Framework Paper 2002/2003, p. 14 
 
On a critical note, the above indicators show a very marginal difference between Kampala 
and the national average indicators except for life expectancy. The generally poor health 
indicators for Kampala may be attributed to rampant poverty, inadequate public health 
facilities in the city and poor sanitation794. KCC health facilities are too inadequate and ill–
equipped to deliver effective and efficient services. KCC does not own any hospital795. It 
owns twelve health centres across the city. Several hospitals and specialised medical service 
centres in the city are either owned by non– governmental organisations (especially religious 
organisations) or by private operators. Access to such medical facilities attracts a higher 
charge than the public ones. This may explain why at least half 150% of the pregnant women 
in Kampala still deliver unsupervised by qualified medical personnel, which is an 
embarrassing situation for a capital city of the country796. 
 
Most of KCC’s efforts in the health sector have concentrated on public health education, 
sanitation and environmental concerns. Interviews with KCC’s health workers revealed that 
the greatest emphasis is on sanitation. It was reported that latrine availability in the city 
covers only 80 percent and 76 percent of spring water is contaminated with human waste797. 
This is no exaggeration because our own observations in Kimwanyi, the slum area of 
Wandegeya suburb, two kilometres, and Nanfuka Zone in Nateete about four kilometres from 
the city centre, respectively, showed that people in these areas are living in very dangerous 
                                            
794 The sanitation situation was discussed in the previous chapter. Only to emphasise here that planned sewer 
system covers only the civic part of the city, having been laid during the colonial times. 
795 Unlike most districts which own district hospitals, KCC does not own one. Mulago Hospital and Butabika 
Mental Health Hospital, are referral hospitals owned by the government. 
796 See KCC, Budget Framework Paper 2002/2003 p. 14.One area where improvement in health provision, is 
safe water provision, discussed earlier in chapter five of this thesis. 
797 Information given by John Lule, Central Division Public Health Inspector in an interview on 17 May 2004. 
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health conditions.  In Kimwanyi Zone, Concern International, an NGO built a public latrine 
there to alleviate these dangerous conditions. However, its use is limited because the 
attendant (responsible for its cleanliness) charges Shs.100 per entry. For the very poor people 
in this area, this is a “lot of money”. A family of four, may require at a minimum Shs.800 a 
day to use a toilet. Since there are no alternative toilet facilities, the family members use 
plastic basins for urinating and plastic papers for long calls, right inside their houses. When 
darkness falls, they pour out all this waste in the drainage channel in the neighbourhood. 
They do the same thing at night, wake up very early and pour out the human waste into the 
channel. While conducting this study in this area, my research assistants and I encountered an 
extremely offending odour from the nearby drainage channel798. LCs on their part, have taken 
sanitation and hygiene in the area as a key issue. Every Saturday, they collect Shs.300 per 
household for labourers to open up the drainage channels. Put together, the cost of sanitary 
disposal is very costly to the residents of Kimwanyi, given their socio–economic conditions. 
 
In Nanfuka Zone, Nateete area, the situation is not much better than that of Kimwanyi.  Most 
homes do not have pit latrines. Drainage is also very poor. During the times when it is 
raining, this flat area is flooded all over. Just like Kimwanyi, the residents of Nanfuka Zone 
live in very dangerous health conditions. One of our respondents who lives at the rented 
premises with eight tenements (mizigo), reported that all occupants of these premises use one 
pit latrine, for which they have to queue especially in the early morning hours to dispose their 
waste799. I observed that the pit latrine had no door. For urinating, family members use a 
plastic basin and pour the urine into the pit latrine. The homes had no bathing facilities so, 
these tenants use their veranda to bathe at night, and in the morning they simply wipe their 
bodies from inside their houses. The situation is so bad that our respondent reported thus: 
In the morning we queue for this one pit latrine and enter in turns, but whoever 
is so had pressed and can’t wait, goes back to his or her house, defecates and 
pours the stuff into the latrine later800. 
 
On the lower side of Nanfuka Zone, the situation is worse. Constructing pit latrines is very 
costly because the water table is high. Once a few feet are dug, the water fills up the pit. 
                                            
798 Interviews were held with LCs and the people in this area on 8 April 2004. Mr. Abdul Kiggude Musisi, who 
said he was Kabaka’s chief and a land lord in the area conducted us around during the observation of the area. 
799 Interview with Ms. Christine Namusoke who resides at the house of Mr. Jackson Kasozi, the LC1 chairman 
of this area. Interview date 13 May 2004. 
800 ibid, Christine Namusoke (interview). 
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According to the Defence Secretary of this area, what the residents do is that once the 
residents build latrines, they make a hole underneath which continuously drains the waste 
into the adjacent channel801. Many homes in this part of the area do not have latrines so they 
excrete directly into the channel, thus, waterborne diseases are very common. 
 
In Kawempe Division, a situation similar to the ones described above does pertain. The 
whole of Kawempe Division except Mulago and Makerere areas, does not have a planned 
sewer system. This, combined with large, congested settlements in Bwaise, Makerere III, 
Kalerwe and Mulago makes sanitation a big problem. Most of these settlements are either in 
the wetlands or flat areas. Toilet facilities do not exist for most of the homes. Those that do 
exist fill fast because they are shallow, yet they can hardly be emptied because there are no 
roads leading to some of the residential areas. It was reported that even public latrines at the 
markets had been filled for a long time, but were still being used802. The Division has not 
been putting money aside for emptying filled up latrines. They pose an imminent danger to 
the health of the public. 
 
Another important public health concern is vector control. This is an aspect which relates to 
household health. In all Divisions, there are vector control officers but their function is 
practically of no value to society because they lack chemicals and equipment to fumigate 
homes or bushes. Fumigation of homes has been left entirely to the private sector. This is a 
critical failing on the part of KCC since it could have contributed to the uncontrolled 
breeding of mosquitoes, which are a menace in the spreading of malaria, the number one 
killer disease in the country. 
 
Food contamination also poses a danger to the health of Kampala residents. It was reported 
that there are several unauthorised food markets all over the city. Most food handlers in the 
markets have no certificates of medical fitness. Some prepare food in filthy places, drawing 
water for making the food from unreliable sources, and sell the food in open spaces. These 
practices go on unabated because the KCC officials do not inspect the food803. KCC officials 
                                            
801 Interview with Mr. Yahaya Semanda, Secretary for Defence, Nanfuka Zone LC1 on 13 May 2004. 
802 Concerns were expressed by Dr. Supe Nsibirwa, the Division Medical Officer, Kawempe in an interview 
with him on 28 April 2004. Similar observations were made Republic of Uganda, Uganda Participatory Poverty 
Assessment Process: Kampala District Report (MFPED), January 2000, pp 68 – 69. 
803 It was reported that most of the milk sold on the streets is adulterated or contaminated. 
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interviewed reported that most of the city orders are not enforced for two reasons. They 
complained that the Public Health Act is obsolete, that is, most of the sanctions attract minor 
penalties and fines. Secondly, that, there is a perceived view within KCC that since most 
people are poverty – stricken, they should be left to do anything to survive. These factors 
have made Kampala a disorderly city. Very delicate foods such as untreated milk and 
uninspected meat are sold widely in the city. 
 
6.13 Challenges of enforcing Public Health Orders 
The primary responsibility of a municipal authority is to ensure public order and to enforce 
its regulations. This is particularly important since cities are areas where very many people 
live and work. The failure to enforce public order and regulations may result in some harmful 
effects on the lives and well-being of some sections of the city population. In Kampala city, 
this has been particularly problematic, if not ignored. 
 
In the past, the failure of city orders was blamed on poor governance and corruption. In the 
recent times the problem seems to lie with KCC’s failure enforce health orders, and lack of 
proper planning. These factors have undermined the essence of what a city ought to be. It was 
reported that since KCC food inspectors have failed to compel food handlers to comply with 
the city regulations, this is a clear avenue for abating corrupt tendencies. KCC Law 
Enforcement Officials and Council Agents at their discretion, sometimes pounce on some 
groups, issue threats of arrest, which result in their victims offering bribes in order to 
continue with their business. For example, it was revealed that since most of the street 
vegetable sellers have no any form of storage in the city, they wrap their vegetables in plastic 
bags and sink them into the Nakivubo channel from where they retrieve them for sale the next 
day. Nakivubo channel drains human and other solid waste from all over the city, which 
means, the buyers will carry home contaminated vegetables. It was reported that this act goes 
on with the knowledge of the city law enforcement agents. 
 
More knowledgeable sources also reported that some markets are emerging in ungazetted 
places e.g. at Wabigalo where most of the petroleum depots are located. The evening market 
traders use lit candles as they sell their food and other merchandise. Naturally, if a leakage of 
fuel was to happen at this place, it could cause a catastrophe to the city – as it would be in 
flames.  More recently, several fuel stations have been constructed in the city without proper 
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planning.  Many observers argue that if a fire was to break at one, it would affect the 
neighbouring one.  In this sense, the danger of KCC’s failure to plan is that it will affect 
many innocent people. 
 
It may well be conceived by the city residents that KCC’s failure to put the city to order 
represents a form of complicity with the people who break the regulations of the city. This 
perception has become particularly prevalent in the vogue of privatisation. It was reported for 
example, that when revenue collections was privatised, especially in respect to trading 
licences, the primary responsibility of KCC to carry out  pre–inspection of premises and other 
requirements necessary for a business to be licensed was relegated. Instead, the private 
revenue collectors aim at raising the cash targets set by KCC. In the process, many businesses 
have been licensed without taking into consideration the environmental and health factors804. 
For example, premises licensed to operate as retail shops also operate as pubs (selling beer 
and spirits) in contravention of the Liquor Licensing Act. Worse still, most of these shops 
cum pubs  have no places of convenience (toilets).  So, strange as it appears, the beer drinkers 
at these premises, for lack of proper places of convenience simply urinate against the walls of 
the building or any place.  This results in damaging buildings and unpleasant odours. 
 
Part of KCC’s failure to apply and enforce trade orders has contributed negatively to the 
filthiness in which Kampala is, and to the poor environmental health of the city. Some of the 
issues relating to the implementation of trade orders have been politicised, for example, when 
KCC yielded to the pressure of the licensed business community to get rid of thousands of 
hawkers from the streets, so that a proper business environment could prevail, the central 
government agents, especially the Resident District Commissioner (RDC) and his deputies 
insisted that before KCC orders the hawkers and vendors off the streets, it must find an 
alternative trading place for them. When KCC designated such a place for the vendors, they 
protested that it was far off the reach of their customers. On their part, the government agents 
have failed KCC to operate on the basis of its mandate of having an organised city. The 
RDCs say that getting the vendors, who litter every corner of the city, off the streets should 
                                            
804 Some “Briefcase” businesses have also been licensed e.g. a company purporting to offer employment was 
licenced in Central Division, when in actual fact, it was extorting money from unsuspecting job seekers. This 
terribly embarrassed the KCC authorities when the people who were fleeced by the company on the false 
pretence of giving them jobs turned to city authorities to complain. 
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not be KCC’s priority. They accuse KCC of failing to do other “important” things it should 
have done805. 
 
The vendors do not only make the business environment difficult, they do not pay taxes but 
most critically, they contribute significantly to littering the city with all sorts of things they 
eat and sell–fresh maize, vegetables, fruits, bananas etc. KCC bears the increased costs of 
cleaning the streets. By some central government officials interfering with KCC’s attempts to 
enforce trade orders, this simply complicates matters for the council. KCC authorities, for 
example, in 2003 closed a slaughter house at Kalerwe which was in deplorable hygienic 
conditions. However, a directive from some influential persons in the government ordered 
that it be opened. KCC obliged. 
 
Moreover, matters have not been helped by Local Council officials, in respect of KCC 
enforcement of health and trade orders in the city. It was reported that before decentralisation, 
Council Agents (Parish Chiefs) would enforce city regulations effectively because they had 
adequate authority. With the coming of democratic decentralisation, power was vested with 
councillors at all levels, including the village (zone) level, therefore, unless the local council 
authorities cooperate with a Council Agent, he or she can hardly enforce any city regulation 
or order806. For example Council Agents revealed to me that Local Council Officials may 
erect an illegal market e.g. they erected one at Kikaya on the wetlands807. The Council 
Agents argue that what complicates the application and enforcement of city regulations is the 
double–pronged but not clearly defined approach, especially between the Council Agents and 
LCs in the course of implementing KCC decisions and orders. On one hand, the LCs have an 
assumption that they have all the powers (according to the Act) and that “power belongs to 
the people” (according to article 1 of the Constitution). On the other hand, the Council Agent 
is the officer of the Council responsible for implementation of its policies and orders. So, this 
                                            
805 The central government officials, especially the offices of the RDC in Kampala has created a “populist” 
stance towards the vendors in order to secure their political support for the Movement government. They also 
emphasise that some of the vendors are security operatives. At the time of this study, I met a senior security 
officer at Kawempe Division headquarters, who was pleading with Division authorities to let one man at the taxi 
stage continue making chapatti (fresh wheat petar bread) because he was a security agent. He was left to stay 
there. 
806 This was revealed during a discussion I held with Council Agents (Kawempe Division) at the headquarters 
on 22 April 2004. 15 Council Agents participated in the discussions. I am grateful to Mr. Murambuzi, the Senior 
Assistant Town Clerk for organising the meeting. 
807 Reported by Ms. Clare Mirembe, Council Agent for Kikaya parish during the above discussions. 
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has bred a conflictual situation that has undermined the work of KCC. According to the 
Council Agents, when they try to enforce any order, the LC says “I am the authority here”. 
Yet, the LCs are sometimes involved in breaking laws such as selling some people’s land, 
illegally. This arises because the LCs may have pecuniary interest in the sale808. However, 
when it comes to public duties like assessment of taxes, census, elections etc LCs are not 
cooperative because there is no monetary gain involved. 
 
The Council Agents, like the City Law Enforcement Officers have no “love lost” in dealing 
with LCs because as the agents of KCC, they have traditionally had a negative record within 
the population. They are perceived by ordinary citizens as corrupt, ruthless, uncompromising 
in the name of enforcement of Council orders. Thus, whereas, LCs may also be ineffective, 
they are on the side of the people who elected them.  
 
6.14 KCC’s Attempts at Improvement of Service Delivery 
Although KCC still faces a serious challenge of providing services through SFR, and it has 
failed to model itself into an efficient and effective organisation, there are some pointers 
towards improvement. According to the World Bank’s assessment of KCC809, its 
implementation of SFR has resulted into the following positive changes: 
(i) improvement in provision of basic services such as grass cutting, street cleaning and 
refuse collection. Because these services were contracted out to private service 
providers, the overhead costs of these services were substantially reduced. 
(ii) Organisational restructuring has reduced the wage bill. 
(iii) To ensure accountability and sound financial management KCC has introduced: cost 
centre budgeting, preparation of realistic budgets, introduction of internal financial 
procedures and discipline, and strengthening of the audit function. 
(iv) Through the divestiture process, unproductive assets were sold off. 
(v) KCC has increased stakeholder involvement in its projects. 
 
                                            
808 Every transaction involving sale of the land attracts a commission of percent for LCs, in addition to ekanzu 
(tune dress) for the chairperson. No traditional land sale transaction may be valid without the signatures of LCs 
in KCC. 
809 World Bank, Project Appraisal Document on a Proposal for Credit in the Amount of SDR 16.50 Million to 
the Republic of Uganda for the Nakivubo Channel Rehabilitation Project, April 13, 1999. 
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During the course of this study, we were able to observe some evidence that the World Bank 
– supported Nakivubo Channel Rehabilitation Projects, had reduced the flooding of main 
business district.  At the same time, several tributary drains around the city had been fixed, 
leading to more smooth running of rain water. Also, as we pointed out earlier, through the 
LGDP several micro-investment projects such as: seasonal roads, pavement works and 
drainage projects have been undertaken by KCC. 
 
Institutional capacity has also been undertaken in the areas of planning, budgeting, financial 
management and other aspects of management. Some examples of such improvements can be 
noted. KCC has strengthened its financial management capacity by installing the Integrated 
Financial Management System (IFMS). This is essential for financial accountability, 
transparency and monitoring. Moreover, when it be comes fully operational, all KCC’s five 
Divisions will be networked, which will enhance further, the function of greater transparency 
and efficient management. Similarly, unlike in the past when local officials e.g. cashiers 
would receive cash which “disappeared” in their hands, KCC today emphasises that its 
customers bank the money for whatever services, directly on KCC’s accounts, and  produce a 
bank slip whereby  the receipting is also computerised.  Despite existence of IFMS, KCC lost 
Shs.1.7 billion through fraud in the course of 2006.  The fraud led to the making of the Town 
Clerk and the Financial Controller. 
 
6.14.1 The Planning Function in KCC 
Another area of improvement is planning. Planning involves preparation of structure plans, 
that is land use planning. It also involves development planning. At both levels there have 
been improvements. As we noted earlier, KCC’s last structure plan had been done in 1972. 
With the help of the World Bank’s First Urban Project, a new structure plan was done in 
1994. Division Planners have come up with detailed plans810 for each parish. The problem 
however, is that these plans have not been fully implemented because KCC does not have 
financial resources for that purpose. Development plans have greatly improved since 1998. 
Three types of planning documents are produced annually: the three year rolling plan (the 
budget framework paper), the capacity building plan and the annual budget. Each Division 
comes up with these documents which are incorporated into the overall KCC plans. 
                                            
810 Detailed Plans are used for purposes of development control, gazetting roads, housing plans etc. Presently, 
the physical planners have adopted mixed planning for development. 
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Planning however, remains one of the critical challenges to KCC. Planners lack updated 
topographical maps (the existing ones were made in 1992). All Division planers lack the 
Geographical Information System (GIS), survey and other basic tools. Practically, the 
planning function is not effectively decentralised to the Division, for example, approval of 
building plans is done by the KCC headquarters. Key two critical factors undermine the 
planning function in KCC: the land tenure system, whereby most of the land in the city is 
owned by mailo (mile) land owners (private) and encroachment by private developers on 
creation areas. These two factors have impeded proper planning for recreation in Kampala.  
 
The planning capacity in terms of human skills has had improvement only in the recent years. 
Each Division has at least one physical planner811. This is a relatively new development after 
decentralisation. KCC itself, traditionally did not take planning seriously, for example until 
1989 it had no substantive planner812. It had generally been perceived in KCC that the matters 
of planning could be handled by the City Surveyor. This was certainly a wrong perception 
because a surveyor can not be a planner or vice versa. This appears to be the reason partly 
why the structure plan of 1972 was never implemented. It is not possible to implement a 
structure plan without planners. 
 
Still to date, bureaucratic tendencies exist in the implementation of KCC’s planning function. 
The technical planners are not the final authority on the planning activities. They plan and 
submit plans to the politicians, who lack any technical knowledge of planning. Besides, for 
the implementation of structure plans KCC is not the final authority. This authority is vested 
with the Town and Country Planning Board, which makes recommendation for gazetting a 
planning area to the Minister of Lands for the final authority. This tall order of bureaucracy 
tends to negate the idea of participatory planning which in theory is supposed to be the basis 
of the planning activity in all local governments including KCC813. This has tended to 
                                            
811 The first six planners were employed by KCC in 1989. This number was again boosted by another six in 
2001. Before 1989 there was no department of urban planning. 
812 The Current Chief Planner was employed in 1999 to implement the new structure plan. Still, the problem 
with planning in KCC is that it lacks Stastistians and Economists. These are necessary if effective planning is to 
be realised in any organisation. 
813 World Bank, Project Appraisal Documenton a Proposed Development Credit in the Amount of SRD 36.7 
Million (50.0 Million US Dollars) and Development Grant in the Amount of SDR 55 Million (75.0 Million US 
Dollars) to the Republic of Uganda for the Second Local Government Project, May 2, 2003, noted stakeholder 
involvement in projects was minimal which led to the beneficiaries to consider them as “external”. 
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undermine people’s support for KCC development activities in terms of stakeholder 
commitment, involvement and local capacity to sustain them. The assumption in the design 
of decentralisation that stakeholders, especially, local communities be constantly consulted 
and involved is not validated by the observations and interviews we carried out. Instead, the 
technical people come with their plans which are scrutinised by elected leaders at the 
Division level. But even at this level, there is a strong suspicion between the technical staff 
and the councillors. In matters of planning, the technical staffs have low regard for the 
political leaders. It was observed for example, that most of the plans submitted by the City 
Engineer either had no objection or were referred to him for final implementation by the 
Works and Technical Committee814. 
 
It is important to note that while planning has become a prominently critical area of 
management in KCC in recent years, the planners still complain that the planning department 
is still side–lined in terms of facilitation. It was reported that the whole department does not 
even have one vehicle to enable the planners to move in the course of their work. The 
planners wondered how they could collect planning data while they were confined in their 
offices815. It was argued that the administrators are given higher preference when it comes to 
allocation of financial resources.  The technical staff feels marginalised in financial resource 
allocation. 
 
 
6.14.2 Personnel Management 
In structural terms, the implementation of SFR was supposed to produce a more open 
organisation. This does not seem to be the case since KCC employees do not yet have a 
career succession plan and a staff development policy does not exist816, and the salary 
structure has not been reformed. The key objective of the SFR was to result in a smaller, well 
motivated and organisation–centred human resource policy. This is not yet the case because 
salaries in KCC are still pegged to the Central Government civil service salary structure, 
which is not at all motivating. Moreover, KCC has made matters worse, by employing some 
                                            
814 Several Minutes of the KCC (Works and Technical Committee) show this tendency. 
815 Interviews with Mr. Mpambara (Division Planner, Kawempe) Mr. Ndiwalana (Division Planner,   Makindye) 
and Mr. Sebagala (Division Planner, Central). 
816 Interview with Ms. Annet Rwemereza (ibid) revealed that KCC does not have a training policy. At the time 
of this study (2004), her department was developing one. 
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of the senior staff on lucrative contracts whereas career managers and junior staff remain on 
the civil service salary structures. It was further reported that contractual senior staff block 
the career advancement of other senior and middle managers and block new ideas in order to 
protect their jobs817. In turn, senior managers, who are not on contract, press the Council to 
add a series of allowances on top of their salaries. Most of the top executives earn more in 
allowances than their official monthly salaries. It was observed that some of the allowances 
are questionably high818.  
 
This is demonstrated in the table below. 
 
Table38:  Showing the Relationship between Salaries and Allowances for the Audit 
Section of KCC 1998/99 
Category of Employee Costs Amount 
Salaries 
Housing Allowances 
Transport Allowances 
Responsibility Allowances 
Lunch Allowances 
Pension Gratuity 
34.604.000 
29.850.000 
8.000.000 
5.000.000 
18.000.000 
6.000.000 
Total 101.654.000 
Source: Figures extracts from KCC, Budget Framework Paper 2002/2003 p. 3 
 
As the figures demonstrate in the above table, salaries as a category of employee benefit in 
KCC give a deceptive picture if one looks at the pay slip per se. However, the packs 
involved, and especially for the top officials mean that they are, in reality well paid. Monies 
expended at the discretion of the bosses far exceed the salary entitlements, for example, while 
Shs.34 million was budgeted for all staff in the Audit department, the chief of the section had 
Shs.18 million lunch allowance budgeted to spend at his or her discretion. 
 
                                            
817 Complains were raised by some managers and staff (both KCC headquarters and in Divisions) that KCC had 
retained some people at the top on contracts, paying them exceptionally high salaries when infact, they had 
retired from the public service. So they get salaries and pension which is not fair. 
818 Reference is made to Minute FC 107/08/2003, in discussion of Councillors allowances vis – a – vis those of 
the Executive Committee of Kawempe Division, where the Councillors had wanted the emoluments of the 
Executive members reduced so that those of the ordinary councillors could be increased. Under Minute MIN KD 
5/3/2003 Reactions to the Division Chairman’s Communication, the Councillors challenged him on the above 
issue. His response was that he would not sign the budget documents if councillors went on to press him that 
direction. 
  
348
SFR as envisaged by KCC was intended to build a small and efficient organisation, run on 
the basis of core staff, but this has not materialised. Whereas official figures show a reduction 
of staff from 2,283 in 1996/97 to 1123 in 2001/02, the facts on the ground show that the 
Division authorities have been expanding their support staff. Since the employment of this 
category of staff is within the mandate of the Division Councils, they are not reflected in 
KCC’s overall staffing position. This is also ironical, in the sense that as contracting out is 
taking place, the Division Councils are expanding their establishment. This tendency, 
certainly eats into resources that are arguably saved as a result of contracting out. 
 
KCC’s drive in its SFR is intended, to “liberate” resources for productive activities and 
extension of welfare services. On a more careful observation, however, evidence that 
financial resources have become more available for such services does not exist. In all the 
five Divisions of Kampala, the productive services of agriculture, fisheries, veterinary and 
horticulture were the most under–funded, year to year. Equally so, the welfare department 
which deals with children affairs, women issues and community services receives no priority 
funding. To demonstrate how these community functions are marginalised, the Central 
Division budgets over the years, make this case clear. In 2001/02 out of its budget of Shs.4.3 
billion only Shs.36.7 million and 20.5 million was budgeted for the production sector and the 
welfare and community services sector respectively. In the 2002/03 budget of Central 
Division of Shs.5.8 billion, the production sector received Shs.42 million and the welfare and 
community sector Shs.179.5 million. Though the latter received some improved funding, its 
share of the budget was less than one only percent of the total. In light of the SFR objectives 
this is no good indictor because the budgetary share of the administrative sector continued to 
grow, for example for Central Division it grew from Shs.581.7 million in 2001/2002 to 
Shs.936.3 million. Equally alarming was expenditure on Council and its committees whose 
budget allocation grew from Shs.473.6 in 2001/02 to Shs.705.1 million.  This raises two 
issues. The first one, is about the Council expenditures which nearly doubled for the same 
people and functions. One wonders what the rationale is, for such expenditure to increase. 
The second one, is the classic analogy of public administration, which generally posits that 
administrators usually expand their budgets as more resources become available. This seems 
to be the case for administrative expenditures in the Central Division of Kampala which have 
more than doubled over a period of two years. Thus, for KCC to assert that contracting out 
services and mobilising more resources, would result in better services to the community is 
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not a fact that is proved by the trends in budgetary priorities we have analysed above.  There 
are some cases of improvement in service delivery in KCC, albeit, this is more associated 
with increased donor-funding, central government funding and divestiture than more prudent 
management or good governance in KCC. 
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Chapter 7 
 
State-Civil Society Relations in Decentralised Service Delivery 
 
7.0 Introduction 
This chapter analyses state-civil society relations. It is an attempt to locate the place of civil 
society in society and to understand relations thereof that exist between civil society and the 
state, and to empirically establish the nature, rationale, as well as the modus operandi of the 
interface that exist between the two realms of public life. The objective of this analysis is to 
locate what agenda, if at all, are promoted by either civil society or state in society, either 
separately or cooperatively and to establish the kind of outcomes that have been engendered 
by that interface. Using case studies from Kampala city, we are able to demonstrate how this 
has unfolded in the era of decentralisation. We have proceeded from the premise that civil 
society plays a great role in service delivery to its members, encourage popular participation, 
and reaches out to vulnerable groups especially the very poor and marginalized people. We 
discern as Harbeson hypothesizes, that civil society is a critical factor in the advancement of 
“improved governance, viable state-society and state- economy relationships, and prevention 
of the kind of political decay that undermined new African governments a generation ago”.819  
In the same vain we understand the state as a hegemonic institution with power that 
authoritatively allocates values in society. Beyond this definition however, the underlying 
reality of the African state and that of Uganda in particular, complicates the kind of analysis 
one can undertake, in the perspective of the state - society relations. This is precisely because 
for most of the post independence period, the Ugandan state collapsed. As the state 
“resurrected”, it embraced the World Bank and IMF sponsored economic reforms - which not 
only limited government expenditures on social services but also pushed for privatisation and 
liberalisation of the economy.  The effects of these developments left large sections of 
vulnerable or poor people unable to access services. Concurrently, the Uganda government 
instituted a local government reform in form of decentralisation, which was believed would 
promote popular participation, accountability and transparency in service delivery at a 
grassroots level. Although the decentralisation policy has been in place for more than a 
                                            
819 John W. Harbeson, “Civil Society and Political Renaissance in Africa” in John W. Harbeson, D. Rothchild 
and N. Chazan, Civil Society and the State in Africa, Boulder: Lynne Reinner,1994,p. 2. 
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decade, the modalities of how it could enhance partnership between civil society 
organisations and local government do not formally exist. Albeit, several civil society 
organisations are working within the framework of state decentralisation, a relationship that 
has hitherto, not received serious analysis in Uganda. 
 
The methodological limitation that we have to contend with lies in the elastic boundaries of 
what civil society organisations do and contribute on the one hand, and on the other hand, 
what local governments do, on their part. Equally, it is now a well-established fact that local 
government officials, like their central government counterparts, are critically short on social 
probity and are engaged in corrupt behaviours which have undermined the very foundation of 
decentralisation - that is, providing services efficiently, effectively on the basis of popular 
accountability, participation and transparency. The critical issue that arises is: to what extent 
could such behaviours have affected the civil society - state relations at the local level where 
both operate?  What could have been the responses of civil society organisations to such 
challenges?  These questions become even more partinent because recent studies have 
pointed out that local government officials in Uganda undermine the work of civil society 
organisations because they perceive them as competitors rather than partners.820 Thus, 
whereas both civil society organisations and local governments share a common objective of 
taking services closest to the local beneficiaries, especially those marginalised by the central 
government and “locked” out of the market because of poverty and vulnerability, the above 
negative tendencies that characterise the two sectors hurt the good goal of attaining that 
objective. The key issue therefore, is to critically examine the extent which both civil society 
organisations and local governments organise and operate at the local level and to assess the 
impact they make on their beneficiaries. 
 
 7.2 Recasting the Concept of Civil Society 
Civil society is a normative term that is wide and elusive. However, for analytical purposes in 
this thesis, we will view civil, society as a realm of organised social organisation that is 
voluntary, self - regulating, self-supporting, autonomous from the state and bound together by 
a set of shared rules and values.821 Functionally, civil society is conceived in terms of 
                                            
820 Abigail Barr, M. Fafchamps & T. Owens, “Non - Governmental Organisations in Uganda: A Report to the 
Government of Uganda” Oxford University, Centre for Study of African Economics, Decentralisation 2003. 
821 Opcit.Herbeson. 
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organised activities by groups to improve society, but are not part of the state or business.822   
In other words we will be emphasising civil society’s benign properties, following the 
perspective adopted by authorities and developmental prescriptions that prescribe 
partnerships between the state and social networks or organisations.   For the purposes of 
argument in this thesis, this quite qualified concept of civil society should suffice. Though 
conceptual clarity about civil society will remain a subject for debate, for our purposes civil 
society is characterised among other elements by, being that realm of society that is organised 
voluntarily without a motive for profit,823 whose immediate interest is not to secure political 
power but to mediate between political power–holders and to promote the interest of those 
they represent, besides their members and beneficiaries. In a nutshell, civil society is distinct 
from the state, society and business. It is distinct from the state because an organized civil 
society group joins or forms government it ceases to be a part of civil society.  It is also 
distinct from society because only that realm of society that is organized for a specific 
purpose can be described as civil society. Civil society goes beyond individual interests of 
private gain, hence it is not organized for profit making business. Civil society has been 
described in a more comprehensive and analytical manner by Taylor thus: 
…in a minimal sense civil society exists where there are there is  tutelage 
of state power. In a stronger sense, civil society exists where society as a 
whole can structure itself and coordinate its actions through such 
associations. As an alternative or supplement to the second sense, we can 
speak of civil society whenever the ensemble of associations that influence 
the course of state policy.824 
 
This conceptualisation is aptly relevant for our purposes for three reasons. First, it affirms the 
notion of free association organizing outside the state. Secondly, it emphasizes the idea of 
engaging the state in order to influence the outcomes of state policy. Thirdly, it reveals the 
continuous actions and activities, both within individual civil societies and between their 
variants. A composite outcome of all the three should mean a vibrant society or plural 
society, which is capable of taming the behaviour of the state, holding it accountable and 
keeping it in line with the rules of the game, a phenomena that has come to be termed as 
governance. Governance itself literally means the manner in which the associational life of a 
given society is organised, and the extent to which it engages the state and other elements of 
                                            
822 Ibid 
823 Ibid 
824 Taylor, Charles (1997) “Involving Civil Society” in Goodin, R.E. & Philllip Petit, Contemporary Prentical 
Philosophy:  An anthology, Blackwell, Oxford. 
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society. In this respect, civil society is seen as common denominator in shaping the rules of 
the game for a democratic society.  
 
In respect of the market, civil society presses for fairness by playing a role on the side of 
those excluded by the market forces. As Held asserts, the free vote and free market are the 
key assumptions for guaranteeing that collective good is achieved.825 With civil society 
mediating between these two essential processes in society, the liberal - democratic element 
is cemented in the society as a whole. Whether one is contesting or confirming the potential 
of a liberal-democratic notion of the state in producing the collective good, the essential 
element is a clear understanding of what civil society can or cannot achieve. 
 
7.3 Civil Society in Uganda 
In Uganda as in many countries in the world, civil society organisations constitute what has 
come to be known as the “third sector”. They play an important role both at the level of 
advocacy (engaging with state policies) and at the delivery services. They are engaged with 
both the central as well as the local levels of the state.  
 
Civil society in Uganda falls within two categories: the first is the formally constituted, non - 
governmental organisations (NGOs). The other category is widely known as community 
based organisations (CBOs). NGOs are registered with a statutory body known as the NGO 
Registration Board, under the Ministry of Internal Affairs. CBOs on their part, are either 
registered with the local government authorities or are operating more or less informally, 
without registration. Thus when the term civil society is used in Uganda, it largely refers to 
these two categories of voluntary organisations. The basic difference between NGOs and 
CBOs is their scale of operations and the size of membership. CBOs tend to be small, issue - 
focused and geographically localised. On their part, NGOs tend to be bigger in size of their 
membership, more broadly-focused and sometimes spatially spread out.  
 
Historically, the NGO sector in Uganda used to be small, and to a large extent, dominated by 
religious groups engaged in charity and provision of some social services.  This picture 
                                            
825 David Held (1995) Democracy and Global Order:  From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance, 
Polity Press/Stanford University Press. 
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changed in the 1990s when the NGO sector expanded rapidly. For example, a recent study of 
NGOs in Uganda reveals that there were 3499 NGOs registered with the NGO Board in 
2000826. Despite their important role, the number of CBOs in the country is not known.  Also, 
whereas the number of NGOs has proliferated in recent years, what they do, how they do it, 
with what means, is not well known. This notwithstanding, there is a widespread consensus at 
government policy level that civil society plays a significant role in the development process. 
It is noted for example: 
In a country as poor as Uganda with limited government capacity and 
profound social needs, it is urgent to expand partnerships in a decentralised 
framework in order to reach the poor and to offer interventions that are 
meaningful to their lives.827     
 
It is further observed that civil society organisation possess a special comparative advantage, 
relative to government in that they are innovative in their activities, spontaneous in their 
operations, they enhance local popular participation and reach the needy more easily than the 
bureaucratic structures of government.828 Similarly, the Uganda government acknowledges 
that NGOs and CBOs have “filled the considerable void left as a result of government 
incapabilities.”829  For example, by 1994 the contribution of the voluntary sector to the 
national economy was estimated to be United States Dollars 125 million, a figure that was 
equivalent to 30 percent of the financial aid to the country that year.830 Besides, in the 
particular sector of health, the voluntary sector provided one third of hospitals beds.831  This 
demonstrates the extent to which NGOs and CBOs are crucial to the development process 
and service delivery. This informs the position of the Uganda government thus: 
Rather than perceiving the voluntary sector as a substitute for the public 
sector, or NGOs as contractors for government, it will be preferable to pay 
attention to the characteristics that give them their strengths and 
weaknesses, and encourage them to exploit their comparative advantage 
wherever it may lie.832 
 
                                            
826  Abigial Barr, M. Fafchamps & T. Owens, “Resources and Governance of Non - Governmental 
Organisations in Uganda” Oxford Centre for the Study of African Economies, Working Paper Series 2004/6. 
827  World Bank (1994) 
828 ibid, World Bank (1994 
829 Uganda Government, Ministry of Finance & Economic Planning, “Realising the Development Potential of 
NGOs in Uganda” Report of Workshop Kampala, 9 - 10 February 1994, p. 10 
830  ibid, p. 7 
831 ibid, p. 10 
832 ibid, p. 11 
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In this sense, the Uganda government considers the voluntary sector as a key strategic partner 
in the development process.833 In policy terms, therefore, the government encourages the 
work of the voluntary sector by extension of selective tax exemptions on materials donated to 
the NGOs. The position of the government is that whereas this is not a right, it is justifiable in 
that it should be seen as “a government contribution to the relief and development” that 
NGOs provide.834 On the basis of this principle, NGOs in Uganda are selectively exempt 
from corporate taxes to the government since their activities do not involve profit making.  
 
Despite the government’s recognition of the role played by civil society organisations in the 
development process, we have little evidence of how civil society and the state relate in 
reality. This raises the question of whether the two are “partners”, “adversaries”, or 
“competitors” in service delivery. Equally important is the question of whether civil society 
organisations are internally democratic or whether they possess capacity to deliver services or 
not. The pertinent question then, is: to what extent are civil society organisations an 
alternative to the public sector? This very question is frequently asked by the NGOs 
themselves. In re-examining their own work vis-a-vis that of local government, a recent study 
by NGOs in Uganda has summarised the issue at hand thus: 
In the transformation of local governance and service delivery which 
Uganda has witnessed over the last decade, particular roles are envisaged 
for CSOs. On one hand, they are frequently identified as the actors that 
should be holding government to account and on the other hand, they are 
also increasingly involved in the implementation of privatised and 
decentralised service delivery, under agreements with the state through sub 
contracting practices835 
 
This observation illustrates the ambiguous situation that civil society organisations find 
themselves, in dealing with the state institutions. It raises a further question: are CSOs and 
the state bedfellows? If they are, who checks the other? How does that facilitate or hinder 
accountability to the people? These questions will be addressed later but an examination of 
the framework in which CSOs and local governments work at the local level is necessary in 
order for us to understand the basis of these issues. 
                                            
833 ibid, p. 21 
834  ibid, p. 25 
835 Gerald Twimukye et al “Biting the hand that feeds you?  Explaining Sub-contracting and Accountability 
Mechanisms Between Civil Society Organisation and Local Government in Arua and Kabale Districts” 
CDRN/KADIFA/CEP-DR Research Report, Kampala, p.vii 
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7.4 The Civil Society-Local Governance Framework in Uganda 
The framework in which CSOs and local governments work, though blurred, draws from the 
Constitution of Uganda (1995) and the Local Government Act (1997). The Constitution in its 
social and economic guiding principles, obliges the state to ensure that: 
(a)  “all development efforts (of the state) are directed at ensuring 
maximum social and cultural well - being of the people” and 
(b)  “all Ugandans enjoy rights and opportunities and access to 
education, health services, clean and safe water, work, decent 
shelter, adequate clothing, food security and pension and retirement 
benefits” . 
 
The constitution affirms in the state policy objectives: “In order to facilitate rapid and 
equitable development, the State shall encourage private initiatives and self-reliance”836. At 
the same time, the Constitution declares that the democratic processes of the state shall be 
guided by “the principle of decentralisation and devolution of governmental functions to the 
people at the appropriate level where they can best manage and direct their own affairs”. This 
state policy is operationalised by the Local Governments Act. In its preamble the Act states: 
An Act to amend, consolidate and streamline the existing law on Local 
Governments in line with the Constitution to give effect to the 
decentralisation and devolution of functions, powers and services . . . to 
ensure good governance, and democratic participation in, and control of 
decision making by the people. . . 
 
Despite this broad view of “democratic participation” however, there is no single clause in 
the Local Government Act which stipulates how this is to happen in respect of citizens’ group 
or civil society organisations. In other words, it falls short of putting in place the necessary 
mechanisms for popular participation and citizens’ engagement with various levels of local 
government. This glaring lacuna in the laws has left CSOs to forge their space in the whole 
system of local state structures and to find their place. As Hyden points out, this seems to be 
the case in many third world countries. He argues that between the state and markets, “what 
has been overlooked is the whole sphere between the two, which relies neither on coercive 
power nor profit maximisation as its prime motivating force”837. 
                                            
836 These State Policy directive principles are operationalised by Article 38 of the Constitution. 
 
837  Goran Hyden, “Bringing Voluntarism Back In” in Joseph Semboja and  Ole Thirkildsen, Service Provision 
Under Stress in East Africa p. 35 
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Despite the weaknesses in the law specifying the role of the CSOs in local governance, the 
national economic policy, either directly or indirectly has been favourable to the growth of 
the CSOs. In 1987 the Uganda government accepted a World Bank and International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) sponsored economic programme of Structural Adjustment Policies 
(SAPs) which was code-named the Uganda Economic Recovery Programme. The key 
elements of this programme were: liberalisation of trade, foreign exchange regime, 
privatisation of public parastatals, and control of government expenditures among others. 
This economic framework, which has worked for nearly two decades has had significant 
influence on how state-civil society relations have evolved in Uganda. First, the pre-1987 
state in Uganda was hegemonic and violent, which discouraged the formation of active 
CSOs, except those that were engaged in “economic survival” activities for their 
membership.838 With full entry of the international non- governmental organisations, as well 
as the mushrooming of local ones, the social space that had hitherto been threatened by the 
violent state was opened. In the be1980s the Western donors and international NGOs 
mistrusted the state; this made them channel significant amounts of the much-needed aid 
through the voluntary sector. In the process, the voluntary sector grew exponentially, to the 
extent that the registered NGOs which were estimated well over one hundred in 1987 grew 
into thousands.839  
 
Secondly, the dominance of the neo-liberal economic reforms in Uganda had both positive 
and negative effects on the Uganda society which required the intervention of CSOs. On the 
one hand, economic reforms engineered the recovery of the economy. The economy has 
grown at an estimated average rate of 5 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) per annum 
since 1992. This has resulted in government’s increased investment in infrastructure and 
services such as roads, safe water, primary health care and primary schools. On the other 
hand however, the social costs of adjustment have had their toll on some sections of society. 
Restructuring and down-sizing of public service which took place in the first half of the 
                                            
838 Nelson Kasfir, “Strategies of Accumulation and Civil Society in Bushenyi, Uganda: How Dairy Farmers 
Responded to a Weakened State” in John W. Harbeson, D. Rocthchild & N. Chazan, Civil Society and the State 
in Africa 
839 Silvia Angey & Christina Nilson, Financial Sustainability of Ugandan NGOs: Are we better than 
Government? CDRN Report, Kampala 2004 report that there were only 160 registered NGO in Uganda in 1987, 
which had grown to 4700 by 2003 
  
358
1990s left thousands of Ugandans without jobs.840 Equally, the privatisation of parastatals 
(public owned companies) had the similar negative effects on employment.841 At the same 
time, the IFIs advised the Uganda government to impose a ban on the expansion of 
employment in public institutions.  While Salaries which were increased slightly in 1996, 
though continuously adjusted, have not followed the rates of increase in price inflation. 
 
These neo–liberal policies have also encouraged liberalization of trade, that is free flow of 
imports and exports. The main effects of this trade regime have been the dominance of 
imports on the market which encourages speculative business behaviour rather than 
investment in productive sectors. This partly explains why despite the statistical recovery of 
the economy, the industrial sector still constitutes only 7 percent of GDP.  Little expansion of 
the industrial sector has also meant little expansion of formal employment. This possibly 
explains two dominant tendencies in the formal employment tendencies in Uganda: one is 
that most of the NGO sector is staffed by University graduates that informal trade dominates 
the market. Jobs in the formal sector have not been expanding over the years. 
 
Whereas also statistics show that the incidence of poverty reduced from 56 percent in 1992 to 
38 percent in 2000,842 real poverty persists. For example one study has observed:  
The paradox of the fast growing economy and the perception among a cross 
section of the population that their situation has not changed, and in some 
cases has become worse, raises an important question843. . . 
 
Moreover, more recent research indicates that most of the benefits of poverty reduction 
strategies went to the top 10 percent of the urban rich, or more than double the extent it 
benefited the poorest people. This concern is shared by the IMF in its assessment of Uganda’s 
poverty reduction efforts. IMF/IDA Joint Staff Assessment in 2001 observed that although 
the government’s efforts at the reduction of poverty have been good, the consumption of the 
richest increased by 20 percent while that of the poorest increased only by 8 percent.844 The 
                                            
840 Public servants were retrenched. The number of civil servants was reduced from 300,000 to 130,000 
841 As a policy, most of the parastatal organisations were sold 
842  Diego Angemi,, “An Overview of the national economy, in view of the Poverty Eradication Action Plan 
Revision”, Discussion Paper No.7, MOFPED, November 14, 2003 
843 Nassozi K. Muwanga, Structural Adjustment Participatory Review Initiative (SAPRI): The Differences in 
Perceptions of Poverty” Paper written for Uganda NGO Forum, Kampala.  
844 IMF/IDA “Uganda Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper; Progress Report Joint Staff Report Assessment, 9 
March 2001 (www.inf.org)  See also Sam Hickey, “The Politics of Staying Poor: Exploring Political Space for 
Ooverty Reduction in Uganda”  World Development, Vol.33, No.6,2005 
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issue therefore, is that the benefits of poverty reduction have not trickled down to the poorest 
of the poor, who remain marginalized and vulnerable. 
 
The willingness of the donors, international NGOs and the encouragement of the government 
have contributed to the tremendous growth of the local voluntary sector. The main 
characteristics of the local NGOs is that they are formed with the aim of addressing local 
issues but also, targeting to be funded by either the foreign governments or international 
NGOs. In the latter respect they act like conduits of international finance to the local 
beneficiaries. This empowers them financially but at the same time weakens them. As some 
commentators have observed, local NGOs in Uganda suffer from a dependency syndrome 
and lack independent means of self-sustenance.845  This has been sometimes attributed to the 
nature of the economic classes that exist in Uganda. Most of the people are poor and the 
middle class is economically weak. 
 
It is also often argued that in Africa the problem is not only the smallest or weakness of the 
capitalist class that leads to a low local contribution to charity, that it is within the nature of 
the African societies to contribute towards lineage relationship of family, clan, tribe and 
ethnic groups where giving to charity is a personalised affair that depends on those reciprocal 
relationships.846  Contestable as this argument maybe, recent studies reveal that in Uganda, 
membership contribution to the finances of local NGOs accounts for a mere 2.5 percent of 
their income while the bulk of it 80.3 percent comes from external funding agencies. This 
may well mean that the local NGO sector is embedded in opportunism rather than ultruistic 
drive to serve human needs and to solve problems. In Uganda, at least there are those NGOs 
that are formed solely for the purposes of soliciting external funding and do nothing for their 
purported beneficiaries. This category of NGOs is termed in Uganda as “briefcase NGOs.”847 
It does not seem too wild to say that these tendencies have been encouraged by external 
funding agencies which seem to have the money to dish out without careful assessment of 
these so–called NGOs. This is the reason the opportunists have masqueraded as 
“philantoropists”. The local people who are supposed to be the beneficiaries, including local 
council leaders tend to be suspicious of the motives of some NGOs. Some of their officials 
                                            
845Opcit Abigail Barr et al (2003). 
846  Alan Fowler, “NGOs and the Globalisation of social welfare:  Perspective from East Africa” in Semboja 
&Thirkildsen. 
847 Susan Dicklitch, The Elusive Promise of NGOs in Africa: Lessons from Uganda 
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drive expensive four wheel drives, arrive in the community and spend a few days talking to 
the people and then “disappear”! As Barr et al (ibid) observe… “ It is conceivable that most 
NGOs would like to do more than talking but , given their limited financial means find it the 
quickest and cheapest way to have immediate impact that deals with the urgency of the 
situation.848 Moreover this talking or what is referred to as “capacity building” seminars is 
another way of avoiding the rigours of accountability that are usually involved when a 
tangible service is delivered .After all, seminars are easy to justify by getting attendance lists 
signed by the participants Thus, while actual work done  by an NGO official after talking to 
local people can not be quantitatively measured , accountability for funds will be made much 
easier by those attendance lists .The problem however seems to be with the international 
donors who shift their policy goals .The debate within the international NGO-system in the 
1990s seemed to be on the side of “capacity building.” It is sometimes argued for example, 
that the traditional NGO activity had concentrated on the supply side of delivering services, 
providing development programmes and helping the needy and so on .There is a shift towards 
the demand side, that is helping communities articulate their concerns and preferences, 
negotiating their positions with the public officials and agencies and to do it for themselves 
rather than someone else doing it for them.  
 
The international NGO agenda has shifted to advocacy, empowerment and enabling 
communities. According to Clark “this is a micro-level of reflection of governance”849  With 
this shift in approach , two things have happened in the local voluntary sector:  (i) the local 
NGOs have increasingly became project implementers of the international NGO agenda or 
“outposts” and (ii) they are increasingly becoming subject to the tutelage of both donors and 
the state .In Uganda, two  simultaneous processes have taken place in respect of the state 
donor–civil society relation .The first is that the donors who until 2005/2006 national budget 
have been contributing 52 percent of the budget  revenue agreed with the government in 1997 
to support the government budget through the sector wide budget framework.  Instead of 
direct donor driven projects, it was agreed that donor resources come under the direct control 
of the state rather than to NGOs as was the case in early 1990s. Through this new method of 
donor funding to the government, the donors have gained a major stake in the economic 
                                            
848 Opcit.Abigail Barr et al, (2003), 
849 See John Clerk, “The Relationship between the state and the voluntary sector” www.gdrc.org/ngo/stae-ngo 
also Robert Chambers, “Spreading and Self-improving: A Strategy in Michael Edwards & David Hulme, 
Making a Difference for Scaling up 
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policy of the country. As one commentator has observed, during the meeting in the Ministry 
of Finance, Planning and Economic Development where economic policies are made, the 
donors sit “at the top of the table”.850 Donors in Uganda do not only fund the budget, they 
actually make government policies. Their involvement is perceived to be justified not only by 
the large amount of money they pour into the state coffers but also by the rationale of 
accountability. The donors’ stated position is that this money is their taxpayers’ money, so it 
should be used for purposes for which it is meant. 
 
In the same way, by supporting the sector wide approach of funding the Uganda budget, the 
donors believe they could influence the government to be more accountable to the intended 
beneficiaries, especially the poor. Thus donors on the Ugandan policy scene are not just 
funders but actors who contribute to the various policy processes and are also aware of the 
power they wield in shaping policy.851 The point to be made here is that the donor–state 
coalescence has increased over the last decade. This has in a way or the other reduced their 
commitment to civil society. In reality, there have been attempts on many occasions to 
incorporate civil society organizations into the donor–state dialogue. Though this is not 
necessarily negative, it has the potential or unintended effect of weakening civil society, 
whose primary role is to engage the state in its policies and public commitments, and to hold 
it accountable. 
 
7.5 Role of Civil Society in State Policy Making 
The key question here is: are state and CSOs bedfellows? The argument is that the 
relationship between the state and CSOs has skipped the attention of most policy observers in 
assessing the role of civil society in public policy making. Most observers’ attention is 
focused on what CSOs do or what they do not do in their autonomous “world”. Other 
analysts have tended to focus on the question of CSO engaging the state through lobbying. 
However there is an increasing trend towards CSOs working together with the state either at 
the central or at the local level.852 At the national level, state–CSO relationship has been 
                                            
850 Richard Sewakiryanga, (2004) “The Corporatist State, the parallel state and Prospects for Representatives 
and Accountable Policy” in Brock K. et al, p.80 
851 Ibid. Richard Sewakiryanga, “The Corporatists state, the parallel state and Prospects for Representatives and 
Accountable Policy” in K. Brock, R. McGeeR J. Gaventa (eds) Unpacking Policy: Knowledge, Actors and 
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852 William Muhumuza, “Unfulfilled Promises? NGOs Micro-Credit Programmes and Poverty Reeducation in  
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characterized by joint policy dialogue and partnership in shaping economic policies. At the 
local level, the state has been decentralized by a framework of governance which is 
underpinned by the devolution of powers, responsibilities and fiscal resources to the local 
level. At the latter level, this policy framework has created opportunities for civil society to 
play its role of advocacy and service provision. 
 
At the national level, the increasing role of CSOs has been triggered off in recent years by a 
number of factors. It is important to note that there has been a change of donor attitudes 
especially within the World Bank towards the role of the state in Uganda. Most Word Bank 
reports praise the Uganda government (and its President Yoweri Museveni) as a success story 
of the Bank’s economic reforms in Africa. In other words, the World Bank and other donors 
seem to have been enthusiastic to showcase Uganda as its “brand–mark” of the much–
criticized structural adjustment policies. In a bid to stave off the “noise” from the independent 
civil society organizations, the CSOs were gradually “incorporated” into the economic policy 
making process. The under–resourced NGOs have been more willing than not, to “cooperate” 
with these two powerful actors–the donors and the state. The invitation by the donors and the 
government is irresistible to CSOs because not only does participation in policy dialogues of 
the donors and the state give a CSO visibility, it also comes with  opportunities that the CSOs 
can reach the top policy makers to put their side issues on the “table”.853  The interest of the 
state as well as the donors, is to bring the CSOs on board so that it can claim that policy 
consultations were broadly done and that a wide spectrum of stakeholders made their 
contribution to the policy. This lends legitimacy to the whole process of donor–driven policy 
making. Critical views however have merged within the CSO sector that indeed, there is a 
“conspiracy” between the state and the World Bank to use such consultations with CSOs so 
that they can claim that their policies enjoy popular consensus or they are home-grown to the 
extent that if they fail to bear fruits they do not carry the blame alone. 
 
Evidence of CSO participation in economic policy making partnership with the state began in 
1997 when the government carried out its first Uganda participatory poverty assessment 
project (UPAP). Several NGOs were invited to participate in these assessment activities. 
NGOs seconded personnel to carry out research and to participate in the analysis and 
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discussion of the fundings. UPAP findings were translated into the first draft of what came to 
be known as Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP).854  The first PEAP was prepared in 
1998.  In 1999 however the World Bank and IMF required as a condition, for lending that the 
government revise PEARP according to their new framework known as Poverty Reduction 
Strategy Paper (PRSP).855  While the framework principles and guidelines were drawn by the 
World Bank and IMF, the government was required to consult as many stakeholders as 
possible. This process again saw extensive consultations with CSOs. Thus, whereas the 
World Bank wanted its new framework for lending to be guided by its new policies under 
PRSP, and the Uganda government wanted the World Bank’s money.  CSOs were called in to 
“assist” a process that was already agreed upon by the two–main actors, that is the donors and 
the government. Moreover, although such a process of consultations helps the CSOs to get 
information on what the government and the donor plans are, many of them view the whole 
idea of their participation as adhoc and ill–prepared. For example it is noted: 
. . . along with the benefits, CSO involvement in formulation of Uganda 
PRSP also had a number of problems. For example, during the process it 
was clear that most CSOs lacked staff capacity to engage donors and policy 
planners in meaningful dialogue about macro economic issues. This 
remains a problem at both national and local levels. In Uganda only a few 
CSOs have the capacity to influence policy planning.  As a result, there is a 
danger that CSOs might endorse positions about which they have little 
knowledge. . ..856  
 
These views express the picture which mirrors the weakness embedded in the engagement 
between CSO–donor–state tripartite, where CSOs join probably not as equals but as just 
junior partners both in perception and capacity. Thus, to conceive CSOs as equal partners 
may seem to be misplaced. Besides, the participation of CSOs begins and ends at contributing 
their input into such policy processes. There is no evidence that they are consulted by either 
the donors or the government when such policies are being implemented. In this regard also, 
the attitudes of government officials tend to be eschewed to certain positions that CSOs find 
difficult to change, for example, it is noted by one of the key leading participants in these 
dialogues thus: 
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Some government officials still regard CSO participation merely as an 
exercise to legitimize the government agenda. They still view criticism 
from CSOs with suspicion. 857 
 
This raises even a more pertinent question, of accountability. By officials of CSOs 
participating in these policy dialogues: are they representing the interests of their membership 
or they are representing their interests and views? Evidence indicates that such officials or 
their representatives collect data, analyse it and take part in discussing the findings. One 
certain thing is that they are paid for it. There is no evidence that payment to those individual 
participants ever trickles down to their CSOs, rather it benefits the individuals involved. How 
then can such individuals from CSOs challenge the government on the same issues? Is it 
possible that those CSO individuals participating in the policy dialogues with the government 
would compromise the agenda of their own CSOs in the case of contradictions? As one 
observer has noted: 
The extent to which civil society participate is both positioned between and 
“manufactured” by the government and international development actors, is 
an important feature of invited spaces and the power dynamics that 
surrounded them. Such a position results in civil society actors being 
largely reactive, responding to resources offered for a particular range of 
activities and functions. This in turn limits their capacity to develop 
autonomous agendas and raises questions about where their accountability 
lies.858 
 
The critical observation is indeed apt, considering the extent to which the donors and the 
government have “incorporated” CSOs in their agenda. For example, in 2005 the World Bank 
released United States $374, 000 to the Ministry of Finance for purposes of “strengthening” 
the partnership between civil society and the government in monitoring public expenditure. 
Instead of CSOs questioning the rationale for such a project or assessing the impact it could 
have on their own agendas, they responded by appraising it as “a good starting point, if only 
it can be beefed up with more funds to have appreciable impact”.859  They however assert, 
perhaps consciously, thus:  
It is also the view of civil society organizations that for them to be able to 
carry out effective monitoring of public expenditure they need to be in full 
charge of the resources set aside for this purpose. They need to apply 
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monitoring fools they have developed, and not to be straight jacketed into 
adopting tools developed elsewhere by people who are not familiar with 
our local situation860 
 
Implied in this question is the idea that CSOs still have a conscious mind that tells them that 
they have to account to their constituencies, and not to give in to whatever the World bank 
and the government tell them. For example, some NGOs under the umbrella of DENIVA a 
local NGO network organization met in Kampala on 16 March 2005 to devise their own code 
of conduct, which was an attempt to defy a proposal by some donor organizations to impose 
their own on local NGOs. The move of this kind on the part of the CSOs appears to be a 
move towards reflecting on the reasons for their existence, and accountability within 
themselves and to their constituencies. However most of them seem to be accounting to the 
donors and lately, to the government a process that has undermined their democratic 
credential and autonomy.861  This partly explains why most CSOs are engaged with 
development issues rather than holding the state to account or pushing it to expand 
democratic space. 
 
7.6 Civil Society and its relationship with the Political Regime 
The civil society-state engagement in Uganda in the area of democratisation is characterised 
complacency and cohabitation.  Whereas CSOs have been the engine of change in several 
authoritarian states in Africa,862 Eastern Europe, Latin America and elsewhere, this has not 
been the case in Uganda.  The state has been the dominant player on Uganda socio-political 
space.  When the present government of National Resistance Movement (NRM) came to 
power in 1986, its strategy for retaining power was to incorporate as many socio-political 
groups as possible in an arrangement it termed as “broad based” administration.  It also 
restricted the activities of political parties, which by law were forbidden from sponsoring 
candidates for elections, addressing political rallies, displaying party colours, holding 
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divorced from the way the state is conceptualized. We can add that the nature of struggles that civil society 
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delegates conferences, restricting them to their headquarters.  The NRM improvised an arena 
of “corporatist” politics in which it created space for various interest groups-women, the 
disabled person, trade union, the army, the political parties etc by giving them slots in 
parliament and other public institutions.  Because of the past violent and unstable politics that 
prevailed before the reign of the NRM, these groups joined the government willingly and 
unsuspicious of the NRM agenda.  This “coalition politics” has, over the last two decades, 
had a critical impact on the growth and operations of the civil society in the country.  First, 
because civil society organisations  are largely represented in the state structures, they were 
assumed to be part and parcel of the government policy making process.  Secondly, the 
groups that are represented find it difficult to go around to oppose government policies which 
they have helped to make.  Thirdly, because of the “coalition” politics, civil society 
organisations perceive the state as a “partner”.  At most of their functions, a senior 
government official is more often than not invited to preside.  CSOs in Uganda conceptualise 
the NRM government as a benevolent “partner” in whatever they try to do.  The effects of 
such tendencies have undermined the capacity of CSOs to engage the state on critical issues 
of corruption, accountability and democratisation, to the extent that most CSOs refrain from 
active criticism of the state.  CSOs also distance themselves from associating with the 
opposition politics lest the government will remind them that their registration may be 
cancelled.  Thus, a combination of government control over the activities of political parties 
and “coalition” politics with CSOs has left a free reign for the ruling NRM to do whatever it 
desires unchecked. 
 
Despite the limited space and engagement that CSOs have with the state in the arena of 
democratisation at the centre, there are a few CSOs that play an active role in holding the 
state to account.  For example, the Uganda Debt Network (UDN)  has consistently pressed 
the state to deal with the questions the foreign debt, and querying public officials on 
corruption and misuse of public funds.  Human Rights CSOs notably, Foundations for 
Human Rights Initiatives (FHRI) have been vocal and critical of the government’s handling 
of human rights issues.   Those CSOs that deal directly with political issues such as the 
Uganda Joint Christian Council (UJCC) engage in dissemination of research findings and 
civic education, especially during elections.  They also avoid a confrontational approach in 
their engagement with the state.  Similarly, women’s CSOs primarily deal with issues of 
gender, which is also a key State Policy.  For example, a number of women CSOs have been 
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vocal on the issue of equality when the new Land Act was being debated in parliament, and 
more recently they have engaged the parliament on the draft legislation of the Domestic 
Relations Bill.  Moreover the government itself created its own voluntary organisations such 
as the national women’s council, youth councils and student union.  Though these are not 
directly under any government Ministry, they are elected bodies nationwide. The government 
uses them to mobilise sections of society.  At the same time, it would be misleading to call 
them NGOs since there are funded by the state and champion state agenda.  In one way or the 
other, there has been a tendency by the NRM government to create a corporatist   
organisation of the state with a desire to co-opt every organised group. 
 
These policy orientations have had the effect of promoting and perpetuating monopoly 
politics.  Monopoly politics essentially refers to a situation where the ruling state-party 
prefers to discourage or to destroy autonomous civil society.863  Under the no-party system of 
the NRM in Uganda since 1986, the ruling movement has tended either to undermine 
independent civil society groups such as farmers’ cooperative societies or to attempt to 
broaden its support by “cohabiting” with CSOs, thus minimizing the space for independent 
civil society. Undoubtedly therefore, the state and the ruling movement are indistinguishable, 
almost in every aspect.  This kind of political dispensation has taught CSOs either to “censor” 
themselves or face the wrath of the law if they acted otherwise. 
 
7.7 State-led decentralisation and the role of the Civil Society 
Whereas the NRM government controls political space at the centre, its major political 
contribution to politics and administration in Uganda has been its politics of decentralisation. 
Once it was firmly in control of the centre and having created a situation for a politically 
weak civil society at the centre, the NRM was willing to decentralise power to local 
government.  Decentralisation helped local government to be allocated financial resources 
from the central government and allowed them to collect their own revenue.  They are also 
allowed to enter partnership or even to sub-contract some work to CSOs.  CSOs use the 
decentralised structure of the state to provide services to their targeted beneficiaries.  They 
act as “gap fillers” where the local state institutions have not been able to deliver a certain 
desired service.  Both NGOs and CBOs need the cooperation of local officials to mobilise the 
                                            
863 cf Issa Shivji, “The Democracy Debate in Africa:  Tanzania” in Review of African Political Economy No.50, 
1991. 
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people to participate in their activities.  Other NGOs work directly in partnership with local 
councils.  These relations between CSOs and local state structures/officials are seen to have 
some productive advantages, for example, the local councils may mobilize the local people to 
provide free labour while the NGO provides technical expertise and finances required for 
materials for a certain service or project.  This working method is seen to increase people’s 
ownership of the project as well as its sustainability.  Some NGOs do not provide direct 
consumable services, so they sensitize the targeted communities hoping to empower them 
with knowledge and solutions to solve specific problems, for example HIV/AIDS NGOs are 
leading in this approach.  Other NGOs sandwich direct service (i.e. material projects) with 
sensitisation or training aiming to create a self-sustaining community.  Thus, contrary to what 
some observers have claimed that NGOs in Uganda hardly provide services but “talking”,864 
evidence suggests that the contribution of the voluntary sector to service delivery in the 
country is great.865  For example, of the major hospitals in the country, the government owns 
55, NGOs 39, private sector 4.  For the maternity units, the government owns 211, the NGOs 
have 144, and the private sector 12.  Because of the critical role the NGOs play in health 
provision especially, the faith based NGOs, the government has in recent years approved 
grants for their health units.  In the education sector, the NGOs still make a significant 
contribution.  Government Grant-aided Primary School are 10,368 while NGOs own 455.  
For secondary schools, the government aided are 1912 while the NGOs own 1395.  At the 
level of primary schools, the new programme of universal primary education (UPE) has 
increased government expenditure on the construction of new classroom blocks as well as 
establishing new schools.  Secondary level education was pioneered by faith based NGOs 
during the colonial days.  This explains the significant role that the NGOs are playing in that 
sector.  The post colonial state also had an ambitious programme of building schools.  The 
quality of service dropped in public schools and health centres in the 1970s and 1980s. 
Sustenance of public schools was taken over by the parents through their Parents-Teachers 
Association (PTAs).866 PTAs contributed to the maintenance of school facilities and payment 
                                            
864 Claim made by Abigail Barr et al, (2003) opcit. 
865 See for example, Reinnika & Svensson, Working for God?  Evaluating Service of Religious Not-for-profit 
health care providers in Uganda.  The World Bank 2003.  These researchers found that the non-profit health care 
was much cheaper and more affordable, with better quality service than the state-provided services 
866 Emmanuel Nabuguzi, “Popular Initiatives in Service Provision in Uganda, in Semboja & Ole Thirkildsen, 
(eds0, opcit. See also, Fabius O. Passi, :The Rise of People’s Organisations in Primary Education in Uganda” in 
Semboja & Ole Thirkildsen, (eds), opcit 
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of teachers’ salaries.  Communities which were unable to form such associations witnessed 
total collapse of educational standards in their schools. 
 
Whereas under the Universal Primary Education (UPE) Programme, the enrolment of pupils 
has almost tripled from 2.5 million in 1997 to about 7.5 million in 2000, it has also come with 
its own challenges.  The teacher-pupil ratio per class stands at 1:110.  This has watered down 
the effectiveness of teaching and lowered education standards in public primary schools.  
Although PTAs still exist, the government position is that they are not allowed to contribute 
to the welfare of school teachers.  The government insists that it is the duty of the State to pay 
salaries.  Salaries for teachers in public schools remain penury.   This leaves the teachers 
without option but to conduct illegal extra classes for children whose parents are able to pay 
extra fees.  Richer parents take their children to private schools which are constructed and 
managed either by private business people or NGOs.  Community based initiatives have also 
been attempted to help children who cannot join UPE schools for one reason or the other. 
 
7.7 Urban Livelihoods and the Response of Civil Society 
There is no doubt that the majority of NGOs, whether international or local have their bases 
in Kampala.  In a study of NGOs, involving 16 districts, which have a relatively high number 
of NGOs it, was revealed that, of the 3159 NGOs in those districts, Kampala has 1777 of the 
NGOs registered with the NGOs Registration Board867. This validates the commonly held 
assumption in Uganda that NGOs tend to be urban-based and rarely do they reach out to the 
most remote rural areas where the most needy people live.   Logically, however, not all 
NGOs are formed for purposes of reaching out to the most remote areas of the country Some 
urban NGOs are formed to attend to specific needs of the urban population, ranging from 
professional classes, intellectual communities, policy dialogues, research and consultancy 
while others are formed specifically to alleviate the conditions of the needy and 
disadvantaged urban communities. 
 
                                            
867 Abgail Barr, Marcel Fafchamps and Trudy Owens. Non Governmental Organisations in Uganda: A Report to 
Government of Uganda, (December 2003).Centre for the Study of African Economies, Oxford University. 
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Urban living conditions in Uganda and Kampala in particular, leave a lot to be desired.  
Whereas it is true that the majority of the poorest people live in the rural areas,868 the 
conditions of the urban poor are characterised by failure to meet basic needs such as water 
and food, which in Ugandan rural areas are easily secured even by the poorest households 
from their peasant gardens and open streams.  In Uganda, the rural households depend on the 
exchange of physical resources between households.  This serves as some form of safety net, 
that is, of relatives, friends, neighbours and other people.  In other-words, the rural people 
have plenty of ‘social capital’ to rely on in times of need.  For example, in case of a 
household lacking money to transport a sick person to a health centre, neighbours and 
relatives improvise a stretcher and carry the sick to the hospital.  This kind of help is taken as 
a social obligation and responsibility in their neighbourhood relations.  More often than not, a 
neighbour seeking to borrow a few sticks of matches or drinking water is not seen as begging 
but a reciprocal gesture because the same neighbour is likely to have taken one or two things 
from the other, previously in the same exchange relations.   Similarly, the children in the 
neighbourhood eat freely at one another’s homes.  It is in extremely rare cases that a person 
will deny food to a neighbour’s child.  Such a behaviour would be condemned by members of 
the local community.  In such cases, the offender could lose certain social entitlements in that 
community.  This system of social capital sustains rural livelihoods but is rare in urban areas. 
 
In the urban setting, the situation is much more different from the rural livelihood systems.  
The urban setting is governed by the cash economy, self satisfaction and individual success.  
The urban society is highly structured in terms of social classes and spatial differentiation.  A 
few safety nets that exist are fluid and temporary.  Housing a relative who happens to visit an 
urban resident is seen as generally acceptable but limited to a few days or in some cases, 
months of hospitality.  This is partly because in the urban areas, an excessive number of over-
staying guests poses a constraint on family budgets.  It affects patterns of expenditure on 
essential items such as food, clothing, and tuition fees for children, transport costs and other 
needs. 
 
                                            
868 See World Bank, Uganda:  The challenge of Growth and Poverty Reduction (1996) p.81.  This reports notes 
that 27 percent of the poorest live in rural areas and 11 percent of them live in urban area.  But it also notes that 
there is less economic disparity in rural areas (22 percent) than in urban areas (49 percent). 
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Kampala urban livelihood systems are characterised among others by lack of adequate 
employment opportunities for many people, lack of proper housing facilities, lack of proper 
sources of household income, lack of adequate infrastructure and services.  In the city, 
people’s livelihoods depend on cash and because many people lack employment, the majority 
of the people cannot afford the basic needs of life like food, decent clothing and shelter.  
Most poor people in the city engage in petty activities to survive.  Poverty itself is perceived 
by urban residents as “a situation where one is surviving marginally due to lack of basic 
necessities, means of production and income.”869   The situation of the urban poor tends to 
degenerate into vulnerability or marginality due to lack of social networks, lack of public 
services, isolation or marginalisation, gender inequality and corruption by public officials. 
 
Table 39: Showing Kampala Public Service Provision Indicators 
Service Level of availability Access/condition 
Sanitation  8 percent of Kampala residents 
have running water in their 
homes. 
 7 percent have access to safe 
drinking water. 
 Protected water springs  
 Most people use latrines 
Most Kampala residents draw 
water in jerrycans from the 
spring sources or buy a 20 litre  
jerrycan from stand pipes. 
Drainage  Only 9 percent of the city is 
served by a central server system 
 5 percent construct their own 
septic tanks 
 Most of Kampala floods when it 
rains 
 Nakivubo channel rehabilitation 
project done at a cost of Shs 23 
billion has improved drainage in 
Kampala. 
 Low lying areas of the city 
suffer floods every time it 
rains heavily. 
 KCC has worked on the 
channels but floods are still a 
problem. 
 Poor drainage is worsened by 
people throwing garbage in 
the drains 
Health services 
(Curative) 
 Hospitals (11) mainly NGO 
owned.  Of these 2 state owned 
 KCC Clinics (7) 
 Health centres (5) 
 Of the 11 hospitals only 2 are 
government owned, Mulago 
and Butabika. 
 KCC clinics and health 
centres are under-staffed 
with qualified personnel. 
 Most poor people attend 
public clinics. 
Public Health  Every Division of the city has a 
Public Health Officer 
 Public health officers lack 
adequate facilitation from 
                                            
869 MOFPED, “Uganda Participatory Poverty Assessment Process:  Kampala District Report” (2000) p. 14 
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Service Level of availability Access/condition 
 A Public Health Officer is 
responsible for public health 
education in the communities. 
 There is concern for the 
environment. 
 Fumigation of homes was left to 
the private sector. 
 Public hygiene is emphasised by 
KCC but most homes are built 
without approved plans. 
 There is law enforcement to 
enforce city regulations. 
KCC to do their job well. 
 Housing Inspectors lack 
facilitation to go around the 
city. 
 The staffing levels of Public 
Health Office are low. 
Schools  KCC owns 84 primary schools. 
 These public schools are under 
the UPE programme 
 Teachers’ salaries are  a 
responsibility of central 
government but paid through 
KCC. 
 Schools are congested especially 
after the introduction of UPE. 
 High running costs of schools - 
water bills, electricity bills, 
lunch, cleaning. 
 School capitation grant 
insufficient 
 Parents with children in city 
schools pay Shs 11,000 per term 
contribution. 
 
 UPE has increased 
enrolment. 
 Most children of the poor 
join public schools. 
 Some congested areas such 
as Bwaise have no public 
school. 
 Parents’ contribution of 
shs.11,000 and other school 
needs for children may not 
be afforded by very poor 
parents even in UPE schools.  
Their children do not attend 
school. 
 BEUPA schools have been 
improvised in the poor 
communities for out-of-
school children. 
Production 
services 
(Agriculture, 
Animal 
Husbandry, 
Fisheries and 
Cooperatives) 
 Each division of KCC has an 
officer to run a section for these 
services. 
 These sections are the most 
under-funded. 
 Most of Kampala peri-urban 
residents depend on urban 
agriculture. 
 Most of the milk, poultry and 
eggs are produced at small scale 
in people’s homes. 
 Several small cooperative 
societies exist in the city. 
 Officers of these sections 
lack facilitation from KCC to 
do their job. 
 Residents engaged in urban 
agriculture depend on their 
own skills.  Do not get help 
from KCC experts. 
 Due to lack of expertise, 
urban agriculture is largely at 
subsistence level. 
 The small cooperative 
societies (mainly savings and 
credit) do not grow into large 
organisations. 
 
Road and 
Infrastructure 
 Roads are the main 
infrastructural service priority of 
 Under the LGDP programme 
more access roads have been 
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Service Level of availability Access/condition 
services KCC. 
 Most roads are gravel roads. 
 A large network of city roads 
remains to be done. 
 Due to the seasonal nature of the 
roads, they require constant 
grading which is costly. 
opened by KCC. 
 Low levels of community 
participation in these projects 
have been reported. 
 Poor workmanship by 
contractors was reported 
 Collusion between tenders 
and KCC officials in 
awarding tenders for works 
was cited. 
Source:  Table constructed by the author from research findings 
 
The above table shows mixed results in KCC’s service delivery.  There are a few areas such 
as road construction and maintenance that have had real improvement.  Another area where 
there have been improvements in the past few years is drainage.  Two factors have 
contributed to the improvements in the road and drainage sector.  The first one is the World 
Bank’s grant to the Ministry of Local Government of US$80 million under the Local 
Government development Programme (LGDP).  These funds are channeled through the 
districts down to the lower local councils.   The objective of the grant is to fund local level 
infrastructure investment projects.  In Kampala, most of the projects undertaken with this 
fund are roads and drains clearance.  The second factor is another World Bank loan to KCC 
for Nakivubo Channel rehabilitation Project which amounted to Shs.23 billion.  Apart from 
the Rehabilitation of the main Nakivubo Channel that carries away most of the liquid waste 
from the city centre. Tributary drains were also done at Nakamiro, Nsoba and Kamwokya.  
Drainage is a serious problem in Kampala because the city experiences heavy rains which 
flood the sprawling low income areas which happen to be on low lying valleys that are 
swampy and therefore prone to stagnant water.  Constant flooding is a threat to human 
livelihood, that is, in extreme cases, poorly constructed homes get swept away and in other 
cases, the dangers of diseases such as cholera, dysentery, malaria and other water borne 
diseases pose a real threat to human life. 
 
While progress has been recorded in the above mentioned areas, there are critical areas that 
KCC has given no serious attention.  These include:  fighting poverty, provision of welfare 
services, and the production sector (e.g cooperatives, marketing, fisheries, and urban 
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agriculture).  These are areas which are critical to people’s survival especially, the very poor 
of the poor.   
 
7.8 The Role of Civil Society in Service Provision in Kampala:  Case Studies 
For this study we selected two leading direct service provision NGOs in Kampala.  A direct 
service provider in this case we mean one which provides a material or welfare service apart 
from say advocacy.  The purposively selected international NGO is known as Concern 
Uganda (CU).  This NGO works directly with the structures of local councils.  Another NGO 
we selected is known as Kamwokya Christian Caring Community (KCCC) a purely local 
NGO.  This one too, was selected on consideration of its multi-functional operations.  It is a 
faith-based organisation, providing services to the poor and acting as a behavioural change 
agent.  In addition to these two NGOs, we selected four community- based-organisations 
(CBOs).  These are: Kisenyi Community Health Workers Association (KICHWA), Kampala 
Central Community Resource Centre (KCCRC), Mengo Kisenyi Youth Development 
Association (MKAYDA) all located in the poor slums of Kisenyi, two kilometers from the 
city centre of Kampala.  The fourth CBO selected is Kamwokya Community Health and 
Environment Protection Association (KACHEPA) located in another slum of Kamwokya in 
the outskirts of Kampala, four kilometers from the city centre. 
 
The choice of the CBOs was out of consideration of the following factors:   
(i) All the four groups are in one way or the other connected with Concern Uganda (the 
main funding agency).  
(ii)  They are located right within the communities where they work,   
(iii)  They are formed by residents of the area where they operate   
(iv)  Their membership and leadership are locally based. 
(v)  They are engaged in self-sustaining activities rather than depending entirely on out-
sourced resources. 
 
In the next section of the chapter, I describe what the CSOs are, what they do and how they 
do it.  Later, a thematic analysis of the issues that affect their performance is done.  We 
conclude the chapter with people’s views of the relationship between CSOs and local 
councils in service delivery. 
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7.8.1  Concern Uganda (CU) 
Concern Uganda is a local NGO with full financial support from Concern Worldwide.870  It is 
founded on the basis of values of fighting poverty among the poor communities and to 
strengthen their ability to deal with their problems.  For the last fifteen years, Concern 
Uganda has targeted poor communities, especially those affected by HIV/AIDS beginning 
their first programmes in Rakai district871 in early 1990s they shifted to Kampala n 1995.  
Kampala city was the second worst hit area by HIV/AIDS after Rakai district.  The most 
vulnerable people were/are the poor slum dwellers in the city.  For not only was HIV/AIDS 
affecting the adult population mainly in these marginal areas, its social effects were alarming; 
increased poverty, lack of food, lack of tuition for children and other basic necessities of life.   
 
The intervention of Concern Uganda was two-fold:  to identify families whose adult heads 
were critically sick or had died of HIV/AIDS related illnesses.  For those who were ill, 
Concern Uganda provided food rations, clothing and other basic necessities.  For those 
families whose bread winners had died, Concern Uganda provided the much needed 
assistance to orphans, for example, clothing, food and even shelter.  Shelter provision 
targeted female-headed households.  According to the Project Manager for Kampala,872 they 
targeted the poorest communities of the city, namely:  Katanga, Nakulabye and Kagugube in 
their first two years of operating in Kampala.  After evaluating this intervention of material 
assistance, Concern Uganda found that the project was unsustainable and was increasing 
dependence rather than independence and empowerment of the beneficiaries.  Moreover, the 
impact of the project was not being felt in the community as it targeted individual households 
and the communities were not involved in the planning processes.  This approach was found 
unsatisfactory and was abandoned.  Since 1999, Concern Uganda has developed two 
programmes targeting the poor communities of Kampala, these are:  Kampala Community 
Development Programme (KCDP) and Kampala Community Empowerment Project (KCEP).  
The difference between KCDP and KCEP is that the former involved Concern Uganda 
working with the communities on their own initiatives while the latter formally involves the 
local government structures and officials. 
 
                                            
870 Concern worldwide is an Irish NGO operates in 30 countries worldwide.  Started in 1968 to support victims 
of the Biafra war in Nigeria it has grown to cater for the poor in the Third World countries. 
871 Rakai district in Uganda was the most hit by HIV/Aids in late 1980s 
872 Ms. Rosemary Mbabazi, Project Manager(interviewed on 1st July, 2005) 
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7.8.2 Kampala Community Development Programme 
Kampala Community Development Programme KCDP had two components: the first 
component was the socio-economic one, where Concern Uganda worked with other NGOs873 
the poor communities to get the economically empowered.  Concern Uganda trained and 
availed credit finance to community groups on a lower interest rate than the banks and other 
micro-finance organisations.874   The main target of Concern Uganda’s credit scheme is 
mainly poor women.  After training them in project planning and management, the women 
either as individuals or in groups identify viable micro projects which generate incomes that 
enable them meet their needs, pay tuition fees for their children and to live reasonably decent 
lives. 
 
The second component of KCDP deals with environmental health.  It targets sanitation, 
access to clean water and good hygiene practices in the slum areas of Kampala.  The 
approach Concern Uganda uses is participatory.  In the slum areas, communities are 
mobilised, they identify their priorities, priorities are ranked, costed and an implementation 
plan and committee are put in place.  The community provides land, identifies its own 
contractor and supervises the project.  Since Concern Uganda requires that the beneficiary 
community should contribute 20 percent of the cost of a project, the land, labour and 
supervision are computed into cash values to constitute a contribution of 20 percent or above.  
Thereafter, Concern Uganda provides the remaining funding for the project.  “The approach 
has been more successful than when Concern Uganda used to help individual 
beneficiaries”.875  This approach is also seen to be sustainable because projects are owned by 
the community, it is cost effective because of the voluntary contribution of the members of 
the community, and the management is also effective because each project is managed by an 
elected committee of the community.  Further, because most members of the urban 
community tend to be individualistic and selfish such projects bring back the spirit of the 
community.  “It was found out that the absence of community spirit is due to lack of common 
capital, something they all share in common.  We are now changing their value systems by 
doing things in which they all have common concern876.” 
                                            
873 In this case, FINCA Uganda, to provide training for women so that they may get credit for their own projects. 
874 Concern Uganda loan interest is below 10% while banks and micro finance institutions charge over 20% per 
annum.   
875 Ms.  Rosemary Mbabazi (interview). 
876 Ibid.Ms Rosemary Mbabazi (interview 
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Concern Uganda identified common problems in Kampala’s slums a lack of sanitation 
facilities, lack of safe drinking water and poor drainage.  It therefore assisted in putting up the 
following projects: two toilet facilities in Kimwanyi and Soweto in Katanga slum 
(Wandegeya), 2 kilometers from the city centre.  A water stand pipe was placed in Soweto.877  
In Nakulabye, another slum area, the communities identified lack of drains or blocked ones.  
Floods and mosquitoes posed big problems to the communities.  Most people were suffering 
from malaria.  Concern Uganda helped the communities by constructing a drain of 800 
meters in Kiwunya (Nakulabye) and desilting others that had been blocked by garbage.  In 
Kiyaye (also in Nakulabye area) the drains existed but due to KCC’s failure to collect 
garbage from homes, the local people were dumping it in the drains that led to their blockage.  
When Concern Uganda asked the residents why they threw garbage in the drains they replied 
“Where do you want us to put it?  KCC does not collect it”.878  Hence when Concern Uganda 
desitting the drains, it put in place health committees for each zone.  These were tasked with 
ensuring that the residents exercise responsible dumping of their garbage.  Concern Uganda 
also appealed to KCC which responded by providing garbage skips in the area.  According to 
Concern Uganda officials, the problems of flooding and mosquitoes have significantly been 
reduced.  In addition to supervising and ensuring that residents dispose off their garbage more 
responsibly, the health committees carry out seminars for residents and mobilise them over 
the weekend to engage in general cleaning, desilting drains, cutting bushes and sweeping 
their premises. 
 
7.8.3 Kampala Community Empowerment Project (KCEP) 
KCEP is another project undertaken by Concern Uganda.  It is also implemented in Kampala.  
It targets the poor in slum areas  It covers six parishes, three in Central Division and three in 
Lubaga Division.  The parishes covered are Kamwokya II, Kisenyi II, Kisenyi III, Ndeeba, 
Lubya and Busega.  The areas covered have a population of about 83,000 people.  These 
areas were chosen on the basis of very high incidence of absolute poverty, poor sanitation and 
high incidence of diseases resulting from poor environment and sanitation.  They lack 
services and HIV/Aids rates are very high.  Moreover poverty in these areas is rampant 
                                            
877 Ibid.Ms Rosemary Mbabazi explained that this is an area where several people ate roasted pork but there was 
no clean water for them to wash or drink.  Spring water in the area is contaminated. 
878 Ibid. Ms Rosemary Mbabazi (interview). 
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because there is lack of gainful employment.  It was established that 65 percent of women in 
these areas are housewives who depend on their husbands, yet most of the husbands too, 
hardly have secure sources of income.  In these areas 7 percent of families depend on small 
scale informal businesses.  92 percent of the population in these areas can read and write but 
have no functional skills to enable them gain income generating employment.  88 percent of 
the families live in rented one-room tenements, most of them built with temporary 
materials879.  
 
Concern Uganda initiation of the KCEP was motivated by the realisation that the city 
authorities were either overwhelmed in terms of services that needed to be provided in these 
areas or simply neglected them.  Thus the design of KCEP differed from the earlier one of 
KCDP.  KCEP sought to strengthen local government structures and CSOs to facilitate the 
poor communities in these areas to address their needs.  The methodology adopted by 
Concern Uganda for KCEP was to place emphasis on participation of local authorities, parish 
development committees and CSOs in planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation 
of community development projects.  It was also a partnership between various stakeholders 
in the community.  The first undertaking of Concern Uganda in this endeavour was to train 
such stakeholders in participatory methodology, taking them through the project cycle and 
highlighting areas of their involvement and intervention.  Such training has emphasized 
project identification, prioritisation, teamwork, project implementation, monitoring and 
evaluation.  This approach has aimed at ensuring that communities benefit effectively from 
both local government and CSO projects, minimise duplication of efforts of CSO and local 
governments and to encourage local communities to contribute to such projects. 
 
Apart from empowering the CSOs, local government structures and local stakeholders, the 
other consideration that Concern Uganda had in mind was that local government projects 
were not benefiting the poor in the communities because they were not effectively consulted 
and did not participate fully in the project processes.  Concern Uganda in its experiment 
requested the Kampala Central Division authorities to entrust it with some of the project 
funds they received from the Local Government Development Project (LGDP).  Concern 
Uganda argued with the Division authorities that external contractors denied the local 
                                            
879 S. Bagaya, project officer KCEP (interview).  He did the baseline survey on which the KCEP project design 
was based. 
  
379
communities the opportunities of getting involved in projects and that this lessened the 
benefits of the projects to them.  Kampala central Division agreed to the idea and released 
Shs 54,900,914 to Concern Uganda for the use in the construction of drains in Kisenyi III and 
Kisenyi II parishes.  The estimate for Central Division, using an external contractor, was 
Shs.20, 301,964 to line up 220 metres of drains in Kisenyi III and shs.34,598,950 to line up 
240 metres of drains in Kisenyi II.  When Concern Uganda, together with its local 
stakeholders received the money, the same amount lined up 381 meters of drains and seven 
foot bridges in Kisenyi II and 442 meters of drains and five foot bridges in Kisenyi III.880    
The same amount of money did double the work on drains plus the bridges.  This is a clear 
indication of a successful local state-civil society partnership. 
 
Concern Uganda used local contractors within the two communities of Kisenyi.  The local 
stakeholders and the community supervised the projects and the results were that the same 
amount of money produced more works to the benefit of communities.  The approach used by 
Concern Uganda emphasized among other things, that there was more transparency in the 
execution of works and that the community leaders were involved in the whole project.  This 
reveals that with the involvement of the beneficiary communities in public projects much 
more can be done with public money.  It also proves that capacity building in terms of 
educating the community about its rights and obligations, if well handled can empower the 
people to protect their public interests.  Moreover, community projects done by the people 
themselves eliminate the profit motives of private contractors and reduce corruption that 
characterises local government projects. 
 
Despite Concern Uganda’s successful experiment with this and other similar community 
projects, its approach has not been replicated by the local government authorities in KCC.  
According to the officials of Concern Uganda: 
This approach denies local government officials and those of the District 
Tender Board the chance to get money for themselves out of these 
projects.881 
    
Concern Uganda is also facing challenges both positive and negative.  On the positive note, 
most of the members of Parish Development Committees (PDCs) who were trained by 
                                            
880Opcit. Ms Rosemary Mbabazi, project Manager (Interview) 
881 Ibid.Rosemary Mbabazi. Interview. 
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Concern Uganda, and who helped in the transparent implementation of projects have been 
elected local council officials.  This is an indication that the committees have appreciated the 
good work they have done.  However, Concern Uganda has now missed these dedicated 
people.  It is planning to  train another cadre of PDCs.  Concern Uganda has also raised the 
voice of the people.  In Ndeeba, another place where Concern Uganda works, an external 
contractor appointed by the District Tender Board was rejected by the PDCs.  The PDCs 
quoted the works done in Kisenyi where more work was done for less money. 
 
Concern Uganda faces some negative challenges.  There are various local political forces that 
would not want Concern Uganda experiment to succeed.  Such forces introduce local politics 
in the whole process for example: 
In cases where a successful project is undertaken with the cooperation of a 
 Movement leader, the multi-partyists want to bring it down.  In 
places where multi-partyists happen to be the local leaders, the Movement 
leaders brand Concern Uganda as promoting the agenda of people opposed 
to the government882. 
 
Because the ruling government is a Movement one, some local Movement supporters have 
been agitating that the PDCs should be re-constituted so that Movement leaders take the 
positions held by multi-partyists.  In Kisenyi II, concern Uganda was forced to pull out 
because of the local political wrangles there. 
 
Although KCC was helped by Concern Uganda, not only in the implementation of its 
projects, but also to strengthen the capacities of local communities and to improve KCC’s 
poor reputation883, the latter has failed Concern Uganda.  KCC officials do not come to 
facilitate workshops organised by Concern Uganda.  This is because Concern Uganda does 
not give them allowances for coming to the workshops884.  KCC officials also tend to 
perceive Concern Uganda’s funding of the community as a reason for them not to provide for 
those areas where Concern Uganda is operating.  They view Concern Uganda as an 
alternative service provider to KCC.  This, in a way, leads KCC to relegate those areas where 
Concern Uganda provides services. 
                                            
882Ibid. Rosemary Mbabazi . Interview. 
883 KCC was known by local residents only for forceful collection of taxes.  Even where KCC provided services, 
they were not appreciated by the community because they were not involved. 
884 As its policy, Concern Uganda does not give cash allowances for attendance of workshops and seminars. 
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Beside partnership with KCC, Concern Uganda has provided direct material services to the 
communities and supported its partner CBOs.  Concern Uganda built a protected spring well 
in Kimwanyi (Wandegeya) and a toilet in the same area.  The spring well serves twenty 
thousand people and the toilet serves about five hundred people in that congested area.  
Direct service provision though important for the local communities has problems related to 
sustainability.  For example, after putting up the toilet at Kimwanyi, a project committee was 
elected to oversee it.  The idea was that they would collect money from the users and the 
money would be used by the committee to keep it clean as well as clean the environment 
around the area.  This expectation turned into a pipe dream as the members of the committee 
could neither maintain the facility in good condition nor account for the money.  Similar 
problems of project sustainability have been noted by Concern Uganda in other areas where it 
works, for example, in Ndeeba and Kisenyi.  In other-words, Concern Uganda faces problems 
of project sustainability similar to those experienced by local governments. 
 
It has been pointed out that the problems experienced by Concern Uganda in the 
implementation of its projects are three-fold:  first, in building the capacities of PDCs, it 
neglected the local councils (LCs).  This bred conflicts between the two local organisations.  
Secondly, in its capacity building endevours, it did not train Division level officials.  Thirdly, 
its funding mechanisms are parallel to other funding from the local governments.  This too 
creates conflicts.  Moreover, the local people feel over-burdened by the requirement of 20 
percent contribution they have to raise for each project885.  In other words, for communities 
where economic survival is the way of life for members of the households, some people view 
Concern Uganda’s public investment projects as increasing their personal poverty rather than 
offering solutions. 
 
Concern Uganda’s approach has however demonstrated that full participation of the 
community members in projects renews public confidence, creates transparency and 
improves accountability.  Participation of the project beneficiaries increases efficiency, voice 
and ownership of the projects.  One example of this is that the community leaders control the 
                                            
885 Concern Uganda, Kampala Community Empowerment Project - Mid Term Evaluation Report, September 
2004  Although Concern Uganda calculates contributions by the community not in cash terms but time and other 
inputs, the members of the communities where it works get fatigued by the constant calls to attend meetings and 
labour contributions 
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money themselves and regulate its expenditure.  Concern Uganda created Fund Boards in 
every community it serves.  This is composed of 2 PDC members, 1 parish councilor, 1 
member of the Division Finance department, 1 staff of Concern Uganda and 1 member of the 
community.  All these members of the Fund Board have to meet and agree that a particular 
creditor needs to be paid on satisfaction that his or her service to the community has been 
properly executed. Two of the members of the Fund Board are elected amongst themselves to 
endorse the cheques after a decision for payment of a creditor has been arrived at by the 
whole Fund Board.  Later, the Fund Board reports to the community about their transactions.  
This process is clearly transparent.  The process of community activism has enhanced greater 
communication in areas where Concern Uganda serves.  As KCEP project officer noted: 
The most important thing is to see change-taking place in people’s lives.  
This  has happened in Concern areas.  We see people fully in charge of 
their affairs.  We have seen what empowerment can do to make leaders 
accountable886. 
 
He pointed out that before Concern Uganda started operating in Kisenyi II, there was a 
serious problem of sanitation and drainage.   The problem was very serious in areas occupied 
by very poor people in zones such as School View, Kakajo, Mbiro, Kiganda, Kiti, Luzige and 
Kigali.  In these areas, the poor people could not construct pit latrines because the water table 
is high and it is expensive.  Concern Uganda has constructed pit latrines in each of these 
zones.  This has reduced the incidence of environmental diseases such as cholera and 
dysentery which used to be common in the parish887. I observed that Concern had lined up 
most of the drains and placed foot bridges in Kisenyi II and III, thus their claims of service 
delivery are evident. 
 
7.8.4 Concern Uganda’s Support to CBOs 
Concern Uganda is not only a service provider, it is also a funding agency to CBOs.  
Presently it supports six CBOs.  However, during the course of this study we were able to 
visit and gain knowledge from only four.  These are:  Kamwokya Community Health and 
Environmental Protection Association (KACHEPA), Kisenyi III Community Health Workers 
Association (KICHWA), Mengo Kisenyi Youth Development Association (MKYDA) and 
                                            
886 Suleiman Bagaya, project Officer KCEP (interview) 
887 Mr. Hilali, a member of PDC, Kisenyi II (interview 
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Kampala Central Community Resource centre (KCCRC).888   KACHEPA and KICHWA are 
engaged in environmental health and sanitation.  MKYDA is engaged in economic 
empowerment of the youth while KCCRC is providing information services and encouraging 
a learning culture in the community.  It is important to note that apart from KCCRC, the other 
three organisations existed on their own before they received funding from Concern Uganda.  
A brief summary of the objectives of each of the CBOs is presented before analysis of the 
issues involved. 
 
 
7.8.5 Kamwokya Community Health and Environmental Protection  Association 
(KACHEPA) 
 
KACHEPA is a CBO located in The densely populated slum of Kamwokya II parish.  It was 
founded by local volunteers who were inspired and trained by a missionary doctor Sr. Miriam 
Duggan.  She had done a survey in 1992 and found out that most of Kamwokya II residents 
suffered from ill-health due to the poor environment they lived in.  She then started a 
community based health care programme which recruited local volunteers to train as 
community health care workers.  The trainee volunteers formed an association which evolved 
into the resent KACHEPA.  KACHEPA was formed on realising that in Kamwokya II 
sanitation was either lacking or very poor.  For example, many homes had no any form of 
toilet and were using polythene bags to dispose of their human waste.  Most residents were 
not attending to their home environs.  Food handling was poor and unhygienic spring water 
was contaminated but most people drunk it un-boiled.  Even when cheap food was available, 
most residents suffered from malnutrition.  HIV/AIDS was wrecking havoc in the area.  
KACHEPA members realised that there was an information gap that is, community members 
lacked guidance, counseling and education.  In May 1995 the first group of 52 voluntary 
community health workers passed the course.  Since then, more community health workers 
have been trained.  These health workers got together to form KACHEPA, which remained a 
loose association until 2002 when it was formally registered.  KACHEPA has worked closely 
with KCC authorities in activities involving:  Child immunisation, pest control, safe 
motherhood, protection of water springs, HIV/AIDS campaigns, health and sanitation, 
education and garbage collection and disposal. 
                                            
888 Other two organisations supported by Concern Uganda are:  Bukaddemagezi Development Association and 
Micro Credit Development Trust.  The first gives credit to the elderly people while the second also gives credit 
to poor women. 
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KACHEPA’s vision is “to have an environmentally healthy Kamwokya with a health 
community working towards self-reliance and development”889. Its mission is “to contribute 
to the development of the communities by participating in environmental health and creating 
awareness in order to improve the quality of health and living standards of the most 
disadvantaged people”.890 
 
KACHEPA identifies the problems of its beneficiaries at three levels:  vulnerability, lack of 
resources and inappropriate policies, institutions and process.  Vulnerability is viewed in 
terms of both gender roles and poverty.  They argue that ill-health affects mostly women and 
children.  They argue that men leave their homes early morning to look for work and come 
late in the evening.  According to their analysis, women shoulder the burdens of home 
management.  Because most children in this slum area are not sent to school by their poor 
parents, they exhibit irresponsible social behaviours which aggravate the poor environment in 
the area.  Poverty is seen to be the main contributing factor to poor sanitation, for example, 
most people in the area can hardly afford the cost of constructing a pit latrine.  The result is 
that most human waste is disposed of in the nearby drainage channels.  Lack of resources is 
associated with lack of skills, capital for investment, services such as; clean water, 
communication and electricity.  Most of the people, both young and old in Kamwokya lack 
gainful employment.  They resort to drugs and alcohol, habits which make their poor 
economic situation worse.  Inappropriate policies and institutions are viewed as a result of 
poor and unresponsive government policies, absence of a strong local economy in the area, 
negative cultural practices and corruption in government.  Clearly, although KACHEPA 
identifies these problems broadly, it does not have the capacity to deal with them at that 
broad level.  From the interview I held with its leaders, it was evident that they could only do 
limited tasks.891  They have been active in collecting garbage from homes in the area at a fee 
paid by the residents.  This has, for the last couple of years, been their main occupation.  
Thus, to argue that they have been motivated by ultruistic motives and voluntarism is to miss 
                                            
889 KACHEPA Strategic Plan 2004-2006. 
890 ibid, Strategic Plan 2004-2006. 
891 Group discussion with KACHERA leaders at their office in Kamwokya II.  the leaders are:  Daisy Kamwezi 
(Chairperson), Ronald Mujambere (V. Chairperson), Ochieng Francis (Health worker), Mathias Mutinyu (Office 
Administrator) Kizito Charles (Volunteer). 
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the economic gain that the members of KACHERA make out of this “business”.  As a 
discussion group892 we had an interview where a member conceded: 
The members of KACHEPA are driven by the desire to serve the 
community.  But volunteers are divided between their personal needs and 
those of the CBO.  So one can only give limited time to KACHEPA. This 
is because he or she has a family to feed, clothe and cater for. Moreover 
most of our members are paying rent for the houses they live in.  How 
would one expect the volunteers to give all their time to KACHEPA, where 
there is no income?893 
 
Indeed part time volunteers do not get any sizeable income from KACHEPA.  They receive 
only a lunch allowance of Shs.2,000/= on the days they work, and this also depends on 
whether resources are available or not.  In lean times they may each get Shs.1,000/=.  
However, full time members such as those on the executive committee get regular salaries 
which are called “allowances”, that is, they receive full time payment894.  In recent years, 
KACHEPA’s internally generated resources have dwindled.  Their main source as noted 
before was collection of garbage for a fee paid by residents.  Ever since KCC privatised 
garbage collection to big companies, KACHEPA’s role in this business has come to the end.  
Since they have no membership contribution as a form of fundraising, the income sources of 
KACHEPA are very limited.  What started as a self sustaining organisation is largely 
dependent on external funding from Concern Uganda. 
 
Concern Uganda has transformed KACHEPA into a more formal organisation  First, it 
required and assisted KACHEPA to register as a community-based NGO in 2002.  This was a 
condition for it to be funded by Concern Uganda.  Second, KACHEPA’s objectives have 
broadened to include:  home care and support for patients who do not have care-givers, 
KACHEPA members visit and help them wash clothes, cook food or mop the house.  
Concern Uganda provides basic things for this programme.  These include salt, sugar rice, 
soap, vegetables etc.  This programme extends mainly to HIV/AIDS patients.  Another 
activity is known as patient referral programme.  This too, concerns mainly HIV/AIDS 
patients, where those who are critically ill are counseled by KACHEPA volunteers and 
helped to go to the hospital for proper treatment.  The transport costs and other facilitation for 
                                            
892 ibid (discussion group). 
893 Ms. Daisy Kamwezi, chairperson KACEPA during the group discussion. 
894 Each garbage collector was receiving Shs 60,000 per month from KACHEPA.  The leaders were/are 
receiving salaries but refused to disclose them to me. 
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such patients is drawn from Concern Uganda fund.  Also, in order to reduce the scourge of 
HIV/AIDS KACHEPA formed a drama group to sensitise the community about the disease.  
Drama shows are staged at public meetings, schools, places of worship etc.  KACHEPA 
recognised that most of the adult population in their community were illiterate.  So, they have 
started adult literacy education classes which are given by volunteers free of charge.  Health 
education about public health and hygiene are done in the community  These involve 
educating the communities about boiling drinking water, responsible disposal of domestic 
waste, keeping the homes and environment clean and others.   
 
Looking at KACHEPA’s activities and programmes, one gets a sense that its internal capacity 
to drive itself has dwindled.  It is now largely dependent on Concern Uganda for funding and 
policy guidance.  It is evident from the new programmes KACHEPA has evolved in recent 
years, that it has shifted from its original concerns of environmental and sanitary objectives to 
HIV/AIDS - which is one of the priorities of Concern Uganda.  KACHEPA seems to have 
followed the path of other CSOs which implement external agenda rather than their own 
internally driven goals. 
 
7.8.6 Kisenyi Community Health Workers Association KICHWA 
Kisenyi Community Health Workers Association (KICHWA) is another environmental 
health CBO operating in the densely populated slum of Kisenyi, two kilometers from the city 
centre of Kampala.  It was founded by four members in 1998  Its objectives are:  to improve 
health in the area, focusing on hygiene in homes, improve drainage by desilting drains, 
educating local people on proper garbage disposal, encouraging construction of latrines and 
keeping them clean.   
 
In addition, their other objective is to fight the spread of HIV/AIDS. KIHCWA was formed 
in 1998 after two local residents died of cholera and many other people were hospitalised for 
the same disease.  It also came from a realisation that since KCC was not doing much about 
their environment, there was need for a healthy environment.  Apart from taking a pro-active 
measure on the issues affecting the health of their community, they hoped to engage KCC to 
deliver services in their area. The issues of HIV/AIDS were added to their programme 
because there is a lot of sex activity in the area partly because most of the unemployed youth 
take drugs and alcohol and engage in sex recklessly. The young girls and women redundant, 
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because they either do not go to school or have no jobs.  Many engage in selling sex as a 
means of survival.  Girls as young as twelve or thirteen are already very active in commercial 
sex.  Whereas there are structures of local government, the local council officials “fear to tell 
the people the truth because they seek cheap popularity.”895 
 
KICHWA has 30 members:  18 women and 12 men.  Members subscribe Shs.5,000 per 
annum.  Their office is a makeshift “box” made out of motor vehicle scrap.  Like 
KACHEPA, their main activity is collection of domestic garbage from homes of the residents 
at a fee of Shs.200 – Shs.500, depending on the amount collected.  Since 1998 when 
KICHWA was formed, this has been their main activity.  In addition, they mobilise the local 
residents to de-sit the drains which are constantly blocked by indiscriminate and irresponsible 
disposal by local residents, some of whom are unable or unwilling to pay the fees to 
KICHWA for its collection.  Again, like in the case of KACHEPA, KICHWA has lost the 
garbage collection business after KCC licensed Nabugabo Updeal company to collect 
garbage in Central Division.  The company has exclusive right to do this business, and this 
has edged out the small operators like KICHWA.  According to its officials, this has dealt a 
serious blow to their programme of “serving the community” they have served for years 
when KCC had failed them896.    
 
KCC and Nabugabo Updeal company are accused of imposing heavy charges for garbage 
collection and of eliminating small operators like KICHWA, which was likely to increase 
poverty in the community.  From their arguments, it is evident that their garbage collection 
activity was paying them well.  I asked them whether their association was purely a voluntary 
one.  They asserted that they were driven by the “plight of the community” but also argued 
that voluntarism in a poor community was problematic because “people have to find what to 
eat”.  For example, they argued that their membership has been declining from 46 in 2004 to 
30 in 2005.  They attribute this to the decision of the executive committee’s increase of 
annual subscription for members from Shs.2,000 to Shs.5,000, which some people could have 
found hard to pay.  They argue that most of the people in the area live from “hand to mouth”.  
On a critical note, however, it is possible that some members could have left KICHWA 
                                            
895 Suleiman Oduma (KICHWA Chairperson) said during our group discussion 
896 Group discussion with the officials of KICHWA who included:  Mr. S. Oduma (chairperson), Mrs. J. Kizito 
(advisor), Mrs. Milly Waiswan (Secretary).  Ms. Kabulo Zainabu (member of the committee), Ms Alice Naiga 
(Member of the committee), Mr. Kalanzi Edrisa (member) and Hadija Wasege (office administrator) 
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following the entry of Nabugabo Updeal company which is collecting garbage on commercial 
scale.  This has meant lack of income for members that they used to derive to their benefit. 
 
KICHWA presently has two sources of income.  They are receiving grants from Concern 
Uganda and are engaged in sub-contracting street cleaning services with the Central division.  
Concern Uganda is supporting KICHWA’s programme on HIV/AIDS campaign, desolating 
drains, public hygiene sensitisation, drama group and is giving them capacity building 
seminars.  Such seminars emphasize planning, project proposal writing, project 
implementation, monitoring and evaluation.  In addition, Concern Uganda paid for their 
working uniform (overcoats and gum boots). 
 
In a move to survive and gain income, KICHWA members have taken a sub-contract to 
sweep and clean the streets in the city centre.  For this, every member who offers his or her 
labour is paid a daily rate of Shs.4,000/=.  Of this amount, KICHWA as an organisation 
retains 5 percent for administrative and other expenses.  Also, not all the thirty members are 
working on the cleaning sub-contract.  Only 14 members are involved, the rest of the 
members are engaged in their private income generating activities.  As evidenced by the 
nature of activities KICHWA members are engaged in, voluntarism seems to be a secondary 
motive.  It is clear that they are engaged in economic activities which are primarily geared to 
the satisfaction of their personal benefit897.  Thus whereas the KICHWA members lamented 
loss of business of garbage collection in Kisenyi III, they have used their experience to gain 
employment in the city centre.  The question that the members of the discussion group were 
unable to answer satisfactorily is whether or not they are now acting as an income generation 
group or were still volunteers.  They however, insisted in their argument that they still serve 
the Kisenyi III community “in other ways”.  They cited their active participation in child 
immunisation campaigns as well as HIV/AIDS campaigns.  From the discussion, it became 
apparent that they are becoming “commercial” in orientation.  They suggested for example, 
that they are planning to bid for cleaning contracts in the districts around Kampala such as 
Mpigi, Mukono and Wakiso.  Yet in this pervasive “commercial” orientation, their 
                                            
897 I observed during our discussion with KICHWA officials a young man who is not a member but an employee 
of KICHWA on the cleaning subcontract who came to collect their wages after some days of his absence from 
work, being ridiculed by the chairman.  The chairman said:  “These young people have no sense of 
responsibility.  He disappeared for a whole week, now he wants money.  These people fail as to complete 
contracts on time”. 
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perspective still contains some benevolence of “helping” the disadvantaged members of the 
community.  They argued that most of the residents of Kisenyi III lacked jobs and HIV/AIDS 
was affecting many people in the area who are dying of HIV/AIDS disease because of 
poverty-they lack medication and food, so they die sooner than later.  Thus getting them jobs 
would be a solution to their poverty. 
 
It appears doubtful that KICHWA would be able to handle large job assignments if they were 
to get them.  They lack the management capacity to organise and coordinate activities on a 
scale larger than what they are today.  Since 1998, they have not had a Board of Directors.898  
The organisation has been run by a few founder members constituting an executive 
committee which is not regularly elected but holds office perennially.  They have no assets, 
no proper office, no office equipment (e.g. computer, type writer, photocopier etc.)899  The 
chairman of the committee doubles as the chief executive officer.  My observation is that if 
the larger section of the community in this impoverished slum area “live from hand to mouth 
“as the group discussion members described it, the KICHWA members are not living 
differently900. 
 
7.8.7 Mengo Kisenyi Youth Development Association (MKYDA) 
Mengo Kisenyi Youth Development Association (MKYDA) is another fairly effective 
CBO901.  Located in Kisenyi II, its main activities are commercial by design and operation.  
Its objectives are to fight poverty among the youth and to impart positive behavioural change 
on them.  Founded in 1999 and registered as a CBO in 2000, its aim is to give life-skills to 
the youth in Kisenyi II (the central area) of this large slum area.  Like the other CBOs, it is 
driven by voluntarism and non-profit making motives. 
MKYDA’s activities include:  training the youth in skills that can enable them engage in 
gainful employment.  Other activities are drama and sensitization of the population against 
HIV/AIDS, community policing and environmental concerns.  Training includes tailoring, 
carpentry, wax candle making and computer usage. 
 
                                            
898 At the time of interview 24 July 2005, KICHWA executive members told me they were planning to put in 
place a Board of Directors 
899 When I requested for some documents, the office attendant had to do copies in the town of Katwe. 
900 During the discussions, some members who work on the cleaning sub-contract were coming for their cash 
payments.  The chairman himself was paying from his drawer.  There were no voucher books to sign. 
901 Interview with Mr. Stalon Mutyaba, Manager MKYDA. 
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MKYDA has four departments:  Vocational training, health and sanitation, behavioural 
change and advocacy.  Here below are the activities under each department. 
 
Table 40:  Showing Activities of MKYDA 
Department Activities 
 
 
 
Vocational Training 
 Tailoring 
 Knitting 
 Carpentry 
 Candle making 
 Computer 
 
 
Health and Sanitation 
 Drainage desilting 
 Public mobilization (hygiene) 
 Door-to-door refuse collection 
 Bush clearance 
 Access road maintenance 
 
Behaviour Change 
 HIV/AIDS Prevention 
 Peer Group education and guidance 
 Human rights and community policing 
 
 
Advocacy 
 Youth empowerment seminars 
 Approaching and working with local authorities 
 Selling the ideas of MKYDA to donors and the 
community 
 Participation in community activities 
 Attending local council meetings 
 
Data on MKYDA’s vocational training activities is scattered.  However, the manager availed 
data for two years.  In 2004, sixty five trainees passed their in various courses.902  Each 
trainee is asked to contribute Shs.3,000 (approx. US$2).  This is used for purchasing 
materials which are necessary for training.  In addition, trainees are required to bring extra 
training materials.  Some of the money that the trainees pay is used to pay the instructors.903  
At the workshop, I observed trainees busy producing products of their trades.  Wax candles, 
knitted ware and furniture of good finishing were available for sale.  The trainees interviewed 
were all praises for MKYDA.  Most of the trainees had elementary education and were 
loitering the city streets with hardly anything of value to do.  Since most of the trainees hail 
from the same parish, they were advised by either their parents or friends to settle for this 
                                            
902 Interview with Mr. Stalon Mutyaba, Manager MKYDA. 
903 Instructors are not volunteers.  They are technical people hired by MKYDA to work for a pay, except one 
Hajati Mariam Namutebi who after being helped by MKYDA in 2000, in knitting and tailoring now volunteers 
to help other trainees. 
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kind of training.  Others had been inspired by their peers who had been trained there and are 
now working either on their own or employed.  There is a case of a successful young man in 
the nighbourhood, who after training at MKYDA sold all sorts of things in the streets as a 
hawker, was able to save enough money to buy a wax candle making machine.  He boasts of 
“making it from scratch”.904    
 
The problems associated with product samples produced by MKYDA trainees is that they 
lack marketing outlets.  Some are indeed, in a rudimentary state.  While some institutions 
such as schools would have taken some of their products such as furniture and sweaters, 
MKYDA does not have enough money to produce products on a large scale.  MKYDA 
chairperson argues that if they had any significant funding they would put up workshops 
which would employ their graduates and act a source of income for their organization. 
 
Besides training at its centre in Kisenyi II, MKYDA has another programme of training 
which is a joint undertaking between MKYDA, Concern Uganda and Lugogo Vocational 
Training Institute in Kampala.905   MKYDA mobilizes the youth, Concern Uganda pays their 
training fees and Lugogo Vocational Training Institute trains them.  This programme has run 
since 2002.  About 150 youth have benefited form this programme.    There is no indication 
of what those who completed course at Lugogo Vocational Institute are doing currently.  
However, the Manager of MKYDA says they intend to carry out a tracer study to establish 
the impact of their programme on the youth who benefited from it.  I met one young man 
who was due to graduate from Lugogo Vocational Training Institute906.  Having completed 
his O’level with poor grades, he roamed the streets of Kampala looking for any form of 
employment without much success.  On learning about MKYDA–Concern Uganda 
sponsorship at Lugogo Vocational Training Institute, he approached MKYDA and got 
sponsored.  He has studied electronic engineering.  He is capable of doing computer software, 
computer and mobile phone repairs.  Even before his graduation, he is working for a 
computer company and earning a living.  This is yet another example of MKYDA’s success 
story. 
 
                                            
904 Robert Senyonjo, candle maker in Kisenyi, a graduate of MKYDA.  His success has inspired many youth in 
the area. 
905 Lugogo Vocational Institute is a government owned institute. 
906 Ronald Kasibante (aged 23) was due to graduate in September, 2005.  Interview held on 27 July 2005. 
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Apart from Vocational Training MKYDA is engaged in health and sanitation activities in 
Kisenyi II parish.  They work as volunteers in desilting drains.  They mobilize non-member 
youth to be involved in communal environmental activities.  In this they work with local 
council officials and get support from KCC–Central division.  In the month f July 2005, 
Central Division had released Shs.250,000 for MKYDA’s public health activities.907   
 
More interesting of MKYDA’s activities is their human rights and youth behavioural change 
programme.  This is a multi-faceted activity.  It involves getting the youth off drugs and 
alcohol.  It also involves campaigns against criminality and the spread of HIV/AIDS.  This 
programme is targeting the deviant behaviours of the youth.  Many of the youth in Kisenyi 
are already drug addicts as well as alcohol abusers.  These lead them into unsafe sex 
activities.  MKYDA’s intervention has registered great success in reduction of criminality.  
They use peer group training follow-up and observation.  First, a few youth are selected, 
trained and empowered in new behavioural orientation such as knowing the dangers of drug 
use and alcohol abuse.  Some of those youth who have managed to abandon those habits are 
turned into trainers.  They trained other youth.  They have formed their peer clubs. Members 
of the peer clubs watch over those whom they know are engaged in criminal activities such as 
pick-pocketing, robbery and mugging.  Those who are unwilling to change are reported to the 
police.  Some of the hard core criminal gang members have left the area because of being 
watched all the time.  As the manager of MKYDA put it: 
In 2003 we brought the police band to play music at the international AIDS 
day celebrations.  Instead of our local youth getting down to enjoy it, they 
instead run away very fast.  The gap between the youth here and the police 
was too wide.908 
 
This has changed. MKYDA’s Community Policing Department has been very active in youth 
behavioural change.  The youth have been educated about their responsibilities and rights in 
the community.  The programme has helped in educating the youth about the dangers of 
drugs on their mental health, the benefits of cooperating with the police when arrested for an 
offence, the rights of an offender in the law and the need and benefits of being a responsible 
citizen.909 The other aspect of behavioural change is the campaign against the spread of 
                                            
907 KCC funding to MKYDA depends on latter’s proposed activities. 
908 Mr. S. Mutyaba (ibid), interview. 
909 It was reported that most of the youth arrested by police would not be released on bond because their 
colleagues would fear to go there to stand surety for them.  As a consequence many youth ended up staying in 
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HIV/AIDS. Although the campaign is done through drama, posters, public seminars, youth 
peer groups and use of radio programmes, what has been achieved cannot be quantified.  No 
one seems to know whether or not the youth have changed their sexual habits.  However, the 
campaign is still on. 
 
In many respects the programme of behavioural change has gone hand in hand with 
advocacy.  The main challenge that MKYDA has had to deal with is the aspect of raising the 
voice of the youth in the marginalized area of Kisenyi.  MKYDA reports success in terms of 
lobbying local councils to prioritise the activities of the youth.  It has recently received 
support for its activities from British American Tobacco (BAT), the Rotary Club of Kampala 
Central, Uganda Taxi Operators and Drivers Association (UTODA) in addition to its main 
financier, Concern Uganda.910   
 
Inspite of the successes recorded by MKYDA, it still faces challenges of organizational 
growth and self sustenance.  Like the other CBOs discussed above, it has no office 
accommodation of its own.  They are renting space in Mbiro zone, Kisenyi II which is 
partitioned with temporary materials to serve as workshops and an office.  They complain of 
incessant increment of rental charges.911  They also lack any secure source of income to 
sustain the organization.  In recent years, Concern Uganda has been footing their bill for rent 
as well as administrative expenses.  For example, the management committee which runs the 
organisation on daily basis gets part of their salaries from Concern Uganda’s financial grants.  
In comparison with KICHWA and KACHEPA, MKYDA appears to be a better managed 
organization.  It has an advisory board of nine members who were elected by their general 
assembly. This board is responsible for policy matters.  It also appoints members of the 
management committee.  The latter reports to the board.  This management system is lacking 
in the other CBOs we have discussed.  Apart from a relatively sound management system, 
MKYDA’s products are visible both in material terms as well as in changing and 
                                                                                                                                        
detention longer than necessary.  This is reported to have changed.  The youth watch the streets of Kisenyi 
against any crime activities.   
910 BAT donated boots and gloves for the youth to work on the drains.  Rotary Club of Kampala Central donated 
sewing machines, carpentry workshop tools, and packaging materials for candles.  UTODA sponsors their 
international AIDS day celebrations.  MKYDA’s main financier is Concern Uganda.  The Latter supports their 
organizational capacity building. 
911 My critical observation is that those tools, equipment and computers were at a risk of being stolen.  Besides, 
their land lord has increased rent from Shs.300,000 to Shs.500,000 in 2005 
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empowering the previously marginalised people, who are there and willing to give a 
testimony to the credit of their organisation.  This is a result of the capacity that MKYDA has 
built over a couple of years it has been in existence.  For vocational training, they have the 
following equipment:4 computers, 2 printers, 1 scanner, 1 laminator, 13 ordinary sewing 
machines, 10 advanced sewing machines and a fully equipped training carpentry workshop.  
They have 1 trainer in computing for 8 trainees, and 2 trainers for 42 trainees in carpentry 
works.912  My critical observation is that they have a large installed capacity that appears to 
be under-utilised.  They have also, not been innovative enough.  Their installed capacity is 
capable of generating some revenue, for instance, if they took on trainees who could pay full 
fees for training.  This would go a long way in generating internal revenue to support their 
programmes, rather then depending on external funding.  This however, is not their main 
goal.  MKYDA on its part, is so far serving its intended objectives of changing people’s lives 
and to a great extent, they have been successful. 
 
7.8.8 Kampala Central Community Resource Centre (KCCRC) 
Kampala Central Community Resources Centre (KCCRC) is a new project initiated by a 
partnership of CBOs that are supported by Concern Uganda.  These CBOs are MKYDA, 
KACHEPA and KICHWA.  Started in April 2004 with financial support from Concern 
Uganda, 913  the three CBOs created KCCRC to serve the following objectives:  to promote a 
learning culture among the people in Kisenyi, to bring modern communication services to the 
area and to promote exchange of information.  It was conceived on grounds that the people of 
Kisenyi have to go to the city centre to access telephone and other communication services 
such as internet.  There was no library service in this area, which limits the learning 
opportunities of the people, especially the youth.  It is envisaged to serve as a one-stop centre 
for services at reasonable cost for people in the area.  The services provided include; library, 
newspapers, computer training, typesetting, photocopying, binding, public telephone and 
internet services.  These services are deemed necessary in view of the information gaps that 
the Kisenyi communities experience.  For example, most of the people in this area are too 
poor to afford the cost of buying a newspaper daily.  The centre provides newspapers, 
whereby a reader pays a small fee and reads all the newspapers of the day at the Centre.914  
                                            
912 Observation checklist at their premises at Mbiro zone - Kisenyi II on 27 July 2005 
913 Concern Uganda provided funding for KCCRC of Shs.741,800 to start it up.  Concern Uganda hoped the 
project would sell its services and become self sustaining in the long run. 
914 Most dailies cost Shs.800.  Reading newspapers at KCCRC is at a fee of Shs.100. 
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Internet and telephone services at the centre are cheaper than the commercial rates elsewhere 
in the city.  The overall objective of the project is that it will reduce poverty through 
improvement and access to information and communication technologies. 
 
The project however, had a false start.915  Started in April 2004, it was closed by the end of 
November of the same year.  There was mismanagement, the workers were unskilled, the 
CBOs (that formed it) were squabbling, finances had been mishandled, there was poor record 
keeping and services were poor.  These factors worked against the realisation of the 
objectives of the project.  The community had not been sensitised or properly informed of the 
existence of the services at the centre.  Moreover, the community at large and the local 
leaders had not been involved in the planning of the project.  They therefore, perceived it as a 
centre for use by the founding CBOs, not for the community.  It ran for seven months, April 
to November 2004, without realising any of its objectives.  Concern Uganda, the main funder 
withdrew and it was closed until May 2005 when it resumed providing services to the 
community. 
 
Before the Centre resumed, the project management committee was re-trained by KCEP staff 
on their roles, responsibilities and supervisory skills.  In addition a new cadre of staff was 
recruited directly by Concern Uganda.  There are two people working at the Centre; the 
Manager and a Documentalist.  The manager is a University graduate and the documentalist 
is a Diploma holder.  It is reported that the public response to the services of the Centre has 
been good.  The library and newspaper readership has already gone beyond the small space 
available at the Centre.  Other services are gradually picking up clientele.   Due to increase in 
demand for the services at the Centre, Concern Uganda has set aside Shs.39 million to put up 
a floor to house the Centre on a building being constructed by Slum Dwellers Foundation in 
Kisenyi III. 
 
This short story of KCCRC exposes a number of issues in the management of CBOs.  First, 
whereas they are convinced about participatory management, they are not practicing it well 
enough.  Secondly, their noble idea of a one-stop centre for such services, excellent as it is, 
could not be nurtured by their own imagination to fruition.  Internal squabbles and self 
                                            
915 S. Bagaya, Project Officer KCEP (interview). 
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interest were wrecking a well thought out project.  Thirdly, transparency in some of the 
CBOs is better preached than done.  Lack of transparency led to the temporary closure of 
KCCRC.  There were no books of accounts and expenditure was done without proper 
records.916 
 
With reconstituted management under the watchful eye of Concern Uganda, KCCRC has 
seen a turn round.  The local leaders have been incorporated on the board, services at the 
centre are advertised at local council meetings, the expenditures are sanctioned by the 
management team, financial and other records are meticulously kept.917  All this, thanks to 
Concern Uganda which threatened at the re-opening of the Centre that if it were mismanaged 
again, support to the concerned CBOs would be withheld. 
 
The CBOs own KCCRC only in theory.  Each of the CBOs was supposed to contribute 
financially, to the setting up and running of KCCRC.  This has not materialised.  So far, the 
contribution of the three CBOs to KCCRC is the attendance of their representatives of the 
KCCRC board meetings.  The salaries of the two workers at the centre, procurement of 
books, magazines, newspapers, all the furniture and equipment and rental payment for the 
building that houses the Centre are paid for by Concern Uganda.  The creation of the Centre, 
though a good idea championed by the three CBOs; has added another organisation to the list 
of local CBOs dependent on Concern Uganda.  Nevertheless, the management of Concern 
Uganda has no cause to complain.  This happens to be one of their cherished ideas of 
changing the lives of the people in the disadvantaged areas of Kampala.  Besides, it is argued 
that this and other projects under KCEP is the reason for the existence of Concern Uganda918 
- which is targeting reduction of poverty in both urban and rural areas.   
 
Looking at the balance sheet of KCCRC, for the months of May, June and July 2005, there 
are little chances that KCCRC would meet the target of self sustenance.  Although there was 
tremendous improvement in terms of percentage income, it was still far from meeting even 
                                            
916 Jesca Nantaba, the new Manager of KCCRC (interview) 
917 Observation checklist at KCCRC, Kisenyi II offices. 
918 Ms Rosemary Mbabazi (interview).  She said money is not a problem of Concern Uganda, viable projects 
targeting poverty reduction are in short supply. 
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the monthly salary of one employee at the Centre.919  However, the objective of the project is 
not commercial but social.  The services offered at this centre are probably the only one of 
their kind offered by any other NGO or public organisation.  Save for Centre for Basic 
Research (CBR), a premier research institution based in Kololo, the upper class suburb, no 
other service of this kind is known to exist in Kampala; especially in the marginalised areas 
of the city.  Thus, even if KCCRC is unable to collect income capable of sustaining it 
internally, it is one project that has potential to impact positively on the lives of the poor, 
especially the youth-born and raised in conditions that are not conducive to scholarship and 
knowledge sharing.  The students interviewed at the Centre appreciated the service920.  The 
Centre’s potential in reducing poverty and enhancing social learning will probably be realised 
in the long rather than short run. 
 
7.8.9   Kamwokya Christian Caring Community (KCCC) 
KCCC is a multi dimensional organisation.  It deals with a multiplicity of problems affecting 
the most disadvantaged people in the community.  It focuses on vulnerable people whose 
social situation has been gravely affected by conditions beyond their capacity to handle.  
Helping people in chronic poverty, social deprivation and diseases is the reason, passion and 
pursuit that drives KCC. 921 Founded in 1987 by Sr. Dr. Miriam Duggan, an Irish Franciscan 
missionary sister, KCCC is a faith and community-based CBO in Kamwokya II parish, a 
densely populated slum in the outskirts of Kampala.  Though based in Kamwokya, KCCC 
delivers services in other disadvantaged areas of Kampala.  The mission of KCCC is to 
improve the quality of life of the most disadvantaged and vulnerable groups in Kampala 
district through enhancing their capacity to identify and address their social, health, 
economic, spiritual, cultural and development needs”.922 
 
KCCC utilises an integrated and holistic approach to community development. It deals with 
the problems of vulnerable people at two levels:  (i) providing support and treatment of 
people affected by HIV/AIDS and (ii) engaging vulnerable and marginalised people…” in 
                                            
919 KCCRC, Quarterly report (May, June and July 2005) indicates the incomes as follows:  May, Shs 6,450 June 
47,000 and July Shs.98,500/= 
920 The Centre has 16 chairs and three reading tables.  Students overflow the place which is already too small to 
accommodate their demand for reading space.  The older members of the community trickle in for public 
telephone and newspaper services. 
921 Statement by Mr. Francis Mbaziira, Executive Director KCCC (interview, 1 August, 2005) 
922 KCCC(2005) “KCCC Policy Statement P.1. 
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long term processes that enable them to have a voice, share experiences and learn about 
effective ways for tapping available environmental opportunities and overcome poverty, 
AIDS and other factors that negatively impact on their livelihoods”923  KCCC inspiration is 
derived from their slogan:” Called to care, share and serve,”924 that seems to reveal their 
Catholic faith concern as well as their charity orientation.  Although KCCC is a Catholic 
Church founded organisation, the services are provided to members of any faith.  For 
example, it started on the basis of local council system in Kamwokya II parish where people 
of all religious denominations reside.  The main concern was (and still is) the control of 
HIV/AIDS in the area.  The concern in 1987 was that AIDS was a new disease which most 
people had little knowledge of.  Because AIDS patients would be emaciated and had terrible 
appearances, they would be isolated and stigmatised by people around them.  KCCC 
intervened by sensitising the community about the disease and helping the sick.925 
 
Starting as Christian pastoral work of visiting the sick, KCCC grew into a large organisation, 
diagnosing the problem of AIDS beyond being a physiological sickness.  It was 
contextualised by KCCC members as a social, economic and cultural problem.  Poverty was 
identified as one of the main causes and accelerator of AIDS.  Besides, AIDS was seen not 
only as an infection that disabled the human capacities of the ones who were ill but also 
socially and economically effecting those close to them or who depended on them for their 
normal livelihoods.  In this way, KCCC contextualised the problem in a very broad 
perspective that informed its objectives and programmes.  According to KCCC officials: 
What started as a small Christian work, grew into a large project whose 
concerns went beyond matters of faith… to broad issues of poverty, HIV 
and other associated diseases, as well as orphans, street kids, food, and 
everything to do with vulnerability and destitution. 
 
This perspective informs the objectives of KCCC which are: 
 To provide, promote and support basic education, vocational skills training and functional 
adult literacy opportunities for the indigent and orphaned children, school drop-outs and 
the girl child through KCCCC informal school, Vocational training centre and school fees 
sponsorship programme. 
 To provide health care services, counseling, bereavement care and psychological/spiritual 
support to persons infected by HVI/AIDS in the community. 
                                            
923 KCCC (2005), Policy Statement (ibid.) 
924 KCCC (2005),”Brochure”. 
925 Because there was little information about the cause of AIDS, local people were associating it with 
witchcraft. 
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 To involve the community, particularly women in income generating projects. 
 To provide shelter and rehabilitation to disadvantaged/vulnerable aged people and 
children. 
 To plan, implement, monitor and evaluate youth development and sexual and 
reproductive health activities, personal development skills, entrepreneurial skills 
development, career guidance, peer support clubs and behaviour change for young people 
10-25 years. 
 To engage in projects for purpose of generating funds to run community services. 
 To carry out research, compile and analyse data and disseminate findings on factors that 
affect vulnerable people especially those infected and affected by HIV/AIDS. 
 
The broad concern of KCCC is the problem of HIV/AIDS which is estimated to have affected 
the lives of two million Ugandans with more than 500,000 having developed full blown 
AIDS.  It is estimated that 65 percent of the total HIV/AIDS victims are young people aged 
between 14 and 30 years, two thirds of whom are female.  In particular Kamwokya Parish 
with a population of 39,000 people, most of whom are youth is HIV positive, since most of 
these are young parents, their death leads to increase in the number of orphans and needy 
children.926  These have to suffer deprivation of food, shelter, clothing, failure to attend 
school, lack of care; and may end up living on streets and engaging in criminal activities.927  
In response to these social problems associated with the HIV/AIDS disease KCCC has 
evolved programmes to help the vulnerable and disadvantaged people. 
 
Table 41:  Showing the Planned Activities of KCCC 
Programme Activities Outputs 
 
PRIMARY HEALTH 
CARE 
 
 Prevention and control of 
HIV/AIDS and other 
diseases 
 Investigation and diagnosis 
of diseases 
 Treatment 
 referral 
 Child immunisation against 
preventable diseases 
 Community education. 
 
 Outpatient treatment at 
clinics at Kamwokya, 
Kyebando, Bukoto and 
Mengo-Kisenyi. 
 provision of ARV drugs, 
6289 persons on ARVs - 
4,166 adult females, 1652 
males and 471 children. 
 8,000 general patients receive 
treatment from KCCC clinics 
every year. 
 316 children are immunised 
every month. 
 350 Community Based 
                                            
926 KCCC, Brochure (ibid) 
927  KCCC, Brochure (ibid) 
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Programme Activities Outputs 
Health workers have been 
trained. 
PERSONAL 
DEVELOPMENT 
SKILLS 
 Motivation and personal 
Development skills 
workshops. 
 Positive parenting 
seminars. 
 Training Peers educators 
 Formation of Peer support 
clubs (Treasure life Youth 
Centres) 
 120 Peer club members meet 
at Kamwokya 
 56 Peer educators trained in 
Mengo-Kisenyi 
 40 Peer educators trained in 
Kamwokya 
 46 Parents have been trained 
in positive parenting 
 Behaviour change among the 
youth registered. 
 Increased communication 
parents - children. 
GENDER AND 
SOCIAL WELFARE 
 Promotion of human rights 
 Fighting domestic violence 
 Promoting Gender parity 
 Economic empowerment 
 Fighting household poverty. 
 
 Provided low interest loans to 
237 households 
 Income generating activities 
started 
 Gender stereotyping reduced 
 Building strong families 
 More families enabled to 
send children to school. 
CHILD WELFARE 
AND 
DEVELOPMENT 
 Rehabilitation of 
disadvantaged and 
vulnerable children 
 Children scholarship scheme 
 Fostering children 
 Strengthening the 
psychology of children to 
positive orientations. 
 1536 orphans and vulnerable 
children are supported in 
schools (65) primary (12) 
secondary and 10% tertiary 
schools. 
 250 children helped to settle 
from the streets. 
 120 community-based child 
counselors trained 
 42 children placed in foster 
homes. 
 300 children in KCCC 
informal schools. 
VOCATIONAL 
SKILLS TRAINING 
AND 
DEVELOPMENT 
 Equipping young people 
with hand on skills in 
tailoring, bricklaying, 
leather works etc. 
 Apprenticeship for 
Vocational trainees 
 Entrepreneurial skills 
imparted 
 Every year 250 young people 
are trained at KCCC 
Vocational training centre at 
Kamwokya 
 Every year 100 are sponsored 
by KLCCC to train at other 
Vocational schools. 
FOOD AND 
NUTRITION 
 Food provided to 
HIV/AIDS, TB and mentally 
sick patients. 
 Patients advised to eat 
 6,500 form households 
affected by HIV/AIDS and 
poverty are supplied by 
KCCC with food 
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Programme Activities Outputs 
nutritious food 
 Children under direct care of 
KCCC are fed at the centre 
 357 orphans and vulnerable 
children in KCCC Vocational 
informal school are fed. 
 
PASTORAL CARE 
AND SUPPORT 
 Giving spiritual guidance 
and counseling 
 Spiritual retreats organised 
 Group sharing and one to 
one spiritual sharing. 
 
 Restoration of hope 
 Increasing resilience 
 1,500 people benefit from 
pastoral care every year. 
FUNCTIONAL 
ADULT LITERACY 
 Equipping reading and 
numeracy skills to adults 
who have never gone to 
school, who are unable to 
read and write 
 Help these people to count 
money and do some 
business 
 200 people are benefiting 
from this programme. 
 Beneficiaries get to know 
how to read and write 
 beneficiaries access loans and 
start small enterprises. 
Source:  Data compiled from KCCC (2005), Policy Statement . 
 
The holistic approach employed by KCCC in dealing with the socio-economic and health 
problems of the disadvantaged people has earned it a lot of financial and other support from 
local and international donors.  All the above programmes have for a long time been 
implemented from the church premises at Kamwokya.  During the time of this study, KCCC 
was undergoing a physical transformation.  A new school with a modern building (double 
storied) was being erected to absorb what used to be an “informal school” operated in church 
premises.928 Most services rendered by KCCC are supported by international organizations.  
ARVs for treatment of HIV/AIDS patients are provided by the United States government 
through the Presidential Emergency Plan for Aids Relief (PEPFAR).  In Uganda, this aid is 
coordinated by Catholic Relief Services (CRS).  In addition to the medication, KCCC is 
receiving food for the Aids patients from USAID.  Other food aid to KCCC is donated by the 
Indian Community in Uganda, United Nations Spouses Association, the World Food 
Programme, Feed the Children, and some individual members of the local community.  
According to the KCCC officials, most of the aid givers are more willing to give support to 
services than the personnel and administrative costs.  The success of KCCCC programmes 
                                            
928 The new school building is to be named after Sr.  Dr. Miriam Duggan, the founder of KCCC.  The money for 
the school building (US$500,000) was donated by CARITAS-SWISS, a Catholic Charity organization in 
Switzerland.  The office block was financed by CRITAS – Norway and Catholic Relief Services (CRS). 
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therefore, has largely been enabled by a large team of volunteers, who give their time and 
labour selflessly.929   Thus, a combination of voluntarism and extensive donor funding have 
greatly helped KCCC’s efforts in delivering services to the needy people.  Here below is the 
extent of funding to KCCC. 
 
Table 42:  Showing the Funding to KCCC, 2004 
Name of Donor Amount in 
Uganda shillings 
Period of 
Grant 
Purpose of Grant 
American Jewish World Service 95,757,321 1 Year Psychological 
support 
Angella Brandit 782,670 1 Year  
AVSI 64,790,000 1 Year  
Basic Needs UK 28,563,365 1 Year Mental Heath 
Binamungu 272,500 1 Year Tuition Fees 
CARITAS SWISS/Lexenburg 269,397,000 1 Year Psychological 
support 
CARITAS SWISS 150,000,000 1 Year School Construction 
COOPI 100,000,000 1 Year Micro Credit 
Concern Worldwide 18,416,000 1 Year Community Health 
CRS Life 55,508,593 1 Year Food Support 
CRS (Main) 274,596,517 1 Year Psychological 
support 
DARLOD 44,245,235 1 Year Tuition Fees 
CRS Construction 85,000,000 1 Year Construction of 
office & Clinic 
GLRA 17,832,000 1 Year Foster Homes 
INGERISH 7,310,000 1 Year Tuition Fees 
INGER Fund 3,255,000 1 Year Tuition Fees 
PEPFA/CRS 297,877,240 1 Year ARVs therapy 
INGRID & CRESTO 3,954,537 1 Year Tuition Fees 
Kampala City Council 4,462,000 1 Year PHC activities 
KARIN Fund 386,061 1 Year Tuition Fees 
LOINS Aid Norway 794,000 1 Year Children donation 
SCIAF 315,857,611 1 Year Psychological 
support 
TDH Italy 136,664,164 1 Year Tuition Fees 
RASKOB 76,141,550 1 Year Psychological 
support 
TRISHA WHITE Fund 9,782,000 1 Year Tuition Fees 
Total 2,061,645,364   
Source:  KCCC (2005) Policy Statement, p.12. 
                                            
929 Mr. Peter Kayiira Byansi.  Some of the volunteers are HIV/Aids patients whose lives have improved with the 
assistance of KCCCC. 
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From the table above, it is clear that KCCC’s programmes have benefited from massive 
international funding.  By Uganda’s local standards one year’s funding to the tune of Shs.2 
billion. (or about US$1.2 million), KCCC is a well funded NGO.  Surprisingly, it is one of 
those little known NGOs.930  Going by this level of funding, and the extensive service 
provision that KCCC gives to the needy people and communities, KCCC is probably one of 
the largest local NGOs in Uganda.  However, like most of the local NGOs, it is evident that 
KCCC is largely dependent on foreign funding.  Local fundraising has not been attempted.  
As the list of funders shows, Kampala City Council is the only local organization that trickled 
in with Shs.4 million.  The rest of the funders are foreign.  The KCCC officials reported that 
although much of the funding is foreign, they have not had any “strings” attached to the aid 
they receive.  It was further reported that the donors are impressed by three factors about 
KCCC, namely; its accountability and transparency, the voluntary spirit and actual delivery 
of services that has changed the lives of thousands of vulnerable people.931   The KCCC 
officials contend that aid in itself is not bad. 
What matters is what you do with it, how you do it and the results you can 
show for it.932 
 
In the case of KCCC, service delivery is supported by aid but it is not the prime mover of 
things in this organization.  The main actors are the critical masses of volunteers whose 
commitment goes beyond the call of duty to ameliorate the suffering of fellow men and 
women, especially the victims of HIV/AIDS. 
 
The management style employed by KCCC is also totally different from that of  most of other 
NGOs in Uganda.   KCCC managers and other workers neither have fancy cars nor air 
conditioned offices.  They simply have working desks and computers.933  Most of the staff 
stay out in the field leading volunteers.  Some of the staff have no offices, they report in the 
morning, they are assigned duties and report back in the late hours of the afternoon.  Apart 
from this horizontal management style, there is effective participation in the organization 
which take place at five levels:  
(i)   All workers and volunteers participate in the discussions of the programme to be 
done.  
                                            
930 Many small and poorly funded NGOs make headlines in Newspapers and other media.  KCCC does not. 
931 Mr. Peter Kayiira Byansi  
932 Mr. Francis Mbaziira, Executive Director KCCC (interview). 
933 I observed this during the interviews at their office in Kamwokya. 
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(ii)  Management takes up ideas from such discussions for and designs programmes.  
(iii) Management reports to the Board, which sanctions the programmes.  
(iv)  Communities are asked about the appropriateness of the programme and what their 
priority concerns are. 
(v)  The management ensures programmes are implemented, monitored and evaluated.  
This approach has enabled KCCC to accomplish most of their programmes 
satisfactorily–the very reason it is able to attract large amounts of funding from the 
donors. 
 
KCCC however faces challenges like other NGOs in Uganda.  It is an organization whose 
activities are aimed at alleviating the conditions of sick people.  This is not only expensive 
but also stressful.  “Giving care to people whose lives have been crippled by HIV/Aids is 
frustrating especially when their conditions fail to improve.”934  This was even worse before 
ARVs (AIDS treatment) became more available.  The situation, however, has improved with 
free ARVs provided by PEPFAR.  Even then, there are not ARVs to administer on every 
patient.  At the same time, most of HIV/Aids patients treated at KCCC clinics are very poor 
and can not afford nutritional meals.  KCCC is providing food to them and their families.  
This too, is expensive.  It has been made possible by donors.  A combination of ARV 
treatment and reasonable diet has helped many HIV/Aids patients regain normal lives. 
 
Ordinarily KCCC would have expected the local communities to contribute to the sustenance 
of their programmes.  This has not been forthcoming because most of the people in the areas 
where KCCC provides services are too poor to do so.  Some donors also insist that KCCCC 
demonstrates that the local communities have commitment and willingness to make 
contributions and to take over the programmes once the aid grants come to the end.  This 
shortcoming has, at times, discouraged some donors from giving grants to KCCC.  On the 
other hand, KCCC has used its large team of volunteers to demonstrate to the donors that 
these members of the community are giving selfless support to the implementation and 
success of the programmes.   The volunteers are the main reason that KCCC continues to 
attract large donor funding. 
 
In terms of human resource management and motivation, KCCC employs a small skeleton 
staff of fifteen people who oversee the implementation of its programmes.  These workers are 
                                            
934 Mr. Peter Kayiira Byansi  
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over-stretched and over-worked.  Yet, the pay at KCCC is relatively small compared to other 
NGOs with similar tasks.935  
 
The managers of KCCC argue that KCCC is a good service provider.  Their argument is 
based on the large clientele they take care of.  For example, they cite the good quality of 
health care they provide which attracts a large clientele936.  This large number of clients over-
stretches the care givers as Peter Byansi puts it:   
“…..care givers are fatigued, they are torn between giving care and 
providing for their economic survival as individuals”.   
 
Most caregivers are volunteers, who get no pay for the services they render to KCCC clients.  
The KCCC managers argue that if it had not been for constraints of financial resources, the 
volunteers would have been given some allowances to enable them get along.  The problem, 
however, is that most donors are unwilling to accept proposals that seek to give allowances 
and staff salaries.  Presently, staff salaries are budgeted for under the item of administrative 
expenses.  In other ords, KCCC does not explicitly present requests for staff salaries to the 
donors, which could lead to their proposals being rejected. 
 
Motivation of staff and volunteers at KCCC comes from work itself.  Most of the volunteers 
are former and (some are still) beneficiaries of its services.  “Giving back” is the inner 
driving force that keeps more than 350 volunteers of KCCC going.  They have also been 
trained by the same organization in various approaches to care giving including:  counseling, 
catering, nursing, community health, social work etc.  In other words, most of the volunteers 
take personal pride in service to others in need.  On the part of the employees, KCCC 
encourages team work and achievement of results.  Management inculcates a spirit of love 
and care among the workers.  One of the employees asserted that: 
it is all about positively helping and changing people’s lives for the 
better….it is not about money.  How much money can buy life?937 
 
                                            
935 The KCCC managers declined to give the details of the salaries in their organisation. 
936 I observed a long que of clients waiting to be attended to at KCCC clinic at Kamwokya when I went there for 
interviews.  The managers estimate that 38,200 people are receiving health care from all KCCC clinics in 
Kampala.  This is in addition to 1536 children KCCC is looking after. 
937 Interview with the coordinator, field care givers. 
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Constraints and challenges faced by KCCC have been managed by a combination of varied 
approaches.  The greatest resource in this endeavour is the resilience of volunteers, who have 
forged partnerships with communities where KCCC services are provided.  Every operational 
area is divided into cells.  Each cell has a service committee.938  They discuss their priorities 
and needs, and make inputs in the programme activities of KCCC.  Besides, KCCC uses a 
transparent approach to accountability.  The budget for a service in a particular area (cell) is 
discussed with the members of the cell committee before implementation.  The beneficiaries 
of the service are given accountability manuals which they follow to ensure that 
implementation is done according to the guidelines in the manual.  Through this process, the 
community gets to own the services. 
 
At the level of the organization itself, KCCC uses rigorous accountability mechanisms.  
These include a finance committee that scrutinizes the activities to be funded. Management 
regularly reports to the same committee on the progress of planned activities and 
expenditures thereto.  The budget itself is not operational until it has been approved by the 
Board of Directors.  With these mechanisms in place, KCCC has attempted to act as an 
accountable organization both to its Board and the beneficiary communities. 
 
One area where improvements need to be made is the motivation of staff.  Some of the staff 
interviewed revealed a sense of resignation and perceived KCCC as “exploiting” them.  They 
are overworked and under paid.  Although most of those interviewed were unwilling to reveal 
their take home incomes, it could be discerned that their frustration was a result of comparing 
their salaries with colleagues in other NGOs.  NGO workers in Uganda are much better paid 
than other workers in the public sector, for example, the medical workers in government 
hospitals.  Asked if they would prefer to change and work in government departments, the 
key responses were two-fold:  that, there is lack of transparency in government institutions, 
for example, the lower level workers only received orders from above, which was not the 
case at KCCC.  The other key response was that though KCCC was not a well paying 
organization, it provided leadership which allowed the staff to get a sense of satisfaction from 
their achievements.  For instance, attending to a client consistently until his/her condition or 
                                            
938 These cells in most cases follow the local council structure.  Service committee members meet regularly to 
discuss issues affecting the service provisions in their area. 
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need improved.  This feeling of “ownership of results” has   been the greatest motivator of 
KCCC staff. 
 
Put together, KCCC is a relatively well managed NGO.  Its service provision though largely 
dependent on foreign funding has helped to save or sustain lives of many people in their dire 
need.  Its voluntary spirit and organisational base goes a long way in cutting costs of service 
provision, enhancing efficiency and delivering visible services that account for its attraction 
of large foreign funding. 
 
7.9 Assessment of NGO Service Provision in the Context of Decentralisation 
The case studies detailed in this chapter illustrate that in the poor or marginalized urban areas, 
the interventions by NGOs and CBOs have helped to address some of the problems of the 
vulnerable sections of the community.  The activities of the NGOs and CBOs either 
supplement the services of local governments or fill the vacuum in service provision.  As we 
have noted in some of the voluntary sector cases, the compelling reason for their involvement 
in service provision was occasioned by the paucity of the much needed services in the 
communities marginalized by state institutions before and after decentralisation.  In other 
cases, the voluntary sector sought to cooperate with local government structures to enhance 
service provision.  The extensive intervention of the voluntary sector is also a demonstration 
that decentralisation has not adequately addressed the needs of the communities in the 
marginalized areas of Kampala city.  For example, by the time Kampala City Council came 
up with the Solid Waste Ordinance, 2004, which sought to introduce private companies in the 
collection of garbage in the city, its logic was an admission on its part that it had failed to 
deliver on its mandate as a city authority.  Besides, KCC reasoned that, after all, CSOs acting 
as private collectors were already collecting garbage for a fee.   
 
In the case of KCCC, the driving force for its formation was the lack of concern by state 
institutions for people affected by poverty and HIV/AIDS problems.  It is important to note 
that for a place like Kamwokya with thousands of people, there is no single public clinic and 
other social services.939 What is even more interesting in terms of social service 
marginalisation in Kamwokya area is the  divide between social classes.  In Kamwokya I 
                                            
939 A new public school was under construction by the time of this study (2004-2005).  KCC was also upgrading 
Kamwokya – Kyebando road. 
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parish on the upper side where the rich live, the sewerage systems, piped water supply and 
tarmac roads exist and are regularly serviced.  Garbage is routinely collected by Kampala 
City Council.  In sharp contrast, Kamwokya II parish in the lower neighbourhood, where the 
poor live, such services are absent.  This area divide illustrates the failure of the official 
policies to provide equity and social justice to all members of society.  There is practically no 
social security system in Uganda. 
 
Thus, from a critical look at the marginalized area of Kampala city, the benefits of 
decentralisation have not sufficiently trickled down to the extent of a visible change in the 
communities living there.  As the document of a British government sponsored project code-
named City Community Challenge Fund (C3F) notes, Uganda’s improved political stability 
and economic growth have led to drastic rural-urban migration and urban growth, especially 
in Kampala where facilities, originally designed for 600,000 now cater for nearly one and a 
half million people.940  There is therefore increased pressure on Kampala’s city infrastructure, 
rampant poverty and unemployment, high crime rates and the ever increasing number of 
street children. 
 
The operational mechanism of the C3F project is similar to those of Concern Uganda.  The 
C3F is premised on empowerment of the communities and helping decentralisation to work.  
C3F principle is that, if projects are initiated by the communities themselves, the livelihoods 
of the poor can be improved.  Equally, C3F anticipated that, if the participatory model 
worked for the benefit of the community, the local governments could adopt it, and that 
would lead to their projects being more responsive to the needs and aspirations of the poor.941  
As the C3F project document puts it: 
It is recognized that the key to reducing urban poverty is the existence of 
good, responsive governance at the local level which, in turn, influences the 
efficient management of urban development and administration of services.  
It is therefore important that the local government process is democratic, 
accountable, participatory, transparent and embraces poor communities.942 
 
                                            
940 C3F is a project focused at poor urban communities, aimed at improvement of services, increasing the voice 
of the poor and providing credit.  It was initiated by the British Department of Foreign and International 
Development (DFID). 
941 Ibid. C3F.  See  www.c3f.org.uk. 
942 We did not independently evaluate the contribution of the C3F project during the course of this study.  See  
www.c3f.org.uk 
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The emphasis in the decentralisation policy in Uganda, is indeed, placed on the above tenets 
of good governance.  However, it is the practical aspects of those involved in the service 
delivery and the constraints of resources in local governments that have led to inadequacy of 
public services.  As a result, two modes seem to dominate the provision of public services, 
vis: involvement of the private sector and activities of CSOs service delivery. 
 
In Kampala City, KCC has virtually privatized the provision of almost every service – from 
toilet cleaning, road sweeping, garbage collection, collection of revenue etc.  The rationale 
for the privatisation of service delivery has always been emphasized as increasing efficiency 
and effectiveness in services.  This has tended to mean that only those people with financial 
means, especially the better-off in society consume the services.  The negative implications 
of privatisation, such as relegating the poor are rarely highlighted.  For example, the 
management of KIHCWA, the CSO which used to collect garbage in Kisenyi III argued that 
the KCC contractors of garbage collection, Nabagabo Updeal Company,was neither efficient 
nor pro-poor.  Nabugabo Updeal collects garbage from homes of local residents at a fee of 
Shs.500 per small bag.  If it is bigger, the household will pay Shs.1,000 per bag.  In areas 
occupied by the poorest of the poor like Kisenyi III, Shs.500 or Shs.1,000 is “big” money.943   
Besides, Nabugabo Updeal Company, in bid to increase its clientele and to make more 
money, removed garbage skips from the road side where residents used to dump their solid 
waste.  The result is that the poor people, who probably want to avoid paying for garbage 
collection, simply dump it in the drains, especially at night.  The drains get blocked.  
According to KICHWA members, whereas KCC had promised that the contracting   
company for garbage collection would desit the drains as well, Nabugabo Updeal is not doing 
so.  The environment around Kisenyi III has again degenerated.944  At the same time, KCC is 
blamed for giving monopoly for garbage collection to one large company in both Central 
Division (to Nabugabo Updeal Company) and in Kawempe (to NOREMA).  According to 
KICHWA officials, these monopolies lead to increase in poverty.  This is because the smaller 
garbage collectors such as KICHWA members were getting some income from the 
“business” of garbage collection were edged out.  Moreover, they as CSOs were providing 
community services such as desilting drains, health education and bush clearance, free of 
                                            
943 KICHWA was collecting a bag of garbage from each household for Shs.200.  Shs.1,000 is equivalent of 
US$0.5.  However, though appears as little money, for the vast population in Kisenyi most of whom have no 
employment, many household live on less than one US dollar a day. 
944 We observed this during our study visit there. 
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charge.  They argue that such free services had reduced incidences of malaria, water-borne 
diseases and deadly cholera.945  KICHWA had also helped to plant four stand water pipes 
with the financial assistance of Concern Uganda, and had lobbied KCC authorities which had 
also installed two stand water pipes in the area.  This was intended to improve the availability 
of clean and safe water to the residents.  The argument then is that, by KCC relegating CSOs 
like KICHWA and KACHEPA and preferring the services of environmental health to 
companies that are ‘detached’ from the community946 and whose primary motive is to make 
profit, KCC was accelerating the increase of poverty and negating the role of community 
based actors in the affairs of their own community.  The broad issue here therefore, is the 
contestation between privatisation of service provision by KCC and the perception among the 
CSOs that the privatisation drive is “hurting” the interests of the communities that are 
supposed to be intended beneficiaries of the services.  There is the misplaced belief that 
privatisation delivers services better than public bodies.  The evidence, however, indicates 
that private providers are more profit-driven than service delivery per excellence.  This also 
puts to question the mode of privatisation that is opted for by government institutions.  The 
argument is that the logic of privatisation does include participation of the community stake-
holders, does not spread out the benefits to the beneficiary members of the community, and 
only concentrates and ends up serving a few vested interests.  This argument is reinforced, 
among other things, by the fact that when KCC, for instance, in soliciting and vetting 
companies to do certain tasks on its behalf, it rarely consults the local communities or even, 
their leaders.947  This, in effect, hollows the whole idea of popular participation that is more 
“preached” than done. 
 
Accountability in service provision by CSOs can be understood at three levels.  The first one 
is that they are institutional responses in area where both the state and the market have not 
had an adequate impact in addressing the problem afflicting people’s lives.  This is seen in 
                                            
945 It was reported that KICHWA members that since the inception of their activities, the last cholera cases 
occurred in 1998. 
946 One of the big companies, Engineers Investments, hired by KCC failed to collect garbage for a fee in 
Kampala Division because the local residents did not understand why they had to pay for a service that KCC 
authorities were supposed to do as part of their statutory duty.  A new company called Norema was later hired.  
To get the Kawempe residents to pay for solid waste collection, Norema had to organize community 
sensitization seminars and to solicit the support of the resident in this venture. 
947 Cf. Uganda Debt Network (2003), Monitoring the use of the school facilities Grants for Primary Schools. 
The guidelines for local government’s projects e.g. schools, require that the communities monitor 
implementation of projects. 
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terms of state failure and market imperfections.  The second level is to see CSOs’ 
interventions as enhancing the capabilities of the communities to be able to address their 
needs.  The third level is the partnership between the CSOs and the state institutions in 
provision of services.  In all the three perspectives, CSOs aim at empowering communities in 
one way of another.  This makes it possible for the communities to get engaged and to take 
keen interest in the form and the processes through which a service is provided, or even the 
question the concerned organizations, as to why they are not receiving a service.  This may 
engender harmony but it may also cause conflicts948 between the CSO and the state actors.  
Although some observers hail Uganda as a “success story” in utilizing aid for reducing 
poverty and human development, and conclude that Uganda provides an excellent example to 
show that aid can work, the cases we have discussed in these pages indicate that this is an 
over-generalisation.  Cases of CSOs reviewed, clearly indicate that they largely depend on 
foreign funding, and are generally weak.  Moreover, except in isolated cases have CSOs 
empowered local communities to demand accountability from state institutions. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
948 Senin Abdulla, “Do Aid Projects Make a Difference?” www.open 2. net/making a difference/non-gov.org.  
Also Tomothy Shaw, “Uganda as an African” Developmental state: Projects for human Development/Security 
at the turn of the Millenium” www.shef.ac.uk/uni/academic/N-Q/perc/dev. 
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Chapter 8 
 
Analysis and Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I reflect upon and review the issues that have been at the centre of the debate 
in this thesis. The key research question in this dissertation is whether or not decentralisation 
promotes good governance in urban management processes.  Concomitant to this, are issues 
of prudent urban management, democratic decision making and participation and the 
contribution of civil society to the sustainability of urban service delivery mechanisms. The 
leading question is: does decentralisation lead to good governance, development and efficient 
and effective service delivery?  And to what extent has decentralisation helped in the process 
of rebuilding state capacities for delivery of public services? 
 
The conceptual underpinning of this study is based on the assumption that decentralisation is 
considered part of the processes of rebuilding state capacities and public sector reforms in 
Africa since 1980s.  It is part of a deliberate effort to make local institutions work for the 
people.  Amidst the extreme casualties of the poor economic performance, social disorders 
and political turmoil that characterized most African countries in the 1970s and 1980s, public 
sector reforms were considered and implemented as part of the institutional reform, 
undertaken by the donor community and the national governments. Such policies included:  
structural adjustment programmes, economic liberalization and deregulation of trade, 
divestiture of public enterprises, liberalised monetary regimes, civil service reforms and state 
decentralisation.  Decentralisation was conceived as a deliberate policy, intended to 
decongest the centre, reduce bureaucratic delays, increase local participation in and 
implementation of programmes, increase mobilization of local resources for development, 
enhance efficient and effective utilization of resources for development, encourage popular 
accountability and transparency in decision making, hence accelerated development.  Further, 
decentralisation was seen to deliver both democratic decisions in political terms and 
efficiency in managerial perspective.  In decentralisation, political decisions and managerial 
actions are seen as two sides of the same coin. 
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In this thesis an attempt was made to relate the above themes with the empirical realities on 
the ground, through the case study of Kampala.  This chapter interprets and puts in 
perspective, the issues that emerged from the study.  Understandably, this necessitates going 
back to the research objectives – the political, managerial and partnerships in service 
delivery. 
 
8.1. Assessing the Political Objectives of Decentralisation  
Without much doubt, decentralisation is a political process.  The form, the course and 
outcomes of decentralisation are dependent on the design of decentralisation Different states 
adopt various models to achieve their desired political objectives.  For example, the Chinese 
use “democratic centralism” which emphasises integration of local government functions 
through a process that allows the central state to dominate decision making at the local level.  
On the other hand, the British and French models emphasise the “dual supervision of local 
governance”949 - which allows the local leaders a significant voice in local matters but 
obliges the central government to provide the services.  There is a strong element of central 
control.  In the North American model, local governments are created by the States through 
their legislatures.  The over-arching principle is to allow local governments exercise “home 
rule” in their specific areas of responsibility.  There is a wide range of variations in local 
governance in the less developed countries (Mawhood 1993, Cameron 2002). 
 
Inspite of the variations in models of local governance, the overriding principle is that local 
governance should be democratic – with clearly defined jurisdictional mandates.  Most 
important, this is pre-eminent in terms of democratic elections at the local level, that is; 
popular representation as well as a significant control of locally raised resources and 
spending powers. This is generally conceived on the principle of subsidiarity (down-up 
system of decision making).  Local participation is meaningless if local councils have no 
financial means of translating decisions into services. In Uganda’s case of local governance, 
the political process leading to decentralisation was guided by populism of the ruling party, 
the NRM, the international donor framework of funding government programmes and the 
ideology of the NRM of appearing to be pro-people.  In short, at the inception, in the late 
                                            
949 Anwar Shah (1986) “A comparative Institutional Framework for Responsive,  Responsible and Accountable 
local Governance” in Anwar Shah (ed). Local Governance in Industrial Countries p.25 
  ibid, p 25 
 
  
414
1980s the political objective of the NRM was to secure local legitimacy and to fit in the 
donor framework of funding.  However, the implementation of the fully-fledged 
decentralisation clearly spelt out in the Constitution (1995) and the Local Government Act 
(1997) stressed the government’s commitment to new rules of the game, that is, specific 
mandates for local governments and financing of the responsibilities given to local 
governments. 
 
It is an imperative observation that although decentralisation was imposed from above, it was 
embraced at the local level.  First, the design was appropriate and well thought out to cater 
for local conditions.  Looking at the broad political objectives, one notices that 
decentralisation was designed to create responsible and responsive local governments.  
Sufficient political and administrative powers were devolved and sources of finance were 
spelt out. In other words, even if the ruling party hoped to gain electoral advantage in the 
process, this did not interfere with the need for a proper design of decentralisation.  Secondly, 
local officials (both appointed and elected) gained a sense of ownership of their policies and 
pride in seeing some locally designed programmes being implemented.  Many local conflicts 
were locally resolved, largely by consensus, except in cases where excitement and lack of 
experience bred unprincipled conflict.950  
 
Decentralisation in urban areas had effects as in the rural areas, for example; holding of 
village meetings, security meetings, resolving domestic disputes; dealing with local land 
matters and so on.  The main difference between the rural and the urban contexts of 
decentralisation is that, in urban areas, local residents tended to be very busy trying to meet 
their economic needs that they missed some of the village meetings.  However, decisions 
arrived at such meetings were binding on every resident, for example, payment of Shs.1,000 
per month by each household for village security is rigorously enforced by the LC officials.  
Thus, decisions arrived at by consensus at meetings created a forum for discussion of matters 
affecting the local residents.  The problem arising from poor attendance of meetings is that 
LC officials made very many decisions, purportedly in the interest of local residents.  In the 
process, some corrupt activities amongst the LC officials were reported, for example, they 
sign off land transactions at ten percent of the sale price.  These monies are never accounted 
                                            
950 See Sabiti Makara (1998) Political and Relations in Decentralisation “in Nsibambi A., Decentralisation and 
Civil Society in Uganda,” Kampala: Fountain Publishers 
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for.  In Makerere II Zone, the Chairperson we interviewed said such monies were used for 
building an office for the village LC.  However, there were no records of accountability for 
any monies the LCs collected, say, for signing passport forms, registering civil cases, fines 
and others.  A general impression held by residents of LC officials is that they are corrupt and 
self-serving.  Thus, while in the rural areas LC officials, especially the Chairperson tend to be 
respectable people or people of material wealth, to the contrary, in the urban areas, it is the 
under-employed who offer to serve on the LC Committee.  This social status has tended to 
undermine their credibility as leaders in urban areas. 
 
Local leadership has also faced other challenges.  One of such challenges is the local 
leadership of Parish Development Committee (PDCs).  PDCs at LCII are not catered for in 
the statutory arrangements of LCs because the basic planning authority at the lower level is 
LC1 (village), LCIII (Sub-county) and then (LCV), the district.  Hence, PDCs created in the 
wake of the World Bank – sponsored Local Government Development Programme (LGDP) 
that supports local development/investment projects have no statutory powers.  These are 
elected from amongst notable citizens in a parish.  In some cases they are hand-picked by the 
Parish Executives Committee.  The PDCs are charged with planning and over-seeing 
investment projects in the parish.  All LGDP supported projects require that the PDC 
concerned, mobilises local residents to contribute ten percent (10%) of the cost of the 
investment.  It was revealed that PDC officials connive with prospective contracting 
companies that vie to executive such projects – the company concerned pays the 10 percent 
to the PDCs which they use to secure funding from the District.  Once the money is released, 
the PDCs who are the supervisors of the investment, cream off certain proportions of he 
money for themselves.  In turn, the contractor does small or shoddy work which is 
“approved” by PDCs.  The complexity with this, is that PDCs are not directly accountable to 
the people, both technically and politically. Projects implemented by PDCs have only had 
limited direct positive impact on the lives of the ordinary urban dwellers.  
 
8.2 Good Governance and Service Delivery 
In countries which have experimented with institutional reforms, there is great anticipation 
that such reforms will produce conditions suitable for good governance (S. Kayizzi-
Mugerwa, (2002).  In particular, decentralisation policies combine administrative, political 
and socio-economic tenets which make it possible for the ordinary citizens to manage their 
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affairs as effectively as possible at the local level.  In the urban setting, decentralised 
governance was intended to address issues related to service delivery, greater community 
participation, creation of user-friendly policies, greater accountability and transparency in the 
financial management and service delivery. 
 
The challenges encountered in urban service delivery range from failed state institutions, 
poor service delivery, demotivated local government officials, corruption and inefficiency as 
well as lack of resources to execute policies.  The main problem is lack of policies that are 
pro-poor, that significantly reduce poverty and address social maladjustment.  Whereas 
several attempts have been made to create a more efficient and effective organization, aiming 
to improve services on a sustained basis, the results have not been encouraging. The people 
lost confidence in the formal institutions.  Instead, ordinary people created their own service 
institutions such as Parents-Teachers Associations (PTAs) in the management of schools. 
(Passi, (1995).  PTAs supplemented the meager salaries of teachers and erected new 
buildings.  When government medical services failed, the people resorted either to local 
herbalists or private medical practitioners.  Although the economic reforms and decentralized 
service delivery undertaken in the 1990s may have attempted to revamp service delivery, this 
has not reached satisfactory levels.  For example, in Kampala city only 10 percent of primary 
school education is provided by the State.  The rest is in the hands of the private sector or 
religious organizations.  The situation is worse in the health sector.  Although KCC maintains 
health centres in each of its five Divisions, these hardly receive medical supplies.  Our 
findings revealed that at these clinics, the main activity of the nurses is to carry out 
immunization of children against diseases such as TB, polio, and other preventable diseases.  
In any case, this is a programme sponsored by the Central Government.  In Kampala, it is 
difficult to see a significant contribution of KCC to the medical services. 
 
Most respondents interviewed during the study argued that the failure of KCC to provide 
services was associated with lack of good governance, which is associated with the 
prevalence of rampant corruption.  Although the decentralisation policy has put in place 
measures to control corruption by ensuring that most of the decisions are arrived at through 
committees, this has not changed the popular view that KCC is largely a corrupt institution. 
Respondents asserted that it is difficult to get any KCC official to do anything for a client 
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without the latter parting with some form of inducement. To a large extent this is raised as the 
reason why many people embark on erecting illegal structures in most parts of the city. It is 
argued by the respondents that prospective small property developers dodge the process of 
getting building plans approved by KCC authorities because it could sometimes cost (in 
illegal payments) as much as the cost of constructing the house itself.  In short, corruption has 
been a hindrance to the development process in Kampala. 
 
The major limitations of the policy of decentralisation in Kampala included the land tenure in 
the city which is skewed in favour of individual landlords who are neither investing in its 
development nor willing to sell it to other developers.  The result is that most of Kampala city 
is a sprawling slum.  Land tenure systems have made urban planning very difficult in 
Kampala.  Moreover, this study also found that the planning function of the city was ruins.   
Most of the tools and resources needed for planning were barely in place.  This is even made 
worse by the fact that there is alarming scarcity of qualified urban planners.  Those available 
prefer to work for private firms rather than government. 
 
In technical, administrative and political senses, urban governance has remained problematic 
in Uganda, even in the era of decentralisation.  It is difficult to talk of good governance in 
Kampala city.  It is filthy, unplanned, mismanaged and unable to deliver effective and 
efficient services. It appears that Kampala has failed to overcome Uganda’s socio-economic 
and political collapse of institutions and social order, which negatively affected the capacities 
of state institutions to deliver public services. 
 
8.3 The Challenges of Fiscal Decentralisation 
This is the most controversial aspect of decentralisation. Premised on assumption that 
decentralisation increases availability of resources to local projects, empowers local 
communities to control, own and direct projects at local level, in Kampala this assumption is 
only partially true.  A comparative overview of the situation before and after decentralisation 
indicates that more financial resources are now available to Uganda’s local governments as a 
result of decentralisation.  Up to 36 percent of national financial resources today is devolved 
to the local governments.  The bulk of the money is collected by central government and 
allocated to local governments in form of grants.  Although the grants have availed more 
resources to local councils, most of the grants leave little or no room for discretionary 
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spending of the local councils.  It has therefore been observed by the local councilors that the 
government has used its grant system to control their activities at the local level.  This is 
perceived as undermining local autonomy and weakening the very essence of 
decentralisation.   
 
Fiscal decentralisation, considered the main cornerstone of decentralisation has further been 
weakened by the marginal tax base of local councils.  As I have discussed in this thesis, the 
local governments depended on direct taxes. However, the main direct tax-personal graduated 
tax was scrapped by the government in 2005.  This was after all, long overdue.  This 
particular tax had always been difficult and very expensive to collect.951  The scrapping of 
this tax, however, left local governments with a very small tax base.  Many local projects 
have stalled. 
 
The main problem with local government finances, however, is not the amount available to 
local councils; it is the failure of effective use of money available to them.  For example, 
Kampala City Council collects revenue amounting to Shs.22 billion, which is more than half 
of what all local governments in Uganda collect.  However, KCC is perennially indebted and 
unable to provide meaningful services.  During the course of this study it was revealed that 
the bulk of the money raised in KCC is spent on administrative activities rather than activities 
aimed at improving the provision of services.  While the general assumption in 
decentralisation is that the elected political leaders would be mindful of services to their 
constituencies, the evidence gathered for this study in Kampala indicates that to the contrary, 
politicians (councilors) are deeply concerned with serving their personal interests.  This has 
weakened their will to act as watch-dogs of people’s interests, to check the excesses of the 
local bureaucratic officials.  Because the commitment of the bureaucratic and political 
officials to service delivery is half-hearted, the willingness of he ordinary tax payer to pay 
his/her levies to KCC is less than expected.  Most respondents argued that taxes paid to KCC 
amounted to a total loss since the benefits were hard to come by.  While some scholars have 
argued that periodic election of local officials increased opportunities for citizens at the local 
                                            
951 A new local tax to replace personal graduated tax has been proposed in the 2007 budget.  It is known as 
Local Service Tax.  It is yet to be implemented, cf. Ian Livingstone and Charlton (1998) “Raising Local 
authority district revenue through direct taxation in a low developing country: Evaluating Uganda’s GPT.”  
Public Administration and Development Vol. 18, Issue 5. 
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to decide “persons whom they think can serve their interests on local councils,”952  evidence 
gathered during this study reveals that this assumption needs to be re-visited.  For KCC 
councilors, the talk does not match the deeds.  Instead of romanticizing the political benefits 
of decentralisation in re-shaping local governments, especially KCC, it appears prudent to 
take a note from Akin Mabogunje’s  observation on the management of African cities when 
he asserts, “well known problems now confront us in new and bewildering guises.”953  My 
study has confirmed that political representation in KCC appears to be more of symbolic 
value than social value to the ordinary citizen.  
 
8.4. A Critical Assessment of the Alternative Service Delivery Mechanism 
More than any other local government in Uganda, KCC attempted to improvise a system of 
alternative service delivery mechanisms (ASDM), which was discussed at length in this 
thesis.  Borne out of internal realization by KCC management that the state of service 
delivery fell far below normal expectation, and that the image of KCC among the Kampala 
people was negative, ASDM was conceived to rekindle people’s hopes in its organisation.  
This internal perspective was reinforced by the external funders, especially the World Bank. 
 
Alternative service delivery has registered some positive as well as negative outcomes. Some 
of the key positive  indicators included: the ability of KCC management to restructure its 
organisation, ability to increase locally generated revenue, restoring people’s confidence in 
the organisation of KCC; restoration of its planning function; streamlining the financial 
management function (e.g. installing a computerized financial management system); re-
valuation of properties for purposes of taxation; drawing of the Kampala master-plan; 
rehabilitation of city markets; and generally  putting a new sense of management in the city.  
In terms of actual service delivery, some major infrastructural works have been undertaken, 
notably the rehabilitation of the Nakivubo Channel at a cost of Shs.23 billion, aimed at 
controlling floods in the city funded by the World Bank.  The fact that KCC is now credible 
enough to borrow such huge amounts of money indicates a return of confidence in its 
organisation. 
                                            
952 See Onyach-Olaa, M.  “The challenges of implementing decentralisation: recent experiences in Uganda” in 
Public Administration and Development vol.23 Issue 1, 2003, p.105 
953 Akin Mabogunje, “Overview of Research Priorities in Africa” in Richard Stren (1994) Urban Research in the 
Developing World (Vol.2), University of Toronto. 
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Despite the positive outcomes of ASDM in KCC, there have been persistent concerns 
amongst the Kampala residents that KCC is not doing enough to provide the much-needed 
services.  To many Kampala residents, the benefits of ASDM appear not to be visible.  The 
ever permanent sight of uncollected and rotting garbage littered all-over the city, makes it an 
uphill task for any official to convince Kampala residents that anything significant in policy 
terms has changed in KCC.  Moreover, ASDM came with a package of cost-sharing, between 
KCC and Kampala residents.  This requires every household to contribute a monthly fee 
towards collection of garbage.  The ever present question asked by many residents is: “what 
does property rate tax do?”  The residents answer their own question with another, by saying: 
“the very reason why KCC collects property tax is because it is a service tax for one’s 
property.  So, what purpose is it for now?”   On its part KCC argues that urban residents need 
to share in the rising cost of running services.  This would probably not have been a problem 
if the private companies providing services had been more efficient than KCC. Through 
documentation and observation, it was noted by this researcher that only one-third of the 
garbage in Kampala is actually collected by KCC.  While this pathetic situation persists, the 
study also revealed that the bulk of the money collected by KCC is actually not only 
squandered but sometimes stolen by KCC officials.954 
 
Lack of proper and transparent management of funds in local governments has created a 
popular opinion amongst residents that through the devolution of powers, the government 
“decentralized corruption.” This opinion is borne of a popular view that officials of the 
central government are generally perceived as corrupt, hence, the practice has spread to local 
governments as well.  These perceptions are not far-fetched.  The evidence gathered during 
this study showed that some KCC officials connive with suppliers of goods and services to 
the council to cut a difference for themselves.  Many respondents interviewed during the 
study strongly asserted that the poor service delivery in the city is largely a result of the 
connivance between KCC officials and suppliers in the process of attempting to provide 
certain services such as road works, drainage works and even garbage collection.  The private 
provision of public service by agents contracted by KCC had in many cases done shoddy 
                                            
954 In January 2006, Shs.3,253,012,886 (equivalent to US$21 million) disappeared mysteriously from KCC 
accounts in the banks.  The money was drawn on cheques properly signed by senior KCC officials.  They were 
subsequently suspended and are facing charges of fraud in the courts of law. 
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work.  It was also noted by many residents that they were dissatisfied with the private 
providers of services contracted by KCC, for example the unhygienic manner in which 
companies contracted to collect garbage carry it through the city.  Unlike KCC which owns 
custom-built trucks to ferry garbage, the private contractors carry garbage in open trucks, 
littering roads and releasing a terrible stench to the people along the way. 
 
While KCC innovated by adopting the ASDM mechanism, there were no adequate 
preparations put in place to supervise the contractors of services.  KCC officials complained 
that lack of effective supervision of contracts has frustrated both the officials involved in 
service delivery as well as the citizens, who are supposed to benefit.  Most KCC officials 
concede that the state of service delivery falls far below people’s expectations.  This is partly 
blamed on lack of guidelines to service providers and the supervisors.  There are simply no 
set standards for service delivery.  This makes it difficult to pin down the contractors on their 
failure to properly execute contracts.  Cases of road works signed off as completed work and 
paid for, and immediately thereafter, washed off by rain water have been numerous.  This 
shameful state of affairs has left KCC officials defenceless.  If it is not a case of connivance, 
and corruption, it is a case of neglect of work.  However, not a single case of KCC official 
was reported as disciplined for any of these offences in recent years.  Although it was 
difficult to establish empirically, it was deduced by this researcher, through observation that 
poor service delivery in KCC was systemic, that is; most officials connected to a particular 
contract demanded to be “tipped” before a contract was awarded.  Thus, while the design of 
ASDM was well conceived, intended to improve service delivery; its outcomes have been 
frustrated by the vested interests of KCC officials, both elected and appointed.  
 
8.5   Public-Private Partnerships:  A case of reinventing the wheel? 
The theoretical underpinnings of decentralisation give a strong priority to effective and 
efficient mechanisms of bringing private providers in the arena of provision of public 
services. It is assumed that such arrangements create room for efficient and effective service 
delivery, apart from breaking the monopoly possessed by the bureaucratic organisations of 
government.  Hence the public-private partnerships are conceived as a gateway to better 
citizens’ preferences, value for money and reduction of transaction costs.  But more broadly, 
the invitation of the private sector to participate in provision of public services is premised on 
the perceived multiplier effect it is envisaged to bring to the local economy, whereby local 
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entrepreneurs benefit in the process of producing a service – helping several members of the 
community to gain directly or indirectly.  This approach has been attempted in Kampala.  
However, deriving from the findings of this study, it was revealed that advantages from this 
method of service delivery I have not been apparent.  Instead, Kampala residents perceive 
contracting-out as part of the local |pork-barrel politics” 
 
As this thesis has demonstrated, the wish by KCC to realize efficiency benefits through 
competitive bidding (using its tender board) and parceling out contracts to private companies 
only brought short-term benefits.  Data presented in this thesis shows that here was a great 
momentum in this direction in the mid-1990s which increased the financial resources to the 
KCC Treasury   However, these initiatives seem to have reached a dead end.  This is partly 
because of three principal reasons:  lack of official commitment, failure to follow a “rule-
book”955 and lack of reputation of the bidding companies.  It has been argued by experts956 
that when any of these principles is neglected, the bid-giver, the local government in this 
case; is likely to suffer the adverse consequences of contracting out.  In this thesis, it has been 
demonstrated that most of the service contracts awarded by KCC have been mismanaged. 
This has happened at two levels: first, it has been shown that KCC officials lack commitment 
in supervising contracts, second, there are no clear rules regulating operations for contract 
winners, and third, the KCC has more often than not, failed to keep its part of the contract 
(e.g. laying basic infrastructure) to allow the bidders operate smoothly. In turn, these factors 
have helped the bidders to default on their parts of the contract.  Evidence has been given in 
this thesis that confirms the several cases where contractors have defaulted. For example, by 
March 2007, UTODA owed KCC Shs.2.5 billion in contract arrears. 
 
While the drive towards public-private partnerships has produced mixed results in KCC, for 
example, increasing the revenue for the Council, there are serious concerns that have been 
overlooked.  First, KCC has, by and large, gone beyond the initial design of public-private 
partnership and embraced full scale privatisation.  For example the city markets which had 
been rehabilitated in the 1990s with a World Bank loan with the objective of creating 
employment and sustainable livelihoods for the urban poor have been sold to private 
                                            
955 See Andrew B. Whitford “Designing Markets: Why competitive Bidding and Auctions in Government Often 
Fail to Deliver”  The Policy Studies Journal Vol. 35, No.1 2007 
956 ibid. 
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developers.  For the NRM government and KCC which claim that their policy goals are 
geared towards poverty reduction, the sale of markets is a clear negation of such a policy.  
Secondly, the sale of lands and markets by KCC defeats the principles of transparency and 
good governance.  Not only are such sales shrouded in some shoddy deals, they are never 
advertised or subjected to competitive bidding.  This study established that the sales of lands, 
markets and other assets by KCC to private developers in most cases did not follow 
procedures established by the District Tender Board (DTB). At times the DTB was sidelined, 
proper valuation of such properties was not done, and the interests of the sitting tenants were 
ignored in such transactions.  The Public Procurement and Disposal of Assets law was more 
often than not totally ignored by KCC.  Sitting tenants under the law are supposed to be given 
first priority whenever a process of re-development of public assets is to be undertaken.  
However, vested interests in KCC (both local politicians and civil servants) are reported to 
have connived with rich private developers to marginalize the bonafide tenants in such sales. 
Newspapers have been awash with stories connecting big shots in Central Government and 
KCC in conspiracy to allocate strategic pieces of land, including city markets to private 
businessmen leaving thousands of market vendors unemployed. For example the Minister of 
Local Government, Kahinda-Otafiire addressing KCC emphasized: 
These markets must be developed.  I can’t make an apology and I will not 
preside over structures where tomatoes are sold on the ground.  How do 
you blame Otafiire for developing markets?  That’s my job.  Would I be a 
Minister for rearing goats?957 
 
This was a direct defiance of President Museveni’s directive to the same Minister contained 
in his April 19, 2007 letter that read in part thus, 
I am writing to direct you to stop a practice of Local Governments 
selling markets to private individuals.  What are you looking for in 
privatizing markets where thousands of poor people are working?  How 
can NRM be involved in such a type of feudalism?958 
 
The President’s letter to the Minister of Local Governments followed the latter’s clear stance 
of fronting for a businessman (Hassan Basajjabalaba) to buy the central market of Nakasero 
where 2500 vendors work for a living. 
 
                                            
957 See  the Daily Monitor 2 July 2007, p.7 
958 Ibid, p.7 
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Besides, the dubious interests of local and central government’s officials, it is KCC which has 
failed the development of the city.  Not only has KCC been allocating plots without a clear 
re-development plan, stakeholders such as the Town and County Planning Board have not 
been consulted in such matters. There have been serious concerns over KCC’s bid to sell 
whatever green area exists in the city.  Many newspaper articles and people interviewed for 
this study suggested that KCC officials were engaged in corrupt deals involving sale of land.  
Although the government, including President Museveni has intervened, it has not succeeded 
in convincing KCC from engaging in “primitive privatisation” of the city.  Thus, despite the 
theoretical argument that public-private partnerships and piece-meal divestiture of non-core 
assets by state institutions increases efficiency in allocation of resources,959 this has not been 
the primary motive of KCC, where private interest have undermined public interest.  This 
study found little correlation between privatisation in KCC and efficient public management. 
 
 8.6 Civil Society – Local Government Relations 
One of the fundamental changes that have occurred in the local governance of urban areas is 
the increasing participation of civil society organizations.  During the colonial and the 
immediate post-colonial period, this was not the case.  Local administration as it was known 
then, was more of a formal structure and process of government business at the local level.  
The idea of society-based organizations having an active role in the matters concerning 
government business was not even contemplated.  However, at that time, the people looked to 
the government to serve them, and in many cases there was a reasonable degree of 
government services.  This encouraged the ordinary people to make voluntary contribution to 
public works, for example in Uganda – this was known as bulungi bwansi  (for the good of 
the nation), where every able-bodied male person would voluntarily participate in 
maintenance of public works at the local level. 
 
In today’s local governance, it is almost impossible to ignore the contribution and 
participation of civil society.  If they are not engaging the government, pressing for a 
particular course of action, they are collaborating to change the status quo. During the course 
of this study, it was revealed that civil society organizations had made significant 
                                            
959 Cf.  Elizabeth Benret, Peter Grohmann and Brad Gentry “Public – Private Partnerships for the Urban 
Environment:  Options and Issues” PPPUE Working Paper Series Vol. 1 UNDP/Yale University, New York 
199. 
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contribution to the welfare of the urban communities, including paying for some drugs in the 
city clinics – for example the African Medical Research Foundation (AMREF) was 
purchasing drugs for KCC Clinics.  Local NGOs, for example, Kamwokya Community 
Caring Centre (KCCC), with significant foreign funding (in billions of Shillings) was 
providing an extensive programme of care for the socially-disadvantaged, as well as 
AIDS/HIV patients. 
 
It was noted during the study that the involvement of CSOs in local government came with 
the some advantages. Where partnerships between local governments and NGOs succeeded, 
there was improved service delivery and reduction in the cost of providing the service, for 
example KCC and Concern Uganda. Equally, people’s participation in the planning and 
implementation of project activities improved as a result of seeing real benefits of their 
involvement. Where communities were very active, the NGOs were more willing to put more 
resources, hence an increase in the welfare and well-being of the beneficiaries. Local 
initiatives prospered more where the communities had more committed leaders than where 
they were not. 
 
While the contribution of CSOs has helped in reshaping and re-defining governance at the 
local level, issues were raised by the respondents about the unpredictability of CSOs.  NGOs 
especially the foreign ones had specific agenda which was resource-fixed and time-bound.  If 
they supported an initiative for say, five years, no matter whether the project succeeded or 
not, they would wind it up, if that was life-span of their funding.  This ended up frustrating 
the ordinary beneficiaries. Local sustainability of foreign-funded projects proved to be very 
problematic because of their design, targeting foreign resources.  The local momentum was 
lost on the way.  Most local beneficiaries’ direct contribution in the financial terms was 
marginal. Local NGOs tended to be over-dependent on foreign funds. 
 
The most debilitating effect of foreign-funded local NGOs is that they tended to be 
complacent when it came to engaging the local authorities to do their statutory duties and 
responsibilities or to ensure accountability. During the course of the study, I found little 
engagement between the NGOs and KCC on such critical issues.  Instead, the NGOs were 
“busy” implementing their programmes. But also, within themselves, there was a problem of 
popular accountability. Evidence that local-foreign-funded NGOs were accountable to their 
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membership was not easily obtainable.  Moreover, like it was the case at the national level, 
most NGOs sought to cooperate with local governments in the process of implementing their 
programmes. While there was some evidence of improved and accountable local leadership at 
the local level as a result of interventions by NGOs, for example, in areas covered by 
Concern Uganda, it could not be established whether this continued to be the practices at the 
end of the project cycle. Although imparting good leadership was one of the core objectives 
of the programme of Concern Uganda, there was no post-project analysis of such impact.  
Besides, the concept of good local leadership as understood by the NGOs, especially Concern 
Uganda, tended to be narrow.  It took the perspective of local leaders who participated and 
were active in the grassroots programmes. The concept of good leadership did not include 
other qualities such as confronting KCC to account or to bring serves to the people. Failure to 
press KCC to account implied that the NGOs were supporting and sponsoring a weak and 
complacent leadership that was not able to transform the governance of the city.  For 
example, in the many struggles the market vendors have waged against their eviction and sale 
of markets by KCC in the period 2004 – 2007, the local council leadership at all levels has 
not spearheaded any, in the interest of the affected people.  Being part of a struggle against 
injustice and unfair treatment of sections of the population is and should be part of the 
leadership needed to bring about transformative government in the state-society relations.  
This quality of leadership is still lacking in Uganda’s local governance.   
 
8.7   Conclusion 
This thesis has demonstrated that decentralisation as a key element of the governance reforms 
in Uganda has instituted a number of positive changes in the management of public affairs 
both at the centre and the local level.  The most notable change in this process has been the 
returning of a system of elected councils. This has replaced the nomination or outright 
appointment of councillors.  Thus, despite the weaknesses of the new local council system 
discussed in this thesis, still some elements of democratic rule are inherent in an elected 
system.  Besides, the Constitution and other laws have proclaimed decentralisation as a pillar 
of the whole governmental process.  This is clearly evident in terms of financial 
commitments of government to the local governments.  Although these commitments have 
fluctuated over time, the principle of non-subordination of local governments still holds as a 
constitutional obligation and as a governmental principle. These commitments are the 
linchpins of the decentralisation programme. 
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The rooting of decentralisation has transformed local governance norms in fundamental ways 
– the ordinary people today look to the local governments to deliver services rather than 
waiting for the distant centre. This process has been helped the vigorous participation of local 
and international civil society organisations in providing services and engaging the state 
institutions at the local level to account to the people. 
 
The thesis has discussed and demonstrated that despite the existence of elaborate regulations, 
rules and procedures put in place by both the government and the local governments, 
transparency, accountability and efficient delivery of services have continued to dog the 
operations of local governments in Uganda.  However, it would be misleading to rubbish the 
modest gains made in governance as a result of decentralisation.  The watchful eye of the 
office of the Inspector General of Government and the Local Government Accounts 
Committee of Parliament have pressed local officials on accountability.  However, the local 
watch-dog – the District Accounts Committees have been disappointing.  It is not easy to find 
evidence of their impact on enforcing accountability. As a result, fictitious supplies, over-
invoicing, shoddy infrastructural works and other fishy deals have been paid for, eroding the 
concept of value-for-money; cherished in the decentralisation programme. 
 
Given this over-arching failure of decentralisation to address the critical governance issues of 
society, the urban crisis in Uganda has deepened. It has moved from the managerial and 
political crises of the 1970s and 1980s to a new stage where patronage politics, pervasive 
privatisation of the public realm, alienation of local stakeholders and “self-serving” politics 
have taken a centre stage.  The urban governance crisis appears to be a replica of the national 
governance problematique couched in psendo one-party kind of politics, conveniently code-
named “Movement” politics. The Movement leadership was more interested in keeping the 
reigns of power than to allow full scale democratic governance at the grassroots. 
Consequently, the national leadership was not eager to tackle corruption both at national and 
local levels.   
 
While corruption is wide-spread in Uganda’s political and administrative structures, its 
intensity in Kampala City Council seems to have gone beyond imaginable limits.  
Decentralisation as a strategy for re-aligning urban politics and management has registered 
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dismal success in Uganda.  Kampala as the main urban centre in the country has exhibited 
qualities of elite domination, economic exploitation of the masses of poor people, inadequacy 
of services and politics of marginalization. Clearly, this thesis found no significant correlation 
between good governance virtues of decentralisation and politics of empowerment – 
especially of the urban poor.  This has been made even worse by privatisation of public assets 
and the policies of cost-sharing. This is in tandem with Martinassen (1997) who observes, 
that achieving high levels of devolution may or not be conducive to improving efficiency in 
resources utilization.960   This is not far-fetched.   A visitor to Uganda who observed the poor 
state of urban environment lamented: 
I walk around Kampala. I observe, talk to people, I watch their activities.  
What we call self-management and self-organising sounds like a fairy-tale 
here.  Taking collective responsibility for environment, our neigbourhood 
and our society itself should be an instructive reaction not compulsion.  
Kampala is drowning in rubbish.  Litter is everywhere.  You live among 
this stench and filth.  How come that you can easily organize 
communication in the city, security guards and market places, but self 
organizing to keep the city clean comes so hard?  It is not a matter of 
money; it is a matter of good will.961 
 
Such an observation reflects our concerns that in the policy framework of the government of 
Uganda – and indeed, in the decentralisation policy, the urbanization aspects were not given 
significant priority.  These concerns are shared by other scholars who have critically observed 
the African urbanization problematique as follows: 
The urbanization process in Africa has over the years been subject to a 
variety of reactions and interpretations of what it is about.  National 
governments have perceived the high rates of urban population growth as 
deeply problematic and have generally shied away from formulating any 
comprehensive policies for urban development.962 
 
These authors note as I do in this thesis, that African governments seem to have embraced the 
“urban bias thesis” promoted by Michael Lipton and pushed by bi-lateral donor agencies, 
whose argument is that the focus of the poor African governments should be on rural 
development. Going by the fact that the African governments possess no effective 
                                            
960 See John Martinussen. Society State and Market . London/New York: Zed Books 1998 pp 212 – 218. 
961 See (letter to the Editor) “Why is the City Drowning in rubbish and Stench?” by Lukas Nojaicki in Daily 
Monitor 26 September 2007 (p.18) 
962 Arne Tostensen, Inge Tuelten & Mariven Vaa(2001)”Urban Crisis, Governance and Associational Life” in 
A. Tostensen Inge Tvedtem and  Mariven Vaa, (eds) Associational Life in African Cities:  Popular Responses to 
the Urban Crisis p.7 
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mechanisms of containing urban population growth, it appears only wise that they should 
support urban service delivery and create opportunities for economic development.  A similar 
argument is advanced by other scholars,963  who argue that it should be obvious to the policy 
makers that the rural areas in Africa provide miserable opportunities for self-advancement 
especially of the educated elites. The emphasis therefore should be on balancing rural and 
urban development priorities.    Even if economic opportunities are available in rural areas, 
they are hardly enviable.  As demonstrated by the case of Uganda the fastest urban population 
growth took place between 1971 and 1986, when the country experienced severe economic 
and political upheavals.  This serves to emphasise that the urbanization process should be 
seen as part and parcel of the development nexus, that is, it should be pursued with correct 
and appropriate policies simultaneously with rural development.  Excluding either sector may 
simply be disastrous.                                              
 
The problem with KCC is that it opted for full scale privatisation, that is selling off most of 
the Council’s assets without exploring options for public management of municipal affairs.  
For example, they would have erected public boards to oversee public parks, street lighting, 
and markets as they do for public schools. Full scale privatisation means that the private 
entrepreneurs charge commercial rates for all services or goods, to the effect that the majority 
of poor people are unable to access certain services or assets.  For instance, the sale of city 
markets to private developers means that the private proprietors may not allow certain 
sections of the population to do their businesses.  Theoretically, this means that the allocative 
efficiency chosen by KCC brings higher costs to Kampala business people.  Allocative 
efficiency refers to a situation where the services allocated to society increase the gains made 
by that particular society and not vice versa.964  In choosing an option for the delivery of a 
public service, the Local Government must ensure that society does not lose in the process.  
Gains of allocative efficiency mean that there will be a sense of responsibility on the part of 
Local Government and accountability on the part of tax payers.  The relationship should be 
reciprocal.  The greater the gain from the service, the higher the willingness of the tax payer 
to meet his or her tax obligations.  The failure of KCC to follow this principle in its 
                                            
963 See Carole Rakodi (1997) “Global forces, urban change, and urban management  in Africa” in Carole Rakodi 
(ed)  The Urban Challenge in Africa, p.19 and also Mahmood Mamdani (1996) Citizen and Subject, p.217. 
964 See Harry Kitchen (2005) “Delivering local/principal services” in Anwar Shah (ed) Public Services Delivery 
(p.121) The World Bank: Washington D.C 
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operations has rendered it  a poorly managed institution. KCC has undermined the basic 
principles of decentralisation. It has failed to act as a political body which galvanizes the 
greatest interest of the electorate. It is an important principle of local government that an 
elected body makes decisions as close to the people as possible, hence be a champion of 
people’s interests.  However, as this thesis has discussed and elaborated at length, KCC as a 
legislative and decision-making body has let down the electorate. 
 
It is notable that local government elections have been quite frequent in Uganda since 1989, 
but the difference made by election of a different set of Councillors in KCC after every 
successive election is difficult to quantify.  Theoretically, it is ordinarily anticipated that if a 
councillor fails to deliver on his/her promises, the electorate will punish him/her at the next 
elections.  What has happened in KCC is a high turnover of councillors; however the quality 
of decisions made by councilors has hardly improved.  Year after year, the Kampala residents 
have experienced declining quality and quantity of service delivery.   
 
This trend has affected the perceptions of the urban population who regard KCC with 
contempt, hence the reluctance to pay taxes.  It is a classic case of a state that has failed to 
effectively penetrate society amidst a weak civil society.  The state is looked upon, as in the 
modernisation critiques, as a lame duck, that is neither productive nor effective; but 
predatory.  The local state (KCC) through decentralisation has failed to transform state-
society relations to a level where legitimate concerns of society are effectively articulated and 
responded to.  For example, the motion of transparency, one of the cardinal principles of 
decentralisation has suffered most in the shoddy deals transacted by KCC. The officials 
simply do not effectively communicate with the people. The presumed dialogue between the 
local officials and the people is glaringly absent, hence the weak link between citizenship and 
governance. 
 
Finally, some key observations to sum up this conclusion.  There is a need for pro-active 
approach and the need for trust.  All that has been discussed in this thesis zeros on these 
pillars, which seem to stand firm in the debate over decentralisation and urban governance.  
The thesis has demonstrated at length that the failure of institutional reform is largely due to 
the behaviour of the actors in the public realm, whose conduct of public business is frozen in 
self-regarding tendencies.  This has been solidified by the overall framework of the patron-
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client politics that has permeated the state and society in most Third World Countries, failing 
them to function on the basis rationality and clearly laid out rules. This has undermined the 
chances of societal reciprocity, negating the anticipated chances of success of a good policy 
such as decentralisation.  Many people in Uganda, observing the rapid institutional growth 
followed by a gradual decline at the local level, do argue that since the game of “eating by 
public officials” is back, decentralisation has become another “political hand-out” of state 
patronage. 
 
It is undoubtable that decentralisation has created structural change in the relations of power 
between the centre and the local the local level.  However, this only goes as far as the official 
lines of authority are concerned. On the ground, decentralisation has not been programmatic 
enough to change the way the people perceive themselves vis-as-vis the State. The common 
argument that decentralisation brings about pragmatism societal level has not fully 
materialized.  In the urban areas, this is worsened by grinding poverty, unemployment, lack 
of food, shortage of services and the failure of officials to account for their actions. 
 
The failure of behaviour change and lack of pragmatism have led to low levels of trust in the 
official activities of local councils, especially KCC (the case study).  Most citizens expect 
little to be done by the local government unless it serves the interests of the officials 
concerned. The people hardly trust that either the central or the local government can do 
anything for the citizens where its officials have no vested interest.  Thus, while centralisation 
in the past had exhibited all indications of a failed or weak state, especially in Uganda, there 
is still insufficient evidence to the effect that decentralisation has returned government to the 
people and the people to the government – which would be a clear indicator of good public 
governance.  However, there is need to take note from Olowu (1995) who has cautioned that 
despite the weaknesses of implementation of decentralisation, this should be no reason to 
believe that the African soft state is any more efficient or technically superior to local 
institutions it seeks to control.965  Needless to add, it is also prudent to make another 
conclusion that even if spaces have been created by decentralisation for civil society 
organisations to provide services, these can only complement the state but can hardly be an 
alternative to state provision.  What is needed is a transformation of state – society relations. 
                                            
965 See Dele Olowu, “The Failure of Current Decentralisation Programs in Africa in James Wunsch & Dele 
Olowu The Failure of the Centralised State (p.75) 
  
432
 
Finally, for many African states which have failed to develop dynamic policies to address 
issues of urbanization, this is fatal mistake.  Both positive and negative realities of 
modernisation and more recent, globalisation, expanded education, commerce and social 
needs that have inevitably driven urbanization.   It is therefore instructive for decentralizing 
states, to take municipal governance at the core of policy processes, otherwise, the 
consequences of non-action will negatively impact on both urban and rural development. The 
recent efforts of the government of Uganda to recognize that the neglect of urbanization will 
have negative policy bearings is commendable.  The recent State of Uganda Population 
Report 2007 recognises this fact thus; 
The overall picture of the urban areas in Uganda is that of a systematic 
crisis. The urban system is not only failing to meet the demands of the rapid 
population growth within the context of poverty and marginalization, but its 
own basis for sustainability is also largely wanting in many ways such as 
support supervision, availability of personnel to plan based on statistics and 
ability to provide quality services.966 
 
The Population Report highlights the importance of urbanization in Uganda’s policy 
framework.  However, the action as to whether the government will come up with a clear 
urbanization policy sooner than later, is still to be awaited.  In such a policy on urban 
governance, it will be imperative to address the issues of effective political participation, 
technical competence, efficient and effective use of public resources, popular accountability 
and above all planned livelihoods and poverty reduction; that way; the internal engine for 
economic development and social transformation will be switched on.  However designing an 
effective urban policy which encompasses ideas of democratic decentralisation will need a 
shift in official attitudes.  As long as the officials of government hold views like those of the 
Ugandan Minister of Local Government, effective policies to address the critical concerns of 
the urban poor will go down to naught.  Mr. Kahinda Otafiire the Ugandan Minister of Local 
Government defending the sale of city markets by KCC officials recently retorted to the press 
“This is a capitalist economy.  Capitalism has no human face.  Man eats man; it’s survival of 
the fittest”967 
                                            
966 Republic of Uganda (200&0 State of the Uganda Population Report; Planned Urbanisation for Uganda’s 
Growing Population (p.9) 
 
967  See H. Bogere & R. Mwanje “Museveni suspends sale of Markets, land in Kampala” The Daily Monitor 
September 25, 2007. 
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To counter such conservative ideologues, Larson and Ribot (2005:7) suggest that an effective 
decentralisation should focus on creating local institutions with real power to deal with 
undemocratic elements in society, local governments themselves should be strong and 
democratic and the central state should be strengthened by decentralisation. Larson and Ribot 
suggest further that the State should “be back-in”968 rather than being “out” – that way 
decentralisation will have a great potential for success.  It appears useful to suggest that the 
key issues in a programme of empowering the less privileged in the urban areas should be to 
give power to the people and their institutions rather than keeping it either in central or local 
governments.  A classic example was Uganda’s experiment with Resistance Councils in the 
mid 1980s – when the local people enjoyed real power (Sabiti Makara 1992, Ddungu 1989), 
or people’s committees in Burkina Faso in the reign of Sankara.  This proposal may appear 
populist but these two cases represented a situation of how people’s power can effectively 
deal with serious problems by cultivating trust, horizontal power relations, initiating  
innovations and pragmatism and succeeding where the governments fatally fail.  Remodelling 
decentralisation along those lines appears like a solution to the frustrations of formalistic 
state-controlled process of decentralisation.  This way, the principles of non-subordination 
and subsidiarity will have real meanings to the ordinary citizen’s empowerment and benefits 
in decentralisation. 
                                            
968  Anne Larson & Jesse Ribot, Democratic Decentralisation through A National Resource Lens” in Jesse C. 
Ribot and Anne M. Larson (2005) Democratic Decentralisation through a National Resource Lens, Routledge, 
Oxford. 
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 “KCC Privatises Garbage Collection” The Monitor.  April 14, 2004. 
 “KCC Seeks $98 from WB” Sunday Vision, 31 October, 2004. 
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Mutumba, Richard & Mwanje, Robert, “Government Shakes up KCC” The Monitor, 14, 
September 2006. 
Mwanje Robert and Kisige Abou, “Nakawa Market Sold to Bassaja” Daily Monitor, 
September, September 27, 2006. 
Mwanje Robert. “KCC Finance Director Suspended” The Monitor, 6th September, 2006. 
Mwanje, Robert. “Government okays boda-boda to operate in Kampala city”. Daily Monitor, 
September 21, 2006. 
Namyalo, Annet “Kacita joins Sebagala’s Cleanliness Campaign”, Daily Monitor. Thursday, 
September 7, 2006. 
Nyamugasira. Do World Bank/IMF Actually support Poverty Reduction Goals? 
Olupot, George “Garbage good for nutrient recycling”. Daily Monitor, Thursday September 
7, 2006. 
Orumuri, 9.11.04 – Showed Kabale town totally flood because of blocked drainage. 
Orumuri, 9.11.04, Interview of Town Clerk with Orumuri Reporter on Sanitary Facilities. 
Ssempogo, Herbert. “Kampala Reduces Bodabodas”.  The New Vision, 26th September, 
2006. 
UPE in Crisis over Funds” New vision, 10 November 2004 
  
486
 
Appendices 
 
Appendix I: Interviews 
 
Group Interviews  
 
Group Discussion 28th May 2004 
KACHEPA Members:  
 Bahati shellina 
 Betty Wamala     
 Busulwa Fred 
 Daisy Kamwezi,  
  Damulira Paul,  
 Kafeero Bakulumpagi Benedicto  
 Kalanzi Edrisa  
 Kaluku Eria 
 Kasibante Ronald 
 Katabalwa Matilda 
 
Group Discussion with Residents of Mulago I Parish, 3rd April 2004 
 Members: 
 Naiga Alice  
 Najjuma Lydia 
 Nalwoga Zaituni     
 Namagembe Sylivia    
 Nampewo Esther     
 Nasege Hadija  
 Ngobi Moses     
 Njuki Abdul     
  Mr. Ochieng Francis,  
 
Group Discussion with Residents of Kimwanyi Zone (Katanga area), Wandegeya, 8th May 
2004. 
 Members 
 Ronald Mujambere, 
 Rugogamu Henry    
 Ssegawa S. Brian     
 Ssekitoleko Robert    
 Wandera Bernardette    
 
Group Discussion with women in Kasubi, Rubaga Division (Zone III – Kasubi). Date: 
20.04.2004. 
 
Group Discussion with Youth Group, Luzige Zone, Katwe, Central Division.  Date: 
15.04.2004. 
 
Group Discussion. MKYDA 25 August 2005. 
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Group Interview with Community members, Kelezia Zone, Makindye.  
Date: 21.04.2004. 
 
Hajati Mulyamu Namutebi, Founder Member MKYDA, Separate Interview. 
Harriet Kabongera.  Resident.  Bukasa/Katongole. 
 
Interview with the residents of Bukasa/Katongole, 29th August 2005 
 Joweri Zawedde 
 Kabulo Zainab  
 Katongole Joseph 
 
Kawempe Division Council Meeting held at Kawempe Division Council Hall.  Date: 30 April 
2004. 
  
Group Discussion with members of Kisenyi III Community Health Workers Association 
(KICHWA) 
 
Group Discussion with Residents of Kivulu I.  Kagugube Parish. Central Division Concern 
Worldwide. Date: 14.04.04. 
 
Meeting with LCIII Chairperson, Kawempe Division on 23 May 2004. 
 
Meeting with the Youth of Luzira LC II Nakawa Division. Furniture Workshop 3 Workers 16 
April 2004. 
 
Meeting with Council Agents (Parish Chiefs), Kawempe Division, Date: 22 April 2004. 
 
Meeting with the Technical Planning Committee Kawempe Division, 20 April 2004. 
 
Meeting with Mengo Kisenyi III Women Movement Mobilisers Development Association 
(MKWMDA) 29th May 2005. 
 
Meeting with Mengo Kisenyi Youth Development Association on 26th August 2005. 
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Interviews with Individual Participants  
 
Dr. Nsibirwa Supe, Division Medical Officer Kawempe Division, Interviewed 28 May 2004. 
Mr. Aine-Omugisha Benjamin, LCI Chairperson Zone 5 – Kiswa.  Kiswa Parish. Nakawa 
Division. Interviewed 21 May 2004. 
Mr. Bagenze Charles, Senior Enforcement Officer. Kawempe Division. Interviewed 20th 
April, 2004. 
Mr. Bukenya Patrick. Probation Officer, Kawempe Division, 21 May 2004. 
Mr. Charles Agwalu, Acting Division Engineer, Kawempe Division, Interviewed 28 April 
2004. 
Mr. Charles Kwehinda, Chairperson LC I Stage 7 Zone. Luzira Parish. Nakawa Division. 
Interviewed 16 April 2004. 
Mr. Dan Kitaze, Parish Development Committee (PDC) Coordinator/Capacity Development 
Coordinator, Kawempe. 
Mr. Deo Muhwezi, Assistant Finance Officer, Makindye Division, Interviewed 05 May 2004. 
Mr. Deo Muhwezi, Assistant Finance Officer, Makindye Division. Interviewed 05 May 2004. 
Mr. Gideon Baryazahe, Council Agent, Kibuye I Makindye Division, Kampala. Interviewed 
25 May 2004. 
Mr. Hakiza Joseph, Division Engineer, Rubaga Division, Interviewed 01 June 2004. 
Mr. Hassan Kagwa, Vice Chairperson, Kikuubo Zone IV.  Kanyanya Parish. Kawempe 
Division, Interviewed 20 May 2004. 
Mr. Higenyi, senior Assistant Town Clerk and Mrs. Kitui Olive, Deputy Speaker, Kampala 
Central Division Council.  Interviewed 23 April 2004. 
Mr. Higobero Steven, PATC Central, Interviewed 26 May 2004. 
Mr. Hilali PDC member (Kisenyi III) Coordinator for Kisenyi II.  Uganda slum Dwellers 
Federation (USDF). 25 August 2005. 
Mr. Ignatius Tumwesigye, Managing Director, Transmedia (Collectors of Property Tax and 
Ground Interviewed 25 May 2004. 
Mr. James Kakooza, Chairperson. LC I Church Zone.  Kamwokya II. Interviewed 29 May 
2004. 
Mr. John Gatheni, Senior Assistant Town Clerk, Rubaga Division, Interviewed 25 May 2004. 
Mr. Johnson Ongom Olela, Assistant Finance Officer, Kawempe division.  Interviewed 20 
April, 2004.   
Mr. Jonathan Musisi, Vice Chairperson, LCI Kamwokya II Parish, Church Area Zone.  
Interviewed 29 April 2004. 
Mr. Justin T.W. Sendikadiwa, chairperson LC III, Rubaga Division. Interviewed 25 May 
2004. 
Mr. Kabugo, Personal Assistant to MD, Transmedia Company. 
Mr. Kagurusi Remmy. Licencing/Advising Officer. Central Division. Kampala. Interviewed 
13  May 2004. 
Mr. Kiggude Musisi Abdul Magidu, Omwami wa Kabaka Owomuruka. Kimwanyi Zone 
(Katanga Area). Wandegeya. Interviewed 08 May 2004. 
Mr. Kiseka G. Clerk to Council. Central Division, Interviewed 25 May 2004. 
Mr. Kiwanuka-Musisi, Former Chairman, Mukono District/Former RDC, Kampala District. 
Interviewed 08  June 2004. 
Mr. Kiyimba Khalid, Resident, Nanfuka Zone. Nateete. Rubaga Division, Interviewed 13 
May 2004. 
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Mr. Lawrence Nsereko, Division Education Officer, Nakawa Division, Interviewed 02 June 
2004. 
Mr. Lule John. Pubic Health Inspector. Central Division, Kampala. Interviewed 17 May 
2004. 
Mr. Mpambara John Karusya, Division Planner Kawempe. Interviewed 26.04.04. 
Mr. Mukholi David, Senior Engineering Assistant, Nakawa Division. Interviewed 31 May 
2004. 
Mr. Mukisa Yasin, Instructor at BEUPA Learning Centre. Makerere III. Interviewed 06 May 
2004. 
Mr. Mukundane Albert, Trade Development Officer Makindye Division, Interviewed 05 May 
2004. 
Mr. Mulambuzi David,, Senior Assistant Town Clerk and Mr. Tumuhairwe Fred. 
Administrative Officer.  Kawempe Division.  Interviewed 3rd May 2004. 
Mr. Mutyaba Stalon, Founder Member, Director/Chief Executive MKYDA – Separate 
Interview. 
Mr. Ndiwalana Robert, Physical Planner, Makindye Division  Interviewed 19 May 2004. 
Mr. Oduma Suleiman, Chairperson KICHWA, 04 May 2004. 
Mr. Othieno Godwin, Physical Planner, Nakawa Division, Interviewed 01 June 2004. 
Mr. Sam Nsubuga, Division finance Officer/Division Finance Controller Kawempe (23 May 
2004). 
Mr. Sebagala Henry, Division Planner, Central Division, Kampala. Interviewed 11 May 
2004. 
Mr. Sebamenya Ronald, Division Engineer. Kampala Central. Interviewed 13 May 2004. 
Mr. Sempewo Charles, Former Clerk to Council/Senior Committee Clerk (1996-1995) 
Interviewed 10 May 2004. 
Mr. Sulaiman Bageya, Concern Worldwide Uganda. Kampala Community Empowerment 
Project (KCEP). Community Development Officer in charge of Kisenyi II & III. 
Interviewed 23 August 2005. 
Mr. Yahaya Semanda, Defence Secretary.  Nanfuka Zone.  Nateete. Rubaga Division. 
Interviewed 13 May 2004. 
Mr. Zimbeihire Benard, Budget/Income Officer. Makindye Division.  Interviewed 20 May 
2004. 
Mr.Chris Byekwaso, Division Finance  Officer/Senior Accountant KCC, Central Division, 
Interviewed 14 May 2004. 
Mr.Mukundane, Trade Development Officer Makindye.  Interviewed  5th May 2004 
Mr.Tumwine William, Principal Assistant Town Clerk.  Makindye Division. Interviewed 04 
May 2004. 
Mrs. Goretti Mayanja, Councillor.  Makerere III and IV. Kawempe Division.  Interviewed 05 
May 2004. 
Mrs. Katende, Community Development Officer. Kawempe, Interviewed 21st April 2004. 
Ms Rosemary Mbabazi, Project Manager, Kampala district. Concern Worldwide Uganda, 
Interviewed 18 July 2005. 
Mrs. Merab Kariisa, Senior Education Officer. Central Division. Kampala. Interviewed 17 
May 2004. 
Ms. Annet Rwemereza, Senior Personnel Officer.  KCC Headquarters. Interviewed 29 April 
2004. 
Ms. Carol Sekabembe, Clerk to Council, Kawempe  Division, 20 April 2004. 
Ms. Christine Namusoke, charcoal seller.  Resident. Nanfuka Zone. Nateete. Interviewed 13 
May 2004. 
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Ms. Grace Namala, Clerk to Council, Rubaga Division, Interviewed 26 June 2004. 
Ms. Jesca Kibazo, Administrator, Kampala Central Community Resource Centre. Kisenyi II, 
Interviewed 25 August 2005. 
Ms. Joy Turyamureeba, Councillor Kyebando East. Kawempe Division.  Interviewed 3rd 
April 2004. 
Ms. Kabajwara Resty, Coordinator/Head, Department of Welfare and Community Services. 
Rubaga Division.  Interviewed 22 May 2004. 
Ms. Mary Nsubuga, Welfare Officer/Youth Affairs Kawempe, 22 April 2004. 
Ms. Nakiganda Sofia, Women Mobilisers. Kisenyi III group 
Ms. Ruth Kijambu, Principal Assistant town Clerk, Kawempe Division Interviewed 05 May 
2004. 
Ms. Sekabembe Carolyne, Acting Clerk to Council, Kawempe Division, Interviewed 27 April 
2004. 
Ms.Banura Margaret, Division Finance Officer Makindye Division.  Interviewed 25 May 
2004. 
 
 
 
